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Abstract 
 
 
Looking beyond formal legal protection for geographical indications (GIs), this research 
project empirically explores the opportunities and constraints which influence whether regional 
product branding initiatives are successful. The legal protection of GIs is characterised by a 
variety of legal approaches which translates the many meanings and objectives attached to 
them. These range from protection of the consumers and producers’ interests against unfair 
competition practices, to territorial development, to preservation of cultural heritage and 
natural resources.  
 
This research seeks to understand the relationships between the type of legal protection, the 
operation of GI initiatives, their economic and non-economic effects, and the opportunities and 
constraints that affect such effects. To this aim, it draws upon empirical data collected from 
twelve GI initiatives involving different means of protection (trade mark and sui generis 
systems) in France and Vietnam that both associate GIs with economic and non-economic 
objectives. In doing so, this thesis identifies the factors that impact on the collective dynamics 
involved in the GI initiatives; those that influence the use and value of GIs on the market; those 
that hinder their use on the market; and those that contribute to the ability of GIs to create 
effects outside the market.  
 
This thesis argues that the significance of the distinction between the two types of legal 
protection varies greatly depending on the institutional context in which the GI initiatives are 
embedded and that the differences between the sui generis and trade mark approaches can be 
reduced in practice. Further, the type of legal protection is often not enough to bring about 
economic and non-economic effects. This research suggests that a wide range of organisational, 
institutional, marketing, socio-economic and cultural factors influence both the use and value 
of GIs, and the benefits derived from them.  
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The man unable to separate false from true, 
Will suffer no less certain or heart-felt a loss, 
Than he who lacks the skill to distinguish fleeces 
Soaked in Aquinum’s dye, from Sidonian purple. 
 
Horace, the Epistles, Book I, Epistle X: 26 
 
 
 
In Ancient Egypt, pyramid builders commonly used geographical signs to indicate the 
durability of bricks and stones as derived from their origin.1 The ancient Greeks also relied on 
geographical signs as proxies for the quality of Corinthian bronze, Phrygian marble or wine 
from Rhodes. These are only few examples of the many designations linking places, products 
and people2 that have enjoyed great commercial success long before their formal definition as 
geographical indications (GIs) by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter, TRIPS).3  
 
Today, there are estimated to be over 10,000 protected GIs in the world, of which 90% come 
from OECD countries and with a trade value of more than US$50 billion.4 Some well-known 
GI products include Darjeeling tea, Parma ham, Champagne wine and Café de Colombia. In 
mobilizing local resources and traditions, GIs ‘convey the cultural identity of a nation, region 
or specific area’5 and, in doing so, de-fetishise goods by reminding us that their value is 
                                                        
1 B. O’Connor, The Law of Geographical Indications (Cameron May, 2004) 21. 
2 E.Vandecandelaere and others, ‘Linking people, places and products: A guide for promoting quality linked to geographical origin and 
sustainable Geographical Indications’ (FAO and SINER-GI, 2009). 
3 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization. 
4 D. Giovannucci and others, Guide to Geographical Indications: Linking Products and Their Origins (International Trade Centre, 2009) vii. 
5 F. Addor and A. Grazioli, ‘Geographical Indications beyond Wines and Spirits: A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical 
Indications in the WTO/TRIPS Agreement’ (2002) 5 JWIP 865, 865. 
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attributable to human labour.6 Driven in part by the demands of the so-called ‘green 
consumerism’7 that stands in contrast to the ‘Macdonalisation’ of products,8 regional product 
branding aligns with the development of quality, safety and traceability standards,9 including 
fair trade, organic and biologic certification labels.10  
 
From a legal perspective, the protection of GIs is characterised by a variety of approaches that 
translate the many meanings and objectives attached to them. These range from market-based 
approaches targeting unfair competition practices, to approaches directed at non-market 
objectives, including territorial development, and preservation of cultural heritage and natural 
resources.  
 
The general objective of this research is to explore the creation process, the operation and the 
likely effects of GI initiatives. More specifically, this research seeks to analyse the 
relationships between the type of legal protection, the functioning of GI initiatives, their ability 
to achieve economic and non-economic effects, and the factors that affect such effects. To this 
aim, it draws upon empirical data collected from twelve GI initiatives in two countries, France 
and Vietnam, which associate GIs with market and non-market objectives.  
 
The first section of this introduction highlights the theoretical background within which this 
research project is situated, including the rationale for protecting GIs, the legal and institutional 
framework for GIs and the politicisation of GIs. Section 1.2 presents the research questions 
and the methodology. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 provide an overview of the French and Vietnamese 
contexts in which GI initiatives have been developing. Section 1.5 concludes with an outline 
of the thesis chapters.  
  
                                                        
6 R.J. Coombe, S. Schnoor & M. Ahmed, ‘Bearing Cultural Distinction: Informational Capitalism and New Expectations for Intellectual 
Property’ (2007) 40 University of California-Davis Law Review 891. 
7 D. Goodman and M. Redclift, Refashioning nature: Food, ecology and culture (Routledge, 1991) 240-241. 
8 P. Zylberg, ‘Geographical Indications v. Trademarks: The Lisbon Agreement: A Violation of TRIPs?’ (2002-2003) 62(11) University of 
Baltimore Intellectual Property Law Journal 1, 61. 
9 Giovannucci and others (n4). 
10 G. Allaire and B. Sylvander, ‘Globalization and Geographical Indications’, in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), Labels of Origin for 
Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (CAB International, 2011) 106, 107. 
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1.1 Theoretical background 
 
1.1.1 Why protect GIs? 
 
The protection of GIs is traditionally justified on an informational efficiency basis.11 These 
geographical signs are situated within an economic framework that seeks to align law with ‘the 
dictates of economic efficiency’.12 Although the ‘underlying philosophy of the distinctiveness 
of local and regional products’13 upon which GIs rest clearly differentiates them from trade 
marks, both trade marks and GIs signal the ‘(commercial or geographical) origin of goods in 
the marketplace’.14 Misleading or otherwise distorting unauthorised uses by third parties lead 
to market failure caused by information asymmetries in the context of experience or credence 
goods.15 By correcting this through legal protection, both regimes meet an important social 
need in enhancing product information to consumers, thus saving their search costs in making 
choices.16 Consequently, their protection derives from the imperfect information theory, as 
developed by Stiglitz17 and Tirole,18 or from Shapiro’s model of reputation, which is concerned 
with ‘the decision of a firm regarding the quality of products to produce with a view to 
maximising profits, assuming perfect competition but imperfect consumer information’. 19 In 
fact, the producers’ goodwill and the brand’s reputation constitute the underlying ‘valuable 
intangible that is being protected’20 against free-rider competitors. Referred to by Belletti as 
the ‘institutionalisation of reputation’,21 GIs protect consumers and producers’ interests against 
                                                        
11 OECD, ‘Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications in OECD Member Countries: Economic and Legal Implications’ 
(COM/AGR/APM/TD/WP(2000)15/FINAL); A. Conrad, ‘The protection of geographical indications in the TRIPs Agreement’ (1996) 86(1) 
The Trademark Reporter 11. 
12 W. Landes and R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003) 4. 
13 W. Moran, ‘Rural Space as Intellectual Property’  (1993) 12(3) Political Geography 263, 265. 
14 D. Gangjee, Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications (CUP, 2012) 2. 
15 According to Nelson, goods can be classified in three categories: (1) search goods, for which consumers can ascertain quality prior to 
purchase; (2) experience goods, for which consumers can ascertain quality after buying and using them; and (3) credence goods, for which 
consumers cannot ascertain quality even after using them. P. Nelson, ‘Information and Consumer Behaviour’ (1970) 78 Journal of Political 
Economy 311.  
16 Landes and Posner (n12). 
17 J.E. Stiglitz, ‘Imperfect Information in the Product Market’ in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization 
(Elsevier Science Publishers, 1989). 
18 J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press, 1988). 
19 OECD (n11) 8. 
20 Gangjee, Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications (n14) 145. 
21 G. Belletti, ‘Origin labelled products, reputation, and heterogeneity of firms’ in B. Sylvander, D. Barjolle and F. Arfini (eds.), The socio-
economics of origin labelled products in agrifood supply chains: spatial, institutional and co-ordination aspects (INRA, Actes et 
Communications 17(1), 2000) 239, 239. 
 21 
fraud and unfair competition practices by preventing name usurpation and diversion of 
income.22 The role of GIs in preventing name usurpation has become increasingly important 
considering the growing number of instances of misappropriation of origin names. To take two 
examples, it is estimated that that the usurpation of the name ‘Karoo lamb’ (from South Africa) 
is commonplace,23 and that about forty million kilograms of tea are sold worldwide as 
Darjeeling tea every year, while the production of genuine Darjeeling tea is only ten million 
kilograms.24 As Das explains, unfair business practices, which stem from the commercial 
success of origin names in relation to market access and possible price premiums, result in loss 
of revenue for the genuine producers while misleading consumers in their purchasing 
decisions.25 
 
Once established, the brand’s reputation enhances the business value of the signs themselves 
by securing consumer loyalty and allowing producers to capture a rent based on the product 
differentiation,26 and hence a return on their initial investments.27 GIs can therefore become 
valuable economic assets and useful marketing tools to increase market access.28 They provide 
producers with incentives to make investments for establishing and maintaining the qualities 
and reputation of the good designed by the sign.29  
  
                                                        
22 C. Bramley, E. Biénabe and J. Kirsten, ‘The economics of geographical indications: towards a conceptual framework for geographical 
indication research in developing countries’ in The Economics of Intellectual Property: Suggestions for Further Research in Developing 
Countries and Countries with Economies in Transition (WIPO, 2009) 109. 
23 E. Biénabe and others, ‘Linking Farmers to Markets through Valorisation of Local Resources: The Case for Intellectual Property Rights of 
Indigenous Resources’ (IPR DURAS Project Scientific Report, April 2011) 32. 
24 K. Das, ‘International Protection of India’s Geographical Indications with Special Reference to ‘Darjeeling’ Tea’ (2006) 9(5) JWIP 459, 
480. 
25 K. Das, ‘Socio-economic implications of protecting geographical indications in India’ (2009) Centre for WTO Studies, 3  
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1587352> accessed 03/09/2018. 
26 Addor and Grazioli (n5) 870. 
27 Bramley, Biénabe and Kirsten (n22) 115. 
28 ibid. 
29 Landes and Posner (n12). 
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1.1.2 The legal and institutional framework for GIs 
 
1.1.2.1 International framework 
 
As ‘relative newcomers to the field of international intellectual property’,30 TRIPS is the first 
international agreement to introduce the term ‘geographical indications’,31 which has become 
the most widely used terminology. Previously, three WIPO multilateral agreements, the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883,32 the Madrid Agreement for the 
Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods,33 and the Lisbon Agreement 
for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration,34 have sought 
to regulate origin marking with limited success. While the Paris Convention has broad 
membership, it imposes only modest protection obligation. By contrast, the more specialised 
Lisbon Agreement favours enhanced protection, which has greatly limited its appeal.35 Unlike 
the WIPO Treaties, TRIPS has a large membership (164 members as of May 2019) and as such 
has been hailed as an ‘important step for the international recognition of (GIs)’.36  
 
Article 22.1 of TRIPS defines GIs as ‘indications which identify a good as originating in the 
territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation 
or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin’. This 
definition leads to three observations. First, the object of protection is an ‘indication’ that may 
consist of either a direct geographical name, such as Champagne wine or Parma ham, or an 
indirect sign, including a word, phrase or symbol,37 for instance Blue Mountain coffee, Basmati 
rice or Feta cheese. Second, although the overwhelming majority of ‘goods’ are quality 
                                                        
30 C. Heath and A. Kamperman Sanders (eds), New Frontiers of Intellectual Property Law : IP and Cultural Heritage - Geographical 
Indications - Enforcement – Overprotection (Oxford Hart Publishing, 2005) Preface. 
31 J. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer Law International, 2001) 244. 
32 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 20 March 1883. 
33 Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods, 14 April 1891. 
34 Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Registration, 31 October 1958. 
35 For more background on the historical process of the Lisbon Agreement and recent negotiations, see D.J. Gervais and M. Slider, ‘The 
Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement: Controversial Negotiations and Controversial Results’ in W. Van Caenegem and J. Cleary (eds), The 
Importance of Place: Geographical Indications as a Tool for Local and Regional Development (Springer - Ius Gentium, Comparative 
Perspectives on Law and Justice n°58, 2017) 15. 
36 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (OUP, 2007) 209. 
37 ibid 219. 
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agricultural products,38 they can also include processed and unprocessed products from other 
sectors, such as textiles, jewellery and handicrafts. While services are excluded from the TRIPS 
definition, member states are free to recognise them under national laws. Third, TRIPS 
identifies three alternative criteria to establish the link between a product and its geographical 
origin. Each is an independently sufficient condition for protection, ceterius paribus.39 While 
it is commonly agreed that the quality and characteristics of a product can be empirically and 
objectively measured,40 the product’s reputation, which refers to consumers’ association of a 
good with a place,41 is the only subjective criteria, and hence the most difficult to measure.42 
The quality of a product might involve its unique shape or taste due to the particular 
characteristics of the soil or climate of the area where it is grown,43 whereas its characteristics 
may include chemical (e.g. acidity, sugar or fat content), physical (such as texture), 
microbiological (e.g. use of ferments and presence of germs) and organoleptic (such as flavour, 
texture, colour, or sensory profile) features.44 They can also encompass a particular know-how 
such as specific breeding techniques or manufacturing processes.45  
 
Article 22.2 provides the standard protection for all GIs. In protecting consumers against 
misleading use, and producers against unfair competition by reference to Article 10 of the Paris 
Convention, this article aims to address issues arising from information asymmetry and free-
riding on reputation. Under this provision, no presumption is made about misleading conduct 
and unfair competition. Consequently, the holder of the infringed indication bears the burden 
of proving the existence of acts of unfair competition and establishing consumer confusion in 
the relevant jurisdiction by demonstrating that the sign’s reputation exists and the relevant 
public in that jurisdiction will make an association between the product and the place.46  
 
                                                        
38 It is estimated that in 2001, 84,1% of the then 766 registrations in the Lisbon register corresponded to only four different categories of 
products: wines, spirits, cheese, tobacco and cigarettes: S. Escudero, ‘International Protection of Geographical Indications and Developing 
Countries’ (2001) South Centre, TRADE Working Paper No.10, 18. 
39 O’Connor (n1) 24. 
40 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Handbook on TRIPS and Development (CUP, 2005) 270. 
41 ibid. 
42 D. Gangjee, ‘From Geography to History: Geographical Indications and the Reputational Link’ in I. Calboli and W.-L. Ng-Loy (eds), 
Geographical Indications at the Crossroads of Trade, Development, and Culture in the Asia-Pacific (CUP, 2017) 36. 
43 INAO, ‘Guide du demandeur d’une appellation d’origine protégée (AOP) ou d’une indication géographique protégée (IGP) à l’exception 
des vins, boissons alcoolisées et boissons spiritueuses’ (November 2017) 18. 
44 ibid 15. 
45 Gangjee, Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications (n14) 232. 
46 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n42) 292; Correa (n36) 228. 
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A higher-level protection is afforded in Article 23.1 for wines and spirits only. Within this 
specific category of products, any use of the indication on goods that do not originate from the 
indicated place is strictly forbidden, whether or not consumers are deceived, ‘even where the 
true origin of the goods is indicated or the [GI] is used in translation or accompanied by 
expressions such as ‘kind’, ‘type’, ‘style’, ‘imitation’ or the like’.  
 
Consequently, Article 22.2 requires proving consumer confusion or unfair competition within 
a specific context, while Article 23.1, in providing protection ‘per se or in absolute terms’47 
beyond misconception or unfair competition, treats GIs as ‘objects, regardless of their 
connotations in a specific context’.48 This two-tiered system of regulation for GIs reflects the 
hard-fought compromise between the high-level protection sought by the then European 
Community and Switzerland, which have a long tradition of protecting GIs and where more 
than 85% of GIs relate to wine and spirit products,49 and the lower protection sought by the 
United States of America (USA) and Australia, who initially opposed the creation of a new 
category of intellectual property right (IPR) for GIs and who consider a number of European 
GIs to be generic.50  
 
1.1.2.2 Overview of the national and regional systems of protection  
 
Very few countries had enacted legislation for protecting GIs prior to the adoption of TRIPS.51 
Laws governing the use of GIs have subsequently mushroomed around the world, but in the 
‘most diverse and uncoordinated manner’,52 as a consequence of the obligation for the WTO 
Members to implement its provisions through the method of their choice.53 Proof of this is 
found in the lack of common terminology in this area and the significant divergences in the 
modes of protection.54 While many countries have inserted the TRIPS definition of GIs in their 
                                                        
47 Watal (n31) 268. 
48 Gangjee, Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications (n14) 238. 
49 Giovannucci and others (n4) 51. 
50 Gangjee, Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications (n14). 
51 WIPO, ‘The Definition of Geographical Indications’ October 2002 (SCT/9/4) 4. 
52 Watal (n31) 264. 
53 TRIPS, Article 1.1. 
54 D. Vivas-Eugui and C. Spennemann, ‘The Treatment of Geographical Indications in Recent Regional and Bilateral Free Trade Agreements’ 
in M.P. Pugatch (ed.), The Intellectual Property Debate: Perspectives from Law, Economics and Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2006); M. Blakeney, ‘Proposal for the International Regulation of Geographical Indications’ (2001) 4 JWIP 629.  
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legislation,55 the WTO identified no fewer than 23 distinct definitions of GIs at the national 
level.56 Besides, considering the two-tiered system of regulation of TRIPS, some countries 
have decided to uniformly provide an absolute protection for all GIs, irrespective of the product 
sector, for instance India57 and Brazil,58 whereas others have translated these two levels of 
protection in their domestic system through special laws for wines and spirits, like the USA59 
and Australia.60  
 
Generally speaking, implementation approaches fall within four legal categories61: (1) 
regulations focusing on business practices, including unfair competition, consumer protection 
and passing off; (2) collective and certification marks; (3) sui generis registration systems that 
acknowledge GIs as a distinct category of right; and (4) administrative schemes, when GIs are 
used on goods which marketing is subject to an authorization procedure, such as for wines and 
spirits whose sale is regulated in many countries.  
 
Among these approaches, the sui generis system, which is strongly promoted by the European 
Union (EU), and the common-law approach based on the trade mark system, which is at the 
heart of the US philosophy, have emerged as the two main institutional approaches to protect 
GIs.62 In 2009, among the 167 countries that actively protect GIs, 111 countries made use of 
sui generis systems, while 56 countries relied on the trade mark system.63 These two 
approaches will be the focus of this research. The choice of one means of protection over 
another reflects different historical developments64 as well as ‘divergent expectations about the 
communicative work these signs are supposed to do and the ensuing scope of protection’.65 As 
seen above, source identification is a crucial communicative function of both regimes. This 
thesis will show how this function operates in various ways and through different circuits. Yet, 
various means of protection can coexist in the same country and apply to different categories 
                                                        
55 WIPO (n51) 4. 
56 WTO, ‘Review under Article 24.2 of the Application of the Provisions of the Section of the TRIPS Agreement on Geographical Indications’ 
November 2003 (IP/C/W/253/Rev.1). 
57 The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999, No 48, Chapter II, Section 9. 
58 Law 9.279 of May 1996 (Industrial Property Law), Title IV. 
59 Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 205. 
60 Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation Amendment Act 2010, No. 98. 
61 O’Connor (n1); UNCTAD-ICTSD (n42). 
62 Bramley, Biénabe and Kirsten (n22) 111. 
63 Giovannucci and others (n4). 
64 O’Connor (n1) 67. 
65 Gangjee, Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications (n14) 4. 
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of products. For example, in Australia, Canada and the USA, protection of GIs for all products 
is usually ensured through collective and certification marks. However, wines and spirits are 
protected under a sui generis system.66 In the EU, sui generis legislation for the protection of 
GIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs,67 wines,68 and spirits69, operates along the EU 
regulations on the European Union Trade Mark70 and unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market.71  
 
Both protection systems have consequences for GI registration, monitoring and enforcement 
processes. Countries that have adopted a sui generis system generally consider GIs as common 
goods or public goods that belong to the state. Their protection, based on a public or 
administrative act, usually relies on a formal registration process that goes beyond the 
minimum standards of protection of TRIPS.72 This process typically requires that a clearly 
identified link between the good’s origin and its quality, characteristics and/or reputation 
should be detailed in collectively framed mandatory specifications documented in a Code of 
Practice (CoP). As such, GIs are protected as long as the conditions for their protection are met 
and the costs associated with the administration, inspection and enforcement of their protection 
are usually borne by a government agency.73 The most prominent example is the EU sui generis 
legal framework, which largely derives from the French system of appellations d’origine.74  
 
By contrast, countries that do not consider GIs as a distinct IPR usually protect them as 
(registered or unregistered) collective or certification marks.75 For instance, in the USA, Kona 
coffee and Idaho potatoes are registered as a certification mark while Cognac is protected as 
an unregistered certification mark. Unlike sui generis systems, collective and certification 
                                                        
66 OECD (n11) 12. 
67 Council Regulation (EC) 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 and Regulation (EU) 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuff . 
68 Council Regulation (EC) 479/2008 of 29 April 2008 on the Common Organisation of the Market in Wine. 
69 Regulation (EC) 110/2008 of 15 January 2008 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical 
indications of spirit drinks.   
70 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark.  
71 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market. 
72  Correa (n36) 221. 
73 Bramley, Biénabe and Kirsten (n22) 111. 
74 Blakeney (n54). 
75 D. Gervais, ‘A Cognac after Spanish Champagne? Geographical Indications as Certification Marks’ in J.C. Ginsburg and R. Dreyfuss 
(eds), Intellectual Property at the Edge (CUP, 2014) 130. 
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marks are private property rights not necessarily originating in governmental initiatives,76 
which do not usually require strict conditions as per the link between the product and its 
geographical origin. Indeed, while both marks are signs that serve to distinguish specific 
characteristics of the goods or services, their owner is free to define which specific conditions 
must be met by the users. The user regulations may include evidence of a link between the 
good and its geographical origin, but only if the owner wishes so. As Martin argues, ‘[t]he 
requirements applied to certification marks are much simpler than those applied to GIs which 
are much more precise when demanding that the particular characteristics of a product or its 
reputation are tied to a determined geographic area’.77 In contrast to sui generis systems, 
collective and certification marks have to be renewed after a certain period of time, upon the 
payment of renewable fees, and all monitoring, inspection and implementation costs are borne 
by the right-holders, except for certification marks which often involve the government or 
another authorized party.78  
 
1.1.3 The politicisation of GIs 
 
Far from being a strictly legal debate, the protection of GIs has become political with the 
emergence of a relatively recent narrative, based on a terroir paradigm, that posits GIs’ ability 
to foster rural development79 and preserve cultural and natural heritage80 in favour of enhanced 
protection pursuant to the TRIPS Article 23.1 standards within a sui generis i.e. registration-
based protection scheme.81 The terroir approach, championed by the EU, anchors geography, 
including the cultural, social and environmental values embodied therein, at the very heart of 
GIs.82 In claiming that ‘GIs are key to EU and developing countries cultural heritage, traditional 
methods of production and natural resources’,83 the EU argues that GIs are not just an IPR that 
                                                        
76 WIPO (n51) 9. 
77 J.M. Cortes Martin, ‘The WTO TRIPS Agreement – The Battle between the Old and the New World over the Protection of Geographical 
Indications’ (2004) 7 JWIP 287, 309. 
78 Correa (n36) 224. 
79 European Commission, ‘Why Do Geographical Indications Matter to Us?’ (MEMO/03/160, July 2003) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-03-160_en.htm> accessed 26/07/2018. 
80 D. Gangjee, ‘Geographical Indications and Cultural Heritage’ (2012) 1(4) The WIPO Journal 85; S. Singhal, ‘Geographical Indications 
and TK’ (2008) 11 JWIP 732. 
81 European Commission (MEMO/03/160, July 2003).  
82 Moran (n13) 265. 
83 European Commission (MEMO/03/160, July 2003).  
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economically benefits producers and facilitates consumer choice. They can also serve as a 
multifunctional development tool to foster the objectives of the public policies concerned if 
associated with adequate proprietary-type protection and well-designed CoPs.84 In contrast, the 
USA and its allies perceive sui generis protection as a form of disguised protectionist tool that 
would disrupt existing legitimate marketing practices.85 
 
Considering the socio-economic, environmental and cultural issues involved, this ‘war on 
terroir’86 is not just a matter of protecting signs. It is also a political dispute about different 
paradigms with respect to which functions GIs should play in relation to trade concerns, 
agricultural policies, and cultural and environmental issues.87 Unlike other IPRs, the dispute 
over GIs does not reflect a North-South divide but rather a conflict between emigrant and 
immigrant countries.88 A strong majority of emerging and developing countries, whose GI-
related interests lie in goods other than wines and spirits, join the EU in supporting enhanced 
standards for GI protection. These include Bangladesh, Cuba, India, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey and Venezuela.89 According to the World Bank, the 
comparative advantage that developing countries have in agricultural products, processed 
foods and beverages makes GIs particularly attractive to these countries.90 Conversely,  a 
number of Latin American countries including Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, oppose the extension of the GI protection amid fears that enhanced protection would 
disrupt existing legitimate marketing practices.91 They worry that emigrants using skills 
brought from their countries of origin to manufacture similar goods protected by a GI in their 
home country would be denied the right to use the GI-protected name.92 
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Showing the positive externalities of GIs is thus an important political issue with commercial 
and legal implications. At stake is the extent to which the EU may strengthen its case at the 
WTO by putting forward empirical evidence that a public policy approach to GIs contributes 
to development objectives. Put differently, if it is proved that the promises of GIs are based on 
real benefits, then the ‘evangelical role of the European Union in popularising’93 its terroir 
narrative would not be ‘simply the projection of a Eurocentric approach to culture’.94 Neither 
would it lead developing countries to waste their time and limited resources in ‘chasing an 
illusive dream’.95 The true potential of GIs would open up promising prospects for fostering 
development while providing the EU with a sound justification for strengthening the 
international legal protection of GIs. Caution is, however, advisable when burdening GIs with 
hopes and expectations. Not only is empirical data lacking, especially from developing 
countries,96 but the empirical research that has been carried out to date has also led to 
inconclusive results as to the welfare effects of GIs, even in Europe, where impacts vary on a 
case by case basis.97  
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1.2 Research questions and methodology 
 
1.2.1 Research questions and hypotheses 
 
This research is concerned with the apparent tensions between the terroir and the trade mark 
approaches to protecting GIs. It seeks to understand the extent to which the creation process, 
the operation and the effects of GI initiatives established according to these two approaches 
differ in light of the broader socio-economic and institutional context for each approach. In 
doing so, this research project aims to provide new empirical data and new perspectives to the 
ongoing international legal dispute over GIs. It asks: what makes GIs work in practice? 
 
To this aim, four main research questions are investigated as follows:  
(i) why is the GI protection process initiated and what objectives are associated with GI 
protection? 
(ii) how are GI initiatives established and how do they operate under both approaches? 
(iii) what factors influence the use and economic value of GIs on the market – or their lack of 
use?  
(iv) what factors contribute to the ability of GIs to create non-economic effects? 
 
The research questions require us to reconsider the aims of GI regulation, by scrutinising the 
creation process, the functioning and the effects of GI initiatives operating under different legal 
systems. The main argument is that the significance of the distinction between the two types 
of legal protection varies greatly depending on the institutional context in which the GI 
initiatives are embedded and that the differences between the sui generis and trade mark 
approaches can be greatly reduced in practice. Besides, I argue that the type of legal protection 
is often not enough to drive the value and benefits of GIs, except in countries where the sui 
generis system enjoys a special status. Legal protection per se is, however, irrelevant in 
instances where local producers cannot participate meaningfully in these initiatives. To unpack 
this argument, the following hypotheses are suggested. 
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(i) The integration of GI schemes with other regulatory interventions and requirements 
 
According to my first hypothesis, GI schemes are affected by, and integrated with, other 
regulatory interventions and requirements. By looking beyond formal GI law to relocate it 
within a wider system of regulatory interventions, this thesis contributes to a regulatory theory 
which rejects the conventional rules-based definition of regulation as a set of formal rules 
adopted and enforced by the state only, as developed by Drahos in the book Regulatory Theory, 
Foundations and Applications.98 Drawing on regulatory pluralism which embraces an array of 
regulatory forms and interventions other than state law and policy,99 this book shows that 
regulation has evolved to encompass new forms of formal and informal norm-making. These 
include, among others, social and customary norms, cultural conventions, beliefs and symbolic 
meanings, economic forces and entrenched business practices, which may have an equal, if not 
greater, impact on people’s conduct.	The state still plays an important role in regulation but as 
one rule-maker among many others within a network of regulation. This wider definition of 
regulation allows us to engage with processes of change and capture the empirical richness of 
regulatory activity to produce thick descriptions of specific regulatory systems at play in certain 
contexts. This is a particularly important point in this thesis as I consider how the effects of GI 
initiatives result not only from formal GI law but from a much wider set of regulatory 
interventions located at different levels and defending varied interests.  
 
(ii) The significance of the distinction between the terroir and the trade mark approach  
 
My second hypothesis considers that the significance of the distinction between the two types 
of legal protection varies greatly depending on the institutional context in which the GI 
initiatives are embedded. In countries that have a long tradition of protecting GIs through a sui 
generis system, the two legal approaches are totally independent from one another and 
significantly different from each other. In particular, the statutes governing the two regimes 
usually involve different processes for the creation and operation of the initiatives. The sui 
generis system typically provides for more stringent requirements as per the definition of the 
link to origin, the quality control systems and the roles of local stakeholders as well as public 
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authority, among others. In these countries, the sui generis system can potentially lead to higher 
economic benefits for producers, when compared with the trade mark system, owing to the fact 
that it enjoys a special status that is sought after by distant consumers. The distinction between 
the two regimes and between their effects is, however, much less obvious in countries whose 
processes for the establishment and implementation of both regimes show strong similarities 
and where legal structures have a very subordinate role. I further argue that, even in countries 
where there is a clear distinction between the terroir and trade mark approach, the type of legal 
protection fails to fully explain the non-economic effects of GIs outside the market. This is 
because those effects are largely mediated by the rules governing the product, found within the 
product specification, as well as by other non-legal factors such as the market and the 
stakeholders’ social, cultural and environmental awareness.  
 
(iii) Producers’ participation and collective action  
 
My third hypothesis suggests that the establishment and use of GIs on the market encourages 
collaboration among producers and other local stakeholders, which further contributes to 
generate spillover effects outside the market.  
 
This proposal builds on collective action theory that has been developed in the context of GIs 
to study the actions undertaken by groups of local producers involved in GI initiatives to 
achieve shared economic and non-economic objectives. As contended by the economists 
Belletti and Marescotti,100 GI products have a strong collective dimension derived from their 
close ties with places of origin. The elaboration of local products typically relies on the local 
resources, knowledge, skills, history and culture of a community of operators within a specific 
geographical area. The formulation, control and observance of the rules of production of the 
GI product requires the mobilisation and collaboration of local stakeholders along the value 
chain to build and maintain consumer trust. Collaboration among local stakeholders is also 
needed for the implementation of collective marketing activities to strengthen the reputation of 
the product on the market and for the prevention of free-riding and individual opportunistic 
behavior within the collective. This reflects the economic approach to collective action. From 
a non-economic perspective, Belletti and Marescotti argue that, when local stakeholders invest 
collectively in the preservation of the cultural and natural resources that are essential to the 
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distinctive character of the GI product including, for instance, traditional methods of 
production and cultural practices, plant varieties and breeds, GIs can bring about territorial 
development dynamics.101 The use of collective action theory is relevant to this thesis as I 
explore the factors promoting or hindering producers’ participation, collaboration and use of 
the GI labels, including the relationship between legal processes, collective action and the 
effects of GI initiatives.  
 
(iv) The role and value of formal legal protection  
 
My last hypothesis posits that formal legal protection is irrelevant in some contexts, typically 
where individual and community needs take precedence over the legal and economic value of 
GIs. This suggests the importance of looking closely at the interests and priorities of local 
producers.  
 
In seeking to understand why GI legal protection is sought and what it means to local producers 
in the everyday life, this thesis engages with scholars who have looked at IP from socio-legal 
and anthropological perspectives. There is a rich literature on how social networks prevail 
where formal institutions are weak and how creative industries develop with no or little 
protection from IP law – what has been described by Raustiala and Sprigman as ‘IP’s negative 
space’.102 Of particular relevance to this thesis is the work of Murray, Piper and Robertson in 
Putting Intellectual Property In Its Place: Rights Discourses, Creative Labor and the 
Everyday. 103 In this seminal book, the authors stress the limited relevance of legal IP 
institutions in some cultural contexts of creative activity, thereby challenging the conventional 
utilitarian and economic theories of IP. As they explore various creative contexts, the authors 
show that creative and innovative practices within communities are contingent on time and 
place. The authors’ attention to cultural, professional, economic, and ideological 
circumstances, including personal desires and community needs, to explain the effects of 
creative activity rather than by the law itself, has been of great influence in developing my own 
grids of analysis.  
                                                        
101 G. Belletti and A. Marescotti, ‘Origin products, geographical indications and rural development’ in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), 
Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (CAB International, 2011) 75. 
102 K. Raustiala and C. Sprigman, ‘The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design’ (2006) 92 Virginia Law 
Review 1687, 1764. See also E. Rosenblatt, ‘A Theory of IP’s Negative Space’ (2011) 34(3) Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 317. 
103 L.J. Murray, S.T. Piper and K. Robertson, Putting Intellectual Property in Its Place: Rights Discourses, Creative Labor, and the Everyday, 
(OUP, 2014).  
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1.2.2 Comparative case study approach 
 
This research is based on a comparative case-study based approach, which is critical for 
understanding whether, how and why the complex, context-specific conditions in which GI 
initiatives are embedded, influence their creation processes, practical operation and socio-
economic effects.104 The ability of case studies to explain how causal processes and interactions 
operate is typically associated with the rich, nuanced and complex data set that they can capture 
through their propensity to use a combination of methods.105 As such, case studies allow for 
explanatory analysis,106 which is most appropriate to address how and why questions.107 A 
comparative case study strategy is thus well-suited for the needs of this research project. Case 
studies were selected purposively and strategically based on consideration of the issues of 
importance to this project, i.e. the type of legal protection and the characteristics of the contexts 
in which GI initiatives are embedded.108  
 
The choice to investigate GI initiatives in France and in Vietnam was made for three main 
reasons. First, both countries associate GIs with economic and non-economic objectives, which 
permits an investigation of the effects of GI initiatives against the expectations associated with 
them. Second, both France and Vietnam protect GIs through both trade marks and sui generis 
systems, which has enabled the study in each country of at least one product protected through 
each system. Third, considering France and Vietnam’s contrasting levels of socio-economic 
development and institutional settings, the choice of these two countries makes it possible to 
explore the influence of the social and institutional context in which GI initiatives are 
embedded.  
 
The selection of the GI initiatives – which represent the ‘unit of analysis’109 - was made in such 
a way as to cover a wide range of types of GI products according to two criteria: (1) the category 
of product and (2) the type of legal protection. Considering that GIs can be used for five 
categories of products, including agricultural products, foodstuffs, handicrafts, wine and spirit 
                                                        
104 R.K. Yin, Case study research : design and methods (Sage Publications, 2003) 13.  
105 Perri 6 and C. Bellamy, Principles of methodology: research design in social science (SAGE, 2012). 
106 A. Bryman, Social research methods (OUP, 2004). 
107 Yin (n104) 1. 
108 U. Flick, E. Kardorff and I. Steinke, A companion to qualitative research (SAGE Publications, 2005) 150.  
109 Yin (n104) 22.  
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drinks, and industrial products,110 the aim of the first criterion was to ensure that at least one 
product was selected in each category of products for each country whenever possible, except 
wines and spirits. This category was excluded from the scope of this research because wine 
and spirit drinks are protected under a special regime at both the international111 and European 
levels,112 which would have distorted the analysis. It should also be noted that there is no known 
example of GIs for an industrial product in Vietnam, hence the selection of an industrial 
product case study in France only. Finally, for the purpose of this project, and to clarify the 
product classification, agricultural products are considered as agricultural commodities that 
have undergone little or no processing, while foodstuffs are understood as resulting from the 
processing of unprocessed products. 
 
Under the second criterion, at least one product protected by a trade mark and one product 
protected by a sui generis system have been chosen in each country, taking into account that 
the EU sui generis legislation for Protected Denominations of Origin and Protected 
Geographical Indications (PDO/PGIs) for agricultural products and foodstuffs113 applies in 
France. Considering that what differentiates PDOs and PGIs is the intensity of the link to the 
area of origin, it was useful to select at least one PGI and one PDO product. 
 
Following these criteria, a total of twelve cases were selected (Table 1.1), including seven 
products in Vietnam and five in France. The slightly higher number of case studies in Vietnam 
is explained by the longer uninterrupted period spent in Vietnam (four months in total), as 
compared with the shorter return trips made to France, which is easier to reach from London. 
 
  
                                                        
110 WIPO, ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Geographical Indications – For what type of product can geographical indications be used?’ 
<http://www.wipo.int/geo_indications/en/faq_geographicalindications.html> accessed 26/07/2018. 
111 TRIPS, Article 23. 
112 Regulations (EC) (n68 and 69).  
113 Council Regulations (n67). 
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Table 1.1 
List of product case studies with year of protection 
 
(i) France  
 
 Collective mark Certification mark Sui generis protection 
Agricultural 
product   
 
Green lentils from Berry (1998) 
 
 
Bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel 
Bay (2006; 2011)* 
 
Foodstuff   
 
Pélardon cheese (2000; 2001)* 
 
Handicraft 
 
Marseille soap 
(2012) 
 
  
Industrial 
product  
 
Wood from the 
Alps 
(2013) 
 
 
 
* The two dates correspond to the protection at the French and European levels, respectively. 
 
 
(ii) Vietnam 
 
 Collective mark Certification mark Sui generis protection 
Agricultural 
product 
 
Sticky rice from  
Đông Triều 
(2013) 
 
 
 Star anise from Lạng Sơn (2007) 
Foodstuff 
 
H’mong beef from 
Cao Bằng  
 (2011) 
 
Vermicelli from 
Bình Liêu 
(2013) 
 
Fried calamari from Hạ Long (2013) 
 
Handicraft 
 
Pottery from Đông 
Triều 
(2012) 
 
 
 
Conical hat from Huế (2010) 
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Map 1.1 
 
Location of the French case studies 
 
 
 
  
Bouchot mussels from 
Mont-St-Michel bay 
Green lentils from 
Berry 
Pélardon 
Marseille 
soap 
Wood from 
Alps 
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Map 1.2 
 
Location of the Vietnamese case studies 
 
 
 
  
H’mong beef from 
Cao Bằng 
 
Star anise from 
Lạng Sơn 
Conical hat 
from Huế 
Fried calamari 
from Hạ Long 
Vermicelli from 
Bình Liêu 
  
Pottery and sticky 
rice from  
Đông Triều 
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1.2.3 Methods of data collection and analysis  
 
In line with the case study approach, a variety of methods were used to generate data. Primary 
data were collected through a combination of semi-structured interviews and direct 
observations. The selection of the respondents was done according to a purposeful sampling 
method,114 which is admittedly not statistically representative, but rather strategically based on 
the presence or absence of specific characteristics, roles, knowledge and experience that are 
relevant to the research project.115 Interviewees included the four following categories of 
individuals: (1) public authorities; (2) farmers, producers and processors; (3) distributors and 
traders; and (4) leaders of producers’ associations and cooperatives. These categories are not 
equally important in each context. For instance, public authorities play a far more important 
role in the management of the GI initiatives in Vietnam than in France, where producers are 
much stronger actors than in Vietnam.  
 
The interviews were conducted in Vietnam with the help of a professional translator between 
March and May 2014 and in France in February 2014 then from June to October 2014. They 
were based on a topic guide that had been designed in advance to collect data and information 
that are of most interest to my research project (Annex 3). To update data, I followed up with 
phone interviews and e-mail correspondence until July 2018. Overall, I conducted between six 
and fourteen interviews for each GI product for a total of 117 interviews. Annexes 1 and 2 set 
out the list and codification of interviews in Vietnam and France, respectively. Such codes will 
be used for all subsequent references to the interviews. 
 
Fieldwork in Vietnam was greatly facilitated by the French Agricultural Research Centre for 
International Development (Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique 
pour le développement, CIRAD)116 and the Vietnamese Centre for Agrarian Systems Research 
and Development (CASRAD) within the research consortium ‘Markets and Agriculture 
Linkages for Cities in Asia’ (MALICA).117 In particular CIRAD and CASRAD not only 
assisted me in obtaining my visa and research authorizations in the field, but also greatly 
                                                        
114 M. Patton, Qualitative evaluation and research methods (SAGE, 1990) 169. 
115 W.J. Gibson and A. Brown, Working with qualitative data (SAGE, 2009) 56. 
116 CIRAD operates under the joint authority of the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research and the French Ministry of Foreign 
and European Affairs. It is one of the main development actors working on GIs. 
117 More information on the MALICA Consortium can be found at < https://www.malica.org> accessed 27/07/2018. 
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facilitated my access to and knowledge of local populations and organisations, thus saving me 
a huge amount of time and resources. In France, I was invited to participate in the training 
session on GIs (InterGI) co-organised by CIRAD and the Swiss organisation REDD in June 
2014.118 This training allowed me to interview local actors involved in the Pélardon initiative 
together with other participants. As I subsequently collected useful material and conducted 
phone interviews with other stakeholders identified during the training, I decided to include 
this product as a case study. This explains why there are two PDO products among my case 
studies. Later, I was also invited to the InterGI session in September 2014 to present the 
Marseille soap case study and organise interviews with some key actors, which usefully 
complemented my own personal interviews. Finally, I was invited to participate in the 
conference ‘Adding value to local wood from the Alps by guaranteeing its traceability’ 
organised by the association Bois des Alpes in October 2014. This conference allowed me to 
meet the key actors of the initiative and collect data from both the speakers’ presentations and 
individual interviews.  
 
In addition, secondary data was generated through document study, including legal and policy 
documents, CoPs, registration regulations, charters, evaluation reports, as well as newspaper 
articles, documentary and promotional videos and pictures.119 The employment of various 
methods was useful to complement and cross-validate data120 – what is commonly called 
‘triangulation’. The aim of this strategy was to provide a more comprehensive and unified 
picture of the GI initiatives under investigation, while increasing the validity and reliability of 
the empirical findings.121 Each case was analysed individually before comparing them with 
and among each other to highlight commonalities and differences. As part of this process, 
interview transcripts and document-generated data were coded manually.  
  
                                                        
118 See details on this programme here: <https://www.cirad.fr/en/teaching-training/available-training/intergi> accessed 20/08/2018. 
119 French CoPs are available on the EU’s DOOR online database <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html>. There is no online 
register for Vietnamese GIs. The author has personal copies of all the files. It should be noted that the charters of two producers’ associations 
(star anise from Lạng Sơn and conical hat from Huế) could not be accessed due to difficult access to documents in Vietnam. 
120 A. Bryman, Research Methods and Organization Studies (Unwin Hyman, 1989) 151. 
121 Flick, Kardorff and Steinke (n108) 172.  
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1.3 General context in France 
 
Regarded as the pioneer of GI protection, France has arguably the oldest, most fully developed 
and most influential sui generis protection system in the world.122 This also inspired the 
European law.123 As already mentioned, the EU and its member countries have associated GIs 
with public benefit outcomes, which in turn has justified public intervention through support 
policies. Support to promote the use of the PDO/PGI scheme is provided primarily under the 
EU’s rural development policy,124 known as the Second Pillar of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP).125 The CAP is aimed specifically at developing rural areas, which represent 52% 
of the EU territory and more than 46 million jobs with a population of 113 million people.126  
 
Both France and the EU have been actively engaged in promoting sui generis protection of GIs 
around the world. For example, the French Development Agency has provided support for the 
2010-2013 PAMPIG project (Projet d’Appui à la Mise en Place d’Indications Géographiques), 
now in its second phase of implementation until 2021,127 which aims to support members of 
the African Intellectual Property Organisation in implementing and protecting GIs. France has 
also funded the 2013-2018 Trade Capacity-Building programme aimed at protecting and 
promoting local products, including through GIs, in member countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).128 At the European level, the main strategy has been to 
foster the protection of GIs through bilateral agreements129 and the provision of technical and 
financial support to promote IPRs, including GIs.130 For instance, the EU has concluded Free-
                                                        
122 O’Connor (n1) 165. 
123 G. Allaire, F. Casabianca and E. Thévenod-Mottet, ‘The geographical origin, a complex feature for agro-food products’ in E. Barham and 
B. Sylvander (eds.), Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (CAB International, 2011) 1.  
124 European Commission, The EU Rural Development Policy 2007-2013 (European Commission, Fact Sheet, 2006) 12 
<https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/fact/rurdev2007/2007_en.pdf> accessed 25/07/2018. 
125 European Commission, ‘The common agricultural policy at a glance’ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-
policies/common-agricultural-policy/cap-glance_en> accessed 24/07/2018. 
126 European Commission, ‘Rural Development in the EU, Statistical and Economic Information’ (Report, European Union, December 2013) 
52 < https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/statistics/rural-development/2013/full-text_en.pdf> accessed 02/09/2018. 
127 See the description of the project here: <https://umr-innovation.cirad.fr/en/projets/pampig-2> accessed 25/07/2018. 
128 See the description of the project here: <https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Ressources/13533_le-financement-de-projets-de-
valorisation-des-indications-geographiques-dans-les-pays-de-l-asean-par-le-prcc> accessed 25/07/2018. 
129 D. Marie-Vivien, D. Sautier and E. Biénabe, ‘Bilateral agreements for geographical indications: the evaluation ‘of the local by the local’?’ 
(XXV ESRS Congress, Florence, Italy, August 2013). The list of European Trade Agreements is available here: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/> accessed 26/07/2018. 
130 European Commission, ‘Main IPR related technical assistance programmes’  <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=328> 
accessed 24/07/2018. 
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Trade Agreements (FTAs) with South Korea,131 Colombia and Peru,132 Singapore,133 and 
Vietnam,134 among many others. In Asia, it has funded the EU-ASEAN Project on the 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (ECAP project)135 and the EU-Vietnam MUTRAP 
project (European Trade Policy and Investment Support Project),136 which both have a GI 
component. 
 
1.4 General context in Vietnam 
 
After gaining independence from France in 1954, Vietnam became a politically unified country 
under a Communist government in 1975 at the end of the so-called Vietnam War. With the 
introduction in December 1986 of a set of reforms known as doi moi (renovation), Vietnam 
gradually deregulated and liberalised the economy to create a socialist-oriented market 
economy.137 As part of these reforms, new agricultural development policies dismantled rural 
collectives, assigned land rights to farmers,138 and liberalised agricultural markets with a focus 
on cash crops (for instance rice, coffee, rubber, cashew nut and pepper), thereby putting an end 
to previous self-sufficiency policies.139 To support the reform process, decentralization policies 
were also adopted.140  
 
Despite Vietnam’s strong economic growth in the past decades, 20.7% of the population still 
lived below the poverty line in 2010, including 27% in rural areas and 6% in urban areas, and 
                                                        
131 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part 
[2011] OJ L 127/6. 
132 Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part [2013] 
EC/CO/PE/en1. 
133 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore [negotiations finished in April 2018 – awaiting 
signature].  
134 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [negotiations finished in June 2018 – awaiting 
signature]. 
135 See the description of the project here: <http://www.ecap3.org/about/ecap-project-overview-1993-2016> accessed 24/07/2018. 
136 See the description of the project here: <http://mutrap.org.vn/index.php/en/about-eu-mutrap-2> accessed 24/07/2018. 
137 T.G. MacAulay, S.P. Marsh and P. Van Hung (eds.), Agricultural Development and Land Policy in Vietnam (Australian Centre for 
International Agricultural Research, Monograph 126, 2007) 14.  
138 M. Kirk and N.D. Anh Tuan, ‘Land-Tenure Policy Reforms, Decollectivization and the Doi Moi System in Vietnam’ (2009) IFPRI 
Discussion Paper, 1 <http://www.ifpri.org/publication/land-tenure-policy-reforms> accessed 03/09/2018. 
139 C. Durand and S. Fournier, ‘Can Geographical Indications Modernize Indonesian and Vietnamese Agriculture? Analyzing the Role of 
National and Local Governments and Producers’ Strategies’ (2017) 98(C) World Development 91, 93.     
140 A. Fforde, ‘Decentralization in Vietnam-working effectively at provincial and local government level. A comparative analysis of long an 
and Quang Ngai provinces’ (Report prepared for the Australian Agency of International Development, 2003). 
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8% of the population is extremely poor.141 Besides, Vietnam’s 53 ethnic minority groups, who 
make up less than 15% of the population, accounted for 47% of the poor in 2010, up from 29% 
in 1998.142  
 
Vietnam is still governed by a single party, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), and its 
administrative system is divided into four levels: Central, Provincial, District, and Communal 
level. As of July 2018, it has 63 administrative units at provincial level (58 provinces and 5 
centrally-run cities), 713 districts and over 11,000 communes.143 All three sub-central 
administrative levels are governed by a representative body, the People's Council, and an 
executive body, the People's Committee, which is composed of Departments that mirror the 
missions and duties of the central Ministries.144 The effects of decentralisation have so far been 
limited. Central units still maintain control and decision-making powers, while there remain 
inconsistent institutions, unclear mandates and tasks of both central and local authorities, and 
inefficient operation styles and manners.145   
 
France’s colonial legacy in Vietnam has translated into a strong cooperation between the two 
countries, including as regards GIs. As such, France has supported the development of the 
Vietnamese legislation on GIs since 1995. In late 2015, France also launched a three-year 
project to support the development of Vietnamese GIs for a total budget of US$1.3 million.146 
Vietnam has also signed bilateral agreements to protect GIs, including the EU-Vietnam 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation of October 2012. This 
Agreement led to the conclusion of the EU-Vietnam FTA of December 2015147 under which 
39 Vietnamese GIs are protected in the EU and 171 European GIs are protected in Vietnam.148  
                                                        
141 According to the updated GSO-WB poverty line for 2010 (US $2.26 per person per day, 2005 PPP).  World Bank, ‘Well Begun, Not Yet 
Done: Vietnam’s Remarkable Progress on Poverty Reduction and the Emerging Challenges’ (Vietnam Poverty Assessment, World Bank, 
2012) 3. 
142 ibid 5. 
143 Vietnam Law and Legal Forum, ‘Current local administration system in Vietnam’ <http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/current-local-
administration-system-in-vietnam-6058.html> accessed 25/07/2018. 
144 ibid. 
145 J. Acuña-Alfaro (ed.), Reforming public administration in Vietnam, Current situations and recommendations (UNDP, The National 
Political Publishing House 2009) 5-6. 
146 See the description of the project here: <https://www.afd.fr/fr/soutenir-le-developpement-des-indications-geographiques-protegees-au-
vietnam-programme-prcc> accessed 26/07/2018. 
147 See the news archive on the EU-Vietnam FTA here: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437> accessed 24/07/2018. 
148 The list of GIs being protected under the EU-Vietnam FTA is available here:  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154223.%20institutional%20-%20GIs%206.5a3%206.11wg%20rev2%20-
%20for%20publication.pdf> accessed 24/07/2018. 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis  
 
This thesis is organised into six substantive chapters.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide an analysis of the legal frameworks for GIs in France in Vietnam, 
respectively. Without providing a full and detailed study of the sui generis and trade mark 
protection systems that apply in both countries, these chapters highlight those features that are 
of most interest to this research. Unlike in France where protection of GIs has matured for over 
a century out of a long process that was initiated by local producers, the legal framework for 
GIs in Vietnam is fairly recent and was led by state authorities. The state-driven, top-down 
approach of Vietnam to GIs sharply contrasts with the bottom-up system of GI protection in 
France, where local producers have a pivotal role in initiating and managing the initiatives. 
Both approaches have significant consequences on the establishment and operation of GI 
initiatives, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
 
Chapters 4-7 are chapters detailing and analysing empirical findings. Chapter 4 explores the 
actors’ strategies and collective dynamics in all twelve case studies. The establishment and 
management of GI initiatives involve collective action dynamics that have emerged as critical 
factors for directing their effects. By presenting the environment and characteristics of the 
twelve products through narrative accounts, this chapter will first show how the genesis of the 
initiatives stems from different motivations and interests attached to the legal protection of GIs. 
It will then turn to the implementation process of the GI initiatives with a focus on the creation 
process and the internal structure of GI collectives. By connecting the legal rules around GI 
recognition with the way in which collective action of local stakeholders is given the space to 
develop, it will highlight their contrasting active/passive roles in the decision-making processes 
involved within the GI initiatives in France and Vietnam.  
 
Drawing upon the six case studies where the use of origin labels on the marketplace can be 
observed, Chapter 5 analyses the factors influencing the value of GIs on the market and the 
economic benefits derived from them. It first explores the ways in which the reputation of 
origin products was successfully established on the marketplace, both before and after the 
labelling processes. This chapter subsequently analyses the effects of GIs on consumer demand 
and production capacity. In particular, it will show that, while consumer demand for the six 
products has generally increased, the potential of the initiatives to match supply and demand 
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depends not only on their growth capacity and dynamism but also on the market environment 
and institutional context in which they are developing. Finally, in analysing commercial 
approaches and marketing strategies, this chapter argues that the types of marketing channels 
not only impact on the commercial value of GIs and the economic benefits derived from their 
use, but further that they do not impact in the same way across the initiatives.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the six products for which the origin label has been either entirely or 
relatively unused despite a formal registration having taken place; whose name has been largely 
associated with goods that do not correspond to the ‘genuine’ product; and/or whose 
manufacturing according to the traditional methods of production is very limited, if at all. 
While a range of reasons contribute to explain such ‘GI failures’, this chapter seeks to identify 
the key factors that impact negatively on the producers’ willingness or capacity of using the 
origin labels and/or producing the traditional product. It will suggest that GIs fail to engage 
and foster the interest of local producers in using the origin labels when the communication 
function of GIs on the market is undermined; when local producers lack economic incentives 
to adhere to the initiative; and when products lack reputation on the end markets due to the 
nature and structure of marketing channels.  
 
Chapter 7 explores the effects of GIs outside the market and seeks to disentangle the factors 
involved therein. It first analyses the dynamics of territorial development that have derived 
from the GI initiatives before examining the extent to which GIs have contributed to the 
preservation of cultural heritage and the protection of biodiversity. This chapter will show that 
the impacts vary greatly across the initiatives depending on each specific context as well as a 
range of factors found at the producer/initiative, market and state levels. These findings suggest 
the need to develop a dynamic understanding of GIs and consider both the functioning of the 
initiatives at the local level, including formal rules and informal constraints, and the broader 
commercial and institutional context in which the GI initiatives are operating. It will argue that 
legal protection is not a sufficient condition to bring about effects outside the market, and that 
the type of legal protection is not necessarily a relevant factor. These findings contribute to 
challenge the EU’s assumption of the positive externalities of sui generis protection of GIs. 
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2 
 
Legal framework for the protection of GIs in France 
 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the French legal framework for the protection of GIs with 
a focus on the sui generis and trade mark systems. As seen in Chapter 1, these regimes have 
emerged as the two main institutional approaches to protect GIs. In describing and contrasting 
the main features of each regime, this chapter aims to provide the necessary basis for discussion 
of the impact of the law on the creation process, operation and likely effects of the French GI 
initiatives under study. This legal study is thus particularly important to the analysis of our 
empirical findings in Chapters 4-7 that will expose the interpretation and the effects of the law 
in practice.  
 
In France, the sui generis protection system has traditionally played a much more significant 
role in the protection of GIs than the trade mark system. The French sui generis law, regarded 
as the oldest and most influential system of GI protection,1 has derived from a long, drawn-out 
process first designed to fight against the increased levels of fraudulent and artificial wines 
following the phylloxera epidemic at the end of the nineteenth century.2 This chapter focuses 
on the existing law only, not the history of French legislation, which goes beyond the scope of 
this thesis. In particular, the chapter looks at those characteristics that are of most interest to 
this research project, making references to historical developments whenever useful. A second 
limitation relates to the type of products. This chapter considers agricultural products, 
foodstuffs, and industrial and artisanal products only, thereby excluding the study of the 
regulations on wines and spirits that are outside the scope of this study.  
 
                                                        
1 B. O’Connor, The Law of Geographic Indications (Cameron May, 2004) 165. 
2 For a detailed study of the French history of wine quality regulations see G. Teil, ‘Protecting Appellations of Origin: One Hundred Years of 
Efforts and Debates’ in W. Van Caenegem and J. Cleary (eds), The Importance of Place: Geographical Indications as a Tool for Local and 
Regional Development (Springer - Ius Gentium, Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice n°58, 2017) 147. 
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It is important to note from the outset that, in France, while the sui generis system of protection 
of GIs must certify the origin of the products, trade marks may be used for that purpose. As 
noted by Gangjee, ‘[t]he very act of establishing a separate system to accommodate regionally 
specific products indicates that [sui generis] GI regimes are positioned differently from trade 
marks and expected to do different kinds of legal work’.3 This chapter will help understand 
how. It is divided into two main sections. Section 2.1 will address the sui generis protection 
system of GIs, and Section 2.2 will explore the trade mark system applicable in France. 
 
2.1 Sui generis protection of GIs 
 
The French sui generis system for the protection of GIs provides for three different schemes 
due to the coexistence of the French and European legislation.4 A brief historical perspective 
is useful to disentangle the different regimes at play.5  
 
After successive failed attempts to protect GIs through an administrative6 then a judicial 
procedure,7 the decree-law of 30 July 1935,8 which constitutes a landmark in the development 
of French modern law on GIs, established the National Institute for Appellations of Origin 
(INAO – which became the National Institute of Origin and Quality in 2006). As a unique 
public institution composed of both state officials and professionals and operating under the 
authority of the French Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF), INAO is specifically 
dedicated to the recognition, control and defence of controlled appellations of origin 
(appellation d’origine contrôlée - AOCs). AOCs were first granted for wines and spirits9 before 
                                                        
3 D. Gangjee, ‘Proving Provenance? Geographical Indications Certification and its Ambiguities’ (2015) 98 World Development 12, 13. 
4 As an EU member state, the European law applies in France. While EU regulations and decisions are automatically binding, directives must 
be incorporated by member countries into their national legislation. 
5 For a comprehensive description of the French sui generis GI system and its historical developments, see N.Olszak, Le droit des appellations 
d'origine et des indications de provenance (Tec&Doc, Paris, 2001). 
6 Loi du 1er août 1905 sur la repression des fraudes dans la vente des marchandises et des falsifications des denrées alimentaires et des 
produits agricoles (Law of 1 August 1905 on the repression of fraud in the sale of goods and adulteration of foodstuff and agricultural products) 
(5 August 1905) Journal Officiel de la République Française (JO) 210.  
7 Loi du 6 Mai 1919 Relative à la Protection des Appellations d’Origine (Law of 6 May 1919 on the Protection of Appellations of Origin) (8 
May 1919) JO 4726. 
8 Décret-loi du 30 juillet 1935 Relatif à la Défense du Marché des Vins et au Régime Economique de l’Alcool (Decree-Law of 30 July 1935 
on the defence of the wine market and the economic regime of alcohol) (31 Juillet 1935) JO 8314 (hereafter, Decree-Law of 30 July 1935). 
9 ibid. 
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extending to cheeses in 195510 and all other agro-food and forestry products in 1990.11 
Subsequently, the French AOC legislation inspired European law12 which introduced the 
concepts of protected denominations of origin (PDOs) and protected geographical indications 
(PGIs) for agricultural products and foodstuffs through the Council Regulation (EEC) 2081/92 
of 14 July 1992,13 as repealed by the Regulation (EC) 510/200614 and Regulation (EC) 
1151/2012,15 that is in force today [hereafter, Regulation 1151/2012].  
 
Curiously, France is the only EU Member State to still have its own sui generis legislation in 
force.16 According to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), national rules 
‘governing the protection of geographical designations which fall outside [the EU’s] scope’ 
can continue to be applicable.17 Consequently, the French system of AOCs is applicable to 
forestry products which are not covered by European law. However, for agro-food products 
which fall within the scope of the European law, the French AOC system is a subsidiary and 
transitory regime that provides protection on the French territory only until the European PDO 
protection is granted.18 Although the concepts of AOCs and PDOs are similar, the concept of 
PGI does not relate to any notion in French law. Whereas a PDO/PGI application can be 
submitted in France without having to be recognised as a French AOC first, all AOCs must 
necessarily be recognised as a PDO.19 If the PDO application is not successful at the European 
                                                        
10 Loi du 28 novembre 1955 relative aux appellations d’origine des fromages (Law of 28 November 1955 on appellations of origin for 
cheeses)  (30 November 1955) JO 11580. 
11 Loi du 2 juillet 1990 relative aux appellations d’origine contrôlées des produits agricoles ou alimentaires, bruts ou transformés (Law of 
2 July 1990 on controlled appellations of origin for raw or processed agro-food products) (6 July 1990) JO 
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000167733> accessed 8 July 2018. 
12 G. Allaire, F. Casabianca and E. Thevenod-Mottet, ‘The geographical origin, a complex feature for agro-food products’ in E. Barham and 
B. Sylvander (eds.), Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (CAB International, 2011) 1, 8.  
13 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31992R2081&from=EN> accessed 
08/08/2018. 
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R0510&from=EN> accessed 
08/08/2018. 
15 Council Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuff <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1151&from=EN> accessed 
08/08/2018. 
16 C. Le Goffic, ‘La protection des indications géographiques en France, dans la Communauté européenne et aux États-Unis’ (PhD thesis, 
Université Pantheon-Assas Paris II, 2009) 159.  
17 CJCE, Assica, Kraft Foods Italia v Associazione fra produttori per la tutela del ‘Salame Felino’ and Others (C-35/13) 8 May 2014 
(Unreported) at [28]-[29]. 
18 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 9. 
19 Rural Code and Maritime Fishing Code (hereafter, Rural Code), Article L.641-10. 
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level, the AOC protection shall cease.20 The maintenance of a national title such as the AOC is 
thus questionable considering that it changes the substitution intended by the European scheme 
into a seemingly overlapping protection.21  
 
It should be noted that France has the second largest number of PDO/PGI registrations after 
Italy. These two countries account for 38% of the total number of PDO/PGIs registered so far. 
As of May 2019, France has registered 104 PDOs and 144 PGIs out of a total of 638 PDOs and 
749 PGIs currently protected.22  
 
Alongside the French AOC and European PDO/PGI systems, France has recently created a 
third scheme with the adoption of a new Consumer Law in March 2014,23 implemented by 
Decree 2015-595 of 2 June 2015.24 This regime is specifically dedicated to protecting GIs for 
industrial and artisanal products (indications géographiques pour les produits industriels et 
artisanaux - IGPIAs), which are not (yet) protectable under European law.25 As of May 2019, 
eight products have been registered as an IGPIA26 and three applications are pending, including 
two for Marseille soap (see below). 
 
For clarity, the French sui generis system for the protection of GIs covers the following 
schemes:  
1. AOCs for agro-food and forestry products, as protected under French law and defined in 
Article 645-5 of the Rural Code;  
2. PDOs and PGIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs, as protected at the European level 
under Regulation 1151/2012; and 
                                                        
20 ibid. 
21 Le Goffic, ‘La protection des indications géographiques’ (n16) 162. 
22 European Commission, DOOR database <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html> accessed 16/08/2018. 
23 Loi  2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation (Law 2014-344 of 17 March 2014 on consumers) (18 March 2014) JO 65 
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028738036&categorieLien=id> accessed 13/08/2018. 
24 Décret 2015-595 du 2 juin 2015 relatif aux indications géographiques protégeant les produits industriels et artisanaux et portant diverses 
dispositions relatives aux marques (Decree 2015-595 of 2 June 2015 on geographical indications for industrial and artisanal products and 
containing various provisions on marks) (3 June 2015) JO 126 <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2015/6/2/EINI1426403D/jo/texte> 
accessed 13/08/2018. 
25 However, the European Commission has been discussing the issue of GI protection for non-agricultural products since 2011. See European 
Commission, ‘Geographical indications for non-agricultural products’ <http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-
property/geographical-indications/non-agricultural-products_en> accessed 13/08/2018. 
26 These are: siège de Liffol; granit de Bretagne; pierre de Bourgogne; porcelaine de Limoges ; charentaise de Charente-Périgord ; tapis 
d’Aubusson ; tapisserie d’Aubusson ; and grenat de Perpignan. See INPI database <https://base-indications-geographiques.inpi.fr/fr/toutes-
les-ig> accessed 21/08/2018. 
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3. IGPIAs for industrial and artisanal products, as protected under French law and defined in 
Article L.721-2 of the Intellectual Property Code [hereafter, IP Code]. 
 
From an institutional point of view, the protection of agricultural products and foodstuffs 
(AOCs, PDOs and PGIs) falls within the scope of INAO under the authority of the MAF, 
whereas IGPIAs fall within the remit of the National Institute for Industrial Property (INPI)27 
under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and Industry. For Marie-Vivien, this division 
leads to a questionable categorisation of GIs depending on the type of products.28  
 
A number of features that are common to all schemes are seen as useful grounds for analysing 
the collective dynamics involved in the creation and operation of GI initiatives and their ability 
to generate economic and non-economic effects. These include: 
(i) the definition of the link between the product and its geographical origin;  
(ii) the choice of the name;  
(iii) the voluntary and collective action of local operators;  
(iv) the elaboration of a code of practice (CoP);  
(v) quality control mechanisms;  
(vi) the right to use;  
(vii) the role of public authority; and  
(viii) the absolute protection of all signs.   
 
2.1.1 Link to the geographical area of origin  
 
Each scheme provides for a definition of the link between the product and its geographical 
origin. AOCs and PDOs require the strongest and most complete link between the product and 
its geographical origin, whereas the product/origin nexus involved in IGPIAs and PGIs is more 
flexible. The analysis of the definition of the link to origin is particularly relevant to research 
questions aimed at examining the factors influencing the economic value of GIs and their non-
economic effects. This is because, as Bramley and Biénabe argue, ‘the stronger the 
                                                        
27 IP Code, Article L.721-3. 
28 D. Marie-Vivien, ‘Do Geographical Indications for Handicraft Deserve a Special Regime? Insights from Worldwide Law and Practice’ in 
W. Van Caenegem and J. Cleary (eds.), The Importance of Place: Geographical Indications as a Tool for Local and Regional Development 
(Springer - Ius Gentium, Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice n. 58, 2017) 221, 245-246. 
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product/origin nexus, the more robust the competitive advantage created by the differentiation 
is likely to be’,29 providing a greater accessibility to markets and hence generating economic 
benefits. Besides, in localising production of goods that often involve labour-intensive 
production techniques, the link to origin may also contribute to the preservation and creation 
of job opportunities in the different stages of the production processes.30 These aspects will be 
dealt with in Chapters 5 and 7, respectively.  
 
According to Article 5.1 of Regulation 1151/2012, PDOs are names identifying products 
‘whose qualities or characteristics are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical 
environment with its inherent natural and human factors; and the production steps of which all 
take place in the defined geographical area’ [emphasis added]. This definition has been closely 
modelled on French AOCs,31 which also emphasise the importance of both natural factors 
(geographical milieu including soil, climate etc.) and human factors (the producers’ know-how, 
methods etc.). Through this definition, AOCs and PDOs seek to guarantee a highly distinctive 
link between a product and its place of origin – in other words, its terroir connection – from 
which the product derives its ‘typicity’.32  
 
The French concept of terroir, which has no equivalent term in any other language,33 has been 
defined by INAO and the French National Institute for Agricultural Research as ‘a determined 
geographical area, defined by a human community, which generates and accumulates along its 
history a set of distinctive cultural traits, knowledge and practices based on a system of 
interactions between the natural environment and human factors. The know-how involved 
carries originality, confers its typical nature, and enables recognition of the goods and services 
                                                        
29 C. Bramley and E. Biénabe, ‘Developments and considerations around geographical indications in the developing world’ (2012) 2(1) 
Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 14, 23. 
30 D. Downes and S. Laird, ‘Community Registries of Biodiversity-Related Knowledge: The Role of Intellectual Property in Managing 
Access and Benefit’ (1999) Paper prepared for UNCTAD Biotrade Initiative <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/CommunityRegistries.pdf> 
accessed 03/09/2018. 
31 According to Article L.115-1 of the Consumer Code, AOCs are ‘the denomination of a country, region or locality which serves to designate 
a product originating therein whose quality or characteristics are due to the geographical environment, including natural factors and human 
factors’ (‘Constitue une appellation d'origine la dénomination d'un pays, d'une région ou d'une localité servant à désigner un produit qui en 
est originaire et dont la qualité ou les caractères sont dus au milieu géographique, comprenant des facteurs naturels et des facteurs humains’). 
32 E. Barham, '''Translating Terroir' Revisited: The Global Challenge of French AOC Labelling'' in D. Gangjee (ed.) Research Handbook on 
Intellectual Property and Geographical Indications (Edward Elgar, 2016) 46, 66.  
33 L. Bérard, ‘Terroir and the Sense of Place’ in D. Gangjee (ed), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Geographical 
Indications (Edward Elgar, 2016) 72, 84. 
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originating from this specific geographical area and thus of the people living within it’.34 As 
noted by Le Goffic,35 the definitions of AOCs and PDOs, in referring to a geographical 
environment including both natural and human factors, are the legal translation of the 
geographical concept of terroir.  
 
By contrast, the definition of PGIs does no mention natural or human factors. According to 
Article 5.2 of Regulation 1151/2012, PGIs are names attached to products ‘whose given 
quality, reputation or other characteristic is essentially attributable to its geographical origin; 
and at least one of the production steps of which take place in the defined geographical area’. 
This definition, which echoes the definition of GIs provided by TRIPS (see Chapter 1), is very 
similar to that of IGPIAs.36 For both qualifications, the product/origin nexus does not derive 
from the geographical environment but from the geographical origin. In not requiring the 
combination of natural and human factors while accepting reputation as a sufficient ground for 
protection, the definitions of French IGPIAs and European PGIs allow for a more flexible link 
to origin. Further, contrary to PDOs which require that all the stages of production shall take 
place in the geographical area, PGIs require that only one stage of the production should take 
place in the geographical area.  
 
Historically, the existence of the dual system of PDOs/PGIs at the European level results from 
different traditions among the EU Member States.37 While some countries, such as France and 
Italy, were attached to the terroir concept, others, such as Germany and the UK, used simple 
indications of origin38 involving a ‘quality-neutral’ link39 between the product and the 
                                                        
34 F. Casabianca and others, ‘Terroir et typicité: propositions de définitions pour deux notions essentielles à l’appréhension des indications et 
du développement durable’ (2006) 2 Terroirs viticoles, Actes du VIe Congrès International des Terroirs Viticoles 544, 546. 
35 C. Le Goffic, ‘L’appellation d’origine, reconnaissance juridique du concept géographique de terroir’ (2007) 358(37) Revue de droit rural 
32. 
36 According to Article L.721-2 of the IP Code, IGPIAs are ‘the denomination of a geographical area or a specific place which serves to 
designate a product other than from the agricultural, forestry, food and fishery sector, originating therein and whose given quality, reputation 
or other characteristic is essentially attributable to its geographical origin’ (‘Constitue une indication géographique la dénomination d'une 
zone géographique ou d'un lieu déterminé servant à désigner un produit, autre qu'agricole, forestier, alimentaire ou de la mer, qui en est 
originaire et qui possède une qualité déterminée, une réputation ou d'autres caractéristiques qui peuvent être attribuées essentiellement à cette 
origine géographique’). 
37 D. Gangjee, ‘From Geography to History: Geographical Indications and the Reputational Link’ in I. Calboli and W.-L. Ng-Loy (eds), 
Geographical Indications at the Crossroads of Trade, Development, and Culture in the Asia-Pacific (CUP, 2017) 47-49. 
38 D. Gangjee, ‘Melton Mowbray and the GI Pie in the Sky: Exploring Cartographies of Protection’ (2006) 3(291) Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 291, 301. 
39 C. Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement (OUP, 2007) 211. 
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geographical origin and which correspond to a ‘minimalist regulation of truth telling’.40 
However, the distinction between PDOs and PGIs may be primarily symbolic, considering that 
the registration procedure and the scope of protection are identical, as will be shown below.  
 
The absence of a sui generis protection for industrial and artisanal products at the European 
level is traditionally explained by the value attached to ‘a notion of terroir heavily influenced 
by a deterministic understanding of the importance of physical geography inputs’,41 i.e. the 
presence of natural factors in the geographical and geological environment from where 
products derive their qualities and/or characteristics. As recalled by Marie-Vivien, this strict 
interpretation of the link to origin historically results from the monitoring system of wine 
production in France.42 Yet it is difficult to reconcile this deterministic approach to terroir with 
the greater social and cultural dimensions embodied in artisanal and industrial products, 
including the producers’ know-how, skills and practices, especially as these can move outside 
the area of origin.43 The establishment of the link between an industrial and artisanal product 
and its geographical origin thus calls for a new type of terroir connection, which would provide 
more space to accommodate human factors and reputation.44 
 
2.1.2 Choice of the name 
 
AOCs, IGPIAs, PDOs and PGIs are formed with appellations that may be names of a country, 
region, locality or a specific area,45 yet non-geographical names are also eligible for protection 
if they have been traditionally used to refer to the geographical origin of the product. For 
instance, the name Pélardon does not refer to any geographical area but derives from old names 
used in relation to the goat cheese produced in the Cévennes area in the 17th Century, including 
‘péraldou’, ‘pélardou’, or ‘pélaudou’. These various names may themselves come from the 
                                                        
40 D. Gangjee, Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications (CUP, 2012) 21. 
41 D. Gangjee, ‘Geographical Indications and Cultural Heritage’ (2012) 1(4) The WIPO Journal 85. 
42 D. Marie-Vivien, ‘The Protection of Geographical Indications for Handicrafts: How to Apply the Concepts of Natural and Human Factors 
to All Products’, 2013 4(2) WIPO Journal 19. 
43 D. Marie-Vivien, ‘A comparative analysis of GIs for handicrafts: the link to origin in culture as well as nature?’ in D. Gangjee, Research 
Handbook on Intellectual Property and Geographical Indications (Edward Elgar, 2016) 292, 295. 
44 Gangjee ‘From Geography to History’ (n37); Marie-Vivien, ‘Do Geographical Indications for Handicraft Deserve a Special Regime?’ 
(n28). 
45 For AOCs: Consumer Code, Article L. 431-1; for IGPIAs: IP Code, Article L.721-2; for PDO/PGIs: Regulation 1151/2012, Article 5. 
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term ‘pèbre’ that means pepper and which may relate to the spicy taste of the cheese. As for 
the name ‘Berry’, it is the historical name of a French province that existed until the French 
Revolution abolished its boundaries in 1790. 
 
Importantly, the names cannot be generic46 as these have become common names identifying 
a category of products and, as such, as are no longer understood as indicating the specific origin 
of the goods. Although French law is silent on the issue of generic terms, the French 
jurisprudence has excluded such names from the scope of protection of AOCs, for instance 
‘Moutarde de Dijon’.47 Likewise, the European legislation explicitly mentions that generic 
terms shall not be registered as PDOs/PGIs.48 The issue of genericity is particularly important 
in the Marseille soap case study. French courts ruled in the 1920s that the name is not an 
indication of origin; that it has entered the public domain; and that it has become a generic 
appellation that can be used for any product whose composition (and not method of production 
or origin) is consistent with the usual practices.49 As a result, no less than sixty-two trade marks 
combining the name ‘savon de Marseille’ have been registered by INPI so far – sometimes 
even including the qualification ‘traditional’.50 At the time of writing, the protection of the 
denomination ‘savon de Marseille’ as an IGPIA is under dispute among three producer 
organisations. An important issue that INPI has to solve is to decide whether the name has 
become generic and, if not, for which type of product the IGPIA should be granted (see 
Chapters 4 and 6).51  
 
2.1.3 Collective action 
 
The voluntary and collective action of local operators which, as suggested by Le Goffic, 
emphasises the idea of human community contained in the definition of terroir,52 is 
fundamental to initiate the application process in the AOCs, IGPIAs, and PDO/PGI systems. 
                                                        
46 ECJ, Feta, 25 October 2005, C-465/02 and C-466/02 [86]. 
47 CA Paris, 19 mars 1929, Ann. propr. ind. 1930, 257.  
48 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 6.1. 
49 Société nouvelle des savons de Marseille C. Syndicat des fabricants de savon de Marseille, Cour de Cassation, 24 October 1928. 
50 See INPI’s database: <https://bases-marques.inpi.fr/Typo3_INPI_Marques/marques_resultats_liste.html> accessed 21/08/2018.  
51 For general background on the issue of genericity, see D. Gangjee, ‘Genericide: the death of a Geographical Indication?’ in D. Gangjee 
(ed.) Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Geographical Indications (Edward Elgar, 2016) 508. 
52 Le Goffic, ‘L’appellation d’origine’ (n35). 
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In involving a participatory process, this requirement has significant consequences on the 
mobilization, participation and empowerment of local actors (see Chapter 4). 
 
According to Article 49.1 of Regulation 1151/2012, ‘[a]pplications for registration of names 
under the quality schemes (…) may only be submitted by groups who work with the products 
with the name to be registered’ except in exceptional cases, with groups being defined as ‘any 
association, irrespective of its legal form, mainly composed of producers or processors working 
with the same product’.53  
 
In France, the role of producers was first promoted with the Decree-Law of 1935 that required 
INAO to consult producer unions before proposing the recognition of an AOC.54 It was 
subsequently strengthened55 with a new Order adopted in 2006 for the promotion of 
agricultural, forestry, food and seafood products [hereafter, Order of 2006].56 Following this 
Order, all operators involved in the production, processing, elaboration and packaging of the 
product57 must group together within one single entity with legal personality.58 This has put an 
end to the possibility that the same AOC is claimed by rival producer unions.59 Such entity, to 
which all operators must necessarily adhere,60 must be recognised by INAO as an Organisation 
for the Defence and Management of the AOC (Organisme de Défense et de Gestion, ODG)61 
on the basis of its representativeness and the balanced representation of the different 
professional groups involved.62 These requirements, that are not mentioned in European law, 
aim to ensure the democratic functioning and inclusivity of the producers’ organisations,63 
which have been identified as a key factor for the success of GI initiatives.64 Similarly, the 
                                                        
53 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 3(2).  
54 Decree-Law of 30 July 1935, Article 21. 
55 D. Marie-Vivien, ‘The Role of the State in the Protection of Geographical Indications: From Disengagement in France/Europe to Significant 
Involvement in India’ (2010) 13 JWIP 121, 126.  
56 Ordonnance 12006-1547 du 7 décembre 2006 relatif à la valorisation des produits agricole, forestiers ou alimentaires et des produits de 
la mer (Order of 7 December 2006 for the promotion of agricultural, forestry, food and seafood products) (8 décembre 2006) JO 18607.  
57 Rural Code, Article L.642-3. 
58 Rural Code, Article L.642-17. 
59 C. Le Goffic, ‘La protection des indications géographiques’ (n16) 253. For examples of conflicts between rival producer unions, see N. 
Olszak, ‘Actualité du droit des signes d’origine et de qualité (indications géographiques, labels)’ (2007) 9 Propriété industrielle 6, 10.  
60 Rural Code, Articles L.642-3 and L.642-21. 
61 Rural Code, Article L.642-17.  
62 Rural Code, Article L.642-18. 
63 INAO, ‘Guide du demandeur pour la reconnaissance en qualité d’organisme de défense et de gestion’ (Janvier 2016) 10. 
64 N. Ackermann and F. Russo, ‘Adding value to traditional products of regional origin: A guide to creating a quality consortium’ (UNIDO, 
2010) 49. 
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regulation on IGPIAs requires that, as a condition for granting the protection,65 their defence 
and management must be carried out by an ODG that must ensure the representativeness of the 
operators.66  
 
Details of these requirements are provided by INAO. To assess the representativeness of the 
ODGs, information shall be provided on the number of operators who are already members of 
the candidate body and the volumes they produce as compared with the total production 
volume.67 Further, to ensure the democratic functioning of the ODG, all members shall have 
the right to participate in its general assemblies, taking into account that quorum rules for 
decision-making should guarantee their proportional representation.68 Finally, all the different 
professional groups involved, including producers, processors and packagers, should be 
equally represented in all decision-making bodies, including the board of directors and the 
general assembly.69 These requirements have significant consequences on the nature of 
collective dynamics involved in the creation process and operation of the GI initiatives (see 
Chapter 4).   
 
Whereas the ODGs for agro-food products must be recognised by INAO as a pre-condition for 
the AOC, PDO and PGI recognition,70 the recognition of an IGPIA confirms recognition of the 
ODG by INPI.71  
 
Applications must be submitted by the ODGs72 to INAO (for AOCs, PDOs and PGIs)73 or INPI 
(for IGPIAs),74 thereby giving local operators grouped within an association a key role in the 
initiation of the application process. Thus, the application process is based on a bottom-up and 
participatory approach. This approach stands in sharp contrast with Vietnam’s top-down and 
state-driven processes (see Chapter 3).  
 
                                                        
65 IP Code, Article L.721-3. 
66 IP Code, Articles L.721-4 and L.721-6, 4°. 
67 INAO (n63). 
68 ibid 11. 
69 ibid 12. 
70 Rural Code, Article L.642-17.  
71 IP Code, Article L.721-3, 5°. 
72 For AOCs: Rural Code, Article L.641-6; for IGPIAs: IP Code, Article L.721-3, 1°.  
73 Consumer Code, Art. L.115-21 and Rural Code, Article R.641-11. 
74 IP Code, Article L.721-3. 
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Two comments can be made on the nature of the ODGs. On the one hand, it is remarkable that 
the representativeness of the ODGs, and the balanced nature of the representation of the 
different categories of operators who work with the product, are mandatory criteria for the 
recognition of AOCs and IGPIAs. On the other hand, the compulsory membership of all 
operators has proved controversial as it is contrary to European law and may also affect the 
constitutional freedom of association, including the freedom not to join an association, as 
established by article L.411-8 of the French Labour Code, Article 11 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 12 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This appears to be a concern more particularly with 
regard to the obligation to pay fees.75 For Olszak, the compulsory membership cannot be a 
legal requirement but only a ‘natural obligation’ and ‘voluntary commitment to fulfil the moral 
duty of defending an appellation’.76 This points to the relationship between generations of 
producers who have developed the product and built its reputation over time and individual 
operators who sustain the appellation in the present time. The recognition of an appellation 
derives from intergenerational transmission of specific knowledge and practices of producers 
over time, which alludes to the continuity or organic nature of the community. In practice, an 
appellation requires the actions of individual operators who produce and market the labelled 
products,77 and who should not be legally required to join one single entity with legal 
personality.   
 
The missions entrusted to producers through the ODGs will be detailed in Chapter 4. Of 
particular importance is that they include the elaboration of a CoP at the core of the application 
process which, before the reform of 2006, was previously drafted by INAO together with 
producers.78 This points to a progressive disengagement of the French State and increased 
powers of producers.79 The objectives also encompass the elaboration of the control plan and 
participation in its implementation.80  
 
 
 
                                                        
75 Rural Code, Article L.642-24. 
76 Conseil d’Etat, 12/02/2007, Ass. Sopravit et autres, n° 301131, Gaz. Pal., 18/08/2007, n° 230, note N. Olszak 9. 
77 Olszak, Le droit des appellations d'origine (n5) 83. 
78 ibid 157-158. 
79 Marie-Vivien, ‘The Role of the State in the Protection of Geographical Indications’ (n55) 126. 
80 For AOCs, Rural Code: Article L.642-22; for IGPIAs: IP Code, Article L.721-6. 
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2.1.4 Codes of practice  
 
The elaboration of a CoP (‘product specifications’ in European law) is a key element of all 
AOCs, IGPIAs and PDOs/PGIs applications.81 It is the fundamental document upon which the 
quality control mechanisms are based and it guarantees to consumers a product’s specific 
qualities and characteristics.82 As stressed by Regulation 1151/2012, ‘[t]he added value of 
[GIs] is based on consumer trust [and] is only credible if accompanied by effective verification 
and controls’.83 To that end, ‘operators should be subject to a system that verifies compliance 
with the product specification’.84  
 
The CoP is generally regarded as the masterpiece of collective action as it must be agreed upon 
collectively by producers,85 which highlights their pivotal role in the definition of the products. 
As such, the law provides local producers with the necessary space to take ownership of the 
initiatives (see Chapter 4). The CoP must be approved by INAO (for AOCs, PDOs and PGIs)86 
or INPI (for IGPIAs)87 and published in a ministerial decree for AOPs,88 the Official Industrial 
Property Gazette for IGPIAs,89 or the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) for 
PDOs/PGIs.90  
 
As a detailed technical document that describes the specificity of the product, the CoP 
includes:91 
(i) the name of the product;  
(ii) the definition of the geographical area;  
(iii) the description of the product, including the raw materials if appropriate;  
(iv) the description of the link between the product and its geographical origin;  
                                                        
81 For agro-food products: Rural Code, Article L.641-6 and Regulation 1151/2012, Article 8(b); for industrial and artisanal products: IP Code, 
Articles L.721-3 and R.721-1. 
82 G. Allaire, F. Casabianca, E. Thévenod-Mottet (n12) 1, 8.  
83 Regulation 1151/2012, Recital 46. 
84 Regulation 1151/2012, Recital 47.  
85 S. Réviron and J.-M. Chappuis, ‘Geographical Indications: Collective Organization and Management’ in E. Barham and B. Sylvander 
(eds.), Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (Wallingford: CAB International, 2011) 45, 53.  
86 Consumer Code, Article L.115-21. See Rural Code, Articles L.641-6, L.641-10 and L.641-11, for AOCs, AOPs and IGPs, respectively. 
87 IP Code, Article L721-6, 1°. 
88 Rural Code, Article L641-7. 
89 IP Code, Article L721-3, 5°. 
90 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 50.2. 
91 For AOCs: Rural Code, Article R.641-12; for PDOs/PGIs: Regulation 1151/2012, Article 7; for IGPIAs: IP Code, Article L.721-7. 
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(v) the conditions of production, including technical, environmental and cultural norms; and 
(vi) the control plan and arrangements.  
 
Interestingly, the regulation on IGPIAs goes further by specifying that the CoPs may also 
include, as a facultative option, the social and environmental commitments of the ODG, 
thereby pointing to the potential multi-functionality of GIs.92  
 
The CoP is thus a normative document that codifies the product quality and cultural and agro-
environmental practices. Despite their mandatory content, the CoPs allow for some flexibility 
and can vary greatly in terms of details and standards. Indeed, local stakeholders taking part of 
the elaboration process are ultimately the ones deciding which criteria and rules of production 
to include – or deliberately ignore.93 This aspect reminds us that, beyond the normative aspect, 
the CoP is also a strategic tool that may have exclusionary effects deriving from the definition 
of the geographical area or the conditions of production.94 The way in which the CoPs were 
elaborated in our case studies, including which economic, environmental or cultural interests 
were represented or excluded from such process, will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
2.1.5 Quality controls  
 
To verify compliance with the CoP and monitor the use of registered names on the market,95 
Regulation 1151/2012 requires Member States to designate the competent authority(ies) 
responsible for official controls.96 These must offer adequate guarantees of objectivity and 
impartiality97 and may delegate the control tasks to one or more control bodies98 that shall be 
accredited in accordance with European Standard EN 45011 or ISO/IEC 65.99 Member States 
are under the obligation to organise external controls but are free to decide whether these shall 
                                                        
92 IP Code, Article L.721-7. 
93 For more detailed discussion on the flexibilities of the PDO/PGI registration system, see Gangjee, ‘Proving provenance?’ (n3) 18-20.  
94 G. Belletti and A. Marescotti, ‘Origin products, geographical indications and rural development’ in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), 
Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (Wallingford: CAB International, 2011) 75, 82. 
95 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 36.3. 
96 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 36.1. 
97 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 36.2. 
98 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 39.1. 
99 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 39.2. 
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be carried out by public or private certification entities, which was an important reform 
introduced by Regulation 510/2006. This has resulted in a variety of approaches across 
Member States. For instance, in Czech Republic, Finland and Luxembourg, external controls 
are carried out by public bodies that are not accredited with any European standard,100 whereas 
in the UK they are undertaken by a designated private firm except in some cases where local 
authorities and Trading Standards officers can also act as inspectors.101  
 
In France, the establishment of control mechanisms is a prerequisite for the recognition of 
AOCs102 and IGPIAs.103 This shows how essential controls are to guarantee the specificity and 
quality of local products in consistency with their CoP.104 Whereas INAO was traditionally in 
charge of the controls and sanctions for AOCs – and hence PDOs/PGIs –, the Order of 2006 
introduced a major reform by making it mandatory – and not only optional as per Regulation 
510/2006 – for controls to be carried out by private, independent third bodies. These bodies 
must be chosen by the ODG,105 approved by INAO106 as the national competent authority 
responsible for official controls, and accredited according to the relevant national and European 
technical accreditation standards.107 As noted by Marie-Vivien, this reform, which was justified 
by the need to tackle the partiality and inefficiency of the controls that INAO used to delegate 
to professional syndicates, as well as to reduce public spending, has led to a reduction of the 
role of INAO and hence of the state.108  
 
While the ODGs could traditionally choose between inspection and certification bodies, since 
2013 only the latter can be responsible for quality controls of AOC, PDO and PGI products.109 
The control of IGPIAs is more flexible considering that the ODGs can choose between 
inspection bodies and certification bodies, who must be accredited by the French accreditation 
                                                        
100 London Economics, ‘Evaluation of the CAP Policy on Protected Designations of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical Indications 
(PGI)’ (Final Report, 2008) 73. 
101 ibid 74. 
102 Rural Code, Article L.641-5. 
103 IP Code, Articles L.721-3 and L.721-7. 
104 Le Goffic, ‘La protection des indications géographiques’ (n16) 112. 
105 Rural Code, Article R.642-37, 1°. 
106 Rural Code, Article L.642-5, 4°. 
107 Rural Code, Article R.642-53. 
108 D. Marie-Vivien and others, ‘Are French Geographical Indications Losing Their Soul? Analyzing Recent Developments in the 
Governance of the Link to the Origin in France’ (2017) 98 World Development 25, 27. 
109 ibid 29. 
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authority (COFRAC).110 The main difference between inspection and certification bodies is 
that the former send their evaluation reports to the ODGs who decide on the sanctions while 
the latter decide on the sanctions themselves.111 For instance, in our case studies, the 
certification bodies are Veritas,112 Certipaq113 and Qualisud114 for green lentils from Berry, 
bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay and Pélardon cheese, respectively.  
 
The law on IGPIAs does not provide detail on the type of controls to be carried out. As for 
AOC, PDO and PGI products, control plans must be elaborated by the certification body in 
cooperation with the ODG115 and approved by INAO.116 They shall provide for three types of 
controls:  
(i) self-monitoring carried out by the operators on their own products;  
(ii) internal controls conducted under the supervision of the ODG; and 
(iii) external controls performed by the certification bodies117 under the authority of INAO118 
and whose costs are borne by producers/processors.119  
 
In addition, an organoleptic examination of the products shall be carried out by a commission 
made up of competent professionals and experts.120  
 
In the case of AOCs, PDOs and PGIs, the certification body has broad powers to decide on the 
granting, maintenance, and extension of the certification.121 It can take appropriate measures 
to sanction failures to observe the CoP, can suspend or withdraw producers’ certification,122 
                                                        
110 IP Code, Article L.721-9. 
111 ibid. Besides, certification bodies must be accredited by the French Accreditation Committee (COFRAC) in accordance with EN 45011. 
See Marie-Vivien, ‘Are French Geographical Indications Losing Their Soul?’ (n108) 28. 
112 See <https://www.bureauveritas.fr/home/about-us/our-business/certification#> accessed 21/08/2018. 
113 See <https://www.certipaq.com/> accessed 21/08/2018. 
114 See <http://www.qualisud.fr> accessed 21/08/2018. 
115 Rural Code, Article L.642-32 and Article R.642-39. 
116 Rural Code, Article L.642-5, 3°. 
117 Rural Code, Article R.642-39. 
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119 ibid. 
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and informs INAO of any such decision.123 Regarding IGPIAs, non-compliant operators are 
subject to a warning or exclusion procedure.124  
 
2.1.6 Right to use  
 
Only those stakeholders who are located inside the concerned region and who comply with the 
CoP have the right to use the AOC,125 IGPIA,126 PDO or PGI logos,127 taking into account that 
the use of an AOC, PDO and PGI logo is also subject to results of the quality controls.128 
Besides, French law requires all operators to adhere to the ODG in order to have the right to 
use the logos.129 However, this membership requirement appears to be contrary to the European 
PDO/PGI scheme, directly applicable in France, which does not require the establishment of 
unique organisations with legal personality. On the contrary, European legislation enshrines 
the principle of availability of PDOs/PGIs by declaring that these may be used by any operator 
marketing a product conforming to the corresponding specification.130  
 
Since May 2009, the use of PDO and PGI logos (or the indications ‘protected designation of 
origin’ or ‘protected geographical indication’) is mandatory on the labelling of the products 
that are marketed under a registered PDO or PGI.131 This reform was driven by the need to 
increase consumers’ awareness of these signs following a survey conducted in 2007 that 
showed that only 8% of European consumers recognize the PDO and PGI logos.132 Since 
January 2012, AOC products registered at the European level can only bear the PDO label or 
indication but not the AOC logo.133  
  
                                                        
123 Rural Code, Article R.622-55. 
124 IP, Code Article L.721-7, 9°. 
125 Rural Code, Article L.641-5. 
126 IP Code, Articles L.721-5, L.721-9 and R.721-8. 
127 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 12.1. 
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130 Regulation 1151/2012, Article 12.1. 
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132 London Economics (n100) 259. 
133 Décret 2007-30 du 5 janvier 2007 relatif à la valorisation des produits agricoles, forestiers ou alimentaires et des produits de la mer 
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Picture 2.1 
Logos of the different signs of quality and origin in use in France 
 
      AOC          IGPIA           PDO           PGI  
 
 
 
   
 
The right to use does not mean that the operators own the appellation. In effect, both French 
and European law is silent on the issue of ownership. As suggested by Le Goffic, GIs do not 
belong to any individual, collective, private or public person, including local stakeholders, the 
ODG, INAO, INPI or the state, as confirmed by the highest French Court.134 Rather, they are 
considered as common goods that cannot be appropriated, are non-rivalrous (the use of the 
label by an operator does not preclude another’s use) and non-excludable (any operator located 
inside the concerned region and who comply with the CoP have the right to use).135 This is a 
significant difference in comparison with trade marks (see Section 2.2) as well as with the state 
ownership of sui generis GIs in Vietnam (see Chapter 3). One consequence of the principle of 
‘non-appropriation’ of sui generis GIs is that they cannot be sold, licensed or transferred.136   
 
2.1.7 Public dimension 
 
Contrary to other IPRs, and despite their categorisation as voluntary standards,137 the sui 
generis protection of GIs in France and in Europe has traditionally been characterised by a 
strong public dimension. The involvement of state authorities is usually justified by the need 
to provide an effective guarantee of the origin, quality and characteristics of the GI product to 
consumers.  
                                                        
134 Cass. Com., 24 March 1992, 89-20.178. 
135 Le Goffic, ‘La protection des indications géographiques’ (n16) 255-282. 
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The public dimension of sui generis GIs is first reflected in their recognition process. In France, 
the recognition of AOCs leads to the publication of a ministerial decree that shall validate the 
CoP on a proposal of INAO138 that cannot be amended, after a two-month national opposition 
procedure.139 In a similar way, IGPIAs are recognised following a decision taken and published 
by INPI in the Official Industrial Property Gazette140  after a two-month public survey141 and 
consultation of stakeholders.142 At the European level, the recognition of PDOs and PGIs is 
published in an implementing act of the Commission.143 
 
The public dimension of GIs is also reflected in the important role that Member States play as 
the first tier to evaluate and validate the PDO/PGI applications submitted at the national level, 
which includes the potential for a national opposition procedure,144 before transferring them to 
the Commission, which triggers the European phase of the procedure.145 Groups of local 
operators cannot submit their PDO or PGI application directly to the Commission. In France, 
it is INAO who processes the applications and acts as an intermediary between local operators 
and the MAF. Subsequently, the MAF transfers the applications proposed by INAO to the 
Commission.146 The internal application procedure for PDOs and PGIs is the same as for 
French AOCs. The mechanism is based on the lex rei sitae principle and the consideration that 
countries where GIs are located are best able to evaluate the link to origin.147  
 
At the European level, the Commission is required to scrutinise the application for a maximum 
period of six months.148 In this regard, it is noteworthy that, despite the official length of the 
European procedure for the scrutiny of the applications, its complexity and duration – which 
was reported to last on average four years –149 has been pointed as an issue discouraging 
                                                        
138 Rural Code, Article L.641.7. 
139 Rural Code, Article R.641.13. 
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potential applicants.150 Case studies also show a disconnect between producers’ needs and 
European bureaucracy. As summarised by an INAO officer, ‘to be clear, European officials 
don’t understand anything about the products which is absolutely normal considering that they 
cannot have a full knowledge of all European products. They just have to verify that the 
applications sent by the Member States meet the European criteria. Yet we lose a lot of time 
trying to explain to the Commission how the product is made’.151  
 
The Commission only checks for manifest errors,152 contrary to Member States who are 
supposed to examine the substance of the application, including the definition of the 
geographical area and the conditions of production. Ultimately, based on its own scrutiny and 
the evaluation of any notice of opposition received during a three-month opposition 
procedure,153 the Commission may either reject the application or register the PDO/PGI on the 
publicly accessible DOOR register.154  
 
The role of the state is also important in the choice and implementation of the official control 
mechanisms although, as discussed previously, INAO’s role has been reduced since 2006 to 
the approbation of the control plans, the accreditation of the certification bodies and their 
evaluation. Yet the involvement of INAO provides AOCs, PDOs and PGIs with a strong public 
and regulatory dimension, as opposed to the freedom enjoyed by the trade mark owners in the 
choice of the controls.155  
 
Finally, whereas the law is silent on the role of the INPI in defending IGPIAs, the role of INAO 
explicitly extends to the defence and promotion of quality signs both in France and abroad.156  
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Figure 2.1 
Registration procedure of PDOs and PGIs 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Agriculture and Rural Development Directorate General  
 
 
It follows from the above that the role of the state through the MAF and INAO is important in 
overseeing the whole application process, administering the control mechanisms and defending 
quality signs. At the same time, Marie-Vivien notes the progressive disengagement of the 
French State in the protection of GIs since the reform introduced in 2006 in at least two 
different ways: first, the producers’ empowerment through the increased role of ODGs in the 
application process and the elaboration of the CoP; second, the shift of quality control 
processes from the state (INAO) to private, independent certification bodies.157  
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2.1.8 Absolute protection 
 
The protection of AOCs, IGPIAs and PDOs/PGIs is similar, although European legislation is 
more detailed. French legislation prohibits the use of any evocative term of the appellation on 
any similar product, as well as on other establishment, product or service when such use is 
likely to misappropriate or weaken the reputation of the name.158 Likewise, European law 
protects against any direct or indirect commercial use on comparable products; any misuse, 
imitation or evocation, even if the true origin is indicated or if the protected name is translated 
or accompanied by an expression such as ‘style’, ‘type’, ‘method’, ‘as produced in’, ‘imitation’ 
or similar, including when those products are used as an ingredient; any other false or 
misleading indication as to the provenance, origin, nature or essential qualities of the product; 
and any other practice liable to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the product.159  
 
The French and European sui generis protection of GIs therefore appears to be the same as the 
highest ‘absolute’ level protection provided by Article 23 of TRIPS (see Chapter 1). Besides, 
sui generis GIs can never become generic and enter the public domain.160 However, unlike 
French law on AOCs that only provides for sanctions in case of non-compliance with the CoP, 
both the French law on IGPIAs161 and European law on PDO/PGIs162 stipulate that the 
registration of the titles may be cancelled by INPI or the European Commission, respectively, 
where compliance with the CoP in not ensured (for both IGPIAs and PDO/PGIs), or no product 
is placed on market for at least seven years (for PDO and PGIs), or the controls are not carried 
out (for IGPIAs). 
 
Contrary to the law on trade marks that limits the group of people who can bring an action for 
infringement (see Section 2.2), the protection of an AOC may be requested by any person 
authorised to use it,163 the ODG164 or INAO.165  
 
                                                        
158 For AOCs: Rural Code, Article L.643-1, 2; for IGPIAs: IP Code, Article L.721-8-I. 
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2.2 Trade mark protection of GIs 
 
Unlike sui generis systems, trade mark systems are not specifically designed to protect GIs but 
may be used for that purpose under certain conditions. According to the IP Code, a trade mark 
(individual or collective) is ‘a sign which serves to distinguish the goods or services of a natural 
or legal person’.166 Similarly, European law defines trade marks as signs ‘capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings [..].167 
Whereas sui generis GIs aim to identify the geographical origin of goods, trade marks convey 
information on the commercial origin of goods.  
 
In France, trade marks can be protected through national and EU trade marks.168 While the 
French national route provides protection on the French territory only, the EU scheme ensures 
a Union-wide protection. The recent ‘European trade mark reform package’ adopted in 
December 2015 has led to the publication of new instruments that will be referred to in this 
section:  
(i) for national trade marks: Directive (EU) 2015/2436169 which has repealed Directive 
2008/95/EC with effect from 15 January 2019 [hereafter, Directive 2015/2436]; and 
(ii) for EU trade marks: Regulation (EU) 2015/2424170 amending Council Regulation (EC) 
207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark171 and which has now been codified and replaced by 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 on the European Union trade mark which came into force on 1 
October 2017 [hereafter, EUTMR]172 
 
This section will focus on certification and collective marks exclusively. Both types of mark 
serve different purposes.173 Collective marks simply aim to distinguish the commercial origin 
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 69 
of goods on the basis of ‘club membership’ (through compliance with the users’ regulation174 
and membership of the association).175 By contrast, certification marks serve the purpose to 
certify specific characteristics of the goods (which may include geographical origin) in 
consistency with the users’ regulations, and hence distinguish such goods from others that are 
not so certified.176  
 
It should be noted from the outset that both the French and European trade mark systems have 
important limitations as per their ability to protect GIs. First, although initially included in the 
proposal for this provision,177 the EUTMR explicitly excludes the possibility to certify 
geographical origin for an EU certification mark (introduced for the first time in European law 
by the EUTMR).178 This exclusion is surprising considering the expectations placed on 
certification marks to be more actively used for protecting GIs.179 Second, the French law 
applicable to the certification of products, which certification marks must satisfy,180 prohibits 
the use of geographic names in certificates of conformity for agro-food products unless such 
names have become generic.181 This tends to indicate that geographic names cannot be used as 
certification marks in relation to agro-food products.182 However, the absence of such 
provisions in the law applicable to the certification of non-agro-food products183 suggests that 
geographical names can be used as certification marks in relation to industrial and artisanal 
products.  
 
Consequently, three types of trade marks can apply to GIs:  
1. EU collective marks for all products, as protected in European law under the EUTMR;  
2. national collective marks for all products, as protected in French law and regulated by the 
IP Code under Directive 2015/2436; and 
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3. national certification marks for industrial and artisanal products, as protected in French law 
and regulated by the IP Code under Directive 2015/2436. 
 
Without going through a detailed analysis of French and European legislation, the sections 
below will highlight the main features that are of interest to this research project. These include: 
(i) the distinctiveness of geographical names;  
(ii) the question of ownership;  
(iii) the users’ regulations;  
(iv) the quality control mechanisms;  
(v) the right to use;  
(vi) the non-transferability issue; and  
(vii) the relative protection.   
 
2.2.1 Distinctiveness of geographical names 
 
Both French184 and European law185 allow for geographical names to be registered as collective 
trade marks. However, in French law, the use of geographical names as collective and/or 
certification trade marks (for industrial and artisanal products only) is subject to the 
distinctiveness requirement.186 This requirement entails that trade marks must have a 
distinctive character, which refers to ‘the uniqueness or singularity of the mark, to the degree 
to which it stands out from the crowd of competing signs in the marketplace’.187 Consequently, 
the use of descriptive names that may serve to designate the geographical origin of the goods 
is expressly prohibited.188 The reason for such prohibition is that descriptive geographical 
names are of general interest189 and should remain available to all economic actors operating 
in the same area.190 Although the use of descriptive geographical names alone is prohibited, 
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collective and certification marks may consist of complex marks combining words, graphical 
and figurative signs, as illustrated by the certification mark ‘Laguiole Origine Garantie’ 
registered since 2001 and, among our case studies, the collective mark ‘Savon de Marseille’ 
registered as a collective mark in 2012. This is because those additional elements make the 
trade marks distinctive.191 This is an important difference with AOCs, IGPIAs, and 
PDOs/PGIs, which may all consist of geographical names exclusively.  
 
 
Picture 2.2 
Examples of complex marks with geographical names 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It should be noted that the application of the distinctiveness requirement reflects the decision 
of French legislators not to use the permitted derogations from the prohibition of Directive 
2015/2436 to use geographical names.192 These derogation provisions allow Member States to 
‘provide that signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the geographical 
origin of the goods or services may constitute’ certification marks193 and collective marks.194 
For instance, in the UK, descriptive geographical names can be registered as collective and 
certification marks,195 notwithstanding the general prohibition to use signs or indications which 
may serve to designate the geographical origin.196 
 
                                                        
191 ibid. 
192 Directive 2015/2436, Article 4(1)(c). 
193 Directive 2015/2436, Article 28.4. 
194 Directive 2015/2436, Article 29.3. 
195 UK Trade Marks Act 1994, Schedule 1§3 and Schedule 2§3. 
196 UK Trade Marks Act 1994, Section 3(1)(c). 
  
 72 
By contrast, an EU collective mark can consist of a descriptive geographical name without 
having to combine words and figurative signs.197 Nevertheless, both Community (now EU) 
trade marks ‘Bois des Alpes’ and ‘Savon de Marseille’, registered under Regulation 207/2009 
in 2013 and 2014 respectively, are complex word/figurative marks. In the first case, the 
combination of words and figurative signs was seen as a way to strengthen the distinctive 
character of the mark.198  In the second case, it was justified by the need to ensure consistency 
with the collective mark already registered at the French level.199 
 
Picture 2.3 
The EU trade marks ‘Savon de Marseille’ and ‘Bois des Alpes’ 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Ownership  
 
Unlike sui generis GIs that cannot be appropriated, trade marks safeguard the private interest 
of their holder. Their ownership, which can be co-ownership, is acquired by registration.200 In 
the absence of specific provisions, collective trade marks may be filed (and owned) by a natural 
or legal, private or public person. The implementation of Directive 2015/2436 is likely to lead 
to the evolution of French law in the near future. Indeed, according to the Directive, 
‘associations of manufacturers, producers, suppliers of services or traders […] as well as legal 
persons governed by public law, may apply for collective marks’.201 This provision emphasises 
                                                        
197 ECJ, Nordmilch v OHIM, T-295/01, II-4378, para. 32; ECJ, Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM, T-379/03, II-4646, para. 35.  
198 Interview F-E1. 
199 Interview F-A1. 
200 IP Code, Article L.712.1.  
201 Directive 2015/2436, Article 29.2. 
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the role of groups of local stakeholders by identifying associations of local stakeholders as the 
only possible applicants governed by private law. Similarly, applications for EU collective 
marks may be filed by associations of local stakeholders or legal persons governed by public 
law.202 However, unlike in the sui generis systems of protection, there is no requirement for 
trade marks to reflect the balanced representation of the different professional groups involved 
with the product. 
 
Turning to certification marks, the rules governing their registration and ownership depart from 
the general trade mark regime to guarantee efficient and independent controls. In French law, 
certification marks may be registered by a legal person only who is neither the manufacturer 
nor the importer nor the seller of the goods or services.203 However, the Directive 2015/2436 
broadens the category of possible applicants to ‘any natural or legal person […] provided that 
such person does not carry on a business involving the supply of goods or services of the kind 
certified’ [emphasis added],204 which may call for amendment to French law.  
 
It follows from the above that, in contrast with the sui generis systems of protection, local 
stakeholders do not have any specific role in the application process of collective and 
certification marks. It may be that French law on collective marks needs amending to better 
take into account the role of groups of stakeholders in the application process.  
 
2.2.3 Users’ regulations  
 
Applications for collective and certification marks at both the French and European levels must 
include users’ regulations205 which remind us of the CoPs. Unlike for the CoPs, the law does 
not specify which elements must be included in the users’ regulations. French law merely 
specifies that, for certification marks, the regulations must set out the conditions of their use.206 
European law goes further and indicates that the regulations governing the use of national207 
                                                        
202 EUTMR, Article 74.1. 
203 IP Code, Article L.715-2, 1°. 
204 Directive 2015/2436, Article 28.2. 
205 For French collective and certification marks: IP Code, Articles L.715-1 and L.715-2(2), and Directive 2015/2436, Article 30.1. For EU 
trade marks: EUTMR, Article 75.1. 
206 IP Code, Article L.715-2, 2°. 
207 Directive 2015/2436, Article 30.2. 
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and EU collective marks208 shall specify at least the persons authorised to use the mark, the 
conditions of membership of the association and the conditions of use of the mark, including 
sanctions. This suggests that the conditions of membership and conditions of use may be 
different, and that nothing prevents the latter from including additional criteria.  
 
In the absence of minimum or mandatory content to describe the specificity of the product, 
applicants have full discretion to include the obligation for a product to have certain 
characteristics linked to its geographical origin. Consequently, users’ regulations can vary in 
terms of the level of detail regarding the ingredients, methods of production, practices etc. to 
be satisfied. Yet, despite such limits of the trade mark system as a whole, if applicants desire, 
users’ regulations can provide the same degree of technical detail and complexity as CoPs. For 
example, the users’ regulations of the certification mark ‘Bois des Alpes’ contains detailed 
provisions specifying the product’s characteristics, methods and place of production. They 
even go beyond the requirements of sui generis systems by including socio-economic, 
environmental and governance standards (called ‘issues of sustainable development’)209 for the 
evaluation of applicants.210 This has important consequences on the ability of the initiative to 
generate effects outside the market (see Chapter 7). It thus appears that users’ regulations in 
the trade mark system may contain as many, if not more, detailed and demanding rules than 
the CoPs in the sui generis systems, as it may also contain minimal requirements. 
 
2.2.4 Quality controls  
 
Neither the French nor the European law on national and EU collective marks (both the 
Directive 2015/2436 and the EUTMR) make provision to ensure the effectiveness of the 
product controls. In particular, they do not require the owner of the mark to be independent 
from its users. However, although not required by European law, the association ‘Bois des 
Alpes’ has gone beyond the minimum legal requirements by designating an accredited 
certification body to carry out controls in an independent manner.  
 
                                                        
208 EUTMR, Art. 75.2. 
209 Rules governing the certification mark ‘Bois des Alpes’ 7. 
210 ibid 3. 
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As regards certification marks, their specific certification function has justified special rules. 
Both French211 and European law212 enshrine the principle of the independence of the users 
from the owner of the certification mark, which aims to provide a strong guarantee of the 
product’s compliance with the users’ regulations by ensuring efficient and independent 
controls. The French law applicable to certification goes further and specifies that certificates 
for non-agro-food products (the only category of products for which a geographical name can 
be protected as a certification mark) must be issued by organisations that are accredited by the 
French accreditation authority (COFRAC).213  
 
2.2.5 Right to use 
 
According to French law, collective marks can be used by any person satisfying the 
regulations,214 while the use of certification marks should be open to all persons, other than the 
owner, who supply goods satisfying the conditions laid down by the regulations.215  
Interestingly, for EU collective marks consisting of geographical names, European law 
specifies that the users’ regulations shall ‘authorise any person whose goods […] originate in 
the geographical area concerned to become a member of the association which is the proprietor 
of the mark’.216 While this provision aims to avoid monopolisation of geographical names, it 
doesn’t imply that only compliant members have the right to use the marks. In fact, the EUTMR 
enshrines the principle of availability of collective marks consisting of geographical names to 
any third party, ‘provided that he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial 
or commercial matters; in particular, such a mark shall not be invoked against a third party who 
is entitled to use a geographical name’.217 This provision closely approximates the rules of the 
PDO/PGI protection systems by introducing the idea of a defined geographical area and the 
principle of availability of geographical marks to all compliant operators whose goods originate 
from the area. 
  
                                                        
211 IP Code, Article L.715-2, 1°. 
212 Directive 2015/2436, Article 28.2. 
213 Consumer Code, Article L.433-4. 
214 IP Code, Article L.715-1. 
215 IP Code, Article L.715-2, 3°. 
216 ibid. 
217 EUTMR, Article 74.2. 
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2.2.6 Non-transferability  
 
By contrast to individual and collective marks that are freely transferable,218 but in a similar 
way as for sui generis GIs, certification marks are not transferrable and cannot be subject to 
assignment, pledge or any measure of enforcement.219 The only exception is in case of 
dissolution of the legal person who is the owner,220 yet under strict conditions. In such case, 
the certification mark may be transferred to another legal person subject to the conditions laid 
down by decree in Council of State, and such transfer may only be made to a certification body 
or a legal person holding a certification body to which it grants an exclusive license of the 
mark.221 These limitations are justified by the specific certification function of this type of 
marks. 
 
2.2.7 Relative protection 
 
In stating that the ordinary regime of trade marks applies to collective and certification trade 
marks,222 French law provides a relative protection to collective marks that is subject to the 
‘principle of specialty’.223 According to this principle, collective and certification marks are 
not protected in absolute terms but only for specific uses in relation to identical or similar goods 
to those designated by the mark.224 More specifically, two types of use are prohibited unless 
authorised by the owner in consistency with the Directive 2015/2436.225 The EUTMR provides 
the same level of protection to EU collective marks226 throughout the EU.227  
 
First, the law prohibits the reproduction, use or affixing of a mark on identical goods, even 
with the adjunction of wordings such as ‘formula, style, system, imitation, genre, 
                                                        
218 IP Code, Article L.714-1. 
219 IP Code, Article L.715-2, 4°. 
220 ibid. 
221 IP Code, Article R.715-2, 2°. 
222 IP Code, Article L.715-2. 
223 A. Bouvel, Principe de spécialité et signes distinctifs (Litec, 2004). 
224 F. Pollaud-Dulian, La propriété industrielle (Economica, 2011) 904. 
225 Directive 2015/2436, Article 10. 
226 EUTMR, Article 9. 
227 EUTMR, Article 1.2. 
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method’.228 Second, upon the condition that there is a likelihood of confusion in the mind of 
the public, it prohibits the reproduction, use or affixing of a mark on similar goods; as well as 
the imitation of a mark and the use of an imitated mark for similar or identical goods.229 
Consequently, the complainant bears the burden of proving the risk of confusion, which 
depends greatly on the degree of distinctiveness which the mark has acquired through use.230 
Special consideration of certification marks should be made here. As noted, a certification mark 
can only be used by a person who complies with the users’ regulations. However, by definition, 
‘similar’ products do not comply with the users’ regulations. It follows from this that the 
complainant can bring an action for infringement on the basis of non-compliance with the 
users’ regulations without having to prove the risk of confusion.231 Finally, a special protection 
is granted for well-known marks against any use that is likely to cause a prejudice to its owner, 
or if such use constitutes unjustified exploitation of the mark, even for goods that are not 
similar.232  
 
In both French233 and European law,234  the persons who are entitled to bring an action for 
infringement are limited to the owner of the mark and its users. However, users can only 
institute infringement proceedings if after formal notice the owner does not exercise such 
right,235 or upon his consent.236  
 
Contrary to AOCs, IGPIAs, PDOs and PGIs that are protected as long as the conditions for 
their protection are met, the protection of trade marks lasts 10 years and can be renewed any 
number of times.237  
 
 
 
                                                        
228 IP Code, Article L.713-2. 
229 IP Code, Article L.713-3. 
230 WTO, ‘European Communities: protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agriculture products and foodstuffs,’ March 
2005 (WT/DS174/R) 121. 
231 TGI Paris, 23 April 1997, PIBD 1997, 635, III, 374. 
232 IP Code, Article L.713-5. 
233 IP Code, Article L.716-5. 
234 EUTMR, Article 80.2. 
235 IP Code, Article L.716-5. 
236 EUTMR, Article 80.1. 
237 IP Code, Article L.712-1, 2°. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the main features of the French/European sui generis 
and trade mark systems for the protection of GIs. This study has allowed us to identify a number 
of differences between and within the two systems. These include the definition of the link 
between the product and its geographical area of origin; the registration requirements; the 
extent to which the quality and production process of local products should be specified and 
codified; the quality control systems; the scope of protection; and the involvement of different 
actors, including local stakeholders, the state, the European Commission, and institutions such 
as INAO, INPI and the ODGs, in the monitoring of the registration procedure, the quality 
control mechanisms and the use of the signs. 
 
Broadly speaking, in France, the sui generis system provides for more stringent registration 
requirements, greater role of both producers and public authority, and wider scope of 
protection, compared to the trade mark regime. Sui generis GIs are considered as common 
goods and public assets that protect the public and producers’ interests – hence a demanding 
procedure for the recognition of pre-existing rights by an act of public authority. Contrastingly, 
trade marks are more closely associated with individual ownership and private, commercial 
interests – which justify a procedure for the creation of rights of ownership.238  
 
Unlike collective trade marks, the rules governing the use, quality controls and non-
transferability of certification trade marks bring them closer to sui generis systems of 
protection, yet their scope is reduced to national protection of industrial and artisanal products 
only. As for collective trade marks, their use to protect local products in France is very limited 
in practice and may appear to play a complementary role to sui generis protection systems only. 
This is especially true considering that, in French law, collective marks can be used 
cumulatively with sui generis GIs so that local stakeholders can provide additional information 
to consumers on their affiliation to an association and compete for market share.239 Yet as 
mentioned above, the trade mark system is flexible enough to be used and adjusted to protect 
                                                        
238 Le Goffic (n16). 
239 N. Olszak, ‘Marques et indications géographiques’ in C. Geiger, J. Schmidt-Szalewski (eds), Les défis du droit des marques au XXIe 
siècle: Actes du colloque en l'honneur du Professeur Yves Reboul (Lexis Nexis, 2011) 76.  
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GI products as well as sui generis systems, depending on the actors’ interests, priorities and 
strategy.  
 
These observations stress the importance of looking at the interpretation of the law in practice, 
including the way in which local stakeholders have made use of the law and the extent to which 
the law provides them with the necessary space to take ownership of the initiatives. In analysing 
our empirical findings in Chapters 4-7, it will be particularly critical to assess the extent to 
which the law and institutions that have fashioned the environment of the GI initiatives under 
study, have impacted on the collective dynamics involved in their creation and operation as 
well as on their ability to generate economic and non-economic effects. 
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3 
 
Legal framework for the protection of GIs in Vietnam 
 
 
 
This chapter turns to the study of the Vietnamese legal framework for the protection of GIs, 
including the sui generis and trade mark systems. In a similar way as for Chapter 2 for French 
law, the objective of this chapter is to provide the necessary knowledge of Vietnamese law to 
further our understanding of its interpretation in practice and be able to identify its effects when 
analysing our empirical findings in Chapters 4-7.  
 
Unlike in France where protection of GIs has matured for over a century out of a long process 
that was initiated by local producers, the legal framework for GIs in Vietnam is recent. It was 
first established in 1995 through the concept of ‘appellations of origin’ (AOs) under the 
influence of France, more specifically as a result of the technical cooperation between the 
French Embassy’s Economic Mission and the Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD).1 The French inter-professional association for ‘Cognac’ also 
conducted several missions in the 1990s to raise awareness with Vietnamese public authorities 
about the importance of protecting GIs.2 Leading up to its accession to the WTO in 2007, 
Vietnam revised its legislative framework to comply with TRIPS and adopted the Intellectual 
Property Law 50/2005/QH11 of 29 November 2005 [hereafter ‘IP Law’]. The elaboration of 
this new legal framework was supported as part of the 2001-2010 Swiss-Vietnamese 
Intellectual Property Project (SVIP).3 This project also led to the creation of the National Office 
of Intellectual Property (NOIP) under the authority of the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST)4.  
                                                        
1 D.H. Dao, ‘Institutions de gestion de la qualité : action collective et apprentissage organisationnel. le cas de l'Indication Géographique (IG) 
"Nuoc mam de Phu Quôc" au Vietnam’ (Master’s thesis, Essor: Développement des territoires ruraux, Ecole Nationale Supérieure 
Agronomique de Toulouse, 2011) 6. 
2 ibid 51.  
3 See the description of the project here: 
< https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/recht/entwicklungszusammenarbeit/factsheet_vietnam_a4all.pdf > accessed 20/08/2018. 
4  D. Marie-Vivien, ‘The protection of Geographical Indications in Vietnam’, draft chapter in I. Calboli (ed.) The protection of Geographical 
Indications in ASEAN (expected, publisher unknown) 5. 
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The IP Law introduced the concept of ‘geographical indications’ which replaced that of AOs. 
To avoid confusion with the umbrella term of GIs as per TRIPS, the Vietnamese ‘geographical 
indications’ will be referred to in this chapter as ‘sui generis GIs’. Whereas the Civil Code of 
1995 protected local products through AOs only, the new IP Law provides that, alongside the 
sui generis scheme, collective and certification trade marks can also protect ‘Vietnam’s local 
specialties’5 defined as ‘special and well-known products that have specific characteristics and 
are produced locally’.6 Interestingly, Marie-Vivien reports that the introduction of this dual 
system of protection of GIs aimed to please both European countries (through the sui generis 
system) and the USA (through the trade mark system).7 Likewise, influences from both the EU 
and the USA have resulted in the coexistence of both systems of protection in China.8   
 
While France was a pioneer in the protection of GIs and actively sought to improve and 
promote its own legal system, Vietnam, as many other developing and emerging countries, 
‘hardly had [its] own legal consciousness of geographical indications before the norm migrated 
from the WTO to [the country]’,9 hence reflecting a ‘passive process of accepting 
“transplantation” of norms’.10 Far from being initiated by local producers and farmers, this 
process was led by state authorities, which still has important consequences today, and at least 
initially was motivated by political and commercial considerations. Yet, as in France, 
Vietnam’s approach to GIs has subsequently evolved toward a more holistic conception. 
Today, their protection aims not only to ‘enhance the commercial value of GI-protected 
products but also preserve cultural values and traditional knowledge of the nation’.11  
 
Although both France and Vietnam associate GIs with public benefit outcomes, the legal 
framework for the protection of GIs in the two countries differ in many ways. First and 
foremost, Vietnam’s state-driven, top-down approach to GIs sharply contrasts with the bottom-
up system of protection in France, where local producers have a pivotal role in initiating the 
                                                        
5 Circular 05/2013/TT-BKHCN, Article 1.9, amending Circular 01/2007/TT-BKHCN, point 37.7.  
6 Circular 05/2013/TT-BKHCN, Article 1.1, amending Circular 01/2007/TT-BKHCN, point 37.8.c(i).  
7 Marie-Vivien (n4) 24. 
8 D. Marie-Vivien and E. Biénabe, ‘The multifaceted role of the state in the protection of geographical indications: A worldwide review’ 
(2017) 98 World Development 1, 5. 
9 M.C. Wang, ‘The Asian Consciousness and the Interest in Geographical Indications’ (2006) 96 The Trademark Reporter 906, 906.  
10 ibid. 
11 NOIP, ‘Geographical Indications, Overview’  
<http://www.noip.gov.vn/web/noip/home/en?proxyUrl=/noip/cms_en.nsf/(agntDisplayContent)?OpenAgent&UNID=49BC1C4511A1FFC
A4725767F00377FAD > accessed 21/08/2018. 
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initiatives. Besides, contrary to France where the sui generis protection is specifically designed 
to protect GIs unlike the trade mark system, in Vietnam both sui generis and trade mark systems 
can equally protect the geographical names of local products, although their requirements and 
level of protection differ. The extent to which the characteristics of each legal framework 
impact differently on the creation process, operation and likely effects of the initiatives under 
study, will be analysed in Chapters 4-7. 
 
In light of the differences between the French and Vietnamese legal framework for the 
protection of GIs, this chapter is organised differently from Chapter 2. Instead of analysing the 
sui generis and trade mark systems of protection in a sequential manner, this chapter analyses 
the features that are common to both systems of protection and which are of most interest to 
this research project.  Section 3.1 will first study the rigid interpretation of the law in practice, 
in particular as regard the product/origin nexus. Section 3.2 will turn to the analysis of the state-
driven, top-down management of both systems, including through the support policies, the 
registration and the management of the IP titles, which leaves little space to local stakeholders. 
Finally, Section 3.3 will highlight the organisational and institutional limitations of the 
Vietnamese framework for the protection of GIs.  
 
3.1 A rigid interpretation of the law  
 
Under Vietnamese law, any type of local products (including raw materials, agricultural, food 
and drink products, industrial and handicraft products), can be protected through either the sui 
generis or the trade mark system. As will be shown, the requirements of the sui generis 
protection system are generally more stringent than for a trade mark protection, in particular 
with respect to the nature of the link between the product and its geographical area of origin. 
In practice, the applicants usually go beyond the legal requirements and the two schemes tend 
to converge toward a strict demonstration of the product/origin nexus.12 
 
  
                                                        
12 D. Marie-Vivien D., B. Pick and T.A. Dao, ‘Geographical Indications and Trademarks in Vietnam: Confusion or Real Difference?’ 
(International Conference on Agriculture in an Urbanizing Society, Rome, Italy, 14–15 September 2015). 
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3.1.1 The use of the French terroir approach to Vietnamese sui generis GIs     
 
As mentioned above, Vietnam first provided a sui generis protection of geographical names 
for local products through the concept of AOs. These were defined as ‘a geographical name of 
a country or locality that is used to indicate the origin of a good as being from that country or 
locality, provided that the good has characteristics or qualities that reflect the specific and 
advantageous geographical conditions of a natural or human character or the combination of 
thereof’.13 This definition did not mention the reputation criterion and did not require the 
combination of human and natural factors.  
 
In practice, the AO applications documented the existence of both elements to demonstrate a 
strong link between the product and its geographical area of origin. This was the case for the 
two AOs registered under this regime, i.e. Phú Quốc fish sauce and Mộc Châu shan tea, for 
which France provided technical assistance. The provision of French technical expertise for 
the registration of these products may have influenced the adoption of a strict interpretation of 
the link to origin by Vietnamese practitioners beyond the legal requirements, considering that 
France has been promoting a rigid interpretation of the concept of terroir encompassing both 
human and natural factors. For example, Dao reports that, as part of the preparation process for 
the registration of an AO for Phú Quốc fish sauce, several seminars on GIs involving French 
experts from the French Embassy in Vietnam and the inter-professional association for 
‘Cognac’, as well as the NOIP, the Ministry of Fisheries, local authorities and local producers 
and processors, took place in 2000. These seminars aimed to identify the specific quality and 
characteristics of Phú Quốc fish sauce and elaborate the application and registration 
documents.14  
 
The IP Law of 2005 introduced the concept of sui generis GIs that are defined as a ‘sign used 
to indicate a product originating from a specific area, locality, region or country’.15 Similarly 
to TRIPS, the IP Law provides for three alternative criteria to establish the link between a 
                                                        
13 Civil Code, Article 786. 
14 ibid 51. 
15 IP Law, Article 4.22. 
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product and its geographical origin, including the quality, characteristics16 or the reputation17 
of the product that must be essentially attributable to the ‘geographical conditions of the area, 
locality, territory or country corresponding to such geographical indication’.18 Yet, despite the 
apparent equivalence with the TRIPS definition of GIs, the requirements of the IP Law are 
more stringent in that the nature of ‘geographical conditions’ is further defined as including 
both ‘natural and human factors’.19 As such, the Vietnamese definition of GIs gets closer to the 
concept of terroir as encompassed in the French AOCs and European PDOs with the additional 
mention of the reputation criterion (see Chapter 2).  
 
The need to demonstrate a strong product/origin nexus that relies on both human and natural 
factors is also reflected in the documentation required as part of the application process for a 
sui generis protection. Applications must provide, in addition to the name or sign to be 
protected as a GI20 and a map of the geographical area corresponding to the GI,21 a detailed 
document describing the peculiar characteristics of the product.22 This document should 
include information on: 
(i) the product and its characteristics (including raw materials and physical, chemical, 
microbiological and perceptive characteristics), quality or reputation as linked to the 
geographical origin;  
(ii) the methods used for defining the geographical area and the evidence that the product 
originates from this area; 
(iii) the local and stable methods of production and processing (i.e. human factors); 
(iv) the link between the product and the natural conditions of the geographical area (i.e. natural 
factors); and  
(v) the self-control mechanism of the characteristics or quality of the product. 
 
In practice, no sui generis GI has yet been granted on the ground of the reputation criterion 
alone. In fact, even when the reputation of the product was described for some of the products, 
                                                        
16 According to Article 81.2, the quality or characteristics of a GI product are defined by one or several qualitative, quantitative or physical, 
chemical, microbiological perceptible norms which shall be testable by technical means or experts with appropriate testing methods.  
17 According to Article 81.1, the reputation shall be determined on the basis of the consumer trust. 
18 IP Law, Article 79.2. 
19 IP Law, Article 82.1. See Articles 82.2 and 82.3 for details on the natural factors and human factors respectively.  
20 The name cannot be a generic name and it must not be identical with, or similar to, a mark having been protected if their use will cause 
confusion as to the origin of the products. IP Law, Article 80.  
21 IP Law, Article 106.1. 
22 IP Law, Article 106.2. 
85 
 
the application documents of the large majority of the GIs registered so far demonstrate that 
the products’ quality and characteristics are linked to the geographical conditions of the area 
of origin. For example, although the reputation and history of conical hats from Huế is 
described at length in the application document, both the human factors and the natural factors 
are also documented in detail. The application highlights the importance of the ‘traditional 
stitching techniques and especially the skills of women’23 and specifies that ‘the colour of the 
leaf […] depends on the types of materials employed and on the processing techniques […]. 
Leaves are different from each other depending on their location due to the variety of climatic 
conditions. It is only in the valleys of the Rivers Đà and Thao that palm leaves used for making 
conical hats are found’.24   
 
In light of the above, it appears that the practice has long gone beyond the formal legal texts 
by valuing the strongest possible link between the product and its geographical area of origin 
through the implementation of the French terroir approach based on a combination of human 
and natural factors. As Marie-Vivien suggests, the reason for the rigid interpretation of the 
concept of terroir probably lies in the French influence.25  
 
The fact that, in practice, criteria to be met for registering sui generis GIs are very high, might 
partly explain the lower number of registered GIs (68 as per August 2018 including six from 
foreign countries – see Annex 4) as compared with that of collective and certification trade 
marks for local specialty products (respectively 765 and 181 as of October 2017).26 It may also 
contribute to explain that the great majority of sui generis GIs are registered for raw materials 
including fruits, vegetables, and materials used in processed products (about 80%).27 Although 
human factors might be less easy to demonstrate for this type of product, the applications 
generally focus on the harvesting, post-harvesting and preservation methods, as for star anise 
from Lạng Sơn.28 However, raw materials tend to have low economic value which may account 
for the limited impact of GI protection on socio-economic development in Vietnam.29 By 
                                                        
23 Document describing the characteristics of conical hats from Huế (GI application), 2. 
24 ibid 16. 
25 Marie-Vivien (n4) 10. 
26 ibid 29. However, the author acknowledges that there is uncertainty about these figures.   
27 Đ. Đức Huấn and others, ‘Rapport - Etude des modèles de gestion des indications géographiques du Vietnam’ (NOIP/AFD, 2017) 20. 
28 Document describing the characteristics of star anise from Lạng Sơn (GI application), 2. 
29 B. Pick, D. Marie-Vivien and D. Bui Kim, ‘The Use of Geographical Indications in Vietnam: A Tool for Socio-Economic Development?’ 
in I. Calboli and W.L. Ng-Loy (eds.), Geographical Indications at the Crossroads of Trade, Development, and Culture: Focus on Asia-Pacific 
(CUP, 2017) 305, 314-316. 
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comparison, sui generis GIs for processed products and handicrafts respectively account for 
about 15% and 5% of all registered GIs despite the economic and cultural importance of these 
two types of products for the country.30  
 
3.1.2 The convergence of trade marks and GIs 
 
In Vietnam, collective and certification marks can be registered to indicate the geographical 
origin of local specialty products. In a similar way as in French law, the IP Law provides that, 
while a collective mark aims to distinguish goods or services of members of an organization 
that is the owner of the mark from those of non-members,31 the functions of a certification 
mark, of which the owner is independent from the users, are to certify the characteristics of a 
product in relation inter alia to its origin, raw materials or methods of production.32 Unlike 
French law but similar to EU trade mark law, the Vietnamese law allows for collective and 
certification marks to be registered for descriptive geographical names as an exception to the 
general distinctiveness requirement which, as a principle, excludes the use of descriptive names 
(see Chapter 2).33 This exception means that collective and certification marks can be registered 
for geographical names without having to be combined with figurative signs. However, in 
practice, they are usually registered with a logo for marketing purposes.  
 
  
                                                        
30 Đức Huấn (n27). 
31 IP Law, Article 4.17. 
32 IP Law, Article 4.18. 
33 IP Law, Article 74.2 dd). 
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Picture 3.1 
Logos of the Vietnamese collective and certification marks under study 
 
Collective mark Collective mark Collective 
mark 
Certification mark 
Sticky rice from 
Đông Triều 
H’mong beef from 
Cao Bằng 
 
Pottery from 
Đông Triều 
 
Vermicelli from Bình 
Liêu 
 
   
 
 
At first glance, the application documentation required in both France and Vietnam is similar.34 
In particular, applicants for a trade mark in Vietnam shall provide samples of the mark and 
regulations governing its use. For a collective mark, regulations shall include: 
(i) the conditions for membership;  
(ii) the list of organisations and individuals who have the right to use the mark; 
(iii) the conditions of use of the mark; and 
(iv) the remedies in case of infringement.35  
 
Regulations governing the use of a certification mark should be more detailed and describe: 
(i) the conditions of use of the mark; 
(ii) the product characteristics certified by the mark;  
(iii) the methods of evaluation of such characteristics; and 
(iv) the methods for controlling the use of the mark.36  
 
Consequently, as in France, regulations governing the use of trade marks do not have to 
demonstrate the product/origin nexus. Yet, unlike in France, Vietnamese law requires 
                                                        
34 See WIPO ‘Technical and Procedural Aspects Relating to the Registration of Certification and Collective Marks’ 30 August 2010 
(WIPO/Strad/INF/6) [39]-[55]. 
35 IP Law, Article 105.4. 
36 IP Law, Article 105.5.  
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additional application documents for the registration of trade marks indicating the geographical 
origin of goods. These include an explanation of the particular characteristics and quality of 
the product bearing the mark,37 a map of the geographical area corresponding to the 
geographical name or the geographical origin of the local product,38 as well as a written 
authorisation of the relevant People’s Committees for the registration of the mark.39 This last 
requirement, which shows the importance given by the state to trade marks indicating the 
geographical origin of local specialty products, will be studied in Section 3.2.3. 
 
In practice, applications for trade mark protection go beyond the legal requirements and get 
closer to the application documentation submitted for a sui generis GI protection. Indeed, in 
addition to the minimum documentation required by the law, the application documentation of 
the four trademarked products under study include a detailed description of the product 
characteristics as well as a substantive document providing much detail on the technical 
process of production (for sticky rice, pottery from Đông Triều and vermicelli from Bình Liêu) 
or breeding methods (for H’mong beef from Cao Bằng). Besides, the application 
documentation of all three collective marks provide information on the internal quality 
management and control procedures which is legally required for certification marks only. 
Looking more closely at the application documentation, it appears that for pottery from Đông 
Triều and vermicelli from Bình Liêu, both natural and human factors are specified and the link 
to origin is demonstrated.  
 
Applications for trade mark protection may thus be as detailed as for those submitted for sui 
generis protection. For example, Marie-Vivien reports that the regulations of the certification 
trade mark for the Shan Tuyet tea from Suối Giàng contain as many details on the 
characteristics of the tea and the product/origin nexus as the CoP for the sui generis GI Shan 
Tuyet tea from Mộc Châu.40 This indicates that the concerned products could possibly have 
been eligible for a sui generis GI protection.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
37 Circular 1/2007/TT-BKHCN, Article 7.1(b)ii, as amended by Circular 05/2013/TT-BKHCN. 
38 Circular 1/2007/TT-BKHCN, Article 7.1(b)iii, as amended by Circular 05/2013/TT-BKHCN. 
39 Circular 1/2007/TT-BKHCN, Article 37.7, as amended by Circular 05/2013/TT-BKHCN. 
40 Marie-Vivien (n4) 27. 
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3.2 State-driven, top-down management system 
 
This section first explores the importance of policy intervention in the identification of the 
product candidates and the initiation of the processes for the registration of sui generis GIs and 
geographical trade marks. It then turns to the analysis of the state’s direct control over sui 
generis GIs before analysing the way in which the state involvement in trade mark initiatives 
is more indirect though pervasive. 
 
By contrast to France where the voluntary and collective action of local producers is 
fundamental to initiate the registration process of sui generis GIs (see Chapter 2), in Vietnam 
the identification of the product candidates for GI protection and the ensuing registration and 
management of the IP titles are primarily the responsibility of the state through its institutions 
at the central and local levels. Considering the strong state intervention in agricultural 
matters,41 and the fact that the majority of local specialty products are agricultural products and 
foodstuffs, the state’s driven, top-down approach to their identification and management is not 
surprising. While the sui generis system best crystallizes the intervention of public authorities 
in the registration and management processes, in practice trade marks are also characterized by 
a strong mediation by public entities. Adding to the bureaucracy of the system, the high number 
of laws, decrees, circulars and amendments adopted in this area is symptomatic of the state’s 
over-regulation.  
 
3.2.1 Policy intervention for the identification of GIs  
 
In Vietnam, the identification of the product candidates for GI and trade mark protection is not 
the responsibility of local stakeholders but that of the state. The important role of the state in 
identifying potential GIs has been observed in other countries, especially among those that 
have provided protection for GIs only recently. For instance, in India, the GI registry conducted 
a nation-wide inventory of food and handicraft products for potential GI protection; in Brazil, 
the National Institute of Intellectual Property supports the identification and subsequent 
                                                        
41 N.H. Bui and T.N. Duc, ‘Le développement de l’agriculture vietnamienne au cours des 15 dernières années’ (2002) 3(2) VertigO – la revue 
électronique en sciences de l’environnement <https://journals.openedition.org/vertigo/3738> accessed 20/08/2018. 
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registration of at least one GI in each federal state; and OAPI has identified five GI products 
in West Africa for GI registration.42 
 
The role of the Vietnamese State in identifying GIs is clearly stated in the Governmental Decree 
122/2010/ND-CP adopted on 31 December 2010, which provides that ‘[t]he Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development and the Ministry of Industry and Trade shall assume the 
prime responsibility for and coordinate with People's Committees of provinces or central-level 
cities in identifying specialties, characteristics and production process of specialties bearing 
geographical indications managed by ministries, agencies or localities’ whereas ‘[t]he Ministry 
of Science and Technology shall specify criteria for identifying geographical names and other 
signs indicating the geographical origins of products’.43  
 
Support policies have been adopted to give operational effect to this policy commitment, even 
since the enactment of the IP Law. The most important of these policies is the so-called 
‘Programme 68’ which was adopted by the Prime Minister following Decision 68/2005/QD-
TTg of 4 April 2005 to support the development of IP assets of small and medium enterprises. 
As part of this national programme, financial assistance is provided to identify, manage and 
enhance the value of local products through their protection by collective/certification trade 
marks or sui generis GIs – both for the registration and post-registration management of the IP 
titles.44 Following the end of the first (2005-2010) and second (2011-2015) phases of this 
programme, its third phase is now running until 2020.45   
 
The procedure of Programme 68 mainly involves state authorities. The Steering Committee of 
the programme, which operates under the authority of the MOST and includes representatives 
of a number of Ministries46 but no producers or other field professionals, first collects and 
reviews proposals for product protection from local authorities (local Departments of Science 
and Technology (DOST), Universities, Research Institutes etc.), before submitting a list of 
                                                        
42 Marie-Vivien and Biénabe (n8) 5. 
43 Decree 122/2010/ND-CP, Article 1.2.  
44 Decision 68/2005/QD-TTg, Article 1.2b). 
45 Decision 1062/QD-TTg of 14th June 2016. 
46 These include representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Culture and Information, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Fisheries, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Education 
and Training and the Ministry of Justice. Decision 68/2005/QD-TTg, Article 2.2. 
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products to be supported by the programme for approval by the MOST.47 Consequently, 
farmers, producers and other local stakeholders cannot directly apply for support. Once the 
products have been selected, a technical expert is selected following an open call for 
proposals48 to lead the project under the supervision of local authorities. The expert may come 
from an IP Law firm, such as Concetti, or an agricultural research institute, such as CASRAD 
or the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSRAD), 
which both operate under the authority of the MARD. 
 
Whereas the project leader is contracted and paid by local authorities – usually the local DOST, 
the local Department of Agriculture and Development (DARD) or the People’s Committee – 
funding is provided by the MOST and administered by the NOIP. On average, funding ranges 
from about US$28,000 for a project involving a collective mark, to US$33,000 for a project 
involving a certification mark, to US$45,000 for a sui generis GI.49 The tasks of the project 
leader, in collaboration with local authorities, generally include, depending on whether the 
project focuses on the pre- or post-registration stage, the establishment of an association of 
producers, processors and/or traders; the elaboration of the documents required for the 
registration of the IP title; training of farmers/producers in production technics; the 
organization of the supply chain; awareness and communication activities, among others. It is 
usually not until the implementation phase of the projects that local stakeholders become 
involved in the initiatives. Generally speaking, the Programme 68 has played a pivotal role in 
the registration and management of GIs in Vietnam, funding for about 70% of all sui generis 
GIs registered so far as well as a large number of geographical trade marks.50  
 
In addition to the centrally-managed Programme 68, the MARD has also provided support for 
the registration of about 20% of all existing sui generis GIs.51 Besides, a number of local 
programmes funded at the Province or District levels also aim to support the development of 
sui generis GIs and geographical trade marks. For instance, Quang Ninh Province has 
                                                        
47 Circular 03/2011/TT-BKHCN of 20/04/2011 providing guidelines for the selection and project management under the support programme 
for IP development in 2011-2015, Article 6 (hereafter, Circular 03/2011/TT-BKHCN). 
48 Circular 03/2011/TT-BKHCN, Article 13. 
49 ibid. 
50 Marie-Vivien (n4) 8. 
51 C. Durand, ‘L’émergence des indications géographiques dans les processus de qualification territoriale des produits agroalimentaires - Une 
analyse comparée entre l’Indonésie et le Vietnam’ (PhD Thesis, Institut national d'études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - SupAgro 
Montpellier, 2016) 292. 
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established a ‘Brand development programme for agricultural products’ by Decision PPC 
273/QD-UBND of 13 February 2012. Under this programme that is managed by the local 
DOST, projects are supported up to 80% by the Province and less than 30% by the relevant 
District52 and are led by a project leader recruited from an established agricultural research 
centre or an IP Law firm. So far, under this programme, provincial representatives of the DOST 
and the DARD have selected 27 products for protection,53 including four sui generis GIs, 16 
certification marks and seven collective marks,54 out of over 80 products proposed by District 
authorities for support.55 Although these figures show a positive trend in GI protection, they 
also indicate that a great number of products were ultimately not supported for protection.  
 
Finally, policy intervention for the registration and management of GIs and geographical trade 
marks is shown in the number of international cooperation projects funded by external sources, 
including the European Commission56 and UN agencies such as the IFAD and the FAO, as 
well as bilateral donors including France, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Canada and the UK. 
These projects either focus on the registration and management of the IP title or aim to develop 
the product quality control system, the value chain and the producers’ skills. For instance, 
under the SVIP mentioned earlier, over 12 sui generis GIs were registered, including star anise 
from Lạng Sơn.57 France also supported the registration of Phú Quốc fish sauce and the Mộc 
Châu shan tea as AOs. To take a last example, in 2015, the French Development Agency agreed 
on a three-year project to support the creation of a national GI committee and the development 
of a new methodology for the elaboration of CoPs, including through the strengthening of 
producers’ associations and the creation of a quality control system.58 The registration of all 
the Vietnamese GI under study has received financial support (Table 3.1). 
 
                                                        
52 Programme attached to Decision PPC 273/QD-UBND, Section III, Article 2.  
53 A total of 24 products were selected in the initial list to which three additional products were added by Decision 797/QĐ-UBND of 
11/04/2012. 
54 For further detail, see Programme attached to Decision PPC 273/QD-UBND, Section II, Article 2.1, and Appendix of Decision 797/QĐ-
UBND. 
55 Interview V-H1. 
56 In particular through the EU-MUTRAP project (European Trade Policy and Investment Support Project) and the EU-ASEAN Project on 
the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (ECAP project) which supported the registration of the Phú Quốc fish sauce in the EU. 
57 See the description of the project here: 
<https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/recht/entwicklungszusammenarbeit/factsheet_vietnam_a4all.pdf> accessed 20/08/2018. 
58 See information on the MALICA website here: <https://www.malica.org/projects/on-going/geographical-indications> accessed 
20/08/2018; See also the AFD website <https://www.afd.fr/fr/soutenir-le-developpement-des-indications-geographiques-protegees-au-
vietnam-programme-prcc> accessed 26/07/2018. 
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Table 3.1 
Funding sources of the GIs under study 
 
Product Programme 68 
Quang 
Ninh 
programme  
 
External sources 
 
  Multilateral               Bilateral  
 
 
Sticky rice from Đông Triều 
 
 Yes  
 
 
H’mong beef from Cao Bằng 
 
  IFAD Luxembourg and  UK 
 
Pottery from Đông Triều 
 
Yes   
 
 
Vermicelli from Bình Liêu 
 
 Yes  
 
 
Star anise from Lạng Sơn 
 
Yes  EU-MUTRAP 
 
 
Fried calamari from Hạ Long 
 
 Yes  
 
Conical hat from Huế 
 
Yes  
 
  
 
 
In Vietnam, the establishment and management of GI initiatives, which relies upon the 
collective action of producers in France, is thus largely based on an interventionist approach 
by state authorities or other countries and organisations whose conception of GIs is likely to 
influence the Vietnamese understanding and practices. While public intervention signals the 
increasing importance attached to GIs and should be welcome to promote their use in a country 
where this concept is still new, this approach also comes with its own pitfalls. First, the fact 
that GI projects are driven by outside actors proves problematic for local stakeholders to 
understand the concept of GIs, take ownership and participate willingly in the initiatives.59 
Further, the appropriation of the description of the local products by agricultural or legal 
experts under the supervision of public authorities in a country where agricultural 
                                                        
59 Đức Huấn and others (n27) 56. 
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modernization is a policy priority,60 may contribute to negatively impact on the maintenance 
of traditional techniques and preservation of local breeds and varieties (see Chapters 4 and 6).61       
 
3.2.2 The state’s direct control over sui generis GIs 
  
The Vietnamese system for the sui generis protection of GIs establishes a division of rights 
among: i) the right to own; ii) the right to register, which involves the right to decide on the 
content of the CoP; iii) the right to manage; and iv) the right to use. Finally, the IP Law has 
also planned the prohibited use of the registered names. 
 
3.2.2.1 The right to own  
 
According to Article 751.4 of the Civil Code and Article 121.4 of the IP Law, the owner of all 
GIs is the state who cannot transfer this ownership62 because GIs are considered as ‘valuable 
properties of the nation’.63 By contrast, in France, sui generis GIs are considered as common 
goods that cannot be appropriated (see Chapter 2). Interestingly, a proposal to amend the IP 
Law and provide for different ownership rules and greater role of local stakeholders is currently 
being discussed.64 
 
3.2.2.2 The right to register  
 
The right to register sui generis GIs with NOIP belongs to the state who can allow 
organisations/individuals involved in the production of the product, their representative 
collective organizations, or the administrative authorities of the locality to which the product 
pertains, to exercise this right.65  
 
                                                        
60 R. De Koninck, ‘Les agricultures du Sud-Est asiatique: interrogations sur l’avenir d’un nouveau modèle de développement’ (2004) 4 
L’Espace géographique 301; ESCAP, ‘Sustainable agriculture and food security in Asia and the pacific, economic and social commission for 
Asia and the Pacific’ (United Nations, ESCAP, 2009). 
61 C. Durand and S. Fournier, ‘Can Geographical Indications Modernize Indonesian and Vietnamese Agriculture? Analyzing the Role of 
National and Local Governments and Producers’ Strategies’ (2017) 98 World Development 93. 
62 Civil Code, Article 753.3. 
63 NOIP, ‘Geographical indications, Overview’ (n11). 
64 Marie-Vivien (n4) 30. 
65 IP Law, Article 88.  
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In practice, the registration of GIs is always processed by local authorities, i.e. the People’s 
Committees of the Provinces, Districts or cities to which the product pertains depending on 
whether the geographical name to be protected refers to the name of a Province, a District or a 
city.66 Even if permitted by the IP Law, no GI has been registered by producers or collective 
organizations to date.67 In fact, the Decree 103/2006/ND-CP of 22/09/2006 specifies that the 
MARD, the Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of Industry are primarily responsible to 
determine, in collaboration with the relevant People’s Committees, the characteristics and 
methods of production of the GI products.68 Going further, the Decree 122/2010/ND-CP of 
31/12/2010 states that the relevant People’s Committees shall file the applications for the 
registration of sui generis GIs,69 thereby excluding outright local stakeholders from the process.  
As seen above, public authorities generally recruit a technical expert to lead the elaboration of 
the CoP and proceed with the registration of the GI under their supervision. As there is no 
standard application form, there is a great diversity in their format.  
 
Sui generis GIs are registered for an unlimited period,70 unless the geographical conditions 
attributable to the reputation, quality or characteristics change. In that case, the registration 
may be cancelled.71 
 
3.2.2.3 The right to manage  
 
The ownership of all GIs provides the state with the right to manage GIs,72 which includes the 
right to grant licenses to use GIs.73 The right to manage can be transferred to the People’s 
Committee(s) of the Province(s) or city(ies) to which the GI pertains.74 It can also be transferred 
to a representative organisation of all collectives and individuals conferred with the right to use 
the GI,75 as authorized by the People’s Committees of the Province or city to which the GI 
pertains.76 Although the representative organisation of producers is listed among the holders of 
                                                        
66 Pick and others (n29) 317. 
67 ibid. 
68 Decree 103/2006/ND-CP, Article 19.3. 
69 Decree 122/2010/ND-CP, Article 1.2. 
70 IP Law, Article 93.7. 
71 IP Law, Article 95.1(g). 
72 IP Law, Article 121.4. 
73 IP Law, Article 123.2(a). 
74 Decree 103/2006/ND-CP, Articles 3.2(h) and 19.1(a) and (b). 
75 IP Law, Article 121.4. 
76 Decree 103/2006/ND-CP, Article 19.1(c). 
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the right to manage by Article 19.1(c) of Decree 103/2006/ND-CP, the same article also states 
that ‘the People’s Committees of provinces and cities under central authority shall […] 
organise the management of geographical indications used for the localities’ specialties’. In 
practice, the DOST and District People’s Committees manage about 70% and 28% of existing 
sui generis GIs, respectively.77  The initiative of conical hats from Huế is the only case where 
the producers’ association has the right to manage the GI. However, the state is still involved 
in the management of this initiative considering that the President of the association is also the 
President of the Provincial Women’s Union which, as a party-State affiliated organisation (so-
called ‘mass organisation’), is largely funded and controlled by the CPV. In all other initiatives 
where a collective organisation has been created, i.e. for about half of the sui generis GIs 
registered so far,78 the producers’ association does not intervene in the management of the GI. 
 
In investigating the existing GI initiatives, Đức Huấn found that four types of documents could 
be promulgated to organise their management:79   
(1) regulations for the management and use of the GI; 
(2) regulations for granting, modifying, renewing and withdrawing the right to use the GI;  
(3) manual on technical production, processing and storage aspects; and  
(4) control regulations, based on the French three-stage control system, including self-
monitoring by the operators; internal controls by the managing organisation or the producers’ 
association; and external controls by a public authority.80 
 
However, these regulations are not legally required and they are characterized by their 
complexity, diversity and lack of homogeneity across the initiatives. Some initiatives 
promulgated one or two of these regulations only, whereas no management regulation has been 
adopted for about 17% of all sui generis GIs.81  
 
 
 
  
                                                        
77 Marie-Vivien (n4) 17. 
78 Durand (n51) 291. 
79 For more details on these regulations, see Đức Huấn and others (n27) 31-44. 
80 ibid 38. 
81 ibid 28. 
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3.2.2.4 The right to use  
 
The right to use the GI can be granted for an indefinite period82 to organisations or individuals 
located in the relevant area and involved in the production and marketing of the GI product.83 
Unlike in France, membership of the producers’ association is not a legal requirement, 
especially as there is no obligation under the Vietnamese law for local stakeholders to organise 
themselves within one single association. The only exception is found in the Hạ Long fried 
calamari initiative where the membership of the association, as well as a working experience 
of three years in the production and sale of calamari, are additional conditions for being granted 
the right to use the GI.84  
 
Local stakeholders must apply individually to the management organisation to obtain the right 
to use the GI. This right is not transferrable.85 It is the only right that can be granted to local 
stakeholders who are not associated with the registration procedure nor the management 
system. Other emerging and developing countries have adopted a similar system. For instance, 
in India, where the GI registration process is led by public authorities, producers join in the GI 
process only after they have applied for the right to use the GI. This has resulted in a low 
number of registered users.86 
 
In practice, there is a significant heterogeneity across Vietnamese initiatives with regard to the 
right to use. According to Đức Huấn, the right to use the GI has been granted in 57% of the 
initiatives for which management regulations have been adopted,87 yet with great differences. 
For instance, 66 producers (out of 93)88 and 24 producers (100% of all producer members of 
the association) have the right to use the names of Phú Quốc fish sauce89 and fried calamari 
                                                        
82 Decree 63/CP of 24 October 1996 as amended by Decree 06/2001/ND-CP, Articles 9 and 10. 
83 IP Law, Article 121.4. 
84 Regulations on the management and use of the GI for fried calamari from Hạ Long, Article 9.7. 
85 IP Law, Article 139.2. 
86 C. Bramley, D. Marie-Vivien and E. Biénabe, ‘Considerations in designing an appropriate legal framework for GIs in southern countries’ 
in C. Bramley, E. Biénabe and J.F. Kirsten (eds.) Developing geographical indications in the South : The Southern African experience 
(Springer, 2013) 15, 47. 
87 Đức Huấn and others (n27) 55. 
88 T. Nguyen, G. Hoang and K. Nguyen, ‘Geographical Indications and Quality Promotion of Agricultural Products in Vietnam: An 
Analysis of Government Roles’ (2016) SECO/WTI Academic Cooperation Project Working Paper Series 15/2016, 
15 <http://seco.wti.org/media/filer_public/10/45/10458906-339d-4e76-830d-dea921307f10/working_paper_no_15_2016_nguyen.pdf> 
accessed 03/09/2018. 
89 Pick and others (n29) 317. 
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from Hạ Long,90 respectively. By contrast, only two producers of Cao Phang orange,91 two 
companies processing star anise from Lạng Sơn,92 and nine companies producing Buon Ma 
Thuot coffee93 are entitled to use the label. Amongst the initiatives where no producer has the 
right to use the GI are fragrant rice from Nang Nhen Bảy Núi and Văn Yên cinnamon.94 In 
2016, no-one was granted the right to use the GI for conical hats from Huế95 and the current 
situation is unclear.  
 
In practice, the actual use of GI labels is still very low. In addition to other reasons that will be 
analysed in Chapter 6, the fact that GI projects are driven by outside actors and that local 
stakeholders get involved in the initiatives only after the GI is registered makes it difficult for 
local producers to understand the GI concept, take ownership and participate willingly in the 
initiatives.  
 
3.2.2.5 The prohibited uses 
 
The IP Law prohibits the use of the denominations on products from the geographical area that 
do not have the same characteristics and do not meet the quality criteria of the GI product; on 
similar products when such use is likely to misappropriate or weaken the reputation of the 
name; and on products not originating from the geographical area and misleading consumers 
as to the true origin of the product.96 An action for infringement can be brought by the state, 
the managing organisation as well as the organisations and individuals who have the right to 
use the GI.97 The law therefore makes a distinction between two types of infringements. For 
products originating from the GI-protected area, the scope of protection extends to the 
characteristics and quality of the product beyond cases of misuses. For products not originating 
from the GI-protected area, the holder of the infringed indication bears the demanding burden 
of establishing consumers’ confusion.  
 
                                                        
90 Interview V-C14. 
91 C. Alexandre, ‘Impacts et perspectives de développement de l’indication géographique Orange de Cao Phong’ (Master’s thesis, Spécialité 
MOQUAS, IRC de spécialité, Montpellier SupAgro, 2017) 58. 
92 Interview V-G8. 
93 Durand and Fournier (n61) 6. 
94 Đức Huấn and others (n27) 55. 
95 Interview V-E8. 
96 IP Law, Article 129.3. 
97 IP Law, Article 125.1. 
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The law protects only the name or sign that constitutes the GI itself, i.e. not the combination of 
the name or sign with the type of product and even less so the associated logo. For instance, 
only ‘Lạng Sơn’ is protected and not ‘star anise from Lạng Sơn’. In practice, all GI applications 
include the combination of the name or sign and the type of product as well as the associated 
logo. In effect, there is no official state logo for GIs as yet and each GI has a specific logo.98  
 
Picture 3.2 
Logos of the Vietnamese sui generis GIs under study 
 
Star anise from Lạng Sơn Fried calamari from Hạ Long 
Conical hat from 
Huế 
  
 
 
 
 
3.2.3 The state’s indirect control over trade marks 
 
In theory, the registration process and management of trade marks which are of private nature 
should provide a larger space to local stakeholders and entail less involvement from the state 
as compared with sui generis GIs. However, both the law and the practice have gradually 
provided public authorities with an important role in the registration and management of 
collective and certification marks indicating the geographical origin of local products. 
 
3.2.3.1 The right to register  
 
According to the IP Law, collective marks indicating the geographical origin of goods can be 
registered by the collective of organisations or individuals engaged in the production or 
                                                        
98 IP Law, Article 106-1(a). 
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marketing of goods or services in the relevant locality,99 i.e. the association of producers and 
traders. Consequently, in order to proceed with the registration of a collective mark, local 
operators must group together within an association, which is not required for sui generis GIs 
and certification marks. Turning to certification marks, these can be registered by organizations 
able to control and certify the quality, characteristics and/or origin of goods or services 
provided that such organisations are not engaged in the production or marketing of such goods 
or services.100  
 
The text of the IP Law does not give any formal role to the state or public authorities in the 
application process for trade mark protection. However, the Law 36/2009/QH12 of 19/06/2009 
has specified that when collective and certification trade marks indicate the geographical origin 
of local specialties of Vietnam, their registration must be permitted by competent state 
agencies.101 The Decree 122/2010/ND-CP has subsequently posited that the relevant People’s 
Committees shall authorise the registration of collective or certification trade marks that 
indicate the geographical origin of local specialties.102 Going further, the Circular 05/2013/TT-
BKHCN of 20/02/2013 states that the People’s Committees’ authorisations must be made in 
writing103 and that written approvals must be submitted as part of the minimum application 
documentation.104 Consequently, although the involvement of state authorities in the 
registration process of geographical trade marks had not initially been planned by the law, the 
specificities and importance of local specialty products for the country subsequently justified 
the necessity to obtain the approval of the relevant local public authorities for their registration.  
 
Regarding more specifically certification marks that should be registered by organizations able 
to control and certify the quality, characteristics and/or origin of goods, the lack of independent 
certification agencies in practice has led state agencies to take over the registration process. 
Consequently, the great majority of certification marks have been registered by the People’s 
Committee of the Province or the District to which the product pertains, which raises issues as 
to the efficiency of the product control process (see Section 3.3.2). 
 
                                                        
99 IP Law, Articles 87.3.  
100 IP Law, Articles 87.4. 
101 Law 36/2009/QH12, Article 13, amending IP Law, Articles 87.3 and 87.4.  
102 Decree 122/2010/ND-CP, Article 1.2. 
103 Circular 05/2013/TT-BKHCN, Article 1.9, amending Circular 01/2007/TT-BKHCN, point 37.7.  
104 Circular 05/2013/TT-BKHCN, Article 1.2, amending Circular 01/2007/TT-BKHCN, points 7.1.b(iii) and 7.1.b(iv).  
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Unlike sui generis GIs that are protected for an unlimited period, trade marks are registered for 
a period of 10 years that may be renewed indefinitely.105 The IP titles may be revoked in the 
absence of genuine use during 5 years or where compliance with the regulations in not 
ensured.106  
 
3.2.3.2 The right to own  
 
According to the IP Law, the collective or organisation who applied for the registration of a 
trade mark becomes its owner.107 The owners of collective marks are therefore the associations 
of producers and/or traders who proceeded with their registration while the great majority of 
certification marks are owned by a state institution. 
 
3.2.3.3 The right to manage  
 
As the IP Law is silent on the management of collective and certification marks, it logically 
follows that these are managed by the owners of the IP titles. As such, collective marks are 
managed by the associations of producers and/or traders whereas the great majority of 
certification marks are managed by the public authorities who own them. The managing 
organisations are responsible for granting licenses to use the marks to individual applicants.108 
For instance, in the case of vermicelli from Bình Liêu, the owner of the certification mark is 
the District People’s Committee, who has delegated the management of the certification mark 
to the Department of Economics and Infrastructure who grants the right to use the mark to 
individual applicants.109 In the case of collective marks, the designation of the associations as 
the managing organisations should, at least in theory, contribute to empower local producers 
and traders. However, as will be shown in Chapter 4, producers’ associations are, to a large 
extent, subject to the control of state authorities.  
 
                                                        
105 IP Law, Article 93.6. 
106 IP Law, Article 95.1. 
107 IP Law, Article 121.1. 
108 See, for instance, the Charter of the association ‘Production and commercialisation of pottery from Đông Triều’, Section II paragraph 1: 
‘Organizations and individuals must submit their application to the Board of the Association that is responsible for granting the licence 
certificates’. 
109 Regulations on the management and use of the certification mark ‘vermicelli from Bình Liêu’ Article 11: ‘The Department of Economics 
and Infrastructure of the District of Bình Liêu is the Management Board of the certification mark who grants the right to use the certification 
mark’.  
102 
 
3.2.3.4 The right to use 
 
There is no specific legal provision on the right to use collective and certification marks. 
Guidelines published by the NOIP laconically specify that the right to use trade marks can be 
granted to any organisation and individual satisfying the users’ regulations.110 In practice, as 
with sui generis GIs, there is a very limited use of trade marks (see Chapter 6). 
 
3.2.3.5 The prohibited uses 
 
Trade mark protection is ensured against any reproduction or imitation of the mark on identical 
or similar products when such use is likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the goods as 
well as, for well-known marks, on different products when the use of the sign is likely to 
mislead consumers as per the origin of the goods or the identity of the owner of the well-known 
mark.111 As for sui generis GIs, the owner of the trade mark, the managing organisation and 
the holders of the right to use the trade mark, are all entitled to bring an action for 
infringement.112  
 
3.3 Limitations of the system 
 
 
Despite the positive dynamic in the registration of GIs in Vietnam in the past twenty years, the 
Vietnamese legal and policy framework presents a number of organisational and institutional 
limitations. These can be explained by the relative youth of the IP system. Besides, the top-
down organization of the system has resulted in bureaucratic procedures and constraints 
embedded in the local environments in which GI initiatives develop. Three main constraints 
are commonly encountered in Vietnam. First, the choice of a means of protection may be 
arbitrary and inconsistent with the legal definition of the sui generis GI and trade marks. 
Second, it is widely recognised that quality controls are inefficient and ineffective. Third, the 
poor quality of institutions arguably undermines the smooth operation of the initiatives. 
 
                                                        
110 For collective marks, see NOIP, ‘Guide à la construction du projet “Etablissement, Gestion et Développement des marques collectives 
utilisées pour les spécialités locales”’ (NOIP, 2009) 5; for certification marks, see ‘Guide à la construction du projet “Etablissement, Gestion 
et Développement des marques de certification utilisées pour les spécialités locales’ (NOIP, 2009) 5. 
111 IP Law, Article 129.1. 
112 IP Law, Article 125.1. 
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 3.3.1 Arbitrariness in the choice of the means of protection  
 
Although it is not always the case, the choice of a means of protection may appear arbitrary 
due to the existence of a system of quotas under Programme 68. The low awareness and 
understanding of the differences between the different systems of protection among state 
authorities and local stakeholders further contributes to uninformed decisions.   
 
According to the quota policy of Programme 68, which supports the majority of GI projects, 
the project leader in charge of the registration process can be in charge of a maximum of three 
projects, of which no more than two can be of the same kind.113 For instance, if two projects 
aim to register a sui generis GI, a third one must necessarily involve a trade mark. This rule, 
which drives the choice of the means of protection based on political motivations rather than 
legal grounds, aims to contribute to an even distribution of collective marks, certification marks 
and sui generis GIs in each region,114 sometimes regardless of the appropriateness of the means 
of protection in relation to the characteristics of the product. For example, Shan tuyết tea from 
Suối Giàng meets the sui generis GI requirements, and in particular shows a strong 
product/origin link including both natural and human factors, in the same way as Shan tuyết 
tea from Mộc Châu that is registered as a sui generis GI. However, local authorities decided to 
protect it with a certification mark because a sui generis GI was already registered in the same 
Province as cinnamon from Văn Yên – both products being supported by Programme 68.115 
The choice of a means of protection therefore appears arbitrary and inconsistent with the legal 
definitions of sui generis GIs and trade marks. 
 
Generally speaking, there is a lack of awareness and understanding of the differences between 
the sui generis and trade mark systems among state authorities and local stakeholders. When 
asked the reasons for selecting the chosen means of protection for the initiatives that fall under 
their authority, local authorities often could not answer the question and reported having left 
this choice to the consultants in charge of the projects.116 As for local stakeholders, the fact that 
they are not acquainted with the different IP titles is not surprising considering that they usually 
become involved in the initiatives once the IP title is registered only. The involvement of state 
                                                        
113 Circular 03/2011/TT-BKHCN, Article 2.  
114 Interview V-C1. 
115 Pick and others (n29) 328-329. 
116 Interviews V-D2 and V-H1. 
104 
 
authorities in the registration of both sui generis GIs and geographical trade marks may also 
lead to confusion about their different function and meaning. For example, when asked the 
reason for protecting pottery from Đông Triều with a collective mark, the leader of a pottery 
village replied that ‘because it is approved by DOST, the trade mark guarantees a specific 
quality and high standards and can therefore build customers’ trust.’117 Such statement could 
well be made about a sui generis GI, for which the state traditionally plays an important role 
in guaranteeing the product quality and characteristics. Finally, the lack of one official state 
logo for all sui generis GIs also contributes to the lack of understanding of the specificities of 
the sui generis protection. This is especially true considering that both sui generis GIs and trade 
marks are usually registered with a logo, which makes it uneasy for local stakeholders and 
consumers to distinguish a sui generis GI logo from a trade mark logo. 
 
At the international policy level, the arbitrariness of the choice of the means of protection may 
lead to questions as to the appropriateness of the EU’s preferential policy for Vietnamese sui 
generis GIs over trade marks as reflected in the EU-Vietnam FTA as finalised in June 2018.118 
According to the FTA, only sui generis GIs are legally protected in the EU but none of the 
geographical trade marks119 despite the fact that some trade marks fulfill the requirements for 
a sui generis protection.  
 
 
3.3.2 Lack of transparent and efficient quality controls   
 
While the establishment of quality control mechanisms based upon the CoP is a prerequisite 
for the recognition of the titles in France (see Chapter 2), GI applications in Vietnam must only 
include information on self-control mechanisms.120 Consequently, the law does not require the 
elaboration of internal and external control plans. This significant legal loophole contributes to 
                                                        
117 Interview V-B4. 
118 European Commission, ‘EU and Vietnam finalise trade and investment discussions’ (Press release, 26/06/2018) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1875> accessed 20/08/2018.  
119 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437> 
accessed 20/08/2018. Chapter 12 ‘Intellectual Property’ of the FTA is available here:  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154223.%20institutional%20-%20GIs%206.5a3%206.11wg%20rev2%20-
%20for%20publication.pdf> accessed 20/08/2018>. The list of the 39 protected GIs from Vietnam in Annex GI-I Part B of the FTA. 
120 IP Law, Article 106.2. 
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ineffective and inexistent quality controls and lack of consistency between internal and external 
controls,121 which challenges the process of building consumer trust. The lack of efficient 
quality controls has also been reported in many other emerging and developing countries, for 
instance in India and in OAPI countries.122 
 
Unlike in France, where the ODGs can choose the certification body in charge of the external 
quality controls, in Vietnam the law provides for a state management of external quality 
controls. According to Decision 27/2014/QD-TTg of the MOST, it is the Directorate for 
Standards, Metrology and Quality (STAMEQ), a governmental agency under the authority of 
the MOST,123 that has overall responsibility: 
(i) to carry out the external quality controls of the products that fall within the scope of 
MOST;124  
(ii) to coordinate with other authorities to carry out the inspection and examination of the 
quality of products and goods that fall within the scope of other ministries;125 and  
(iii) to manage the labels.126  
 
In practice, the local Departments of STAMEQ at the Province and District levels oversee the 
external quality controls of all types of products protected with a GI. Considering that most 
GIs relate to agricultural products and foodstuffs and that STAMEQ staff are not agricultural 
experts, there is doubt on their technical capacity to perform the control agencies role 
efficiently.127 In practice, local Departments of STAMEQ usually collaborate with other state 
agencies, such as the DARD,128 local authorities of the Ministry of Industry and Trade129 and 
of the Ministry of Health.130 Regarding internal controls, the producers’ associations (when 
established) or managing organisations are the competent authorities.  
 
                                                        
121 Đức Huấn and others (n27) 43. 
122 Marie-Vivien and Biénabe (n8) 6. 
123 Decision 27/2014/QD-TTg of 4/05/2014 on the functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of STAMEQ, Article 1.1. 
124 Decision 27/2014/QD-TTg, Article 2.8(b). 
125 Decision 27/2014/QD- TTg, Article 2.8(c). 
126 Decision 27/2014/QD- TTg, Article 2.8(e). 
127 Đức Huấn and others (n27) 44-45. 
128 Law 05/2007/QH12 of 21/11/2007 on Product Quality, Article 70.2(b). 
129 Law 05/2007/QH12, Article 70.2(d). 
130 Law 05/2007/QH12, Article 70.2(a). 
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In practice, since their elaboration is not legally required, there is no control plan and hence no 
technical standards and quality criteria upon which state authorities in charge of the external 
quality controls, or associations and managing organisations responsible for internal controls, 
can base their controls. The only exception is found for the Phú Quốc fish sauce that is subject 
to a detailed control plan.131 For all other GI initiatives, this legal vacuum leads to inconsistent, 
inefficient, non-transparent or even non-existent external quality controls. According to Đức 
Huấn, about 85% of the authorities in charge of the external controls and 75% of the collective 
organisations in charge of the internal control do not perform well.132 
 
Quality controls were reported to be an issue in all the initiatives under study. For instance, 
some producers of fried calamari from Hạ Long use more flour and less calamari than 
prescribed by the CoP,133 and several rice farmers in Đông Triều allegedly mix sticky rice with 
normal rice that is easier and less costly to grow,134 without subsequent adequate controls from 
the authorities.   
 
If fraudulent practices primarily aim to reduce production costs, they may also stem from a 
disagreement with the requirements of the CoP, such as in the case of conical hats from Huế, 
or a misunderstanding as per the meaning and function of a GI, as with star anise from Lạng 
Sơn. In the first case, according to the CoP, only conical hats made of coconut-palm leaf with 
three stitches per 1cm knitted down from the top brim to the 15th brim, can be sold with the 
GI label,135 thereby excluding other categories of hats made of a lower quality leaf and allowing 
more space between stitches. However, the producers’ association, i.e. the managing 
organisation, sells all types of conical hats with the GI label because it actively supports its use 
on all categories of hats.136 These practices allegedly led to tensions with the local DOST,137 
showing a conflict between the organisation who registered the GI and drafted the CoP (DOST) 
and the organisation who manages it (the producers’ organisation).  
 
                                                        
131 Đức Huấn and others (n27) 42. 
132 ibid 45. 
133 Interviews V-C1, V-C3 and V-C5. 
134 Interviews V-A4 and V-A5. 
135 Document describing the characteristics of conical hats from Huế (GI application), 8. 
136 Interview V-E1. 
137 Interview V-E6. 
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In the second case, one of the two companies entitled to use the GI was found to affix the logo 
not only on the packaging of star anise products, but also on that of cinnamon products. This 
practice was justified by the manager of the company on the basis that ‘the GI logo enables 
[their] consumers to identify that the products are sold by [his] company’.138 In using the GI 
label to identify the commercial origin of its products, whether they be cinnamon or star anise 
products, as if the GI were its private trade or commercial name, this company shows a lack of 
misunderstanding of the very meaning and function of a GI. The staff of STAMEQ in charge 
of the quality control of star anise from Lạng Sơn admitted not having inspected the shops 
where the GI-labelled star anise is sold.139 These case studies illustrate the inefficiency or 
inexistence of the quality control systems.  
 
Picture 3.3 
 
The use of the GI logo ‘Lạng Sơn’ for star anise on the cinnamon product 
 
 
 
Broadly speaking, the associations and authorities in charge of quality controls lack the 
necessary equipment, funding, staff and technical expertise,140 while the effects of combination 
of functions also emerge as an important issue.141 Further, the lack of technical standards and 
quality criteria upon which to base quality controls greatly contributes to the inconsistency of 
the control systems. Consequently, while the pre-registration phase of the IP titles appears to 
be well circumscribed by the law although it generates criticism for disregarding the role of 
                                                        
138 Interview V-G4. 
139 Interview V-G3. 
140 Interviews V-C13 and V-G3. 
141 Đức Huấn and others (n27) 44. 
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producers, the post-registration stage appears much weaker and not adequately organised at 
both the regulatory and practical levels. The silence of the IP Law as regards internal and 
external quality controls tends to suggest that the registration system was established before 
the practical organisation of the quality controls was even thought of, although they are 
generally considered to be at the core of an efficient GI system. 
 
3.3.3 Institutional quality and non-transparent practices  
 
Considering the Vietnamese state-driven, top-down approach to GIs, the role and conduct of 
public authorities is critical to the success of GI initiatives. However, the over-involvement of 
the state in the GI protection system is considered as a serious impediment to the smooth 
operation of the initiatives as it brings along bureaucratic and complex institutional procedures 
while creating opportunities for non-transparent practices at both the central and local levels.  
 
Poor institutional quality and non-transparent practices are first observed at the central level. 
According to an interviewee,142 the substantive examination procedures carried out during the 
application phase by NOIP officers last about eighteen months in practice while, according to 
the law, they should last no more than nine months in the case of trade marks and six months 
in the case of sui generis GIs from the date of publication of the application.143 The length of 
the European procedure for the scrutiny of the applications has also been criticised (see Chapter 
2). In Vietnam, the reasons for long examination procedures generally lie in the bureaucracy 
and non-transparent practices on the part of public officials of NOIP. In particular, while the 
examination fees are fixed (around US$100),144 the NOIP officers were reported to drag the 
process out and unofficially increase the fees. In the words of the Director of an IP Law firm, 
‘the NOIP is a state agency that operates on a receiving-and-granting principle. Its officers take 
the right to manage the procedure the way they want. The only thing we can do is to pay them 
what they ask for and wait for their reaction.’145 The procedure to receive funding from the 
NOIP under Programme 68 also appears to be bureaucratic, non-transparent and time-
consuming. For instance, it took three years after the registration of the certification mark for 
                                                        
142 Interview V-H5. 
143 IP Law, Article 119.  
144 Circular 22/2009/TT-BTC of 4/02/2009 on the rates, collection, remittance, management and use of industrial property fees and charges, 
Appendix. 
145 Interview V-H5.  
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Cát Hải fish sauce for the project leader to receive funding for the implementation of the 
project.146  
 
There is also evidence of such practices at the Province and District levels. Some stakeholders 
reported that consultants had to ‘give envelopes’ to local authorities so as to receive funding 
from the regional programme,147 with the amount of each envelope varying between US$25 
and US$50. This is a significant sum in a country where the average monthly wage is about 
US$150 in the two largest cities and even lower in smaller towns and villages.148 These 
practices lead to a vicious situation in which project leaders provide rent to individual public 
officials for their own personal gain in order to receive public funding for the continuation of 
the job they were recruited for. All these accounts illustrate the low institutional quality and 
the opacity of the system of accountability, reporting and allocation of public resources.   
 
These practices also affect local producers, farmers and other stakeholders, especially when 
local authorities exercise their direct authority, i.e. during the controls of the products. The high 
number of state agencies involved in external quality controls with unclear, undefined or 
redundant functions and responsibilities, combined with the lack of a legal requirement to 
elaborate control plans, poses problems of transparency, efficiency and coordination. In one 
initiative, some producers reported they were inspected more than ten times a year by state 
delegations soliciting ‘envelopes’ that altogether can amount up to about US$500/year.149 As 
explained by a trader, ‘when they open the envelope, they would still say that it is not enough 
to share among members of the delegation, so they usually ask for more. I cannot refuse to pay 
them because they can pretend to find any negligence in my shop if they want to. I could even 
be forced to close the shop, so I have to pay and run my business as usual. These practices are 
like a law’.150 Finally, these practices may also occur in more uncertain situations. For example, 
in another initiative, District authorities appear to regularly seize packages of the labelled goods 
without paying the price to producers so as to give them as presents to higher ranking civil 
servants.151 
 
                                                        
146 ibid. 
147 Interviewees requested absolute anonymity.  
148 ibid. 
149 Interviewees requested absolute anonymity.  
150 Interviewee requested absolute anonymity. 
151 ibid. 
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As evidenced by the case studies, non-transparent practices are an endemic problem in Vietnam 
that not only undermines the smooth functioning of the initiatives but more generally erodes 
the rule of law and weakens citizens’ trust in both the central and local state institutions. These 
practices are embedded in the institutional environments in which the initiatives take place, 
which may ‘entrench the powers of local elites, or subject communities to greater state 
surveillance’.152 
 
Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the Vietnamese legal framework for 
the protection of GIs, including the sui generis and the trade mark systems. In contrast to the 
pivotal role of the producers’ collective action provided by the law in France, Vietnam has 
adopted a state-driven approach to GIs. From this perspective, these two countries illustrate 
some of the different roles that the state can play in the identification, support and legal 
protection of GIs.153 Further, unlike in France where there are significant differences and a 
clear distinction between the two systems of protection, in Vietnam the management processes 
and practices of both systems share common characteristics. These include the rigid 
interpretation of the law, the policy intervention for the identification of potential GIs, the 
state’s (direct or indirect) control over GIs, the occasional arbitrariness in the choice of the 
means of protection, the lack of efficient quality controls, and the prevalence of bureaucratic 
and non-transparent practices.  
 
If the Vietnamese legal framework for the protection of GIs was adopted for the political 
purpose of accessing the WTO, its rapid internal implementation has resulted in a two-tier 
system in which the registration phase of the IP titles is ahead of the post-registration phase as 
illustrated by the silence of the law on quality control. The incompleteness of normative GI 
frameworks as regards the implementation of the post-registration phase has been observed in 
many other countries that have only recently provided protection for GIs.154 
 
                                                        
152 R.J. Coombe, S. Schnoor and M. Ahmed, ‘Bearing Cultural Distinction: Informational Capitalism and New Expectations for Intellectual 
Property’ (2007) 40 University of California-Davis Law Review 891, 896-897. 
153 Marie-Vivien and Biénabe (n8). 
154 D. Barjolle, P. Bernardoni and O. Renard, ‘Etude du potential de la commercialisation des produits agricoles des pays ACP utilisant les 
indications geographiques et les marques avec origine’ (Study by REDD SA Lausanne, AGRI-2012-EVAL-05, 2013). 
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Most importantly, the Vietnamese top-down approach to GIs has resulted in a positive dynamic 
observed in the increased number of registered GIs in the past few years. However, this 
approach also leaves little room to local stakeholders to take ownership of the initiatives. 
Indeed, the political choice made by the state to control the management of the initiatives and 
accelerate the implementation of the law through expertise runs counter the ability of local 
stakeholders to ‘appropriate the collective process’,155 understand the concept of GIs and 
participate meaningfully in the decision-making processes that affect them the most. These 
observations call for a reconsideration of the respective roles of the state and local stakeholders. 
In this regard, Marie-Vivien reports that discussions to amend the IP Law and provide more 
space to local authorities and local stakeholders are ongoing,156 which stresses the need to 
continue research activities in this country.  
 
The understanding of the Vietnamese legal framework for GIs as provided in the present 
chapter is particularly useful to the analysis of our empirical findings. The impact of Vietnam’s 
top-down approach to GIs on collective action dynamics and the involvement of local 
stakeholders in the GI initiatives will be addressed in the following chapter. In practice, this 
approach also contributes, among other factors, to a low use of the GI labels, if at all, which 
will be dealt with in Chapter 6. 
                                                        
155 D. Barjolle and B. Sylvander, ‘Some factors of success for ‘origin labelled products’ in agri-food supply chains in Europe: market, internal 
resources and institutions’ (2002) 36 (9-10) Economies et sociétés 1441, 1551. 
156 Marie-Vivien (n4) 30. 
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4 
 
Actors’ strategies and collective dynamics 
 
 
 
This chapter investigates the processes of collective action in relation to GIs. More specifically, 
it draws upon our twelve case studies to analyse actors’ strategies for initiating the GI 
protection process and the collective dynamics involved in the creation and operation of GI 
collectives. In doing so, this chapter will shed light on the ‘inner side’ of GI initiatives, i.e. 
their internal organisation, as opposed to their ‘outward face’, including marketing and 
commercial aspects, which will be studied in the subsequent chapters.  
 
Analysis of the collective dimension of GIs is particularly relevant to the issues dealt with in 
this thesis. Although ignored in TRIPS, collective action dynamics involved in designing the 
product specifications and managing the initiatives have emerged as critical factors for 
directing their effects,1 as they can contribute to bring about economic benefits and positive 
dynamics of territorial development.2  
 
As already mentioned, GIs signal origin and thus have close ties with places. The elaboration 
of local products typically relies on the local resources, knowledge, skills, history and culture 
of a community of operators within a specific geographical area,3 which is presented as if it 
were organic (see Chapter 2). Chapter 1 explained that GIs protect the producers’ and brand’s 
reputation, which results from a collective process of value addition4 and can allow producers 
to capture an economic rent based on the product differentiation.5 From a legal perspective, 
                                                        
1 D. Barjolle and B. Sylvander, ‘Some Factors of Success for Origin Labelled Products in Agri-food Supply Chains in Europe: Market, Internal 
Resources and Institutions’ (2002) Working Paper for Les Cahiers de l’ISMEA, 16-17 <http://www.origin-
food.org/pdf/partners/bs19%20fev02.pdf> accessed 03/09/2018.  
2 A. Tregear ‘From Stilton to Vimto: using food history to re-think typical products in rural development’ (2003) 43(2) Sociologia Ruralis 
91. 
3 G. Belletti and A. Marescotti, ‘Link Between Origin Labelled Products and Rural Development’ (Dolphins Final Report, WP3, 2002) 6. 
4 Barjolle and Sylvander (n1). 
5 F. Addor and A. Grazioli, ‘Geographical Indications beyond Wines and Spirits: A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical 
Indications in the WTO/TRIPS Agreement’ (2002) 5 JWIP 865, 870. 
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GIs are usually considered as a form of collective legal monopoly right that can only be used 
by those stakeholders who are located inside the region and who satisfy the standards defining 
the product in its CoP.6 Put differently, GIs are ‘the collective property of the beneficiaries and 
can only be managed collectively’.7  
 
One consequence is that GIs both require and justify a form of mobilisation, coordination and 
organisation among local stakeholders for the elaboration, control and observance of voluntary, 
locally-agreed social norms.8 Social norms, or else ‘bottom-up law’,9 include production rules, 
quality standards, cultural conventions and governance structures, and aim to protect the 
common good, i.e. the reputation. They often pre-exist the legal form of GIs,10 which highlights 
their importance as governance and enforcement mechanisms where there is no positive law.11 
From that perspective, GI initiatives lend themselves to Ostrom’s theory on common property 
regimes for governing shared resources such as fisheries and grazing pastures.12 Of particular 
interest is Ostrom’s suggestion that cooperation among local actors arises out of a ‘lattice of 
interdependence’ to use, share and protect the common good.13 In this context, the activation 
of strategies and legal processes to protect GIs should aim to ‘back up’ existing social norms 
and conventions.     
 
The French Comté cheese (PDO since 1996) provides an example of successful collective 
management of a GI product. Torre shows that three factors contribute to the well-functioning 
of the Inter-professional Committee for the Management of the Comté cheese: (1) contractual 
relations that reduce uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour regarding the product quality and 
price policy; (2) a democratic internal governance structure that represents all categories of 
stakeholders; and (3) mechanisms of organisational trust that help maintain cohesion between 
local producers and their commitment to common objectives.14 One positive outcome is that 
                                                        
6 L. Bérard and P. Marchenay, ‘Tradition, regulation and intellectual property: local agricultural products and foodstuffs in France’, in S.B. 
Brush and D. Stabinsky (eds.) Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property Rights (Island Press, 1996) 230. 
7 A. Torre, ‘Collective action, governance structure and organizational trust in localized systems of production: the case of the AOC 
organization of small producers’ (2006) 18(1) Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 55, 59. 
8 ibid.  
9 R.P. Merges, ‘From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation’ (2004) 5 
SSRN < http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543> accessed 17/08/2018. 
10 D. Rangnekar, ‘Geographical Indications and Localisation: A Case Study of Feni’ (ESRC Report, 2009) 17. 
11 E. Rosenblatt, ‘A Theory of IP’s Negative Space’ (2011) 34(3) Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 338. 
12 E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (CUP, 1990). 
13 ibid 38. 
14 Torre (n7) 67-68. 
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the production of Comté cheese offers better remuneration to farmers, processors and other 
stakeholders in the supply chain than many other GIs.15 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. Section 4.1 explores the actors’ strategies and 
motivations for initiating the GI protection process. As will be seen, these reflect different 
visions and understandings of GIs and are based either on voluntary collective action or state 
intervention depending on each context. Section 4.2 turns to the creation process of GI 
collectives, with a focus on the process used to establish them as derived from the broader legal 
and institutional environment; the methods arising from such process to elaborate the CoP as 
part of the GI application; and the objectives of GI collectives. Finally, Section 4.3 analyses 
the operation of GI collectives, including the organisational models and rules of governance, 
which raises questions of inclusion and participation.  
 
4.1 Actors’ strategies for initiating the GI protection process  
 
This section explores the actors’ motivations and strategies for initiating collective action. By 
presenting the environment of the case study products and the reasons for starting collective 
action through narrative accounts, it will illustrate the diversity of meanings, values and 
interests attached to the legal protection of GIs. 
 
As seen in the previous chapters, the French and Vietnamese GI legal frameworks assign 
different roles to local stakeholders and state authorities. This leads to formulate different 
questions in relation to the actors’ motivations and strategies in each context. In France, it is 
relevant to investigate the reasons for the initiation of collective action by local stakeholders, 
who decide on both the application for GI protection and their own association to the initiative. 
In Vietnam, it is more appropriate to question the political objectives associated with the GI 
legal protection as part of a project funded by state authorities or external sources.  
 
As argued by Réviron and Chappuis, reasons for the mobilisation of stakeholders are primarily 
economic and commercial.16 Yet the analysis of our case studies outlines the need for a more 
                                                        
15 Barjolle and Sylvander (n1) 13-14. 
16 S. Réviron and J.-M. Chappuis, ‘Geographical Indications: Collective Organization and Management’ in E. Barham and B. Sylvander 
(eds.), Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (Wallingford: CAB International, 2011) 45, 47.  
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nuanced understanding of stakeholders’ motivations. As will be seen, French producers view 
GIs as a legal and economic protection tool primarily to fight against unfair business practices, 
but also to support the survival and growth of production activities, promote territorial 
development, and preserve traditional practices. Vietnamese authorities tend to use GIs as a 
marketing tool to build the product’s reputation on the market and improve its quality and 
productivity.  
 
4.1.1 Legal and economic protection  
 
Before.the.initiation.of.the.GI.protection.process,.the environments of all the products studied 
in France were characterised by a pronounced economic slowdown that threatened their 
viability. Besides, the name of all the products except wood from the Alps, which is the only 
non-consumer product among the case studies, was increasingly being used by actors outside 
the area of origin. In this context, it is the perception of a common risk derived from a 
challenging context and, for most products, free-riding on the established reputation of the 
name in the marketplace, that led local actors to reflect on the opportunity of a GI protection.  
 
4.1.1.1 Marginalisation of the areas of origin and misuse of the name 
  
Before the PDO qualification, the economic contexts of Pélardon cheese and bouchot mussels 
from Mont-St-Michel Bay were characterised by the marginalisation and depopulation of the 
areas where the products come from. Subsequently, concerns related to usurpation and 
misappropriation of the name prompted local stakeholders to trigger the process of legal 
protection of the name.  
 
(i) Pélardon cheese 
 
The Pélardon cheese is produced in the Cévennes area (Languedoc-Roussillon Region). As one 
of the oldest goat cheeses in Europe,17 it was used in the 16th Century as an exchange 
                                                        
17 C. Corniaux, V. Baritaux, S. Madelrieux, ‘Entre (re-)localisation et globalisation : analyse des stratégies spatiales des laiteries dans six 
bassins laitiers’ (8èmes Journées de Recherches en Sciences Sociales, Grenoble, France, December 2014) 9.  
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currency.18 The Cévennes area covers very isolated valleys and experienced a massive rural 
exodus in the 20th Century,19 especially in the 1960s with the end of the traditional silk worm 
breeding in the region due to the fierce competition from China.20 Until then, the production 
of Pélardon cheese was essentially for family consumption. Following the 1968 revolts in 
France, a few ‘neo-rurals’, i.e. urban people who decided to move to rural areas in the search 
for alternative ways of life as a sign of protest against dominant social and political values, 
decided to set up in the Cévennes and promote and produce Pélardon cheese.21 These 
newcomers created the first dairy cooperative and rapidly increased the production of the 
cheese in the 1970s, which gradually evolved toward specialised livestock farming.22 After an 
overproduction crisis in the 1980s which led cooperatives to stop collecting milk and breeders 
to start processing milk themselves, regional authorities decided to promote the production of 
the cheese by elaborating technical regulations defining its method of production and adopting 
the regional brand ‘Pélardon Languedoc-Roussillon’.23 However, it was found that the name 
‘Pélardon’ was increasingly being used on goat cheeses produced in Spain and other parts of 
France where production costs were lower, which resulted in cheeses sold as ‘Pélardon’ with 
rock-bottom prices.24  
 
Producers started discussing the usefulness of an official quality sign as early as 1987 when 
they created a union for the defence of Pélardon cheese, which later became the producers’ 
association for the defence of Pélardon in 1993. In 1994, the association decided to apply for a 
GI (French AOC before European PDO), which they considered to be the only certification 
system able to protect the geographical origin while certifying the product specificity.25 The 
primary objective pursued through the legal protection of the name was to fight against unfair 
business practices.26 Other important objectives cited by producers were to reduce the risk of 
                                                        
18 CoP ‘Pélardon’, Article 2 <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominationId=529> accessed 26/06/2018. 
19 In 1975, the population in the Cevennes area is 40,545 down by 66% from 118,500 in 1846, which is one of the highest depopulation rates 
in France. See C. Crosnier and C. Granger, ‘Le parc national des Cévennes, la population à l’épreuve de la gestion des milieu ouverts’ in M. 
Picouet and others (eds.), Environnement et sociétés rurales en mutation: approches alternatives (IRD, 2004) 165-184. 
20 B. Dedieu, ‘Exode rural et mutations des systèmes de production ovins en Cévennes’ (1984) 162 Economie Rurale 14. 
21 A. Benkahla, J. P. Boutonnet, and M. Napoléone, ‘Proximités et signalisation de la qualité: approches croisées pour l’étude d’une AOC, 
Le cas du Pélardon’ (4e Journées de la Proximité, Marseille, France, June 2004) 4. 
22 M. Napoléone and J.P. Boutonnet, ‘L’AOC Pélardon, fédératrice de nouvelles dynamiques individualles et collectives’ (6th International 
Livestock Farming System Symposium, Benevento, Italy, 26-29/08/2003). 
23 ibid. 
24 Benkahla, Boutonnet and Napoléone (n21) 4. 
25 ibid. 
26 Interviews F-B2 and F-B7. 
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overproduction by controlling the supply and quality of the labelled products; promote the 
territory; attract new breeders; and defend ‘neo’-traditional pastoral and grazing practices.27  
 
(ii) Bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay 
 
The very start of mussel bed farming in the Mont-St-Michel Bay originally emerged from the 
strong political will of the then mayor of the Vivier-sur-Mer commune, a fish merchant, who 
was seeking to maintain local population by creating new economic activities in the 1950s.28 
After the Second World War, Vivier-sur-Mer, where 90% of the current mussel production 
activities are located, suffered from depopulation – 600 inhabitants in 1950 down from 900 in 
1938 and 2,000 in 1900 – and a drop in economic activities.29 Mussel farming on vertical stakes 
(so-called ‘bouchot’) emerged as a promising economic activity since it had been found that 
mussels were attaching themselves naturally to the wooden palisades of the fixed fisheries and 
were growing well.30 The development of the mussel bed farming in the area required 
authorisation from state authorities due to the fact that the Mont-St-Michel Bay is a Public 
Maritime Domain (PMD).31 Established by Decree in 1852,32 the PMD belongs to the state, 
hence is inalienable. Economic activities that take place on the PDM are defined by state 
authorities and subject to prior authorisation. As research institutes had established that the 
area would provide an adequate environment, national authorities approved the development 
of mussel farming activities. They were especially eager to promote this activity to limit 
imports as there was no such product on the French market.33 Mussel breeding areas expanded 
quickly from the creation of two small plots of 12 km in 1954 to 78 km in 1957, 166 km in 
1963 and 270 km in 2018.34  
 
                                                        
27 Interviews F-B1, F-B4 and F-B6. 
28 K. Frangoudes, ‘L’occupation du domaine public maritime par des cultures marines, le cas de la Baie du Mont-Saint-Michel’ (1999) 
Coastman Working Paper n°11 <http://coastman.free.fr/wp/Coastman_WP11.pdf> accessed 03/09/2018. 
29 P. Delacotte and B. Cornu, Les hommes de la Baie – Mont Saint-Michel (Ouest & Compagnie, 2011).  
30 Frangoudes (n28) 10. 
31 ibid.  
32 Décret du 21 février 1852 sur la fixation du domaine public maritime (Decree of 21 February 1852 regulating the public maritime 
domaine).   
33 Frangoudes (n28) 10. 
34 R. Mongruel, A. Davaine and O. Thébaud, ‘Private adaptation to ecological constraints in a rights-based management system: the strategies 
of mussel growers in the Mont-Saint-Michel Bay (France)’ (Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Sustainable Coastal Zone Management 
Rights and Duties in the Coastal Zone, Stockholm, Sweden, 12-14 June 2003) 2. 
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The growing number of vertical stakes led to production and sustainability issues in the 1960s-
1970s.35 This prompted producers to initiate collective action by creating a first professional 
union in 1971 to request a decrease in their number. Restructuring projects aimed at reducing 
the number, density, and the maximum mussel bed fertilisation rates, as well as reorganising 
the location of the vertical stakes, were adopted in 1975, 1980, 1983 and 2002.36 Further, 
second and third professional unions were created in the 1980s and early 2000s to defend 
different views and interests as regards the various restructuration projects. It is in this context 
that producers started noticing in the 1980s that 20,000-30,000 tonnes of mussels were sold 
every year under the name ‘Mont Saint-Michel’ while only 10,000-12,000 tonnes were – and 
still are – grown and harvested in the area.37 Despite the rivalry among them, producers 
belonging to different professional unions gathered to discuss the utility of a PDO protection. 
The primary objective attached to the PDO was to protect against the misuse and 
misappropriation of the name.  
 
4.1.1.2 International competition and loss of production  
 
The economic hardships resulting from international competition and importation of same-type 
products were encountered in the case studies of green lentils from Berry and wood from the 
Alps.  
 
(i) Green lentils from Berry  
 
Green lentil is a dried seed that belongs to the leguminous plant family Lens culinaris of the 
ANICIA variety that comes from Puy region. The cultivation of green lentils started in the 
1950s with the introduction of this variety in the area known as the ‘Champagne Berrichonne’ 
where clay-limestone soils combined with a temperate climate with regular rainfall in the 
spring and high temperatures at the end of the growing cycle in the summer are particularly 
well-suited for growing the crop.38 The production was at its peak in 1983 when it represented 
                                                        
35 Frangoudes (n28) 11. 
36 Interviews F-C1, F-C3 and F-C6. 
37 ibid.  
38 CoP ‘Green lentils from Berry’, 17 <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominationId=396> accessed 
15/08/2018.  
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79% of the total production of lentils in France.39 As the lentil market became more competitive 
at the international level, lentils from other countries especially Canada started flooding the 
French market at very low prices, which led French farmers to abandon this production. 
Consequently, the production area decreased to 109 hectares in 1997 down from 7,200 hectares 
in 1983.40  
 
A few passionate producers, concerned about preserving the cultivation of green lentils in the 
area, decided to group together with the aim to save the industry. This marked the shift from 
individual to collective action. In 1994, they created a producers’ association to discuss and 
coordinate their activities; established the commercial entity Cibèle (Compagnie 
interprofessionnelle du Berry pour la lentille) to promote and market their production; 
harmonised prices; and invested jointly in a sorting unit and a packaging facility. Producers 
also felt the need to build the reputation of the lentils by ensuring high-quality standards and 
guaranteeing origin. To this aim, they obtained the French Label Rouge qualification in 1996. 
The Label Rouge is an official sign highly regarded among French consumers that refers to 
products which by their terms of production or manufacture have a higher level of quality 
compared to other similar products.41 Subsequently, producers applied for a PGI, registered in 
1998, as a growing number of competitors outside the area of origin were free riding on the 
name’s reputation.42 The legal protection of the name primarily aimed to protect producers and 
consumers’ interests. Around the same time, producers of Puy green lentils (based on the same 
ANICIA variety) applied for an AOC (obtained in 1996 before the PDO in 2008). The decision 
of producers of green lentils from Berry to apply for a PGI and not a PDO was based on two 
reasons.43 First, they wanted to differentiate themselves from Puy producers. Second, they 
feared that they would not qualify for the more stringent PDO protection because the 
production of lentils in Berry area is more recent, less traditional and smaller as compared with 
that of lentils in Puy area, where the original variety comes from, and which had been protected 
as an appellation of origin since 1935.44  
 
                                                        
39 ibid. 
40 ibid 17-18. 
41 Rural and Maritime Fishing Code, Article L641-1. See INAO’s website < https://www.inao.gouv.fr/eng/Official-signs-identifying-
quality-and-origin/Label-Rouge-Red-Label> accessed 21/06/2018. 
42 Interviews F-D2 and F-D3. 
43 Interviews F-D1, F-D2 and F-D4. 
44 Tribunal civ. 1ère instance Puy, 17/01/1935. 
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(ii) Wood from the Alps  
 
Before the start of the registration process of the certification mark, sawmills in the Alps faced 
stiff international competition with a sharp increase in imports of sawn wood from Germany 
and Finland.45 Small and medium enterprises also had difficulties in adjusting to the new 
European classification standards adopted in the 1980s and 1990s.46 As a result, over 50% of 
sawmills in the Alps have disappeared since 1980.47 Besides, according to the French National 
Federation of Wood, China’s substantial imports of European timber without local processing, 
due to the fact that it is the world's largest construction market, could result in a loss of 
thousands of jobs and that of added value of €800 million for local sawmills in France.48  
 
In this context, local public authorities concerned with the development of the wood industry 
and the protection of the territory approached the Regional Inter-professional Federation for 
Wood and Forest to raise awareness of local actors.49 This highlights the strong political 
dimension of the initiative. As a result, a commission composed of local stakeholders and 
authorities was established, leading to the creation of an association.50 Concurrently, the 
labelling process was planned by the Alps Committee, the governing body of the Alps region 
which gathers public authorities and professional representatives and associations.51 Arising 
from its Interregional Programme for the Management and Development of the Alps,52 and 
articulated as Measure 2.2 of the implementing Interregional Convention for the Alps for 2015-
2020,53 the origin labelling process was seen as a strategy to add value to local wood and 
develop the industry while contributing to the sustainable development of the territory.  
                                                        
45 Association ‘Bois des Alpes’, ‘La démarche’, available here: <http://boisdesalpes.net/association.php> accessed 16/08/2018. 
46 Interview F-E1. 
47 Union Régionale des Associations de Communes Forestières, ‘Schéma stratégique forestier pour le Massif des Alpes’ (2006) 4 (on file 
with author). 
48 Fédération nationale du bois, ‘Exportation des bois ronds, Manifestation de la FNB devant l’Assemble nationale’ (2014) 4 (on file with 
author). 
49 Interview F-E1. 
50 ibid. 
51 The Alps Committee (Comité du Massif des Alpes) was established by the law n°85-30 of 9 January 1985 relative to the development and 
protection of mountains. 
52 The Alps Committee, ‘Schéma interrégional d'aménagement et de développement du massif des Alpes’, adopted in 2006 and revised in 
2013 (on file with author). 
53 Convention Interrégionale du Massif des Alpes for 2015-2020du 4 septembre 2015 (Interregional Convention of the Alps region of 4 
September 2015) 8. The Convention is the primary policy lever through which action is taken for the management and development of the 
Alps region.  
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4.1.1.3 Modernisation of ways of life and loss of market  
 
The first soap-maker in Marseille was identified in 1371 and soap factories started to appear in 
the 15th Century.54 In the 17th Century, the appellation ‘savon de Marseille’ became a common 
name to designate soaps produced in the area. The composition and rules of production of 
Marseille soap were established by the Edict of Colbert of 5 October 1688. According to this 
text, the Marseille soap is based on soda ash and vegetable oils only, thereby excluding dye, 
fragrance, animal fat, additive or processing aid.55 They are made (‘saponified’) in a cauldron 
following five processing steps according to the so-called ‘Marseille method’.56  
 
Picture 4.1 
Cauldron room of a soap factory in Marseille 
 
 
Engraving ‘Les merveilles de l’industrie’ by Louis Figuier, 1873-1877 
 
At the end of the 18th Century, soap manufacturing was the largest industry in Marseille with 
35 soap factories. A few producers started producing similar soaps outside Marseille, in Salon-
de-Provence, Toulon and Arles.57 A decree adopted by Napoleon on 28 December 1812 aimed 
at protecting the geographical origin of the soap – not the name as such – by creating a mark 
consisting of a pentagon indicating the composition (olive oil), the name of the producer and 
                                                        
54 P. Boulanger, Le savon de Marseille (Eds Equinoxe, 2013) 18. 
55 ibid 21. 
56 The five steps are: saponification or paste producing; rinsing/salting-out; heating/cooking; cleansing/washing; and liquefying.  
57 Boulanger (n54) 24. 
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the name of Marseille.58 Only producers based in Marseille had the exclusive right to use the 
pentagon mark.  
 
 
Picture 4.2 
The pentagon mark of Marseille soap 
 
As olive oil became rare and expensive in the 19th Century, producers started mixing it with 
imported seed oils such as copra and palm oils. Two types of soaps emerged: a white soap 
made up of copra and palm oils (for washing laundry); and a green soap made up of olive oil 
and copra or palm oil (for body and face cleansing).59 With a port at the crossroads of oil trade 
routes (olive oil from Mediterranean countries, copra oil from Africa and palm oil from Africa 
and Asia), Marseille was considered the ideal location for soap production. The industry was 
particularly successful in the 19th Century when Marseille soap was granted the ‘Golden 
Crown’ at the Universal Exhibition in Paris in 1855.60 Producers started affixing the stamp 
‘72%’ on soaps to indicate the content of vegetable oil as a sign of quality.  
 
In the 19th and beginning of the 20th Centuries, Marseille soap played an increasingly important 
role in the household economy due to the emergence of the consumer society coupled with the 
                                                        
58 ibid 35. 
59 ibid 38. 
60 ibid 43. 
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growing attention paid to domestic hygiene and comfort.61 About 180,000 tonnes of Marseille 
soap were produced in 1913 compared with 22,000 in 1789 and 70,000 in 1863.62  
 
Picture 4.3 
Advertising billboards for Marseille soap at the beginning of the 20th Century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Production dropped dramatically after the Second World War primarily because of the rapid 
development of synthetic detergents in the 1950s and the increasing use of electric washing 
machines and powders.63 Today, five passionate soap factories still produce about 2,000 
tonnes/year of traditional Marseille soaps, down from ninety in the beginning of the 20th 
Century.64 Further, the name of the soap has been popularised and widely used on the market 
for products made outside Marseille and/or that do not comply with the traditional method (see 
Chapter 6).  
 
In this context, the five ‘genuine’ producers decided to defend their common heritage by 
creating an association in 1998 (Groupement des Savonniers de Provence) which became the 
UPSM (Union des Professionnels du Savon de Marseille) in 2011. The UPSM, which now has 
four members accounting for 90% of the total production of the genuine product, is centered 
around the promotion of the traditional soap and the protection of its collective mark. Its 
                                                        
61 For more on the history of soap and advertising, see the work of A. McClintock, ‘Soft-soaping Empire – Commodity racism and imperial 
advertising’ in N. Mirzoeff (ed.) The Visual Culture Reade (Routledge, 1999) 506. 
62 Boulanger (n54) 63. 
63 ibid 98. 
64 ibid 105. 
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registration in 2012 primarily aimed to help consumers identify the genuine soap produced by 
members of the UPSM.  
 
Yet as mentioned in Chapter 2, the protection of the soap name as an IGPIA is currently at the 
heart of a legal dispute between three producer associations. The AFSM (Association des 
Fabricants du Savon de Marseille), created in 2014 among twelve producers including the 
global group L’Occitane, submitted an IGPIA application in June 2015. This association 
supports the introduction of innovations and product diversification to meet the needs and 
tastes of today’s consumers for coloured and perfumed soaps. The UPSM submitted an IGPIA 
application in December 2015 for a product corresponding to the traditional Marseille method, 
thereby excluding the use of animal fat, colorants and perfumes. A third association, the 
ASDMF (Association Savon de Marseille France) created in December 2017, which gathers 
95% of French soap producers outside Marseille region, is planning to submit a GI application 
for the name ‘Savon de Marseille France’.65 It argues that so-called Marseille soaps can be 
produced anywhere in France and it defends the right to use the name in relation to a 
manufacturing process only, regardless of any specific geographical location as long as it takes 
place on the French territory.66  
 
4.1.2 Marketing and product development  
 
In presenting the context of each case study, the section will show that the protection of almost 
all Vietnamese products under study was primarily associated by state authorities with market 
and product development objectives. Considering that most Vietnamese local products do not 
have a well-established reputation that could be subject to unfair competition, GIs are not 
primarily conceived of in legal terms but rather as a marketing tool to build the reputation of 
the name and increase the competitiveness of the product on the market. This is the case for 
many local products in other developing and emerging countries.67 A few notable exceptions 
                                                        
65 ASDMF, ‘Qui sommes-nous?’ <http://savondemarseillefrance.fr/SAVONS_MARSEILLE_WEB/FR/presentation-association-savon-
marseille-france.awp> accessed 4 June 2018. 
66 ibid. 
67 J. Hughes, ‘Coffee and Chocolate: Can We Help Developing Country Farmers through Geographical Indications?’ (Report prepared for 
the IIPI, 2009) 7. 
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to the lack of reputation of Vietnamese local products include Phu Quoc fish sauce,68 Thieu 
lychee from Thanh Ha,69 mint honey from Mèo Vạc,70 Buôn Ma Thuôt coffee71 and, among 
our case studies, fried calamari from Hạ Long, which will be dealt with last. Besides, as many 
local production systems face quality issues, GI projects provide the opportunity to codify 
quality and production standards, which has led to product improvement or innovation in at 
least two case studies. 
 
At the policy level, the association of GI protection with market and product development 
objectives is reflected in the NOIP’s Guides on GI projects.72 According to these guides, GIs 
should aim to increase the economic value and competitiveness of the products, expand the 
market, promote scientific and technological innovations, and enhance producers’ standards of 
living by increasing incomes.73 Economic and market development objectives with an 
emphasis on export markets are also clearly articulated in the support programmes, including 
the state-level Programme 6874 and local support programmes, such as that of the Quang Ninh 
Province.75 The focus on export products and international markets is not surprising 
considering that Vietnam has made support to export and integration into the global market a 
priority of its agricultural policy since the 1990s.76 Other countries have adopted a similar 
strategy linking legal protection to international marketing. For instance, India’s Foreign Trade 
                                                        
68 D.H. Dao ‘Institutions de gestion de la qualité : action collective et apprentissage organisationnel. le cas de l'Indication Géographique (IG) 
"Nuoc mam de Phu Quôc" au Vietnam’ (Master’s thesis, Essor: Développement des territoires ruraux, Ecole Nationale Supérieure 
Agronomique de Toulouse, 2011) 58. 
69 C. Durand ‘L’émergence des indications géographiques dans les processus de qualification territoriale des produits agroalimentaires - Une 
analyse comparée entre l’Indonésie et le Vietnam’ (PhD Thesis, Institut national d'études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - SupAgro 
Montpellier, 2016) 347. 
70 ibid 351. 
71 C. Durand C. and S. Fournier, ‘Can Geographical Indications Modernize Indonesian and Vietnamese Agriculture? Analyzing the Role of 
National and Local Governments and Producers’ Strategies’ (2015) 93 World Development 98.     
72 NOIP, ‘Guide à la construction du projet “Gestion et Developpement des IGs”’; ‘Guide à la construction du projet “Etablissement, Gestion 
et Développement des marques collectives utilisées pour les spécialités locales”’; ‘Guide à la construction du projet “Etablissement, Gestion 
et Développement des marques de certification utilisées pour les spécialités locales”’ (NOIP, 2009). 
73 See for instance NOIP, ‘Guide à la construction du projet “Gestion et Developpement des IGs” 5. 
74 Decision 68/2005/QD-TTg of 4 April 2005 establishing the Programme 68, Article 1.1b).  
75 Decision PPC 273/QD-UBND establishing a ‘Brand development programme for agricultural products of Quang Ninh Province by 2015’, 
Article 1.  
76 X. Dung Cao and T.D. Tran, Transition et ouverture économique au Vietnam : une différenciation sectorielle’ (2005) 4(104) Economie 
Internationale 27. 
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Policy Statement for 2015-2020 has established a programme to promote the branding, 
marketing and export of GI products.77  
 
4.1.2.1 Revitalisation of the production 
 
Conical hats have long been used by Vietnamese farmers as an essential protection from rain 
and sunshine when working in the fields. In the dynastic period, conical hats were also worn 
for prayers and temple visits, mostly by women. In the 20th Century, especially during the 
Vietnam War, they became part of soldiers’ uniforms.78  
 
Picture 4.4 
Soldiers wearing conical hats 
 
 
The production of conical hats in Thừa Thiên–Huế Province, where the GI conical hat from 
Huế originates, started under the Nguyễn dynasty in the early 19th Century, as Huế attracted 
many well-known artisans from across the country in a wide range of industries.79 Today, 
conical hats are produced in many different places across Vietnam. They are regarded as a 
national emblem that is closely linked to the traditional agriculture of the country and are 
widely used in traditional women’s costumes.80 For older Western tourists who remember the 
images of soldiers wearing conical hats, they are also icons of Vietnam’s struggle for 
                                                        
77 R.W. Sharma and S. Kulhari ‘Marketing of GI Products: Unlocking their Commercial Potential’ (Research Study for the Centre for WTO 
Studies and Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, 2015) 3.  
<http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/Papers/Marketing%20of%20GI%20Products%20Unlocking%20their%20Commercial%20Potential.pdf> 
accessed 03/09/2018. 
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independence.81 The national symbolic status of conicals hat is recognised in the document 
detailing the characteristics of conical hats from Huế as part of the GI application.82  
 
Modernisation of ways of life, coupled with increased industrialization and rapid urbanization 
have led to the progressive disappearance of the hats, at least in urban areas. This is because 
the number of motorised two-wheelers has grown exponentially in the past two decades 
(representing 95% of all vehicles registered in Vietnam in 2017),83 and because the use of 
helmets on all roads has been mandatory for all motorcycle drivers and passengers since 
2007,84 thereby replacing conical hats.85 Conical hats are now mainly used by farmers in the 
fields or bought in Huế by tourists, taking into account that Huế Imperial City was listed as a 
World Heritage Site in 1993 and attracts thousands of visitors every year.86  
 
While three categories of conical hat are produced in Thừa Thiên–Huế Province, the GI-
qualified hat involves the most expensive and time-consuming production process. Most 
producers are small households whose production is limited and hence who have other jobs to 
increase their incomes.87 This explains why they have gradually switched to the production of 
the cheapest categories of hats to save time and money.88 Consequently, the production of the 
genuine conical hat from Huế has decreased rapidly. 
 
Against this backdrop, the decision of the authorities to protect the name of conical hats from 
Huế, which became the first-ever GI handicraft product in Vietnam, addressed the need to 
revitalise its production. More specifically, considering that conical hats are an emblematic 
product produced across the country, the GI aims to identify the specific characteristics of the 
product made in Huế and build its reputation on the market.89 The GI protection is also seen as 
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a means to promote cultural preservation and craftsmanship.90 From that perspective, the GI 
should aim to convey a narrative about the cultural values embodied in the hat, which is all the 
more important considering its economic importance as a sought-after touristic product. 
Finally, the GI is also considered as a tool to create stable jobs, promote the role of women 
producers and increase producers’ incomes.91 In that respect, the President of the association 
explained that ‘those who make conical hats are small-scale producers so it is very hard for 
them to survive and make a living from conical hats only. At the same time, it was necessary 
to find a way to preserve this traditional product. This responsibility devolves on public 
authorities and is not a matter for producers only’.92  
 
Interestingly, the President of the association is also the President of the Provincial Women’s 
Union, whose involvement was justified by the need to protect the rights and interests of 
producers who are mostly women in all stages of the production process.93 This tends to support 
Parasecoli’s suggestion that GIs should contribute to promote the socio-economic role of 
women considering that GI products often involve work done and traditions transmitted by 
women.94  
 
4.1.2.2 Rural industrialisation policy   
 
Đông Triều craft village, in Quảng Ninh Province, is one of the 2,000 craft villages in Vietnam. 
These are defined as settlements with more than 20% of households engaged in craft production 
or more than 20% of household income derived from handicrafts.95 The ceramic products from 
Đông Triều are jars of particular size and heavy weight that have been produced in the area 
since the 16th Century following traditional methods of production. These involve the mixing 
of clay and sand, the use of traditional kilns and a high-temperature fire of 1280-1300°C.96  
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Picture 4.5 
The traditional pottery from Đông Triều 
 
 
 
Although handicraft activities have taken place in the area for over four centuries, most rural 
householders were traditionally farmers who engaged occasionally in the production of 
ceramics during the dry season to increase incomes, as was the case in other rural regions of 
Vietnam.97 The industrialisation of handicraft activities in Đông Triều is fairly recent and dates 
back to the 1950-1960s when the first family production workshop was established before 
expanding to a cooperative of several other family production workshops.98 The expansion of 
handicraft activities in the area has been supported by local authorities as part of Vietnam’s 
rural industrialisation strategy. This strategy aims to reduce rural poverty by promoting non-
agricultural activities and creating jobs, stimulate demand for consumer products and reduce 
rural-urban migration.99 In that respect, the MARD adopted policies to encourage the 
production of handicrafts in rural areas, with each village focusing on one particular 
handicraft.100 This follows a similar model to the ‘One Tambon (subdistrict) One Product’ 
initiative introduced in Thailand in 2001.101 At the local level, Quang Ninh Province adopted 
a resolution in 2010 to build new rural activities102 and which emphasises the economic and 
cultural importance of handicraft villages. Today, about 2,000 producers, of which more than 
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90% are women, are involved in pottery production in Đông Triều,103 which highlights again 
the role of women in the production of local products.104 
 
In this context and unlike the other Vietnamese case studies, the producers’ association was 
established in 2004, i.e. before the registration of the trade mark in 2012, on the initiative of its 
current President, who was then an official at the Provincial DARD. The objectives of the 
association were to reduce competition among potters, structure the industry and provide a 
platform for the exchange of good practices and information on modern production 
techniques.105 Interest in the protection of the name emerged later, once again on the initiative 
of the President of the producers’ association. The main objective attached to the collective 
mark was to build the product’s reputation on the market.106 Local authorities were eager to 
support this project in the broader context of Vietnam’s rural industrialisation policy. 
 
4.1.2.3 Livelihoods approach 
 
The production systems of H’mong beef and star anise from Lạng Sơn are embedded in 
difficult economic environments. This context contributes to explain the ‘livelihoods approach’ 
of the externally-funded projects that were implemented to protect the product name in both 
cases.  
 
(i) H’mong beef from Cao Bằng 
 
The H’mong cow is an indigenous breed producing high quality beef. It has been produced 
since the 1960s in the Province of Cao Bằng, along the border with China, by the ethnic 
H’mong group, one of the eight minorities living in the area who represents about 10,000 
households or 52,250 people, i.e. 10% of the total population of the Province.107 Cattle raising 
contributes to about 60% of the total income of the H’mong people,108 who use traditional 
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breeding practices.109 These include keeping the cattle in cowsheds and feeding them with 
natural grass, elephant grass, and ground corn cooked as porridge, which gives the beef its 
specific taste.110  
 
From an economic perspective, Cao Bằng is among the poorest and most remote provinces, 
with over 80% of the population living in rural areas and working in agriculture, especially 
among the ethnic minorities.111 Noting that Vietnamese statistics differ from those of the World 
Bank, the following figures need to be taken with caution. In Cao Bằng, over 25% (according 
to the Vietnamese statistics)112 or 50% (according to the World Bank)113 of the population is 
poor. By way of comparison, according to the World Bank, the national poverty headcount 
ratio at US$1.90 a day (percentage of the population living on less than $1.90 a day at 2011 
international prices) is 2.6% in 2014 down from 52.9% in 1992.114  
 
Considering the contribution of beef production to the livelihoods of the H’mong people, two 
cooperation projects were implemented to increase production, improve market linkages and 
reduce poverty. First, the ‘SuperChain’ project, funded by IFAD and implemented in Vietnam 
in 2007-2009 for three products including H’mong beef from Cao Bằng,115 aimed at 
strengthening supply chains by linking small-scale farmers to supermarkets and other quality 
chains.116 Subsequently, the 2008-2014 project ‘Developing Business with Rural Poor in Cao 
Bang’, financed through a loan from IFAD and co-funding from Luxembourg and Germany, 
sought to empower poor rural households by improving their organisation and enhancing their 
participation in the value chain.117 As part of this project, an agricultural expert was recruited 
to create the producers’ association and prepare the trade mark application. The primary 
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objective of the collective mark was to build the reputation and economic value of the beef to 
increase producers’ incomes.118 Other objectives were to guarantee the product’s quality, origin 
and traditional breeding practices. The construction of the only slaughterhouse operating within 
the producers’ association was also funded externally through a loan by the Asian Development 
Bank.119 
 
(ii) Star anise from Lạng Sơn 
 
Star anise is a dark-grey spice that has 6-8 equal, separate petals arranged in a star shape. It is 
commonly used in the cooking of East Asian countries, India and China, as well as in European 
countries. It is also used in cosmetics and medicine where the shikimic acid found in the fruit 
is one of the most important ingredients of the antiviral medicine Tamiflu that aims to treat the 
H5N1 avian/bird flu virus.120  
 
Vietnam is the second largest producer of star anise in the world after China. The Province of 
Lạng Sơn, located in northern Vietnam, is the largest production site of star anise in the country. 
It is also one of the poorest and most remote provinces. Over 16% (according to the Vietnamese 
statistics)121 or 45% (for the World Bank)122 of the population live below the poverty line. 
Livelihoods are heavily reliant on agriculture and forest land resources with over 80% of the 
population working in agriculture.123 The star anise production area occupies a total of 35,575 
hectares, i.e. about 60% of the total cultivated area of 58,500 hectares at the country level.124 
The production of star anise in Lạng Sơn is estimated to be between 6,000 and 10,000 
tons/year125 and represents up to 50% of farmers’ incomes.126 The process of planting and 
harvesting star anise is mainly based on traditional know-how and experience, including the 
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use of manual techniques. There are traditionally two value chains: dry star anise and star anise 
oil.  
 
Considering the economic importance of star anise production to the livelihoods of poor 
farmers in the area and, generally, to the global trade of the spice, funding was provided through 
the Swiss-Vietnamese Intellectual Property Project (2001-2010) to register the GI.127 The 
objectives were to promote the product and increase its production with a view to improve the 
livelihoods of smallholder farmers.128  
 
4.1.2.4 Product development  
 
In the case studies of vermicelli from Bình Liêu and rice from Đông Triều, the projects 
implemented to protect the product names also aimed to change production practices and 
improve the quality and productivity of both products through the introduction of new varieties 
and modern equipment. This tends to support Durand and Fournier’s claim that GIs are used 
in Vietnam to promote agricultural modernisation,129 which Vietnam has adopted as a national 
priority since the 1960s to address the need to feed its growing population.130 The use of 
improved varieties or modern equipment to meet new social, environmental or market 
conditions, which may require amending the quality and production standards,131 has been 
observed for many other origin products, for instance Porto wine,132 Tequila,133 and Basmati 
rice.134  
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(i) Vermicelli from Bình Liêu 
 
Vermicelli is a popular Vietnamese product that has been traditionally produced in Bình Liêu, 
a rural and mountainous district of Quảng Ninh Province.135 Arrowroot tubers, the raw 
material, are traditionally harvested and processed by hand by smallholder farmers. The manual 
processing method has been reported to be of low productivity while resulting in uneven quality 
and quantity across farmers, which makes it difficult for the product to be competitive in the 
market.136  
 
In this context, local authorities viewed the certification mark as a marketing tool that could 
provide higher economic value to the product and enhance its quality through the definition of 
processing, production and quality standards.137 The authorities have also supported the 
introduction of improved varieties that offer higher yields and the use of modern processing 
equipment, including milling, grinding, washing and drying machines that have now replaced 
the traditional manual processing process for the largest part.138  
 
(ii) Sticky rice from Đông Triều 
 
As a staple part of the diet of Vietnamese people, rice is a major food crop that greatly 
contributes to Vietnam’s food security and rural economy. At the global level, Vietnam is the 
fifth largest rice producer and the second biggest rice exporter.139 Vietnam’s agricultural 
economy is primarily based on rice which is cultivated on 82% of the country’s arable land, 
particularly in the Mekong and Red River deltas.140 One of the specific objectives of Resolution 
63/NQ-CP of 23 December 2009 on National Food Security is to step up intensive rice farming. 
In this Resolution, rice is considered as a ‘principal task’ that is associated with national 
objectives of industrialisation and modernisation.141  
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Sticky rice, a short grain variety of rice, has been grown by generations of farmers in Đông 
Triều District. The productivity and economic value of sticky rice are about 50-75% higher 
than for normal rice. This has led many farmers to mix sticky rice with low-quality ‘normal’ 
rice and sell their production at the price of pure sticky rice to get higher margins.142 The 
product quality was thus uneven across farmers. Further, the sticky rice from Đông Triều does 
not have specific characteristics nor a reputation on the market.143 
 
In this context and considering the national objectives of industrialisation and modernisation, 
the trade mark project aimed to build the product’s reputation while improving it quality and 
productivity. In this regard, it introduced an improved rice variety with a better resistance to 
pests and increased productivity of about 10% to 40 quintal/ha compared to the old variety.144  
 
4.1.2.5 Fight against misuse of the name  
 
The fried calamari from Hạ Long is a typical product of Hạ Long City, the capital city of Quảng 
Ninh Province. They have been produced by traditional family units since 1946.145 Their 
specific taste and characteristics derive from the high quality of the calamari found in the Gulf 
of Tonkin and the producers’ technical know-how. This product, which has long enjoyed an 
excellent reputation among local consumers, was listed among the 50 most delicious dishes in 
Vietnam in 2012 and the 100 most delicious dishes in Asia in 2013.146 Their production and 
reputation also benefit from the millions of tourists drawn each year to the nearby Hạ Long 
Bay, a UNESCO World Heritage Site (increased from 1.2 million in 2002 to approximately 
3.9 millions of tourists inland in 2014).147 Evidence of their strong reputation is the widespread 
use of the name on squid products that do not come from Hạ Long City, particularly in the 
neighbouring Quang Yên District.148 In this context, the main objective of the GI was to fight 
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against the misuse of the name.149 This has also been the case for other well-known Vietnamese 
products such as Thieu lychee from Thanh Ha150 and mint honey from Mèo Vạc.151 
 
4.2 Creation of GI collectives  
 
This section will explore the way GI collectives were created with a focus on: the process used 
to establish them; the methods arising from such process to elaborate the CoP as part of the GI 
application; and the objectives of GI collectives. In doing so, it will emphasise the contrasting 
active and passive roles of local stakeholders in the creation process of GI collectives in each 
country, as derived from France’s bottom-up versus Vietnam’s state-driven approach to GIs.  
 
It should be kept in mind that these different approaches do not necessarily determine the way 
collective action starts out nor its future development. For instance, in the case of the 
Vietnamese Buôn Ma Thuôt coffee in Vietnam (GI since 2005), local stakeholders have 
gradually taken over the management of the GI initiative that was initiated by local 
authorities.152 Conversely, in the case of the Austrian Mostviertel Perry (PGI since 2011), 
producers did not participate actively in the establishment of the initiative (led by the Regional 
Management Office), never used the PGI and even decided to withdraw from its protection.153  
 
4.2.1 Process  
 
As will be discussed, the law in each country determines the process used to establish the GI 
collectives. In French/European law, the GI registration process is based on the collective and 
participatory action of local stakeholders. In Vietnam, the GI registration process is usually led 
by a technical expert under the supervision of public authorities, which typically provides little 
space for collective action to develop on its own.  
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4.2.1.1 Participatory  
 
As explained in Chapter 2, in French law the registration process of PDO/PGIs involves a 
participatory process led by local stakeholders who must group together within one ODG. The 
ODGs must ensure the representativeness of the different professional groups involved in the 
production, processing, elaboration and packaging of the PDO/PGI product.154  
 
In practice, collective action dynamics preceded the creation of ODGs in all three PDO/PGI 
initiatives under study. As seen in Section 4.1.1, Pélardon producers created a first union in 
1987 which became an association in 1993, before they decided to apply for a PDO recognition 
in 1994. Similarly, lentil producers created an association in 1994, two years before they 
decided to apply for a PGI. In both cases, the producers’ association became the ODG, which 
required amending its charter to change the association’s name, missions and membership. For 
example, to be recognised as the representative ODG for green lentils from Berry, the 
association created in 1994 among a dozen farmers opened its membership to three other types 
of stakeholders: storage silos; wholesalers-packers; and the sorting centre.155 In the initiative 
of the PDO mussels, prior to the registration of the AOC in 2006, producers interacted and 
defended different interests in three professional unions created between 1971 and 2002. The 
PDO process brought together producers from the three unions in one ODG created in 2003 
which thus emerged as a unifying association.  
 
In involving interaction and decision-making processes, the pre-existence of producer 
organisations has emerged in the GI literature as a factor facilitating the GI registration process, 
such as was the case for the Colombian coffee.156 However, if the registration process for green 
lentils from Berry was unproblematic, it was long and complex for the two other initiatives, as 
will be shown in Section 4.2.2.  
 
Turning to trade marks, Chapter 2 showed that, in France, the registration of collective trade 
marks must be processed by the association of producers/traders while local actors are not 
required to create an association in the case of certification marks. In the Marseille soap case 
study, interviews confirmed that anterior interaction among producers within the association 
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Groupement des Savonniers de Provence created in 1998 facilitated the creation of the UPSM 
in 2011.157 In the case of wood from the Alps, even in the absence of legal requirement, local 
stakeholders decided to create an association after they had been approached by local 
authorities to find ways to address the economic challenges facing the local wood industry.158 
In this initiative, support from public authorities in instigating the creation process 
compensated the lack or limited pre-existing collective action dynamics, as was the case for 
other European products, including the Tuscan extra virgin olive oil and the Sorana bean from 
Italy.159  
 
Unlike for PDO/PGIs, the French/European law does not require associations established 
within trade mark initiatives to be representative of the different professional groups involved. 
The choice to include such requirement is thus left to the discretion of each association. On the 
one hand, the membership of the association established for wood from the Alps is 
representative of the four professional groups involved with wood products (Table 4.1).160 On 
the other hand, the membership of the UPSM is reduced to four soap factories and excludes 
the providers of the vegetable oils that come from other countries, whereas the AFSM has 
twelve producer members and the ASDMF gathers 95% of French soap producers outside 
Marseille area. This leads to question the extent to which these competing associations could 
be considered as representative of the profession which, as seen in Chapter 2, is a legal 
requirement for the ODGs established for IGPIAs.161  
 
4.2.1.2 Technocratic 
 
As seen in Chapter 3, in Vietnam, the right to register a sui generis GI has always been 
exercised by state authorities and there is no legal obligation to create a collective organisation. 
However, according to the NOIP, the establishment of a collective organisation is ‘necessary’ 
to assist the managing organisation.162 Yet it has been reported that only half of the sui generis 
GIs registered so far in the country, including all those supported by the Programme 68, have 
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seen the creation of a producers’ association.163 The creation of producer organisations is, 
however, mandatory in the case of collective trade marks but not for certification marks, as in 
French law. In practice, an association was established in all seven Vietnamese case studies. 
 
According to the NOIP, local actors involved in the production and trade of the product create 
collective organisations ‘voluntarily’.164 However, these are usually set up by an external 
consultant recruited from an IP law firm or an agricultural research institute who must ‘propose 
a plan to establish the collective organisation of producers and traders’165 in the case of sui 
generis GIs, or ‘identify the correct organisation who will be the owner of the collective 
mark’.166 In this context, collective action dynamics do not usually precede the creation of 
associations but rather are instigated by an external expert under the supervision of state 
authorities. The creation process of producers’ associations is thus largely technocratic 
following a top-down, state-driven approach to GIs. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, top-down approaches are common in countries who have only 
recently adopted GI provisions to comply with TRIPS167 such as India,168 Indonesia,169 and 
West and Central African countries.170 In countries with weak institutional structures, it is 
generally contended that the involvement of external experts can successfully contribute to the 
creation of producers’ associations and accelerate the GI registration process.171  
 
The establishment of producers’ associations through a top-down approach comes with two 
main pitfalls. First, membership rules may exclude some types of stakeholders, resulting in a 
lack of representativeness or, conversely, include stakeholders against their will. For instance, 
the association of producers of fried calamari from Hạ Long excludes fishermen who provide 
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the fresh calamari.172 In the initiative of sticky rice from Đông Triều, it was decided that the 
production area should be undivided across the different land parcels to facilitate irrigation and 
pest control and promote the collective use of pesticides and fertilizers.173 This led to the 
exclusion of many farmers who felt a sense of injustice as they claim to provide the same 
quality rice. In the words of a non-member farmer, ‘many people are jealous and do not 
understand why they were excluded from the project. It should have included everyone. The 
quality of our rice is the same’.174 At the same time, when the project started, many farmers, 
who are now members, did not want to join the association and grow sticky rice variety because 
there is only one planting season per year instead of two for normal rice and because the sticky 
rice flower is more easily infected by pests. As summarised by a non-member farmer, ‘some 
would like to be part of the association but are not members. Some don’t want to be part of the 
association but are members’.175  
 
Another example of ‘forced’ inclusion is provided by the case study of vermicelli from Bình 
Liêu. In this initiative, the President of the association was pressured by local authorities to 
lead the association because of his large production capacities which account for 50% of the 
total production of vermicelli in the whole District. Prior to the start of the project in 2012, he 
had registered his private trade mark in 2007 and made a huge investment to build its 
reputation.176 As such, he was not willing to abandon it for the origin certification mark. As he 
explained, ‘[m]y trade mark has an excellent reputation, why should I change and use a new 
certification mark?’.177 He ultimately took this position because, in his own words, ‘if [he] 
do[esn’t] follow the instructions of the authorities, they can cause serious difficulties’.178  
 
A second drawback of top-down approaches is that they carry the risk of a negative impact on 
local stakeholders’ awareness, understanding and willingness to participate actively in the 
initiatives.179 In the case studies of sticky rice from Đông Triều and vermicelli from Bình Liêu, 
some farmers are not aware of the existence of the association or of their own membership, 
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and do not show interest in the initiative. When asked about this, the project leader for 
vermicelli from Bình Liêu explained that ‘it was impossible to visit every household to inform 
them of the project, farmers easily forget what they are told, and awareness in this region is 
very low’.180 In fact, a large majority of origin-labelling initiatives in Vietnam show little 
interest and commitment of local actors, as confirmed by other recent empirical studies, for 
instance a study concerning Cao Phong oranges.181 In analysing eight case studies in Vietnam, 
a project funded by the French Agency for Development also found that almost 90% of 
producers were not aware that a GI had been registered for their product.182  
 
4.2.2 Method 
 
Arising out of the process used to establish the GI collectives in each country, the methods 
adopted to elaborate the product specifications as part of the GI application are different in 
each context. In France, their elaboration results from negotiations and reconciliation of 
different, sometimes conflicting, interests or, put differently, the social construction of 
compromise183 among local stakeholders. These collective processes typically lead to 
negotiated constructions over concepts of tradition, heritage and local identity, which are open 
to interpretation,184 as well as over methods of production, product name and boundaries,185 
which may reflect stakeholders’ strategic objectives and have exclusionary effects.186 In 
Vietnam, local stakeholders usually have a consultative role.  
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4.2.2.1 Negotiations  
 
As seen in Chapter 2, in French law, local stakeholders lead the elaboration of the product 
specifications as part of the application process. This requirement provides local actors with a 
space to engage in negotiations and discuss their own vision of the product, including its 
quality, characteristics and production process, with a view to adopt common standards and 
hence formalise, confirm or modify pre-existing social norms.187 In our case studies, the 
negotiation phase took between one and fifteen years, depending on the initiatives and the 
nature of the conflicting interests at stake. In the case of PDO/PGI initiatives, the intervention 
of INAO authorities as mediators was usually required. 
 
For both green lentils from Berry and Marseille soap, the main point of contention among 
producers was the delimitation of the geographical area. In the first case, a soil investigation 
led to the exclusion of bordering areas where soil types were found to be different.188 The same 
CoP was adopted for both the Label Rouge and the PGI and all producers have adhered to both 
qualifications. In the Marseille soap case study, a dispute among members of the UPSM arose 
between a soap factory located in Salon-de-Provence (about 50km away from Marseille), 
which had been producing ‘genuine’ Marseille soaps since 1900, and a Marseille-based 
producer, who considered that only soaps produced in Marseille could be called Marseille 
soaps in accordance with Napoleon’s Decree.189 An agreement was finally reached to include 
the department ‘Bouche-du-Rhônes’, where both Marseille and Salon-de-Provence are located, 
as the geographical production area, which was later reflected in the IGPIA application. 
Interestingly, in the IGPIA application submitted by the AFSM, the geographical area is wider 
and encompasses four departments.190  
 
In the case study concerning wood from the Alps, the negotiation process took about five years 
and dealt with the delimitation of the geographical area, the definition of technical standards 
for the wood drying process, and the adoption of eco-certification such as the Programme for 
the Endorsement of Forest Certification Scheme (PEFC).191 While processing companies were 
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defending loose standards, specifiers and service providers supported a set of strict criteria, 
which were ultimately adopted.192   
 
In the Pélardon cheese initiative, negotiations lasted over ten years.193 They mainly focused on 
the delimitation of the geographical area, the specificity of the cheese and its link to the 
territory. Negotiations required conducting complementary ethnological surveys and 
environmental studies. These involved producers, ethnologists, and cheese and livestock 
technicians, while INAO acted as a mediator.194 Similar mediation and extension services were 
provided during the registration process of the Sorana bean (PGI since 2002) and the Styrian 
pumpkinseed oil (PGI since 1996).195 In the Pélardon case study, it was finally agreed that 500 
communes spread over five departments,196 covering a much wider area than the region of 
origin with a very diverse vegetation,197 should be included. Yet the link between the cheese 
and the territory is closely defined through goat feeding, in particular the obligation to take the 
goats out on the territory for a minimum number of days198 to make them feed on local plants 
and herbs such as thyme, acacia, or hazelnut. Consequently, the terroir connection allows for 
sensory variety across cheeses. As explained by the coordinator of the producers’ association, 
‘we cultivate diversity within the same appellation. Cheeses can vary; they may have blue 
moulds, be creamy, white or have a hazelnut taste. All this diversity is linked to our terroir 
while we have minimum criteria that all cheeses must meet’.199 Product variety within the same 
appellation is not uncommon, particularly for cheese products whose characteristics derive 
from specific animal production systems such as the Fiore Sardo cheese (PDO since 1996).200  
 
The negotiations among mussel producers proved to be the most complex among the case 
studies. According to one producer, they started in the early 1980s and dealt with ‘every single 
aspect of the CoP because many producers didn’t want to have restrictions and rules to 
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respect’.201 Some producers even opposed the protection process and especially the registration 
of this specific name which they wanted to remain available to all. Contestation of the GI 
qualification process has been observed in other initiatives. For instance, some sub-regional 
farmers’ groups contested the protection of the Tuscan extra-virgin olive oil as a regional GI.202 
In our case study, negotiations proved so difficult that they even stopped between 1996 and 
1999. When they started again with INAO as a mediator, compromises were made which have 
allegedly driven the product quality towards lower standards. Besides, the INAO instructed the 
ODG to register this specific name as it was found to be the oldest and most common name in 
use in relation to the product since 1956.  
 
 
Picture 4.6 
Old labels with the name ‘Mont-St-Michel’ 
 
 
 
Once the ODG had submitted its application to the INAO, it took years of negotiations with 
the European Commission to establish the link to the territory before it became the first ever 
PDO seafood product. This is because the raw materials, i.e. the mussel spats, originate from 
the neighbouring region of Normandy because the temperature of the water of the Mont-St-
Michel Bay is too low for spats to develop. This explains why the CoP includes a farming, 
preparation and packaging area but doesn’t mention where the larvae must come from.203 The 
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CoP, however, specifies that the spats must not be longer than two millimetres to ensure their 
repatriation to the Bay at the earliest possible time.204 In the words of one producer, ‘mussels 
from Mont-St-Michel Bay have a strong link to terroir. It is here that they grow and feed by 
filtering local water which has a specific planktonic composition. It is precisely through their 
feeding that mussels acquire their specific characteristics, and whether the spats come from 
here or there does not impact on the final product’.205  
 
Overall, our findings confirm previous studies showing that, while group heterogeneity bears 
the risk of conflicting interests and longer negotiations,206 the main issues of contention during 
the negotiation process are the definition of the link between the product and the territory, the 
elaboration of more or less stringent production standards, and the delimitation of the 
geographical area.207 As explained by Barham, ‘[d]efining the exact boundaries and definition 
of a [GI] can be controversial among producers… neighbours who follow slightly different 
processing methods may find that one of them is included while the other is not’.208  
 
As a result, the CoPs can include higher or looser standards depending on each initiative. For 
instance, the standards adopted for green lentils from Berry are rather flexible. As explained 
by the President of the association, ‘we didn’t want to raise the bar too high, otherwise it would 
have been very difficult to step back. If you start too high, you will be penalised. We need 
room for manoeuvre.’209 Likewise, for bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay, an 
interviewee mentioned that ‘producers included the minimum norms they could easily respect 
and which do not necessarily reflect the quality they can really provide’. 210  By contrast, the 
production standards of the three other products are considered as high and stringent. In effect, 
they aim to defend time-consuming and/or costly traditional practices and artisanal processing 
methods (for Marseille soap and Pélardon cheese) and preserve environmental sustainability 
(wood from the Alps) in line with the actors’ strategies for initiating the protection process as 
analysed in Section 4.1.1. As shall be seen in Chapter 7, the traditional and/or environmentally-
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friendly production rules included in the CoPs can powerfully direct the effects of the initiatives 
outside the market.  
 
Interestingly, in the initiatives of Pélardon cheese and bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel 
Bay, a few producers within the collective are still challenging the rules included in the CoP, 
either because they are considered as too strict or too loose, which undermines the quality of 
collective action and social cohesion within the group. For example, in the Pélardon initiative, 
the obligation to take goats out on the territory to feed on local herbs for a minimum number 
of days is opposed by those farmers who produce hay in large quantities and who view this 
obligation as too burdensome.211 In the mussel initiative, a producer stated his opposition to 
the way in which the PDO is used as a quality standard whereas, according to him, the quality 
is very uneven across producers and production standards are not high enough.212  
 
Generally speaking, it has been recognised that stricter standards usually involve higher 
implementation costs and techniques, which may exclude small or poorly-equipped 
producers,213 such as for the Cantal cheese (PDO since 1996).214 By contrast, looser rules 
facilitate the implementation process and increase the number of potential users, as with the 
Gruyère cheese (PGI since 2013).215 At the same time, stricter standards are more likely to 
strengthen the product’s reputation and increase consumer confidence than looser rules.216 
 
4.2.2.2 Consultations  
 
The fact that outside actors are primarily responsible for the application process in Vietnam 
means that local actors do not negotiate the rules of production in the construction phase of the 
initiative. However, they are usually consulted either directly or through their representatives 
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as part of the surveys, data collection and meetings that the external consultant must organise 
in the pre-application phase.217 In most cases, the participation of local stakeholders is limited 
to approving the pre-drafted production rules, the charter of the association and the choice of 
the logo,218 thereby pointing to a lack of meaningful consultations. By contrast to most CoPs 
in France, the CoPs in Vietnam are elaborated in a few months only and generally reflect the 
main recommendations of agricultural research and services from where the external consultant 
is recruited. 
 
Consultations of stakeholders were held for all the initiatives under study except for star anise 
from Lạng Sơn. In this initiative, the association was established in 2008, i.e. one year after the 
registration of the GI and the elaboration process of the CoP did not involve consulting local 
stakeholders. As a result, some stakeholders reported not being aware of its content or of the 
GI logo itself.219 Similarly, the GI for Buôn Ma Thuôt coffee was registered in 2005 but the 
association was established in 2010 only.220 
 
In some initiatives, consultations proved to be a successful way of getting local producers 
engaged with the project and having their voice heard. For instance, in the case of the pottery 
from Đông Triều, the logo initially proposed by local authorities represented a vase but, 
producers successfully suggested that it should be a jar resembling the traditional product.221 
In other initiatives, a general concern relates to the lack of participation of some of stakeholders 
in the consultation phase, resulting in their low awareness of the functioning of the initiative 
which itself threatens its sustainability. This issue has already been raised by scholars working 
on GIs in Vietnam. For instance, in the case of Muntok white pepper, the consultation process 
involved the farmers’ association but no other local stakeholder.222 For conical hats from Huế, 
only the largest traders were consulted on the choice of the logo.223 In the case of H’mong beef, 
no farmer participated in the consultations. The only trader participant opposed the logo 
proposed by the consultant, albeit unsuccessfully as the trade mark application had already 
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been prepared.224 Turning to fried calamari from Hạ Long, although the quality and origin of 
the calamari are specified in the CoP,225 fishermen were excluded from the initiative and hence 
from the consultations, as was also the case for Phu Quoc fish sauce. This confirms Marie-
Vivien’s general observation that providers of raw materials do not usually participate in the 
construction phase of the Vietnamese GI initiatives, which may lead to quality control issues.226 
Indeed, as reported by Marie-Vivien, a survey found that 50% of Phu Quoc fish sauce 
manufacturers believe that the quality control cannot be efficient without the involvement of 
fishermen.227  
 
 
Figure 4.1 
Bottom-up versus top-down process  
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4.2.3 Objectives  
 
In France, the ODGs pursue objectives of general interest that are largely centred around the 
defence and management of the appellation. By contrast, in Vietnam, producers’ associations 
are resolutely market-oriented, in line with the association of GIs with product competitiveness 
and market development objectives.  
 
4.2.3.1 Defence of the appellation  
 
In France, the objectives of the ODGs established within the PDO/PGI initiatives mirror the 
terms used in Article L642-22 of the Rural Code. They are supposed to contribute to the 
‘mission of general interest of preservation and promotion of terroirs, local traditions and 
know-how as well as of products derived thereof’.228 More specifically, they should:   
(i) elaborate the CoP and contribute to its implementation; 
(ii) submit a proposal to INAO as to the selection of the certification body; 
(iii) participate in the elaboration of the control plan in collaboration with the certification 
body; 
(iv) participate in the implementation of the control plan (internal control); 
(v) identify and update the list of local operators and ensure the periodic transmission of this 
information to both INAO and the certification body; 
(vi) participate in activities related to the defence and management of the appellation, the 
product and the terroir as well as in the promotion of the product and in the statistical 
knowledge of the sector; 
(vii) implement the relevant decisions of INAO’s national committee; and 
(viii) provide INAO with any information collected in connection with their missions, upon 
request.229 
 
The law does not prevent the ODGs from adding optional objectives to address other interests. 
In practice, only the association of producers of green lentils from Berry has done so through 
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the inclusion of objectives related to research and improvement of cultivation techniques, 
development of new by-products derived from the lentils and varietal research.230  
 
Although the missions of the ODGs are laid down by the law, the objectives of the associations 
established in the trade mark initiatives can be freely debated and decided by their members. 
Both the UPSM and the association ‘Bois des Alpes’ aim at promoting, managing and 
defending the trade mark in the same way than the ODGs.231 They also have more detailed 
objectives related to economic development and preservation of cultural heritage which reflect 
the specific challenges faced by each industry. For instance, the goals of the UPSM include 
promoting the product history and the traditional know-how of its members to the general 
public.232 Among the objectives of the association ‘Bois des Alpes’ are to strengthen 
relationships and cooperation among local actors, develop new modes of exploiting and 
marketing wood and enhance the visibility of wood on the local and international market.233 
The charter of the association also makes an explicit reference to eco-certification of wood 
products and sustainable territorial development through job creation.234 The association’s pro-
active approach and commitment to contribute to local sustainable development is also 
reflected in the socio-economic, environmental and governance standards (called ‘issues of 
sustainable development’)235 that have been introduced for the evaluation of applicants by the 
external certification body.236 As will be seen in Chapter 7, this has important consequences 
on the ability of the initiative to generate effects outside the market.  
 
4.2.3.2 Market development 
 
In Vietnam, producers’ associations established within both the sui generis GI and trade mark 
are clearly market-oriented. While they must ‘enforce principles of willingness, equality and 
sharing of risks and benefits’,237 producers’ associations should, according to the NOIP:238 
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(i) coordinate the purchase and distribution of the products of the members of the association; 
(ii) organise promotion and marketing activities; 
(iii) manage, monitor, guide and control the cultivation, processing and marketing processes 
(internal control); 
(iv) manage the use of the logos and packaging; 
(v) strengthen the solidarity among producers and traders; 
(vi) support the diffusion of scientific and technical innovations in the production and 
processing of products; and 
(vii) cooperate with other organisations and individuals to exchange experiences, coordinate 
the production and marketing to enhance the competitiveness, quality and economic efficiency 
of the products. 
 
Some producers’ associations are also responsible for printing the logos and producing the 
packaging in exchange of the payment of a fee by users. This is the case for the pottery from 
Đông Triều239 and conical hats from Huế.240 In other initiatives, the printing of the logos is the 
responsibility of individual stakeholders as with Hạ Long fried calamari.241 Local authorities 
who act as the managing authority of the initiatives can also be in charge of printing the logos 
as is the case of star anise from Lạng Sơn242 and vermicelli from Bình Liêu.243 
 
4.3 Operation of GI collectives 
 
This section will explore the operation of GI collectives, including the three main 
organisational models and the rules of governance. As will be seen, these are characterised by 
the oversight of local actors in France as compared with state control in Vietnam.  
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4.3.1 Organisational models  
 
In France, the ODGs usually take the legal form of an association, as with Pélardon cheese, 
green lentils from Berry,244 and the two trade mark initiatives. It can also take the legal form 
of a professional union, as in the PDO mussel initiative.245 In Vietnam, collective organisations 
may be established in the form of an association, as is the case in all our case studies, or a 
cooperative, or any group linking producers and traders working with the product.246 The size 
of the collective organisation varies greatly across the initiatives, from four members (for the 
UPSM) to over 700 members (for star anise from Lạng Sơn). However, these numbers do not 
necessarily reflect how many stakeholders are engaged in the production of the GI product. For 
instance, over 2,500 planters are involved in the cultivation of arrowroot for vermicelli from 
Binh Lieu.247  
Following Réviron and Chappuis’s analysis,248 three main types of organisational models can 
be distinguished depending on the categories of members and type of activities of the 
collectives, i.e. inter-professional associations; professional associations; and cooperatives. 
Table 4.1 provides details on the organisational model of each initiative under study.  
 
4.3.1.1 Professional associations   
 
Professional associations gather one type of actor who operate at the same level of the supply 
chain. This model is very common in PGI initiatives which typically gather processors only.249 
It was also adopted by producers of Parma ham (PDO since 2008).250 Within our case studies, 
this type of one-level association is found for the Marseille soap and fried calamari from Hạ 
Long. In both initiatives, only producers, who are also traders, are members of the association, 
thereby excluding providers of the raw material – oil producers for Marseille soap and 
fishermen for fried calamari.  
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This type of organisation typically serves as a catalyst for coordination and concerted action at 
the horizontal level. At the same time, local actors may still have competing commercial 
interests. For instance, all the members of the association for fried calamari from Hạ Long sell 
their production on the two same markets in Hạ Long City. This has led to fierce competition 
among them.251 By comparison, members of the UPSM use different marketing channels (large 
retail outlets, boutiques, local market stalls and/or factory shop) and hence are not in direct 
competition.252 This contributes to explain their strong cohesion, notwithstanding their external 
conflict with the AFSM and the ASDMF.  
 
4.3.1.2 Inter-professional associations   
 
Inter-professional associations are the most common organisational model.253 This is the model 
of the Interprofessional Committee for the Comté cheese (Comité Interprofessionnel de 
Gestion du Comté), comprising farmers, cheese-makers and ripeners, and the General 
Confederation of ewe’s milk producers and producers of Roquefort cheese (Confédération 
générale des producteurs de lait de brebis et des industriels de Roquefort). This model usually 
fosters horizontal and vertical cooperation between local actors.254 Inter-professional 
associations have a large membership as they gather different types of actors at various levels 
of the supply chain, yet they have no commercial activity.  
 
Among our case studies, eight initiatives follow this model (Table 4.1). These initiatives are 
characterised by the heterogeneity of their members in type, size and economic terms. For 
instance, the ODG for bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay includes 85 lease holders 
(‘concessionaires’), 43 producer-packagers (‘operators’) and six packagers, taking into account 
that all the concessionaires are part of the structure of an operator. Packagers are commercial 
entities of different sizes that represent altogether about 80% of the total production in 2017 up 
from 57% in 2009, and whose shareholders are producers.255 In total, about thirty operators 
supply these commercial entities. Besides, the two largest operators account for about 18% of 
                                                        
251 Interviews V-C4, V-C5 and V-C11.  
252 Interviews F-A1, F-A2 and F-A5. 
253 Réviron and Chappuis (n16) 53. 
254 J. S. Cañada and A.M. Vazquez, ‘Quality certification, institutions and innovation in local agro-food systems: Protected designations of 
origin of olive oil in Spain’ (2005) 21 Journal of Rural Studies 475, 478. 
255 Interview F-C11.  
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the total production of PDO mussels.256 In the case of Pélardon cheese, the ODG includes 57 
farm producers, who both process and sell the cheese, 17 dairy farmers who produce milk 
and/or curd that they sell to collectors for processing, and three larger commercial entities, 
including one refiner and two processors, one of which represents about 35% of the total 
production of Pélardon cheese.257 Among the 40 members of the association for vermicelli 
from Bình Liêu are farmers, processors and traders, including three cooperatives and one 
company which accounts for 50% of the total production.258  
 
As with professional associations, members of inter-professional associations cooperate to 
protect the reputation of the GI while pursuing their own commercial interests. For example, 
according to mussel producers, the two largest commercial entities are in fierce competition 
with one representing 40-45% of the total production of PDO mussels and aiming at a 
monopolistic position.259 There is also strong competition between Pélardon producers with 
the use of different references and additional signals to consumers, including price.  
 
Our findings further confirm that the heterogeneity of members’ characteristics, assets and 
strategies can have a negative impact on the effectiveness of collective action.260 In particular, 
a conflict between generations stemming from divergent objectives has been noticed in the 
case of mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay and Pélardon cheese. In the first case, the 
interviewees revealed that the youngest generation seeks to associate the PDO label with a 
luxury product and create a niche market, whereas the older generation insists that the PDO 
mussel ‘is not a luxury product but a product with a traditional know-how and methods of 
production; [their] aim was not to make money but to preserve a traditional job and a traditional 
know-how’.261 Similarly, in the second case, interviewees mentioned that the older generation, 
who ‘was driven by a genuine willingness to safeguard their patrimony, territory and know-
how and to fight collectively for [the] product’ has interests different from the new generation 
who ‘might engage in the PDO initiative by self-interest only’.262 This is especially true 
considering that some young farmers left the PDO initiative as soon as they had received 
                                                        
256 ibid. 
257 Email from Ms Podeur, coordinator of the ODG, to author (12/03/2018). 
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259 Interview F-C3. 
260 Dentoni, Menozzi and Capelli (n206). 
261 Interview F-C4. 
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financial support to join it. This opportunistic behaviour and lack of engagement from the 
younger generation shows there is an issue of inter-generational trust.  
 
In Vietnam, although the mandate of the associations includes the strengthening of the vertical 
and horizontal links among local stakeholders, two factors hinder the realization of these 
objectives. The first factor is concerned with the sheer number of members and the lack of 
coordination and cooperation among them, as is the case for the association of producers of 
star anise from Lạng Sơn which counts over 700 members. In this initiative, there is no direct 
link between farmers and buyers with collectors and wholesalers acting as intermediaries. 
Further, there do not seem to be established relationships between collectors and farmers at the 
village and commune levels either,263 while the coordination roles of the association and the 
managing organisation (Provincial DOST) have been reported to be weak or non-existent.264 
Consequently, there are no vertical links among actors of the supply chain. Farmers and 
collectors make a new relationship for each transaction whereas buyers are not able to instruct 
farmers about the product quality they want. The same issue is found in other large GIs, for 
instance in the coffee sector, especially country-wide GIs such as Kenyan coffee (certification 
mark since 2010). In this initiative, the value chain is characterised by a large number of 
intermediaries, weak coordination among actors, lack of involvement of coffee growers, 
heterogeneous production practices and uneven quality of coffee bean.265 
 
The second factor lies in the inactivity and general inefficiency of the Vietnamese producers’ 
associations because of the scarcity of resources and equipment as well as the lack of leadership 
ability from the presidents. This typically results in the associations’ lack of activity, weak or 
inexistent links among local stakeholders and quality issues, thus highlighting the failure of the 
associations to serve as a platform for collective action.  
 
4.3.1.3 Cooperatives  
 
By contrast to the models discussed above, cooperatives have a commercial activity. This 
model is rare and usually involves centralisation and mutualisation of costly assets,266 thereby 
                                                        
263 CORDAID and SNV (n120). 
264 Interviews V-G5, V-G6 and V-G7. 
265 Belletti, Marescotti and Touzard (n179) 51. 
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reducing or eliminating competition among members. For instance, the cooperative created for 
L’Etivaz cheese (PDO since 2000) facilitates cheese storage and ripening.267 Both the 
initiatives relating to green lentils from Berry and sticky rice from Đông Triều follow this 
model.  
 
In the first case, producers created the commercial entity Cibèle at the same time as they 
established the association (now ODG) in 1994. Although they are separate entities with 
different managers, Cibèle is also a member of the ODG. As an institutional actor, the ODG 
interfaces with INAO and is responsible for the defence of the appellation and internal quality 
and production controls. Contrastingly, as a commercial actor, Cibèle is in charge of sorting, 
packaging and marketing the PGI-labelled lentils under its own commercial brand. To this end, 
every year, producers make a contract with Cibèle for the number of hectares to be cultivated. 
In return, Cibèle buys the total production of lentils at the same price from all farmers. This 
system provides farmers with security of payment. This mode of organisation not only means 
that Cibèle is the only possible user of the PGI label. It has also led to the adoption of strict 
internal ‘pre-labelling’ inspection mechanisms to prevent free-riding within the collective. 
Inspections occur throughout the production cycle, including the phase of sowing seeds, the 
flowering season, and the period just before harvesting when eligible parcels are pre-
labelled.268  
 
Farmers have a strong common interest in the commercial success of Cibèle as one-third of the 
capital is directly held by farmers with the other two-thirds held indirectly by the same farmers 
via a grain company. This structure has fostered a high degree of horizontal coordination. 
According to a farmer, ‘there is a strong cohesion among us because we are aware that if one 
producer makes a single mistake, this would impact on the whole sector. We are all dependent 
on each other because our lentils are ultimately sold by Cibèle and not by an identified 
producer. All producers, be they small or big, are equal. We need to preserve our collective 
approach and cooperative spirit’.269  
 
Similarly, in the case of sticky rice from Đông Triều, farmers sell their production to the 
producers’ association which is subsequently responsible for packaging and marketing the rice 
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with the origin label. The association is therefore the only body that can actually use the label. 
The project leader justified this structure by reference to farmers’ lack of skills in sales and 
management and the increase in the regulatory costs that the sale of labelled rice by farmers 
would incur.270 Despite having a broadly similar structure to that which controls green lentils 
from Berry, the Đông Triều sticky rice initiative does not have the same impact on collective 
action and social cohesion. This is mainly due to the lack of resources and incentives to make 
the initiative work and the very high number of farmers involved in it.  
 
 
  
                                                        
270 Interview V-A1 
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Table 4.1 
Organisational models 
 
Product Professional groups among members Membership 
Right-holders 
(by law) 
Organisational 
model 
Marseille soap 
(UPSM) 
 
Producers; traders 
 
4 Compliant members Professional association 
 
Fried calamari 
from Hạ Long 
 
Producers; traders 24 
Compliant members 
with working 
experience of three 
years 
Professional 
association 
Wood from the 
Alps 
 
Forestry producers and 
managers; harvesting and 
processing companies; 
specifiers and service 
providers; inter-
professional and 
institutional organizations 
 
26 
Compliant sawyers, 
dryers, carpenters, 
constructors, 
industrial 
manufacturers, 
woodworkers, 
traders, distributors 
Inter-professional 
association 
Pélardon 
cheese 
 
Farm and milk producers; 
processors; refiners 
 
77 Compliant members Inter-professional association 
Bouchot 
mussels from 
the M.S.M. 
Bay 
 
Concessionaries; mussels 
growers; mussels 
cleaners/scrubbers; 
packagers 
 
49 Compliant members Inter-professional association 
 
H’mong beef 
from Cao Bằng 
 
Farmers; slaughterhouses; 
traders 46 Compliant members 
Inter-professional 
association 
 
Conical hat 
from Huế 
 
Processors; producers; 
traders 
200 Compliant 
producer/trader 
Inter-professional 
association 
 
Pottery from 
Đông Triều 
 
Producers; traders 85 Compliant members Inter-professional association 
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4.3.2 Governance  
 
This section will analyse the governance of GI collectives. In this regard, Larson stresses the 
need for collective organisations with strong institutional mechanisms and governance 
systems.271 These aspects are particularly important if one is to address issues of democratic 
representation and participation in the internal decision-making processes while raising the 
question of whether the management of the collectives is representative of the whole chain. In 
France, members are directly involved in the governance of GI collectives whereas in Vietnam 
collective organisations are generally controlled by state authorities.  
  
                                                        
271 J. Larson, ‘Relevance of geographical indications and designations of origin for the sustainable use of genetic resources’ (Study prepared 
for the Global Facilitation Unit for Underutilized Species, FAO, 2007) 58. 
Product 
Professional groups 
among members Membership 
Right-holders 
(by law) 
 
Organisational 
model 
 
 
Star anise from 
Lạng Sơn 
 
Farmers; processors; 
collectors; traders 
700 Compliant 
producer/trader 
Inter-professional 
association 
Vermicelli 
from Bình Liêu 
Farmers; processors; 
traders 36 
Compliant 
producer/trader 
Inter-professional 
association 
 
Sticky rice 
from Đông 
Triều 
 
Farmers 
 
650 
 
Association Cooperative 
Green lentils 
from Berry 
 
Farmers; storage silos; 
wholesalers-packers; 
sorting centres (Cibèle)  
 
50 Cibèle Cooperative 
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4.3.2.1 Local control 
 
As discussed earlier, in France the ODGs must ensure both the representativeness and the 
balanced representation of the different professional groups involved.272 To this aim, all three 
ODGs have established two bodies that ensure their democratic functioning through 
stakeholders’ control and participation in decision-making processes.  
 
The first body is a general assembly that meets at least once a year and whose main aim is to 
approve financial statements and agree budgets. It is composed of all the members and takes 
decisions by a simple majority vote,273 based on a system of weighting of votes that reflects 
the relative importance of each professional group in the lentils’ and the mussels’ ODGs. In 
the Pélardon ODG, by contrast, each member has a vote.274  
 
This system of weighting of votes, although initially considered democratic, has proved to be 
problematic in the case of bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay. In the general assembly 
of this ODG, each member has one vote per tonne of PDO mussels produced the previous year 
with a maximum of 600 votes.275 According to producers, the heterogeneity among producers 
in production terms, combined with the growing number of producers who are shareholders of 
commercial entities, has progressively led to a situation in which the largest producers 
increasingly control the decisions of the general assemblies, and in particular assert their own 
economic and commercial interests (or those of the commercial entity they belong to) over 
collective issues such as quality of the product.276  
 
Another issue relates to the geographical spread of an initiative that can impact negatively on 
the members’ participation in the general assemblies. This is the case for the Pélardon initiative 
which covers five departments. Geographical distances have been reported to hinder the 
participation of farmers located at more than 2.5 hours driving distance, which undermines the 
quality of collective action and social cohesion.277 In this respect, it is interesting to note that, 
                                                        
272 Rural Code, Article L.642-18.  
273 Charters of the ODGs ‘Lentilles vertes du Berry’, ‘Pélardon’ and ‘Moules de Bouchot de la Baie du Mont-Saint-Michel’, Articles 9, 15 
and 11, respectively. 
274 Charters of the ODG ‘Pélardon’, Article 15. 
275 Charter of the ODG ‘Moules de Bouchot de la Baie du Mont-Saint-Michel’, Article 11. 
276 Interview F-C13. 
277 Interview F-B6. 
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in economic geography, physical proximity has emerged as a key factor behind the success of 
territorial innovation systems such as the Silicon Valley,278 which supports the proposal that 
geography matters ‘even where distance technology is at its most advanced’.279  
 
The second body is a management board that meets when convened by its Chair for all three 
initiatives, as well as at the request of one, five or half of its members for the Pélardon, 
mussels’, and lentils’ initiatives respectively, and in any case at least twice a year in the 
mussels’ initiative.280 The management board has the broadest powers to administer the 
association, except for those expressly devolved to the general assembly.281 While the Charter 
of the ODG for the PDO mussels is silent on the professional composition of the board,282 those 
of the two other ODGs are composed of a minimum number of members elected per relevant 
professional group.  
 
As in the case of ODGs, the structures of the UPSM and the association ‘Bois des Alpes’ 
comprise a management board composed of all four members of the association for the 
former,283 and of a minimum number of members per each of the four professional groups for 
the latter.284 The management board meets as often as needed and at least once (UPSM) or 
twice a year (‘Bois des Alpes’) at the invitation of its Chairperson or at the request of half 
(UPSM) or five (wood from the Alps) of its members.285 Besides, both associations include a 
general assembly open to all members that meets at least once a year and which take decisions 
by an absolute majority of votes cast.286  
 
 
                                                        
278 K. Morgan, ‘The Exaggerated Death of Geography: Learning, Proximity and Territorial Innovation Systems’ (2004) 4 Journal of 
Economic Geography 3, 12. 
279 J. Brown and P. Duguid, The Social Life of Information (HBS Press, 2000) 169. 
280 Charters of the ODGs ‘Lentilles vertes du Berry’, ‘Pélardon’ and ‘Moules de Bouchot de la Baie du Mont-Saint-Michel’, Articles 8.3, 10 
and 10, respectively. 
281 Charters of the ODGs ‘Lentilles vertes du Berry’, ‘Pélardon’ and ‘Moules de Bouchot de la Baie du Mont-Saint-Michel’, Articles 8.4, 11 
and 9, respectively. 
282 Chater of the ODG ‘Moules de Bouchot de la Baie du Mont-Saint-Michel’, Article 8.  
283 Charter of the UPSM, Article 18: the management board must comprise at least four members.  
284 Charter of the association ‘Bois des Alpes’, Article 11.  
285 Charter of the association ‘Bois des Alpes’, Article 12; Charter of the UPSM, Article 20.  
286 Charter of the association ‘Bois des Alpes’, Article 15; Charter of the UPSM, Article 10. 
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4.3.2.2 State control  
 
In Vietnam, collective organisations are characterised by the strong involvement and control 
of the state authorities. As a principle, all associations in Vietnam are subject to a ‘unified state 
management of associations nationwide’ under the authority of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs.287 Consequently, the establishment of associations must be licensed and their charters 
approved by state authorities – either by the Ministry of Home Affairs for national or inter-
provincial associations288 or by the President of the provincial People's Committee for 
provincial associations.289 Further, associations must report annually on their organisation and 
operation to the competent state agency.290  
 
Importantly, as observed by the Director of an IP law firm, state authorities control the 
producers’ activities through their involvement in the governance and management of the 
associations, either directly or indirectly.291 In effect, the presidents of the associations are often 
former local public officials or representatives from institutions affiliated to the CPV. These 
include the Women’s Union, the Youth Union and the Farmers’ Union, as well as the 
Cooperatives, which are the state agencies at the village level. As shown in Table 4.2, state 
authorities are involved in the management of all the associations under study, except for the 
vermicelli from Bình Liêu and fried calamari from Hạ Long. However, in the first case, 
although the association is chaired by the Deputy Director of the largest producing company, 
the main shareholders of the company are the Vice-Chairman of the District-level People’s 
Committee and representatives of the CPV – notwithstanding the prohibition on public officials 
to engage in business activities292 – who were reported to control the activities of the 
association indirectly. In the second case, the first President of the producer association was an 
official at the District-level Market Control Department (under the authority of the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade) before he was replaced by the largest producer. This shows that, in this 
case study, producers have gradually taken over the management of the GI initiative, with the 
help and support of the managing organisation.  
 
                                                        
287 Decree 45/2010/ND-CP of 21/04/2010 on the establishment, operation, and management of associations, Articles 1.1 and 36. 
288 ibid Article 14.1. 
289 ibid Article 14.2. 
290 ibid Article 24.7.  
291 Interview V-H5. 
292 Business Law 60/2005/QH11 of 25/11/2005, Article 13.1(b).  
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Table 4.2 
Management systems in the Vietnamese case studies 
 
Product IP title Owner of the IP title 
 
Managing 
organisation 
 
President of the producer 
association 
Sticky rice 
from Đông 
Triều 
 
Collective 
mark 
 
Association Association Leader of the Cooperative 
 
H’mong beef 
from Cao Bằng 
 
Collective 
mark Association Association 
Former official at the 
Department of Finance 
 
Pottery from 
Đông Triều 
 
 
Collective 
mark 
 
Association 
 
 
Association 
 
 
 
Former official at the DARD 
 
Vermicelli 
from Bình 
Liêu 
Certification 
mark 
 
District People’s 
Committee 
District 
Economic 
Department 
 
Deputy Director of the 
largest company 
 
 
Star anise from 
Lạng Sơn 
 
Sui generis GI 
Provincial 
People’s 
Committee 
Provincial 
DOST 
Commune-level Secretary of 
the CPV 
 
Fried calamari 
from Hạ Long 
 
Sui generis GI District People’s Committee 
Economic 
Department of 
Hạ Long City 
Largest producer 
Conical hat 
from Huế Sui generis GI 
Provincial 
People’s 
Committee 
 
Association 
 
 
President of the Province-
level Women’s Union 
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The structure of the Vietnamese associations is complex and includes a large number of boards 
and special committees. Among the most important boards are:293 
- a general assembly composed of all the members of the association and whose functions are 
broadly similar to those of the general assemblies of the French associations;  
- an executive or management board whose members are elected by the general assembly and 
whose mandates are broadly similar to those of the management boards in France. In addition, 
the executive board is responsible for receiving and examining the applications for the right to 
use the IP title (for sui generis GIs and trade marks), and for either granting the right to use 
(for collective trade marks) or advising the managing authority on whether to grant the right to 
use (for sui generis GIs and certification trade marks);  
- an inspection board, in charge of the internal quality control and the implementation of the 
regulations of the association; and 
- a board of finance, in charge of the budget and other accounting activities.  
Other units may be created to focus on marketing, awareness raising, technology and 
production activities.294  
 
Importantly, two issues may raise concerns as to the genuine, equal and balanced participation 
of local stakeholders in the decision-making processes of the associations. First, the general 
assemblies of the Vietnamese associations under study are required to meet once every five 
years only.295 Considering that the general assembly is the only body open to all members, this 
prompts questions about their usefulness and about the role of local stakeholders in the 
governance of the initiatives. It also illustrates the lack of meaningful consultations with local 
actors after the IP title is registered, as is the case during the application process. However, our 
case studies may not account for all Vietnamese producers’ associations and further research 
is needed in this area to confirm or challenge our findings. Second, the respective importance 
of the different professional groups is not taken into account in the composition of the various 
Boards nor in the voting systems or decision-making process. While this does not automatically 
mean that the representation of the different professional groups is unbalanced in practice, there 
                                                        
293 Charters of the associations ‘Production and commercialisation of fried calamari from Hạ Long’, Articles 12-19; ‘Production and 
commercialisation of sticky rice from Đông Triều’, Articles 11-15; and ‘Production and commercialisation of vermicelli from Bình Liêu’, 
Articles 12-16. 
294 Charters of the associations ‘Sticky rice from Đông Triều’, Articles 16; and ‘Vermicelli from Bình Liêu’, Article 19. 
295 Charters of the associations ‘Sticky rice from Đông Triều’; Article 12; ‘H’mong beef from Cao Bằng’, Article 12; ‘Fried calamari from 
Hạ Long’, Article 13; and ‘Vermicelli from Bình Liêu’, Article 13.  
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is a risk that the functioning of the associations hinders empowerment and participation of local 
stakeholders while entrenching power imbalances.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the processes of collective action involved in the twelve 
case studies, including the actors’ strategies for initiating the GI protection process and their 
role in the establishment and operation of GI collectives. Our findings primarily illustrate the 
variety of objectives and meanings associated with the GI protection, the diversity of forms of 
collective action dynamics and internal organisational structures, and the contrasting roles 
played by local actors in the creation and operation of GI collectives in France and Vietnam.   
 
In relation to the actors’ strategies for initiating the GI protection process, this chapter suggests 
the need to consider two factors. The first factor, well-studied in the GI literature,296 is the 
profile of the products themselves, including whether their reputation precedes the legal 
protection. The more the reputation and specificity of a product are acknowledged by 
consumers, the more likely its name may be usurped and misappropriated.297 In such instances, 
as seen in Chapter 1, the GI protection is used as a legal tool to protect the collective reputation 
attached to the product and fight against unfair competition practices,298 as for most French 
products under study. However, when the product does not have a well-established reputation 
before the legal protection, as is widespread in Vietnam, the strategy behind the GI protection 
is to build such reputation through its differentiation and increase the market.299 The GI 
protection is thus thought of as a marketing (rather than legal) tool aimed at establishing a 
quality convention upon which the product’s reputation will gradually be built.300  
 
                                                        
296 See for instance G. Belletti and others, ‘The Roles of Geographical Indications (PDO/PGI) on the Internationalisation Process of Agro-
food products’ (105th EAAE seminar on international marketing and international trade of quality food products, Bologna, Italy, March 2007).  
297 G. Belletti, ‘Origin labelled products, reputation, and heterogeneity of firms’ in B. Sylvander, D. Barjolle, F. Arfini (eds.), The socio-
economics of origin labelled products in agro-food supply chains: spatial, institutional and co-ordination aspects (INRA, Série Actes et 
Communications, 2000) 17(1) 239, 239. 
298 C. Bramley, E. Biénabe and J. Kirsten, ‘The economics of geographical indications: towards a conceptual framework for geographical 
indication research in developing countries’ in The Economics of Intellectual Property: Suggestions for Further Research in Developing 
Countries and Countries with Economies in Transition (WIPO, 2009) 109. 
299 A. Pacciani and others, ‘The Role of Typical Products in Fostering Rural Development and the Effects of Regulation (EEC) 2081/92’ 
(73rd Seminar of the European Association of Agricultural Economists, Ancona, Italy, June 28-30 2001). 
300 Durand (n69) 162. 
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The second factor is the broader socio-economic and institutional environment in which local 
products are embedded. For example, the socio-economic context of all the French products 
were (and most still are) challenging when local actors decided to initiate the protection process 
in a collective attempt to defend their activities and promote the development of their territory. 
In Vietnam, rural poverty and state policies and strategies, including Vietnam’s export-oriented 
agricultural policy, rural industrialisation strategy and national objectives of industrialisation 
and modernisation, contribute to explain the market and product development objectives 
associated with the GI protection. Despite the widespread use of the concept of 
embeddedness301 in the literature on agri-food networks,302 few authors have studied its 
importance in relation to GIs.303 Our findings demonstrate the need for more research on the 
impact of both horizontal embeddedness, which refers to local social and cultural relations,304 
and vertical embeddedness, i.e. the wider socio-economic, institutional, political and cultural 
environment,305 on the strategies underpinning the GI protection process, as well as on the 
creation and operation of GI collectives.  
 
To further highlight the importance of vertical embeddedness, the analysis of our case studies 
also confirm the role of the legal and institutional environment in influencing and shaping the 
forms and processes of collective action in each country, regardless of the means of protection. 
Whereas there is a small emerging literature on collective action efforts during GI registration 
processes,306 there is a need for more systematic research of the relationship between such 
efforts and legal processes. In France, local actors strategically initiate the protection process, 
actively negotiate the pre-existing social norms defining the product identity and manage the 
initiatives in a participatory manner which leads to their empowerment. In Vietnam, local 
actors are usually integrated passively within initiatives designed by external consultants and 
managed by state authorities. This approach typically provides them with little or no space to 
                                                        
301 M. Granovetter, ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness’ (1985) 91(3) American Journal of Sociology 481. 
302 S. Bowen, ‘The importance of place, re-terittorialising embeddedness’ (2011) 51(4) Sociologia Ruralis 325, 325. 
303 ibid. 
304 R. Sonnino, T. Marsden, ‘Beyond the divide: rethinking relationships between alternative and conventional food networks in Europe’ 
(2006) 6(2) Journal of Economic Geography 181. 
305 R. Sonnino, ‘Embeddedness in action: saffron and the making of the local in southern Tuscany’ (2007) 24(1) Agriculture and Human 
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306 X.F Quiñones-Ruiz and others, ‘Why early collective action pays off: evidence from setting Protected Geographical Indications’ (2016) 
Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems 179; M. Paus, S. Réviron, ‘Crystallisation of Collective Action in the Emergence of a Geographical 
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contribute to the decision-making processes in a meaningful way and take ownership of the 
collectives.  
 
This does not preclude the possibility that Vietnamese stakeholders may gradually associate 
themselves with the initiatives, take over their management, or at least place some hope in the 
possibility to benefit from them. Examples of top-down and bottom-up approaches leading to 
successful and unsuccessful collective mobilisation of local actors, respectively, have been 
mentioned above. Besides, a bottom-up and participatory approach typically involves long and 
complex negotiations, especially if there is a great heterogeneity among stakeholders, which 
may result in the adoption of lower or higher quality standards that may still be contested after 
the GI registration. By contrast, a top-down approach might be useful in countries that lack 
strong institutional structures to kick off collective action dynamics and accelerate the GI 
registration process.  
 
At the operation level, most Vietnamese initiatives feature little interest, understanding and 
commitment of local actors and remain purely ‘administrative’ with a very low use of the GI 
labels, if at all, which will be addressed in Chapter 6. The lack of involvement of stakeholders 
is further exacerbated by limited resources and equipment of the associations, inadequate 
leadership ability from their presidents, and weak or inexistent links among local stakeholders. 
Recent literature on GI-labelled coffee also points to the failure of top-down processes to 
mobilise local actors because of their lack of empowerment and little knowledge of both the 
characteristics of their own product and the meaning of the GI protection, among others.307  
 
Overall, some initiatives show a great level of social cohesion as a result of their organisation 
model, governance systems and stakeholders’ adhesion to both formal standards and informal 
ethical rules. In others, conflicts between private and common interests and ongoing 
contestation of the rules adopted at the local level are likely to undermine the quality of 
collective action. This suggests a need to conduct further research on stakeholders’ 
understanding and adhesion to local formal rules as well as informal ethical or moral rules 
within the group, as these may have impact on the quality of collective action and social 
cohesion. The impact of the broader legal and institutional framework, the internal structure 
and functioning of GI collectives should also be looked at. 
                                                        
307 Belletti, Marescotti and Touzard (n179) 53. 
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5 
 
Factors influencing the value of GIs on the market 
 
 
 
This chapter aims to identify the factors influencing the value and benefits of GIs in the 
marketplace. Among our twelve case studies, the commercial use of origin labels can be 
observed in six initiatives, including two in Vietnam and four in France, although with varying 
degrees of success. These are the fried calamari from Hạ Long, vermicelli from Bình Liêu, 
bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay, Pélardon cheese, green lentils from Berry, and 
wood from the Alps. By contrast, there has been no or very little use of the origin labels in the 
six other initiatives. The market environment of these six other products will be studied in 
Chapter 6 so as to provide a separate and detailed analysis of the factors involved in the lack 
of use of the origin labels. 
 
As seen in Chapter 1, the primary role of GIs is best seen in a marketplace context, where they 
provide information to consumers as per the geographical origin of the goods and contribute to 
protect the product’s reputation as derived from specific territorial values, including local 
natural resources and know-how.1 Building upon the economics of product differentiation,2 
scholars generally agree that, in turn, the product’s reputation can lead to increased consumer 
demand which drives higher production volumes and advances the economic and commercial 
interests of local stakeholders by the capturing of private economic benefits arising from the 
use of GIs. These include price premiums and greater market access resulting from successful 
                                                        
1 F. Thiedig and B. Sylvander, ‘Welcome to the Club? An Economical Approach to Geographical Indications in the European Union’ (2000) 
49 Agrarwirtschaft 428; D. Rangnekar, ‘The Socio-Economics of Geographical Indications: A Review of the Empirical Evidence from 
Europe’ (UNCTA/ICTSD Issue Paper No. 4, 2004) 13–16; C. Bramley and J.F. Kirsten, ‘Exploring the Economic Rationale for Protecting 
Geographical Indicators in Agriculture’ (2007) 46 Agrekon 69. 
2 C. Bramley, ‘A Review of the Socio-economic Impact of Geographical Indications: Considerations for the Developing World’ (WIPO 
Worldwide Symposium on Geographical Indications, Lima, Peru, 22–24 June 2011). 
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marketing.3 The market remuneration of GIs,4 which corresponds to ‘the mechanisms by which 
society pays producers for the services associated with the origin-linked product’,5 thus 
involves three distinct steps: (1) the establishment of the product’s reputation; (2) increased 
consumers’ demand and higher production volumes; (3) greater market access and higher 
prices linked to marketing strategy and channels. 
 
The potential of GIs to bring about economic and commercial benefits has gained particular 
importance, especially in the EU where the promotion of GIs has been increasingly linked to 
rural development, including by improving farmers’ incomes through price premiums.6 As 
explained by van Ittersum and others,7 the existence of price premiums which, according to the 
European Commission, is ‘often one of the first aims of supporting a strategy for an origin-
linked product’,8 greatly depends on the consumers’ appreciation of origin labels and their 
consequent willingness to pay a higher price.  
 
This chapter explores the market remuneration of GIs by looking at each the three steps 
mentioned above. Section 5.1 first considers the ways in which the reputation of origin products 
was established in the marketplace, both before and after the labelling processes. In doing so, 
it will argue that GIs cannot only be an instrument to protect an established reputation but also 
a tool to build and strengthen the product’s reputation when coupled with collective promotion 
efforts and marketing investments. Section 5.2 analyses the effects of GIs on consumer demand 
and production capacity. In particular, it will show that, while consumer demand for the six 
products has generally increased, the potential of the initiatives to match supply and demand 
depends not only on their growth capacity and dynamism but also on the market environment 
and institutional context in which they are developing. Finally, Section 5.3 explores the 
commercial approaches and marketing strategies. It will argue that, if the types of marketing 
                                                        
3 C. Bramley and E. Biénabe, ‘Developments and considerations around geographical indications in the developing world’ (2012) 2 (1) Queen 
Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 14. 
4 E. Vandecandelaere and others, ‘Linking People, Places and Products: A Guide for Promoting Quality Linked to Geographical Origin and 
Sustainable Geographical Indications’ (FAO and SINER-GI, 2009) 118. 
5 ibid 5. 
6 Council Regulation (EEC) 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 and Council Regulation (EC) 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 (EC), Recitals 2. See also 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of 21 November 2012, Recital 4. 
7 K. van Ittersum and others, ‘Consumers’ Appreciation of Regional Certification Labels: A Pan-European Study’ (2007) 58 Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 1.   
8 European Commission, ‘Workshops on Geographical Indications - development and use of specific instruments to market origin-based 
agricultural products, making particular use of GIs in African ACP countries’ (European Commission, 2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/events/2014/gi-workshops/training-brochure_en.pdf> accessed 30 March 2018. 
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channels impact on the commercial value of GIs and the economic benefits derived from their 
use, they do not impact in the same way across the initiatives. The analysis of the six case 
studies will therefore provide an illustration of the diversity of factors influencing the use and 
value of GIs in the marketplace, as well as the benefits derived from them, depending on the 
actors’ strategies, product specificities and features of the institutional and market environment 
in which the GI initiatives are developing.  
 
5.1 Product reputation 
 
A well-established reputation in the market has been identified as a key factor for commercial 
success of origin products.9 Conversely, the lack of collective reputation undermines the 
potential of GIs to realise economic (and other) benefits, as has been observed with many origin 
coffees,10 and most products that are analysed in Chapter 6.  
 
Building upon our case studies, this section will show that there are many ways in which the 
product’s reputation is built or maintained and operates in the market. These depend on the 
history of the production and the cultural and territorial values embodied in the product.11 The 
various perspectives (local, national or international), the diversity of audiences (tourists, local 
consumers or distant buyers) and the type of processes and actors involved in the advertising 
and promotion activities (single stakeholder, collective of producers or state authorities) should 
also be considered as they contribute to different branding strategies. As noted by GI scholars,12 
the reputation of GI products can either precede the GI registration, which requires efforts to 
maintain and protect it against unfair competition practices, or be built after the GI registration.  
 
 
 
                                                        
9 D. Barjolle and B. Sylvander, ‘Some factors of success for ‘origin labelled products’ in agri-food supply chains in Europe: market, internal 
resources and institutions’ (2002) 36(9-10) Economies et sociétés 1441; J.A. Winfree and J. McCluskey, ‘Collective reputation and quality’ 
(2005) 87 American Journal of Agricultural Econonomics 206.  
10 F. Galtier, G. Belletti and A. Marescotti, ‘Factors Constraining Building Effective and Fair Geographical Indications for Coffee: Insights 
from a Dominican Case Study’ (2013) 31(5) Development Policy Review 597, 612. 
11 Winfree and McCluskey (n9). 
12 E. Biénabe, J.F. Kirsten and C. Bramley, ‘Collective action dynamics and product’s reputation’ in C. Bramley, E. Biénabe and J.F. Kirsten 
(eds), Developing geographical indications in the Sout : The Southern African experience (Springer, 2013) 51, 54-55. 
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5.1.1 Reputation ante labelling process 
 
The vermicelli from Bình Liêu, fried calamari from Hạ Long, bouchot mussels from Mont-St-
Michel Bay and Pélardon cheese have all been popular on the market since well before the 
labelling process, yet three different reasons account for their long-established reputation 
among consumers.  
 
First, the reputation of fried calamari from Hạ Long and of bouchot mussels from Mont-St-
Michel Bay has been closely linked to the prestige of the places where they come from. Both 
products are produced in regions that have been protected as UNESCO World Heritage Sites 
since before the GI protection process13 and whose name is part of the product name. The 
choice of the product name is particularly strategic as it takes advantage of the renown linked 
to a place, which has allegedly contributed to increasing the commercial success of the 
products.14 This is because the UNESCO recognition has been attractive to distant domestic or 
foreign consumers who associate it with quality products and/or because the area of origin 
attracts a high number of tourists who add to the ‘local’ demand for the product. Other GI 
products have benefited from the tourism development in UNESCO-protected areas. For 
example, in Vietnam, this has also been the case for the mint honey of Mèo Vạc produced on 
the Dong Van Karst Plateau UNESCO Global Geopark (Hà Giang Province).15  
 
In these instances, the region’s reputation is not built upon the marking of distinctive goods as 
it is generally assumed by GI advocates,16 and as experienced for instance in many wine regions 
through the growth of agro-tourism centered around the promotion of local wines.17 Rather, it 
is the region’s established reputation that is likely to support the promotion of local products. 
This would tend to confirm Marette’s view that consumers value the origin of the products per 
                                                        
13 UNESCO World Heritage List, ‘Hạ Long Bay’ <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/672>; ‘Mont-Saint-Michel and its Bay’ 
<http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/80> accessed 18 September 2017. 
14 Interviews V-C2 and F-C9. 
15 C. Durand, ‘L’émergence des indications géographiques dans les processus de qualication territoriale des produits agroalimentaires - Une 
analyse comparée entre l’Indonésie et le Vietnam’ (PhD Thesis, Montpellier SupAgro 2016) 351. 
16 R.J. Coombe, S. Ives and D. Huizenga, ‘Geographical Indications: The Promise, Perils and Politics of Protecting Place-Based 
Products’ in M. David & D. Halbert (eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Intellectual Property (SAGE Publications, 2014) 207, 212.  
17 Bramley and Bienabe (n3) 24. 
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se but not necessarily the origin labels in themselves,18 although it could also be argued that 
both the physical origin of the products and the origin labels contribute to reinforce each other’s 
attractiveness. The promotion of local products may even be planned in the local tourism 
policy. In this respect, it is interesting to note that in Vietnam, the development of ‘tourism 
products, respecting natural elements and local cultures’ is a pillar of the ‘Strategy on tourism 
development until 2020, vision to 2030’.19 This marketing strategy has been seen elsewhere; 
for example the use of a collective mark with the name of Matera, a World Heritage site since 
1993, has been promoted by the local Chamber of Commerce to publicise Matera craft 
products.20 It should be noted that the reputation of fried calamari from Hạ Long, listed among 
the 50 most delicious dishes in Vietnam in 2012 and the 100 most delicious dishes in Asia in 
2013 by the respective Guinness Books of Records,21 has further increased with the ‘Vietnam 
Gold Agriculture Brand Award’ received from the MARD in 2017.22 
 
Second, in the case of Pélardon cheese, which comes from a region that has become an 
UNESCO World Heritage Site after the GI protection process,23 most of the production has 
traditionally been sold on local markets through traditional distribution channels, either on-
farm or in local markets. Geographic proximity between consumers and producers has 
contributed to increasing consumer knowledge and awareness while building the reputation of 
both the product and individual producers through trust and personal interaction within the 
production area.24 However, as will be further discussed in Section 5.3, it is precisely because 
personal knowledge and trust are the most important marketing arguments at the local level 
that the origin label has little value inside the area of origin.  
 
                                                        
18 S. Marette, ‘Can Foreign Producers Benefit from Geographical Indications under the New European Regulation?’ (2009) 10(1) Estey 
Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 70, 71. 
19 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Government Portal, ‘Strategy on Vietnam’s tourism development until 2020, vision to 2030’ 
<http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/English/strategies/strategiesdetails?categoryId=30&articleId=10051267> accessed 21/08/2018. 
20 C. Bortolotto, ‘Globalizing Intangible Cultural Heritage? Between International Arenas and Local Appropriations’ in S. Labadi and C. 
Long (eds.) Heritage and Globalization (Routledge 2010) 97, 99. 
21 Interview V-C2. 
22 Interview V-C13. 
23 UNESCO World Heritage List, ‘The Causses and the Cévennes, Mediterranean agro-pastoral Cultural Landscape’ 
<http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1153> accessed 18 September 2017. 
24 A. Benkahla, J.-P. Boutonnet and M. Napoléone, ‘Proximités et signalisation de la qualité: approaches croisées pour l’étude d’une AOC. 
Le cas du Pélardon’ (4th Congress on Proximity Economics: Proximity, Networks and Co-ordination, Marseille, 17-18 juin 2004) 11. 
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Third, the reputation of vermicelli from Bình Liêu within the area of production had been built 
up from the notoriety previously acquired by the main producer/trader who has since become 
the President of the producers’ association. This producer, who accounts for 50% of the total 
production of vermicelli in Bình Liêu, had registered the collective mark ‘vermicelli from Bình 
Liêu’ for his own business in 2007, i.e. six years before the registration of the certification 
mark, and had made huge investments to build its reputation.25 This explains why he was first 
reluctant to join the collective branding initiative and use the certification mark,26 especially 
considering that his own reputation was allegedly impaired by the lower-quality vermicelli 
produced by other members of the association and marketed under the same brand.27 Yet the 
fact that the collective packaging provides for the insertion of the producer’s name has allowed 
his own customers inside the area of production to identify vermicelli produced by his company 
and marketed under the new certification mark.28 The association of his name with the new 
certification mark has gradually contributed to increasing the reputation of the latter within the 
territory.29 However, although local consumers are now aware of the existence of the 
certification mark, it remains unclear whether they value the certification mark per se, whoever 
the producer, or whether they look for the producer’s name on the packaging without relying 
on the certification mark.   
 
5.1.2 Reputation post labelling process  
 
Unlike the previous products, green lentils from Berry and wood from the Alps did not have a 
strong reputation before the start of the origin labelling process. As seen in Chapter 4, the legal 
protection of the name, in both cases, aimed to increase the reputation of the product and 
develop the market as it is generally the case for origin-products that do not have an established 
reputation.30 Different strategies were adopted to develop the reputation of these two products 
on the market. Collective action among producers has been instrumental to increase the 
reputation of green lentils from Berry through joint promotion, marketing and labelling. 
                                                        
28 Interviews V-D1 and V-D2. 
26 Interview V-D1. 
27 Interviews V-D3 and V-D8. 
28 Interview V-D3. 
29 ibid. 
30 A. Pacciani and others, ‘The Role of Typical Products in Fostering Rural Development and the Effects of Regulation (EEC) 2081/92’ (73rd 
Seminar of the European Association of Agricultural Economists, Ancona, Italy, June 28-30 2001). 
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Conversely, the involvement of public authorities has been pivotal to building the image of the 
wood from the Alps. 
 
According to producers,31 low market visibility of green lentils from Berry before the labelling 
process was due to fierce competition from green lentils from le Puy that have enjoyed a high 
reputation since their qualification as an appellation of origin in 1935.32 In effect, it took about 
ten years to build the reputation of the product on the market after the creation in 1994 of the 
producers’ association and the company Cibèle, in charge of the collective promotion and 
marketing of the product.33 According to producers, collective marketing investments have 
been instrumental in reviving production and promoting the product.34 The French Label 
Rouge high-quality certification, granted in 1996 and better known than the European labels 
among French consumers, has greatly contributed to building the product’s reputation (see 
Section 4.1.1.2). At the same time, the higher quality standards associated with the Label 
Rouge certification have increased consumer awareness of the PGI label which, by localising 
the production, has further enhanced the value of the product.35  
 
By contrast to producer-led collective efforts, the process for building the reputation of wood 
from the Alps was primarily driven by local public authorities concerned with the development 
and protection of the territory, thereby highlighting the strong political dimension of the 
initiative.36 Indeed, if the involvement of public authorities has been pivotal in the construction 
phase of the certification mark (see Chapter 4), their role in the promotion of the use of the 
labelled, certified wood has also been essential for increasing the reputation of the wood and 
its use in construction projects. In fact, with only 10% of the projects using wood from the Alps 
being for private construction, the use of the certified wood results from competitive bids for 
the construction of public buildings for the largest part.37 The overwhelming proportion of 
public construction projects derives from the desire of public authorities to show exemplarity 
in the use of local wood and encourage the local population to embrace the opportunities and 
benefits offered by the local wood industry. According to the coordinator of the producers’ 
                                                        
31 Interviews F-D1, F-D2 and F-D4. 
32 Tribunal civ. 1ère instance Puy, 17/01/1935. 
33 Interview F-D2. 
34 Interviews F-D1 and F-D2. 
35 ibid. 
36 Interviews F-E1 and F-E2.  
37 Interview F-E9. 
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association, this strategy has greatly contributed to building the reputation of the local wood 
within the region.38 
 
5.1.3 Advertising and promotion 
 
Important investments in advertising and promotion have been necessary in all the initiatives 
to enhance consumers’ awareness and maintain or strengthen the product’s reputation even for 
the four products whose reputation had been established before the GI protection. Advertising 
and promotion investments have proved especially useful for those products who only had a 
reputation inside the area of origin.  
 
Collective communication and promotion activities are usually the largest item of expenditure 
of GI collectives.39 In France, these activities are developed and implemented by the producers’ 
associations, thereby ensuring the producers’ participation. Collective communication and 
promotion activities are usually funded in two ways: public support received from the 
European Commission or the Regional authority; and producers’ contributions to the collective 
budget of the association, which not only covers communication and promotion activities but 
also the costs of external controls. For instance, Pélardon producers contribute €0.8/goat and 
€0.012/cheese sold in addition to fixed annual fees of €70,40 whereas mussel producers 
contribute €0.03/kg of mussels sold in addition to fixed annual fees of €150.41 For an average 
producer who sells 300 tonnes of mussels every year, the annual fees related to the use of the 
origin label thus amount to over €9,000. Although significant, this amount should be put in 
perspective with the cost of collective activities including promotional tools. As such, the last 
campaign video clip that promoted bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay on three public 
channels in 2017 during 15 days for a total of 189 TV spots cost about €200,000.42 
 
 
                                                        
38 Interview F-E1. 
39 J.-S. Cañada and A.-M. Vazquez, ‘Quality Certification, Institutions and Innovation in Local Agro-Food Systems: Protected designations 
of origin of olive oil in Spain’ (2005) 2(4) Journal of Rural Studies 475, 480. 
40 Interview F-D6. 
41 Interview F-C11. 
42 Interview F-C12. The campaign video clip is available here: <https://youtu.be/aGVwVzm9wTA> accessed 27 March 2018. 
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Picture 5.1 
Example of promotional panel for green lentils from Berry 
 
 
 
This illustrates how GI collectives allow producers to pool resources so as to implement 
collective action and achieve common goals that they would not be able to meet individually.43 
Generally speaking, while the activation of place-based marketing strategies involves higher 
expenses for the creation and marketing of a differentiated product image among consumers,44 
such expenses are usually compensated for by the lower transaction costs and the economies 
of scale achieved through the mutualisation of marketing and promotion costs (among others 
costs) within the GI initiatives.45 
 
The way in which promotion and advertising activities are funded and implemented in the 
Vietnamese initiatives contrasts with the French initiatives. In Vietnam, where producers have 
limited financial capacities, local state authorities are generally responsible for financing and 
implementing advertising and promotion activities which usually take place in local state-
                                                        
43 B.A. Babcock and R. Clemens, ‘Geographical Indications and Property Rights: Protecting Value-Added Agricultural Products’ (MATRIC 
Briefing Paper 04-MBP 7, May 2004) 12; S. Réviron and J.-M. Chappuis, ‘Geographical Indications: Collective Organization and 
Management’ in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (CAB International, 
2011) 45, 46. 
44 Bramley (n2). 
45 Bramley and Biénabe (n3); D. Barjolle and J.M. Chappuis, ‘Transaction costs and artisanal food products’ (Proceedings of the Annual 
Conference of International Society for New Institutional Economics, Tubingen, Germany, 22-24 September 2000).  
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owned magazines, radio, TV and exhibitions.46 Generally speaking, in countries where local 
stakeholders have limited financial capacity, the involvement of external actors like the State, 
NGOs or other private agents in the promotion and advertising activities is usually welcome,47 
providing that they ensure the participation of local stakeholders in the governance of the 
initiative and the sharing of benefits. 
 
5.2 Consumer demand and production capacity  
 
As mentioned earlier, the product’s reputation drives consumer demand which, in turn, may 
lead to higher production and sales volumes.48 Generally speaking, the last few decades have 
witnessed a growing consumer demand for origin products in reaction to hyper-
industrialisation, mass production, standardisation of ‘placeless’ food and the series of food 
scandals since the late 1970s.49 Consumers’ association of origin products with higher quality 
standards has in fact been well documented both in Europe50 and Vietnam.51 A number of 
surveys, carried out predominantly in Europe, show that consumers are increasingly sensitive 
to the origin of products. For example, a Eurobarometer survey carried out in 2012 in the 27 
EU Member States showed that 71% of interviewees consider origin as an important factor 
when buying food.52 In Vietnam, a survey conducted in 2005 shows that consumers in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City associate the place of origin with the product’s higher quality.53 
However, it should also be kept in mind that, while there is generally a good recognition of 
origin labels among French consumers, the situation is more complex in Vietnam. Indeed, 
Vietnamese consumers reportedly lack confidence in origin and other state labels, particularly 
with regard to the efficiency of the control procedures carried out by state authorities.54 They 
                                                        
46 Đ. Đức Huấn and others, ‘Rapport - Etude des modèles de gestion des indications géographiques du Vietnam’ (NOIP/AFD, 2017) 45-46. 
47 D. Marie-Vivien and E. Biénabe, ‘The multifaceted role of the state in the protection of geographical indications: A worldwide review’ 
(2017) 98 World Development 1, 5. 
48 J. Crespi and S. Marette, ‘Some Economic Implications of Public Labeling’ (2003) 34(3) Journal of Food Distribution Research 83. 
49 D. Goodman, ‘Rural Europe Redux? Reflections on Alternative Agro-Food Networks and Paradigm Change’ 2004 (44)1 Sociologia Ruralis 
3. 
50 European Commission, ‘Europeans’ attitudes towards food security, food quality and the countryside’ (Report, Special Eurobarometer 
389, July 2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_389_en.pdf> accessed 21/08/2018. 
51 T.T. Tran and others, ‘Les produits de terroirs vietnamiens: points de vue des consommateurs locaux’ (Colloque International Localiser 
les produits : une voie durable au service de la diversité naturelle et culturelle de Sud ? 9-11 juin 2009, Paris, France). 
52 European Commission, ‘Europeans’ attitudes’ (n50) 4. 
53 Tran and others (n51). 
54 Durand (n15) 254. 
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also appear to be confused over the many different standards and labels in use in the country, 
especially considering there is no national GI logo yet (see Chapter 3).  
 
In Europe, the impact of higher reputation on production volumes has been observed in many 
GI products. For example, the production of San Daniele ham, which was granted the PDO 
protection in 1996, grew from 1.7 million hams in 1997 up to 2.14 million in 2000 and to 2.6 
millions in 2018.55 Similarly, Giovannucci notes that the production of the Puy lentils increased 
almost four times between 1990 and 2002 arguably due to the French AOC protection obtained 
in 1996.56 A recent report released by FAO also notes that the production of the Penja pepper 
from Cameroon (GI registered in 2013) grew by 328% between 2000 and 2015.57 
 
Despite these well-documented success stories in the GI literature, this section will argue that, 
while consumer demand for the products under study has generally increased, the initiatives 
demonstrate variable abilities and potentialities to match supply and demand depending not 
only on their growth capacity and dynamism but also on the market environment and 
institutional context in which they are developing. 
 
5.2.1 Strategies to increase production capacity  
 
In the case of fried calamari from Hạ Long, vermicelli from Bình Liêu and green lentils from 
Berry, the production capacity has expanded to better meet the growing consumer demand with 
different results across the initiatives. In general, expanding the production in the face of 
increasing consumer demand, usually through the increase in the membership of the producers’ 
association, and/or the expansion of the production area, and/or the use of input-intensive 
cultivation systems, is a strategy that has been adopted for other famous GI products, including 
                                                        
55 C. Folkeson, ‘Geographical Indications and Rural Development in the EU’ (Master’s thesis, Lunds University, 2005) 57. For the 2018 
data, see the San Daniele ham official website: <http://consorzio.prosciuttosandaniele.it/en/the-production-chain/> Accessed 21/08/2018.  
56 Giovannucci and others, Guide to Geographical Indications: Linking Products and Their Origins (International Trade Centre, 2009). 
57 FAO and EBRD, ‘Strengthening sustainable food systems through geographical indications - An analysis of economic impacts’ (FAO, 
2018) 16 <http://www.fao.org/3/I8737EN/i8737en.pdf> accessed 18/08/2018. 
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Blue Mountain coffee (Jamaica),58 Tequila (Mexico),59 Rooibos tea (South Africa),60 Comté 
cheese (France),61 and Kona coffee (United Sates).62 For instance, Tequila production, which 
tripled between 1995 and 2008 from 104 million litres to 312 million litres and is now stable 
at about 250 million per year,63 has experienced both an expansion of the cultivation area and 
a shift from traditional, labour-intensive cultivation practices to more chemical-intensive 
practices and expansion of the cultivation area.64 
 
Turning to our case studies, the production of fried calamari from Hạ Long increased by 35% 
from about 50 tonnes in 201465 to 730 tonnes in 2017 and generally meets consumer demand,66 
especially considering that most of the production is consumed locally by visiting tourists. In 
the case of vermicelli from Bình Liêu, the total production was over 400 tonnes in 2017 up 
from about 300 tonnes in 2014, an increase of about 33% in three years. However, in this 
initiative, production levels have been reported to be insufficient to meet the growing 
demand.67 For both products, the rise in production capacity results from the increase in the 
number of producers as well as, for vermicelli from Bình Liêu, the introduction of improved 
varieties that offer higher yields and the use of modern processing machines, including milling, 
grinding, washing and drying machines that have replaced the traditional manual processing 
process. This change in production practices would tend to support Durand and Fournier’s 
claim that GI initiatives can be used in Vietnam as a way to promote agricultural modernisation, 
including through the substitution of traditional local techniques with modern ones and/or the 
use of improved varieties.68 
 
                                                        
58 Giovannucci and others (n56) 170. 
59 S. Bowen and A. Zapata, ‘Geographical indications, terroir, and socioeconomic and ecological sustainability: The case of tequila’ 2009 
(25)1 Journal of Rural Studies 108, 111. 
60 E. Biénabe and others, ‘Linking farmers to markets through valorisation of local resources: the case for intellectual property rights of 
indigenous resources’ (IPR DURAS Project Scientific Report, April 2011) 64. 
61 S. Bowen, ‘The importance of place, re-terittorialising embeddedness’ (2011) 51(4) Sociologia Ruralis 325, 338. 
62 FAO and EBRD (n57) 16. 
63 S. Bowen, Divided Spirits: Tequila, Mezcal, and the Politics of Production (University of California Press, 2015) 42. 
64 Bowen and Zapata (n59) 111-115. 
65 CASRAD, ‘Building and developing the geographical indication “Hạ Long” for fried calamari’ (Project Final Report, CASRAD, 2014) 
52. 
66 Interview V-C14.  
67 Interview V-D8. 
68 C. Durand and S. Fournier, ‘Can Geographical Indications Modernize Indonesian and Vietnamese Agriculture? Analyzing the Role of 
National and Local Governments and Producers’ Strategies’ (2017) 98(C) World Development 93.     
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In the case of green lentils from Berry, the strategy was first to increase the size of the 
production area within the limits set by the CoP before attracting new producers. The higher 
reputation of the lentils, coupled with the recent contingent production problems in Le Puy 
area69 where yields are generally half as high as in the Berry area,70 have created conditions for 
the expansion of production. In the last few years, between 1,300 and 1,700 tonnes of green 
lentils were produced from a total production area of 880 hectares, up from 1,000 tonnes from 
a production area of 400 hectares in 2014.71 At the initiative level, the association has grown 
to 50 producers in 2018 up from 28 producers in 2014, hence an increase of 80% in four years 
only.72 This has led to a major increase in turnover from €1 million in 2015 to nearly €2 million 
in 2018.73  
 
Despite this positive dynamic, the production still does not meet the consumer demand in a 
context where the national production of lentils across the country – about 20,000 tonnes every 
year on a total production area of 18,000 hectares in 201674 – meets only about half of the 
national demand.75 This explains why massive quantities of lentils are imported from other 
countries, especially Canada, which is the world’s largest producer.76. As explained by the 
President of the producers’ association, ‘[t]oday we are too short. Demand is increasing 
because we have become famous and consumption has evolved toward heritage vegetables, 
however we cannot meet consumers’ needs. We must attract new producers within our 
association because we need to produce more’.77 At the producer level, the growth of the 
initiative has been limited by difficulties to improve crop productivity. In effect, the wastage 
rate is high – 12-25% depending on the year due to diseases78 – whereas only a very small 
number of efficient crop protection products have been approved for use by farmers. While an 
informal rule limiting all production areas to 30 hectares has been imposed on producers with 
                                                        
69 Interview F-D6. 
70 The average yield is 11 quintals per hectare for green lentils from Le Puy as compared with over 20 quintals per hectare for green lentils 
from Berry. See CoP ‘Green lentils from Berry’, 15 and 18 
<http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominationId=396> accessed 15/08/2018. 
71 Email from Ms Taillandier, Commercial Director of Cibèle, to author (12/07/2018). 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid. 
74 ibid. 
75 ANILS and ODG, ‘Lentilles Vertes du Berry’, ‘Le Marché de la Lentille, Le Fonctionnement de l’ANILS, Ses activités techniques’ 
(PowerPoint presentation, February 2017). 
76 ibid. 
77 Interview F-D2. 
78 ibid. 
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the aim to reduce losses in the event of a poor harvest,79 the development of new lines with 
higher and more reliable yields has become necessary to increase the production at the 
individual level. Yet, as Chapter 7 will show, crop breeding activities have been hindered until 
very recently by the lack of visibility and influence of this sector with public authorities. 
 
5.2.2 Constraints to increasing production capacity 
 
By contrast, it has been difficult for Pélardon cheese, and impossible for bouchot mussels from 
Mont-St-Michel Bay, to expand the production and satisfy consumer demand.   
 
In the Pélardon initiative, consumer demand is now stable after having slightly increased, 
which may be partly linked to the competition of the many French labelled PDO or PGI cheeses 
in general (45 PDO and 9 PGI as of August 2018) and goat cheeses in particular (14 PDO as 
of August 2018).80 On the supply side, the production has slightly increased by 7% in twelve 
years from 213 tonnes in 2004 to 228 tonnes in 2016 (equivalent to about 3.8 millions of 
cheeses),81 despite the fact that the number of producers has decreased over the years (see 
Chapter 7). However, the small increase in production, which is mainly explained by 
producers’ higher technical skills coupled with the growing proportion of cheese production 
sold with the origin label,82 is not always sufficient to meet the demand. In effect, it remains 
difficult to attract new producers within the initiative. This is mainly due to the challenging 
access to, and very high costs of, land, and also because most of the cheese production is still 
sold inside the area of origin where the origin label has little value hence a lack of interest 
among local farmers to use it and join the initiative (see Section 5.3.1.2).  
 
                                                        
79 Interview F-D3. 
80 INAO search database <http://www.inao.gouv.fr/eng/Espace-professionnel-et-outils/Search-a-product> accessed 21/08/2018. 
81 Interview F-B8. 
82 Email from Ms Podeur, coordinator of the ODG, to author (12/03/2018). 
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Source: Data provided by the coordinator of the ODG 
 
Turning to bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay, consumer demand has increased for 
bouchot mussels in general, whatever the origin. Bouchot mussels, including but not limited to 
those from Mont-St-Michel Bay, have acquired a growing reputation among consumers since 
they have been protected in France with the European traditional speciality guaranteed label 
(TSG) in 2013.83 This label aims to ‘safeguard traditional methods of production and recipes 
by helping producers of traditional product in marketing and communicating the value-adding 
attributes of their traditional recipes and products to consumers’.84 The growth of consumer 
demand for bouchot mussels, which are the only product protected as a TSG in France as of 
August 2018, was confirmed by a recent survey where French consumers were asked the type 
of mussels they are familiar with. While 60% mentioned bouchot mussels regardless of their 
origin, only 4% referred specifically to those from Mont-St-Michel Bay.85  
                                                        
83 DOOR dossier number FR/TSG/0007/0048 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominationId=10202 
accessed 20/08/2018. 
84 Council Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuff, Article 17. As of August 2018, a total of 58 products are protected as a TSG. See results of the DOOR 
database here:   
<http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html?&recordStart=0&filter.dossierNumber=&filter.comboName=&filterMin.milestone__
mask=&filterMin.milestone=&filterMax.milestone__mask=&filterMax.milestone=&filter.country=&filter.category=&filter.type=TSG&filt
er.status=REGISTERED> accessed 21/08/2018. 
85 FranceAgriMer, ‘L’image de la moule en France auprès des consommateurs de moules et des professionnels de la filière’ (Les Etudes de 
FranceAgriMer, 2014). 
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Despite the growing consumer demand, it is legally impossible to expand the overall 
production of the mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay. About 10-12,000 tonnes of rope-grown 
mussels have been produced every year in the area since 1986 on a total area of 270 km of 
vertical stakes,86 generating a turnover of more than €20 million.87 This represents about 20% 
of the national production of bouchot mussels and 17% of the total production of mussels in 
France.88 Although bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay account for a large part of the 
national production of mussels, demand still exceeds supply. The reason for the insufficient 
supply in relation to consumer demand derives from the very nature of the Mont-St-Michel 
Bay which, as explained in Chapter 4, belongs to the PMD.89 Consequently, the number and 
distribution mussel leases in the Mont-St-Michel Bay, as well as the number of, and distance 
between, piles of the vertical stakes have been established by Decree.90 The density of vertical 
stakes on which mussels are bred has in fact been gradually reduced over the years.91 This is 
because overproduction and high density of cultured molluscs had contributed to the 
development of the parasite Mytilicola intestinalis which caused significant mussel mortality 
in the 1980s,92 hence the need to control and restrict production activities. The product 
specifications further specify the maximum mussel bed fertilisation rates – 55% or 65% by line 
of 100 linear meters depending on the location of the piles.93 The very strict regulation of 
mussel aquaculture industry in the area thus explains why the production cannot meet the rising 
consumer demand.  
 
  
                                                        
86 R. Mongruel, A. Davaine and O. Thébaud, ‘Private adaptation to ecological constraints in a rights-based management system: the strategies 
of mussel growers in the Mont-Saint-Michel Bay (France)’ (Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Sustainable Coastal Zone Management 
Rights and Duties in the Coastal Zone, Stockholm, Sweden, 12-14 June 2003) 3. 
87 Interviews F-C1, F-C11 and F-C12. 
88 Interviews F-C2, F-C3, F-C5. F-C7 and F-C8. 
89 K. Frangoudes, ‘L’occupation du domaine public maritime par des cultures marines, Le cas de la Baie du Mont Saint-Michel’ (Coastman 
Working Paper n° 11, 1999). 
90 Arrêté du 21 mai 1985 portant réglementation des installations de bouchots à moules en baie du Mont-Saint-Michel (Order of 12 May 
1985 regulating installations of bouchot mussels in the Mont-St-Michel bay) JO 08-06-1985 
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?cidTexte=JPDF0806198500006346&categorieLien=id> accessed 18/07/2018. 
91 Interviews F-C1, F-C3 and F-C10. 
92 D. Gerla, ‘Exemple de gestion d’un basin mytilicole, la Baie du Mont St-Michel’ (Rapports Internes de la Direction des Ressources 
Vivantes de l'IFREMER, 1990) 14. 
93 CoP ‘Bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay’, Article 5.1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominationId=10203> accessed 10/06/2018. 
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5.2.3 Mechanisms to stimulate demand and increase production  
 
Unlike other products, the wood from the Alps cannot be construed as a consumer product 
subject only to supply and demand conditions on the market. This is because, as already 
mentioned, the large majority of construction projects using the certified wood are for public 
buildings tendered through competitive bids. In this initiative, other mechanisms are in play to 
stimulate the demand and create opportunities for greater use of the certified wood in 
construction projects.  
 
The first one resides in the way in which calls for tenders are drafted with an explicit reference 
to Bois des Alpes. To encourage this practice, a legal guide published in 2013 by the association 
with a view to provide guidance on how to draft the calls for tenders suggests to require 
explicitly that the wood be fully traceable according to a certification process ‘such as the 
certification process of wood from the Alps’.94 Besides, the association has been actively 
involved in the training of contractors, authorities and wood specifiers or buyers (who advise 
on technical choices of materials) in the drafting of calls of tenders.95  
 
A second way to increase the use of the certified wood is found in the number of partnership 
agreements between the association and other institutions, including local and regional 
authorities and organisations, aimed at promoting the use of the certified wood. For instance, 
according to the 2014-2020 partnership agreement between the association and the Federation 
of French Alpine and Mountain Clubs, the latter shall undertake to prescribe the use of the 
certified wood in the construction, renovation and extension of its Alpine network of mountain 
huts.96  
 
Finally, subsidy and other support policies have been adopted to stimulate the demand for the 
certified wood. At the local level, these are regional subsidies associated with the use of the 
certified wood in construction projects, including from the Region Auvergne Rhone-Alpes and 
                                                        
94 Bois des Alpes and Communes Forestières, ‘Construire en Bois des Alpes, Etapes clés pour insérer une fourniture de bois certifiée “Bois 
des Alpes” dans la commande publique’ (Guide pratique, 2013) <http://www.boisdesalpes.net/doc/guide-juridique-boisdesalpes.pdf> 
accessed 15/07/2018.  
95 Email from Mr Portier, coordinator of the producers’ association, to the author (21/02/2018). 
96 Partnership Agreement between the association Bois des Alpes and the Fédération française des Clubs Alpins et de Montagne, Article 2 
(January 2014) on file with author. 
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the Drôme Department.97 At the European level, the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERFD) provides €6 million under the 2014-2020 interregional operational programme ‘Massif 
des Alpes’ to increase the use of the certified wood from the Alps.98 Companies who want to 
benefit from this support must use a minimal percentage of certified wood every year. 
 
As a result, there has been a sharp increase in the number of projects involving the use of the 
certified wood from 23 pilot buildings in 2014 (representing over 2,200 m3 of certified wood)99 
up to about 75 buildings constructed or ongoing and 50 other buildings planned as of July 
2018.100 Over 7,000 m3 of certified wood have been used since 2013, taking into account that 
the market potential is about 190,000 m3/year.101 Public buildings that have been constructed 
with the certified wood have important social functions and include gymnasiums, schools, 
resorts, mountain huts, training centres, swimming pools, municipal halls, tourism centres, 
sheepfolds, among others.102  
 
Picture 5.2 
Examples of public buildings using the certified wood from the Alps 
 
 
 
Source: Association Bois des Alpes 
 
                                                        
97 Email from Mr Portier, coordinator of the producers’ association, to the author (21/02/2018). 
98 European Commission, ‘Interregional Programme Alps 2014-2020’ <http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-
2020/2014-2020/2014fr16rfop001> accessed 13/07/2018.  
99 Réseau des bâtiments pilotes en Bois des Alpes, ‘Présentation de la certification Bois des Alpes’ (PowerPoint presentation, 15/10/2015). 
100 Interview F-E9. 
101 ibid. 
102 The list of projects achieved so far is available here: <http://boisdesalpes.net/realisations.php> accessed 02/09/2018. 
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5.3 Marketing channels and value of origin labels 
 
As argued in the GI literature, marketing strategies and trade issues have emerged as important 
factors for understanding the economic effects of GI initiatives.103 In the context of growing 
concerns over food safety, ecology and animal welfare in both developed and transitional 
economies,104 both consumers and producers are showing increasing interest in ‘alternative’ 
distribution systems, within which GIs are considered to fit.105 Such distribution systems 
‘short-circuit the long, complex, and rationally organised industrial chains’106 by redefining 
producer-consumer relationships around the clear signalling of the origin, quality or other 
characteristics of products. Different types of supply chains can be distinguished which impact 
differently on the value of origin labels and hence on the economic benefits that stakeholders 
derive from their use.  
 
To start with, the fried calamari from Hạ Long and Pélardon cheese involve highly local 
marketing channels inside the area of production for the largest part of the production. For the 
purpose of this research, highly local marketing channels, which cover a variety of trade 
circuits from farms shops to farmers markets to agricultural fairs, to name a few, 107 are defined 
as either direct sales between the producer and the consumer or involving at most one 
intermediary and operating inside the area of origin. By contrast, the distribution of both 
bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay and green lentils from Berry is characterised by 
the dominant position of mass retailers outside the area of production, which has important 
consequences on the bargaining power of producers. Finally, the marketing of vermicelli from 
Bình Liêu is determined by physical and institutional constraints whereas the use of wood from 
the Alps inside the area of origin both derives from, and contributes to, the strong territorial 
development objective of the initiative as supported by local authorities.  
 
                                                        
103 Bramley and Biénabe (n3). 
104 D.E. Goodman, E.M. Dupuis and M.K. Goodman, Alternative food networks: knowledge, practice and politics (Routledge, 2012); P. 
Moustier, ‘Short urban food chains in developing countries: signs of the past or of the future?’ (2017) 1(25) Natures, Sciences, Sociétés 7. 
105 T. Marsden, J. Banks and G. Bristow, ‘Food supply chain approaches: exploring their role in rural development’ (2000) 40(4)  Sociologia 
ruralis 424. 
106 ibid 425. 
107 H. Renting, T.K. Marsden and J. Banks, ‘Understanding alternative food networks: exploring the role of short food supply chains in rural 
development’ (2003) 35 Environment and Planning 393, 399-400; Y. Chiffoleau, ‘Les circuits courts de commercialisation en  agriculture : 
diversité et enjeux pour le développement durable’ in G. Maréchal (ed.), Les circuits courts alimentaires (Educagri, 2008) 21. 
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This leads us to identify four main types of short marketing channels although it is important 
to keep in mind that most producers use a combination of them, thereby suggesting not only 
their complementarity but also the increasing diversity and complexity of producer-consumer 
interfaces.108 The section below will first present the reasons why highly local marketing 
channels inside the area of production have benefited fried calamari from Hạ Long but not 
Pélardon cheese. Subsequently, it will consider the benefits and drawbacks relative to the use 
of spatially extended marketing channels outside the area of origin for green lentils from Berry 
and bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay. Finally, although vermicelli from Bình Liêu 
and wood from the Alps also involve spatially extended channels and highly local ones, 
respectively, these cases will be studied separately. This is because the channels involved in 
these initiatives are less the result of free entrepreneurship as with other initiatives. If physical 
constraints explain why most of the production of vermicelli from Bình Liêu is marketed 
outside the area of origin, the sustainable development objective attached to the wood from the 
Alps certification account for the short circuits adopted in this initiative.  
 
5.3.1 Highly local marketing channels 
 
The largest part of the production of fried calamari from Hạ Long and that of Pélardon cheese 
are processed and sold inside the area of production through highly local marketing channels. 
In both initiatives, most of the producers have limited material, human and organisational 
capacities, which generally contributes to explaining the adoption of local marketing 
channels.109 Yet this section will show that the effects of highly local marketing channels vary 
greatly between the two products. On the one hand, physical proximity between producers and 
consumers has contributed to building the reputation of fried calamari from Hạ Long while 
providing producers with a stronger negotiating power and increasing the benefits arising out 
of the use of the origin label. On the other hand, the local clientele has a personal knowledge 
and experience of both Pélardon cheese and its producers, which weakens the communicative 
function of the origin label inside the area of production.  
                                                        
108 Marsden, Banks and Bristow (n105) 426. 
109 M. Aubert and G. Enjolras, ‘Déterminants de la commercialisation en circuits courts : quels exploitants, sur quelles exploitations?’ (Paper 
presented at the 7th Journées de Recherches en Sciences Sociales SFER-INRA, Angers, France, 12-13 December 2013); R. Gasson and others, 
‘The farm as a family business: A review’ (1988) 39 Journal of Agricultural Economics 1; F. Gale, ‘Direct farm marketing as a rural 
development tool’ (1997) 12(2) Rural Development Perspectives 19. 
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5.3.1.1 Proximity with consumers as a means to promote the origin label 
 
About 95% of the volume of traded fried calamari from Hạ Long is sold through highly local 
marketing channels inside the area of production.110 The very nature of the product (i.e. fried) 
combined with the size and capacity of local actors, who are all small-scale producers, explain 
why most of the production is sold on local markets. Specifically, all members of the 
association are involved in direct sales to final consumers on the two main local markets (‘Hạ 
Long I market’ and ‘Hạ Long II market’) either for immediate consumption or packaged for 
take-out. Face-to-face interactions and direct sales represent about 50% of the total trading 
volume.111 The large majority of customers in the local markets are tourists visiting the Hạ 
Long Bay UNESCO World Heritage Site who are made aware of the specific attributes of the 
product at the point of sale. In addition, the sale of fried calamari to restaurants, hotels, and 
retailers located in Hạ Long City via short marketing channels inside the GI area and involving 
one middleman at most represent about 45% of the total trading volume.112 Finally, about 5% 
of the production is sold ‘pre-fried’113 in vacuum-sealed packages to final consumers in the 
main cities of other Provinces (such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi) through a number of 
middlemen including distributors, supermarkets, food stores, and retailers in urban areas.114  
As a result, three types of packaging are used:  
(1) a transparent plastic bag with no GI logo when fried calamari are sold to final consumers 
for immediate consumption (Picture 5.3); 
(2) a packaging with the GI logo when fried calamari are sold to final consumers for take-out 
or to restaurants, hotels and retailers located in Hạ Long City (Picture 5.4); and 
(3) a vacuum-sealed packaging with the GI logo when fried calamari are sold ‘pre-fried’ outside 
Hạ Long City (Picture 5.5).  
 
Although it is difficult to provide a detailed estimate, it is reasonable to assume that a 
significant percentage of fried calamari is sold for immediate consumption i.e. without the GI 
logo. However, the GI logo can usually be seen on the front of the producers’ market stalls 
(Picture 5.5) as well as on a large banner in the centre of the market (Picture 5.6).    
                                                        
110 CASRAD, ‘Building and developing the GI “Hạ Long” (n65) 104–05. 
111 ibid. 
112 ibid. 
113 Fried calamari sold in vacuum-sealed packages were fried one time. Customers must fry them one more time before consumption. 
According to producers, this process does not affect the quality and taste of fried calamari (interviews V-C4, V-C5 and V-C10). 
114 CASRAD ‘Building and developing the GI “Hạ Long”’ (n65) 106. 
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Picture 5.3 
The sale of fried calamari on Hạ Long I market for immediate consumption 
 
 
 
Picture 5.4 
The sale of fried calamari for take-out or to restaurants, hotels and retailers in Hạ Long City 
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Picture 5.5 
The sale of fried calamari in vacuum-sealed labelled packages 
 
 
 
 
Picture 5.6 
The GI logo on the front of the producers’ market stalls 
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Picture 5.7 
The GI logo on a large banner in the centre of the market 
 
 
  
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the high concentration of traders in the two markets of Hạ Long 
City has led to fierce competition among producers. At the same time, direct sales and 
proximity with consumers – mostly tourists – have contributed to promoting the origin label, 
taking into consideration that the GI label was first tested by three pilot families at the start of 
the origin labelling project in 2014115 before being used by all the producer members of the 
association in 2017.116 The wider use of the GI label, including on the producers’ market stalls, 
has in turn strengthened the product’s reputation and contributing to higher prices – 13-17% 
increase since the GI labelling process.117 According to Van Thinh, the price of the GI product 
is about 20% to 110% higher than the non-GI product depending on the place of production 
(Graph 5.2).118 Direct sales, which involve less transaction costs, have also provided producers 
with greater flexibility in setting selling prices, whereas longer marketing routes outside the 
area has led to lower profit margins for producers. This is shown in the higher prices charged 
by producers who sell directly on the markets with no middlemen (about $15/kg in July 2017 
                                                        
115 Interview V-C2.   
116 Interview V-C13. 
117 Interview V-C14.  
118 N. Van Thinh, ‘Analysis of factors affecting the income of households making GI products: a case study of Hạ Long grilled squid - Quang 
Ninh Province’ (Proceedings of the International Conference for Young Researchers in Economics and Business, Da Nang, Vietnam, October 
2017) 267.  
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up from less than $US9/kg in 2007) compared to the lower prices charged by producers who 
are involved in longer marketing channels with middlemen (about $US14/kg).119  
 
 
Source: Van Thinh – citing the People’s Committee of Quang Ninh Province as his own source  
 
According to Van Thinh, the increase in the selling prices has translated into higher incomes 
(Graph 5.3), whereas the average annual income of non-GI producers was about $US9,300 in 
2016, or 60% of that of GI producers.120 
 
 
 
Source: Van Thinh 
 
                                                        
119 CASRAD ‘Building and developing the GI “Hạ Long”’ (n65) 268. Prices were confirmed during interviews V-C4, V-C5, V-C6, V-C7, 
V-C10 and V-C13. 
120 Van Thinh (n118). 
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Despite the economic benefits associated with the use of the GI, the institutional environment 
in which this initiative operates, especially given the lack of transparency of the quality 
controls, has emerged as an important constraint limiting the efficiency of the initiative.  
 
5.3.1.2 Proximity with consumers as an impediment to using the origin label 
 
The largest part of the production of Pélardon cheese has traditionally been sold inside the 
production area, either on-farm or in local markets. However, it is generally on premises where 
there is no direct relationship between consumers and producers, outside the PDO area or in 
retail shops inside the area of origin, that the PDO label is better valued.    
 
Inside the region of production, the PDO label is generally not a selling point except for tourists 
or when the sale takes place in a retail shop. At the farm gate, trust in the producer, which is 
not mediated by brands and labels but through personal interaction, is the most important 
marketing argument. Market success at the local level is thus largely based on spatial proximity 
which, by contributing to develop consumers’ knowledge and skills,121 decreases the value of 
the communicative function of the origin label. Further, inside the area of origin, PDO Pélardon 
producers, who account for about one-third of all ‘Pélardon type’ cheese producers in the 
Cévennes area,122 find themselves competing with non-PDO goat cheese local producers. In 
effect, those who have not joined the initiative because they find the compliance rules in the 
CoP too prescriptive still benefit from the reputation of, and collective communication done 
on, the PDO Pélardon, and hence claim the same origin and similar values of authenticity and 
tradition when selling their cheese. As explained by the coordinator of the ODG, ‘[i]n short 
distribution channels, information is diluted and gets lost. Consumers get confused and 
ultimately buy cheese from a specific producer because they like the producer and the product 
whether or not it is labelled. It happened that producers had joined the PDO initiative, 
developed their clientele and subsequently left the PDO initiative to avoid its obligations but 
kept their clientele all the same. In some cases, they even keep promoting their cheese as a 
PDO Pélardon cheese even though they do not comply with the PDO requirements’.123 Another 
farmer stated ‘when people here want to buy some goat cheese, they say “I want a Pélardon”, 
                                                        
121 Interview F-B6. 
122 Interview F-B8. However, this figure masks substantial differences among departments inside the PDO area. In the Lozère department, 
70-80% of all goat cheese producers use the PDO label.   
123 Interview F-B6.  
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not “I want a goat cheese”. For them, goat cheese is a Pélardon, even if it is not labelled. 
Pélardon has become a name commonly used by local people’.124   
 
The importance of physical proximity between traders and consumers has been observed in 
other initiatives. For example, in the case of Benin’s gari ‘missè’, territorial proximity and 
local, social links play a key role in ensuring product traceability and consumer confidence, 
which makes an official GI legal protection unnecessary.125   
 
The dilution of the meaning of the PDO label in short distribution channels, coupled with the 
growing demand of cheese suppliers at the regional and national level for origin-labelled 
products, explain why some producers increasingly market their cheese outside the PDO area. 
As stated by a cheese producer, wholesalers, dairy shops and restaurants outside the area of 
origin ‘really see the difference between our cheese and a non-PDO cheese and actively seek 
a PDO-labelled product as a marketing argument for their own customers’.126 For the most 
remote and isolated farmers, especially in the Lozère department in the north of the PDO area, 
selling outside the area by using a regional or national carrier also proves easier.127  
 
Outside the area of origin, the type of competition is different with most agro-food products 
being marketed with an origin label or alternatively a strong commercial brand.128 In this 
context, the PDO-labelled Pélardon cheese does not compete with ‘Pélardon type’ goat cheese 
anymore but with other PDO and PGI cheeses that also promote an image of quality and 
territorial anchoring. Paradoxically, whereas many small farmers, who underpin the image of 
authenticity associated with the PDO, still sell most of their production on the farm or in local 
markets where the origin label has little value, the PDO has allowed small and medium-sized 
farms and cheese companies, whose material, human and organisational capacities are higher 
either individually or because they pooled their resources within a small association,129 to open 
new business opportunities outside the area of origin and access the regional and national 
                                                        
124 Interview F-B1. 
125 G. Sautier, E. Biénabe and C. Cerdan, ‘Geographical Indications in Developing Countries’, in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), Labels 
of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (CAB International, 2011) 138, 144. 
126 Interview F-B4.  
127 Interview F-B9.  
128 M. Napoléone and J.P. Boutonnet, ‘AOC Pélardon: du compromis vers l’émergence d’actions collectives. Dynamiques de systèmes de 
production et des stratégies de commercialisation’ (Séminaire SFER, Les systèmes de production agricoles: performances, évolutions, 
perspective, Lille, France, 18–19/11/2004). 
129 Interview F-B9. 
195 
 
market. For a few producers, sales outside the PDO area represent up to 60-80% of their 
production.130 Because the unit cost of transportation decreases with increasing volumes, 
farmers who sell outside the PDO area are generally encouraged to supply large quantities of 
cheese. By increasing the sales at the regional and national level, the PDO label has also 
contributed to reducing the market saturation at the local level. 
 
Inside the PDO area, whether on farm or in retail shops, prices vary between €1.20 and €2 per 
cheese depending on the quality. Because of the direct competition between PDO and non-
PDO cheese producers at the farm gate, where sales are based on a relationship of trust rather 
than on labels, the price difference between the PDO and non-PDO cheese is only marginal. 
However, in retail shops, non-PDO goat cheese is sold at about €1,131 hence a greater price 
difference which points to the value of the origin label when there is no direct interaction 
between producers and buyers.  
 
The value of the PDO label is even stronger outside the PDO area where it has contributed to 
building the reputation of Pélardon cheese among distant consumers who are willing to pay a 
premium. The value chain outside the PDO area generally involves a wholesaler – who buys 
the cheeses at €1.30-1.40/unit and sells them at about €1.50/unit – and a retailer who sells the 
cheese to final consumers at about €3/unit and who therefore captures most of the rent based 
on the differentiation of the cheese through the origin label. In the opinion of those producers 
who sell a large part of their production outside the PDO area, the growth in demand for the 
PDO Pélardon cheese outside the area of production has greatly contributed to increasing their 
economic viability.132 In light of the above, it has been suggested that, while the PDO label 
allows producers to capture a premium outside the PDO area, the closer to the production area 
the sales take place, the more the price difference between the PDO Pélardon and non-labelled 
goat cheese decreases.133  
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5.3.2 Spatially extended marketing channels 
 
The markets for both green lentils from Berry and bouchot mussels from Mont-St- Michel Bay 
involve spatially extended supply chains. By contrast to highly local marketing channels that 
rely greatly on interpersonal relationships and networks of trust, spatially extended supply 
chains for origin products have been defined as channels ‘where value and meaning laden 
information about the place of production and those producing the food is translated to 
consumers who are outside the region of production itself and who may have no personal 
experience of that region’.134 The role of origin labels as institutionalised quality conventions 
and mediators between producers and consumers is thus particularly critical in the success of 
this type of channel.135   
 
About 85% of the total production of green lentils from Berry is sold outside the PGI area.136 
While it is difficult to get exact figures for bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay, it is 
estimated that about 10% of the production is sold in the area of origin, 25% of the production 
is sold in the Paris region and 65% in the rest of the national territory.137 As an illustration, the 
map below shows the high number of selling points outside the area of origin. 
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Map 5.1 
Places where to buy PDO bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay 
 
 
Source: ODG <http://moules-aop.com/espace-consommateur/ou-trouver-les-moules-aop> accessed 
10/08/2018 
 
In this context, the role played by mass retailers is of particular importance. In effect, no less 
than 70-80% of the total production of green lentils from Berry and bouchot mussels from 
Mont-St-Michel Bay are sold in medium- and large-retail outlets where they get exposure in 
the artisanal or terroir product lines of the hyper- and supermarkets. The rest are sold to 
retailers, restaurants, markets, fishmongers or other grocery shops.138 The dramatic rise of mass 
retailers across the world has been one of the most important changes in retailing in the past 
few decades which has led to a reconfiguration of supply chains.139 For some authors, the fact 
that large-scale retailers are increasingly interested in local or ’alternative’ products, and in 
effect provide shelf-space for these, partly reflect the attractiveness and appeal of the origin 
labels among consumers while exposing the permeability of the interface between ‘alternative’ 
and ‘conventional’.140  
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Importantly, the fact that medium- and large-retail outlets are typically highly concentrated has 
significant consequences on both the organisation of supply chains and the bargaining power 
of producers.  
 
5.3.2.1 The importance of mass retailers to the organisation of supply chains 
 
Considering that they operate as central purchasing units and as such buy very large volumes 
which no single producer can provide alone, mass retailers necessarily impact on the 
organisation of supply chains. As such, the distribution involves complex and long supply 
chains, including wholesalers, distributors and other commercial entities, as is the case for 
green lentils from Berry and bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay.  
 
For green lentils from Berry, the commercial entity Cibèle, whose capital is comprised of 
farmers’ shares in one-third and shares of a grain cooperative in two-thirds which are 
themselves held by producers, first buys lentils from farmers before proceeding with their 
labelling and packaging. Subsequently, Cibèle sells the total production of PGI-labelled lentils 
to wholesalers and other commercial entities as well as to retailers, restaurants, delicatessens 
and grocery shops.  
 
Conversely, the mussel initiative is characterised by the presence of six commercial entities of 
different sizes that represent altogether about 80% of the total production in 2017 up from 57% 
in 2009 and whose shareholders are producers.141 According to a number of producers, the two 
largest companies, Mytilimer and Cultimer, are in fierce competition, with the former 
representing 40-45% of the total production of PDO mussels and seeking to have a 
monopolistic position.142 Besides, about 10% to 15% of the mussel production are sold directly 
by producers to wholesalers (down from 30% in 2009); the remaining 10-15% are sold to 
restaurants, fishmongers and on markets, both within and outside the production area.143 It is 
also worth mentioning that about 5% of the production is exported to foreign countries and 
particularly in Asia where it is promoted as a high-end niche product.144  
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Whereas the lentil initiative is designed in such a way that the commercial entity Cibèle only 
– and no producer – can sell the origin-labelled lentils to other actors in the supply chain, only 
10% to 15% of bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay are sold directly by producers to 
final consumers or individual restaurants and fishmongers. Yet if virtually all the mussel 
producers sell their production through a commercial entity, the common practice is generally 
to use several marketing channels and most producers are also involved in direct sales even if 
for only a small part of their production. This points to the importance, with respect to their 
share of production sold with the PGI label, that mussel producers keep in the promotion of 
their production at the individual level, unlike lentil farmers.  
 
5.3.2.2 The impact of mass retailers on prices and distribution of the premiums 
 
The large concentration of sales in medium- and large-retail outlets through mass retailers has 
greatly impacted on the bargaining power of producers and hence on prices of both products. 
This is because mass retailers do not interact or negotiate directly with producers but instead 
buy very large amounts of same category products from wholesalers and commercial entities 
with which they negotiate prices in global terms. For instance, it has been noted that, in the 
case of Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese, farmers’ margins have been gradually decreasing due to 
the growing competition from similar but lower-quality cheese sold by the same conventional 
retailers.145 Some authors have suggested that the increasing control by mass retailers of the 
distribution of origin and quality products ‘brings with it the danger of a downward pressure 
on producer prices and a dilution of quality standards, thereby undermining the raison d’être’ 
of origin labels and other quality conventions.146  
 
The picture is, however, more complex. Supplying mass retailers allows producers to sell off 
substantial volumes of their production and be guaranteed payments within a short period of 
time. It is nevertheless true that the stability of commercial relationships and producers’ 
payment security are counterbalanced by their loss of independence and autonomy in terms of 
price negotiation while disconnecting them from consumers for the largest part of their 
production volumes.  
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In the case of the PDO mussels, the price paid to producers in 2017 is €2,20-€2,30/kg when 
they sell directly to restaurants, fishmongers and on local markets (base price for bags of 15 
kilogrammes), and at least €2,50/kg when they sell directly to end consumers on local 
markets.147 By contrast, when mussels are sold through a long supply chain, the price paid to 
producers by commercial entities is about €2,10/kg (product sold in containers for subsequent 
tray packaging);148 the price paid to commercial entities by wholesalers is €2,90-€4/kg 
depending on the quality of the mussels;149 and the price paid by final consumers in hyper- and 
supermarkets range from €4-€6/kg.150 To put it differently, the retail prices of bouchot mussels 
from Mont-St-Michel Bay in hyper- and supermarkets are two to three times higher than the 
price paid to producers and about 1,5 time higher than the price paid to commercial entities. 
By comparison, the price in hyper- and supermarkets of non-PDO bouchot mussels is €3-
4,50/kg, which is about 20% lower than the price of the PDO bouchot mussels.151  
  
Likewise, the price paid by Cibèle to lentils producers has been about €700/tonne for the last 
few years whereas the price paid to Cibèle by wholesalers and other commercial entities has 
been about €1,700/tonne, i.e. 2.4 times the price paid to producers.152 Further, the retail price 
of the origin-labelled green lentils from Berry in hypermarkets, supermarkets and specialty 
shops varies between €1.9 and €3 per 500-gramme package, which amounts to €3,800-
6,000/tonne – i.e. between 2.2 and 3.5 times the price paid to Cibèle and between 5.4 and 8.5 
times the price paid to producers.153 By comparison, the retail price of non-labelled green lentils 
in hyper- and supermarkets ranges from €0.67 to €1.60 per 500-gramme package, or €1,340-
€3,200/tonne.154  
 
These figures clearly show that, if GI products command a higher price than standard products 
(about 200-300% higher for green lentils from Berry and 15-20% higher for bouchot mussels 
from Mont-St-Michel Bay), most of the price premium is captured by commercial entities and 
mass retailers. This confirms Belleti and Marescotti’s assumption that price premiums often do 
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not benefit the actors in the upstream phase of the supply chain and hence the furthest away 
from buyers/consumers.155 In the words of a mussel producer, ‘this monopoly situation is not 
such a good thing because it places extra pressure on both prices and quantities and it can lead 
to price dictatorship. Large-scale distribution can cripple us by locking in prices for a very long 
time’.156 For the President of the producers’ association of producers of green lentils from 
Berry, ‘[d]ue to the fact that we provide large volumes to wholesalers, medium- and large-retail 
outlets, a price increase of 1.5 to 2% a year is all we can expect’.157  
 
At the same time, the price paid by Cibèle to producers has increased from €400/tonne in 2000 
to €700/tonne in 2016.158 According to the coordinator of the producers’ association, this 
significant increase is not due to the PGI label but rather derives from economies of scale and 
optimization of production assets at the collective level, including by lowering sorting, 
packaging and trading transaction costs.159 In the case of the PDO mussels, producers agree 
that their higher price is generally not due to the PDO label but rather to the attractiveness of 
the name ‘Mont-St-Michel’ itself and the use of more expensive equipment resulting in higher 
production costs.160 Yet the PDO label is believed to have helped sustain the price level.161 
More recently, the price of the PDO mussels has increased by 10% since 2014,162 which is due 
to greater consumer demand for bouchot mussels in general – whatever their origin – coupled 
with a sharp production decline in the Charente-Maritime Department, which has greatly 
contributed to limiting the competition on the market.163  
 
                                                        
155 G. Belletti and A. Marescotti, ‘Origin products, geographical indications and rural development’ in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), 
Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (CAB International, 2011) 75, 83.                                                                                                                                       
156 Interview F-C13. 
157 Interview F-D2. 
158 Interview F-D6. 
159 ibid. 
160 Interviews F-C2, F-C3, F-C5 and F-C8. 
161 ibid. 
162 Interview F-C11. 
163 ibid. 
202 
 
5.3.2.3 Strategies to increase prices 
 
Some mussel producers and commercial entities have looked for ways to circumvent 
difficulties in negotiating prices with the medium- and large-retail outlets through market and 
product differentiation. A clear sign of this is the development of niche markets both within 
and outside the PDO mussel market itself.  
 
Within the PDO market, the largest commercial entities have embraced the opportunity to 
export the PDO mussels (as ‘ready to cook’ in a vacuum package) as a high-end niche product 
with a strong ‘Made in France’ emphasis that is reinforced by the PDO label. Other famous 
GIs have expanded to foreign markets such as Champagne wine and Parmigiano-Reggiano 
cheese.164 In these distribution circuits, producers sell their production to restaurants or 
wholesalers.  
 
About 5% of the total production is exported, mostly in Asia, yet the price of the PDO mussels 
on foreign markets is three to four times higher than in France (about €20 in Shanghai as 
compared with €4 in France for a 700-gramme vacuum pack).165 Although the selling prices of 
the mussels on foreign markets include the transportation costs and customs duties, they 
nonetheless allow commercial entities to get higher margins than in France. Importantly, the 
fact that customers on foreign markets are willing to pay a premium price translates the value 
they attach to the place/product link. It logically leads some producers to favour an export-
oriented marketing strategy to position the PDO mussels as a luxury product and drive the 
prices up.  
 
Outside the PDO market, one certified producer has decided to go beyond the PDO 
requirements to produce higher-quality mussels with a larger size and higher flesh content 
which he promotes on the market with his own trade mark over a longer time period than the 
PDO marketing season. His niche product represents about 15% of his total production and is 
sold without the PDO label to high-end fishmongers at a price 30% higher than the PDO 
mussels, the rest being sold with the PDO label.166 While his individual initiative has prompted 
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mixed reactions among PDO producers, one of them declared that ‘by producing his high-
quality mussels, he contributes to drive the quality of the PDO mussels down because he takes 
the best mussels out of the PDO market. For the good of the PDO he should not sell any mussel 
with the PDO label because his PDO mussels may appear as a residue of his top-quality 
mussels.’167 Similar developments have been observed in winemaking in Tuscany. For 
instance, producers of Chianti wine have opted out of the GI rules to pursue new production 
methods and introduce non-Tuscan grape varieties into the blends to produce higher-quality 
wines.168 This would tend to suggest that, far from ‘stifl[ing] competition’,169 GI protection 
could ‘stimulate competition and innovation’,170 possibly at the expense of social cohesion 
within the GI collective, while questioning the extent to which GI is a high-quality signal. 
 
5.3.3 Physically-dependent marketing channels 
 
The marketing channels of vermicelli from Bình Liêu are highly dependent upon the local 
physical constraints. Indeed, the area of production is difficult to access due to the poor road 
infrastructure and is remote from major consumer centres, hence the need to transport large 
quantities of vermicelli over long distribution channels. As a result, the supply chain involves 
wholesalers, distributors and other middlemen across Vietnam especially in the north and 
central regions of the country. Most importantly, the type of buyers, who are not end consumers 
for the largest part of the sales volumes, clearly shows the constraints facing this initiative. 
Although it is difficult to gauge precisely, about 80% of buyers are local state authorities, or 
companies that have close relationships with the former and who are encouraged to buy 
vermicelli from Bình Liêu as presents for their staff to celebrate the Têt (Vietnamese New 
Year) or other public holidays.171  
 
The over-involvement of state authorities in the management and functioning of the initiative 
(see Chapter 4), as well as their over-representation among consumers, comes with its own 
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pitfalls, including non-transparent practices that undermine the smooth functioning of the 
initiative.172 Another significant consequence is that the selling price of the main producer 
(50% of the total production), which is the highest on the market, is fixed by local authorities 
at the provincial level with a view to avoid inflation, regardless of the market value, the 
consumer demand and the type of buyer (end customer, distributor or wholesaler). Between 
2012 and 2016 the price was set at VND75,000/kg (US$3.3/kg) despite the increase in 
production costs over that period.173 In 2017, it was slightly increased by 6% to VND80,000/kg 
(US$ 3.5/kg).174  
 
5.3.4 Sustainability-oriented value chain 
 
The wood from the Alps certification has been designed by local authorities around a strong 
environmental and sustainable development objective which has led to the adoption of highly 
local marketing channels. As such, the processing and construction stages should take place 
locally through short circuits, thereby reducing distances over which the wood is moved. 
Ultimately, as stated by local authorities, one important goal is not necessarily to increase the 
price of the wood as in a market-driven approach but rather to expand its use and thereby create 
job opportunities on the territory.175  
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Map 5.2 
Network of buildings constructed with the certified wood from the Alps as of July 2017 
 
Source: Association Bois des Alpes 
 
This initiative therefore operates according to a different logic than the other case studies. In 
the other initiatives, the increase in prices and the capture of rents by producers are important 
market-driven objectives attached to the origin labels. In this initiative, the greater use of wood 
from the Alps partly depends on the ability to show that the cost of construction with the 
certified wood is not higher than with a non-certified wood, or at least that extra-cost is offset 
by the creation of jobs in the territory. One of the main challenges is thus to address the 
economic constraints that would hinder the use of the local certified wood. In this regard, the 
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association is actively involved in communication and awareness raising activities to promote 
the benefits of the use of the certified wood. The activities are further supported by studies and 
research such as life cycle assessments that the association regularly undertakes to support the 
wider use of the certified wood.176 Overall, according to a study conducted on 22 pilot 
buildings, increasing the proportion of wood in a building structure results in lower overall 
costs, although results are more mixed depending on the specific activities and use of the 
wood.177 It is precisely to increase the use of the certified wood further that over twenty 
distributors were certified by July 2018, which should lead to larger construction projects 
involving a compulsory consumption of a minimum quantity of wood.178 Besides, as shown in 
Section 5.2.3, partnership agreements and support policies at the regional and European level 
have been adopted to promote the use of the certified wood.   
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has focused on the market environment of the six products for which the origin 
label is used. The objective was to identify and analyse the factors influencing the value of GIs 
in the marketplace as well as the economic benefits derived from them. Three lines of research 
were followed: the product’s reputation; production capacity to meet consumer demand; and 
marketing channels.   
 
Our findings illustrate the diversity of ways in which the product’s reputation operates in the 
market. They also indicate that GIs are used both as an instrument to protect an established 
reputation and as a tool to build the product’s reputation on the market, thereby contradicting 
Réviron’s claim that the reputation must precede the GI registration.179 Importantly, collective 
promotion efforts and marketing investments have also been made – and continue to be made 
– in all six initiatives to develop and sustain the product’s image among consumers. The 
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importance of investments in promotion and advertising raises the issue of financial capacity 
as to who bears the costs. These may be considerable for small farmers in developing countries 
especially given the lack of reputation of many GI products.180 This issue is particularly critical 
when these costs are borne by producers and not by public agencies or in the absence of a 
strong GI collective that would allow for the mutualisation of promotion and other collective 
costs.181  
 
Subsequently, this chapter has shown that, although higher demand for origin products has 
been well-documented in the literature, greater consumer demand is not necessarily due to the 
GI label itself. For instance, in the case the wood from the Alps, it is the association’s pro-
active promotion of the wider use of the wood, coupled with the provision of subsidies, that 
have greatly contributed to increasing the number of construction projects using the certified 
wood. Greater demand can also derive from the higher value placed by consumers on other 
labels which in turn reinforce the GI labels. This has been the case for instance for the French 
Label Rouge certification (signalling the superior quality of green lentils from Berry) as well 
as for the European TSG (certifying the traditional mode of production of bouchot mussels). 
This points to the need to consider the various certifications used on the same product and the 
mutually-reinforcing processes among them, an aspect generally overlooked in the GI literature 
except with regard to the fair trade certification.182 From a broader perspective, and as will be 
evidenced in Chapters 6 and 7, the range of potential impacts of GIs, both economic and non-
economic, makes it particularly relevant to adopt a complementary approach to, and 
convergence among, different certifications, including those addressing provenance, quality, 
tradition, fair trade and organic farming.183  
 
Shifting from consumer demand to production capacity, I argue that a number of factors impact 
on producers’ ability to match supply and demand. On the one hand, strategies aimed at 
expanding production volumes usually involve increasing the membership of the producers’ 
association, expanding the production area, and/or using input-intensive cultivation systems, 
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as has been the case for many successful GI products. On the other hand, the capacity to 
increase production may be limited by institutional constraints (strict state regulation of 
production of bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay); or hindered by the low interest 
among local farmers in using the GI label, which can itself be linked to the organisation of the 
supply chain (prevalence of short circuits for Pélardon cheese). Consequently, both the 
functioning of the initiative at the local level and the broader institutional context in which the 
GI initiatives are operating need to be considered when exploring their production capacity.  
 
Finally, the cross-case analysis suggests that marketing channels are particularly relevant to 
the value and benefits of the GI labels. One the one hand, highly local marketing channels have 
contributed to building the reputation of fried calamari from Hạ Long and promoting the origin 
label while empowering producers. In the wood from the Alps initiative, the adoption of highly 
local marketing channels both derive from, and contribute to, the sustainable development 
objective attached to the initiative. On the other hand, physical constraints explain why most 
of the production of vermicelli from Bình Liêu is sold outside the area of production whereas 
the value of the origin labels of French products tends to increase as the product is exported 
outside the area of origin. At the same time, spatially extended marketing channels have 
entailed increased isolation of French producers from final consumers, with no or little 
flexibility to set or negotiate selling prices.  
 
On this account, the impact of origin labels on prices appears mixed. Our findings show that 
GI products generally command a higher price than standard products. These results align with 
the empirical studies conducted in Europe that have provided evidence that the price of many 
European GI products is higher than that of similar products in the same category.184 For 
example, in carrying out a comprehensive study in 2001-2002 under the FAIR European 
research programme, Barjolle and Sylvander found that fourteen out of the twenty-one 
products under scrutiny have received a price premium.185 Among the most famous examples, 
the Italian Toscano olive oil receives a 20% price premium; the Bresse chicken is sold at a 
price that is four times that of non-GI chicken; and the Parma ham sells at prices 50% higher 
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than other standard hams.186 A retail benchmark study conducted in the cheese sector in France 
also concluded that GI-labelled cheese products have a price 30% higher than standard cheese 
products.187 
 
Five observations can be made which shall allow for a more sophisticated interpretation and 
analysis of our empirical results. First, there is a great difference in the levels of price premiums 
observed across the case studies (about 200-300% higher for green lentils from Berry as 
compared with 15-20% higher for bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay and fried 
calamari from Hạ Long). In fact, the ‘extreme variability’ in the magnitude of price premiums 
was observed in another empirical study commissioned by the EU and published in 2013, with 
some GI products commanding only marginal price premium (+2-3%) and others being sold 
for double the price of that of the corresponding standard products.188  
 
Second, the levels of prices premiums can vary widely for the same product depending on the 
points of sale as these can greatly impact on the value of the origin label. For instance, the price 
premium for Pélardon cheese is only marginal at the farm gate but increases up to 20% to 50% 
in retail shops inside the PDO area.  
 
Third, our findings show that most of the price premiums are captured by commercial entities 
and retailers due to the organisation of the supply chains and the low bargaining power of 
producers. The organisational features of the supply chain and the superior bargaining positions 
of the largest actors have been pointed out in the literature as factors hindering fair distribution 
of returns and good economic results,189 as is the case for instance for the Italian Parmigiano-
Reggiano and the French Cantal cheeses.190 In the UK, Ilbery and Kneafsey have shown that 
most producers and small businesses never benefit from GI premiums that are captured by 
larger food companies.191 In this chapter, the power imbalance between producers and traders 
                                                        
186 Babcock and Clemens (n43) 13; U. Grote, ‘Environmental Labeling, Protected Geographical Indications and the Interests of Developing 
Countries’ (2009) 10(1) The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 94, 105. 
187 Secodip 2002 data reported in Giovannucci  and others (n56) 29. 
188 Areté, ‘Study on Assessing the Added Value of PDO/PGI Products’ (Study commissioned by the European Commission, 2013) 6 
<http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external-studies/added-value-pdo-pgi_en.htm> accessed 18/07/2018. 
189 Belletti and Marescotti (n155). 
190 K. de Roest, ‘The dynamics of the Parmigiano-Reggiano production system’ (n145) 271; D. Barjolle, S. Réviron and B. Sylvander, 
‘Création et distribution de valeur économique dans les filières de fromages AOP’ (2007) 29 Economie et Sociétés 1507. 
191 B. Ilbery and M. Kneafsey, ‘Registering Regional Speciality Food and Drink Products in the United Kingdom: The Case of PDOs and 
PGIs’ (2000) 32(3) Area 317. 
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has been documented in relation to the presence of mass retailers in the supply chains. The loss 
of local control over prices has been noted in other circumstances. For instance, Cleary and 
van Caenegem show that, because of their geographical isolation, dairy farmers on King Island 
have no other option than to sell their milk to the sole operator on the island upon which they 
have become dependent.192 As a result, dairy farmers have become price takers rather than 
price makers.193  
 
Fourth, the economic benefits of GIs can be limited by institutional issues and lack of 
transparency from state authorities, as is the case in the Vietnamese case studies.  
 
Fifth, the limits of our analysis should be recognised considering that no exhaustive cost-
benefit study could be conducted to determine the real economic benefits of all six GIs.194 As 
cautioned by Giovannucci, price premiums do not automatically translate into increased 
profitability considering that GI products require additional production, certification, and 
marketing costs, hence the need for premiums to be high enough to compensate for such costs, 
especially when these are borne by the producers and not by public agencies.195  
 
With these limits in mind, it is argued that the GI protection alone, as well as the mere use of 
the GI label, are usually not sufficient in themselves to bring about economic benefits and 
advance the commercial interests of local stakeholders. As shown in this chapter, a wide range 
of organisational, institutional and marketing factors influences both the use and value of GIs 
in the marketplace as well as benefits derived from them.  
                                                        
192 J. Cleary and W. Van Caenegem, ‘Mitigating One-Size-Fits-All’ Approaches to Australian Agriculture: Is There a Case to be Made for 
Geographical Indications?’ in W. Van Caenegem and J. Cleary (eds.), The Importance of Place: Geographical Indications as a Tool for Local 
and Regional Development (Springer - Ius Gentium, Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice n. 58, 2017) 111, 134. 
193 ibid. 
194 Grote (n186). 
195 Giovannucci and others (n56). 
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6 
 
Factors hindering the use of GIs on the market 
 
 
 
This chapter will turn to those products for which the origin label has been either entirely or 
relatively unused despite a formal registration having taken place; whose name has been largely 
associated with goods that do not correspond to the traditional or ‘genuine’ product; and/or 
whose manufacturing according to the traditional methods of production is very limited, if at 
all. More specifically, the objective of the present chapter is to identify the factors explaining 
why GI initiatives have failed to promote the GI label and/or the traditional product among 
both producers and consumers/buyers. Whereas the GI literature focuses largely on the analysis 
of the effects of GIs that are actually used on the market, it is nonetheless essential to not 
overlook those initiatives which have been unsuccessful in promoting the use of the origin 
labels and/or the production of the traditional product. Along with the factors influencing the 
value and benefits of GIs that are used on the market, which were analysed in Chapter 5, the 
identification of the reasons for ‘GI failures’ will broaden our understanding of the enabling 
and inhibiting factors for successful GI mobilisations.  
 
In total, six initiatives show little, adverse or non-use of the origin labels or names on the 
market, and in at least half of them the use of traditional methods and practices, as reflected in 
the CoPs, has been very low or declining. The six initiatives are the Marseille soap, conical 
hats from Huế, sticky rice from Đông Triều, pottery from Đông Triều, H’mong beef from Cao 
Bằng, and star anise from Lạng Sơn. All these initiatives are characterised by consumers’ lack 
of awareness of, and demand for, the origin label and/or the traditional product. 
 
A range of reasons contribute to explain such ‘GI failures’ – where GI labels or products remain 
relatively invisible on the market – including the impracticalities and costs associated with the 
use of the origin label, the low awareness of local producers and the lack of activity of the 
producers’ association, among others. These will be addressed when relevant. More 
particularly, the analysis of the six case studies has identified three key factors in terms of 
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prevailing market conditions that impact negatively on the producers’ willingness or capacity 
to use the origin labels and/or producing the traditional product.  
 
Section 6.1 will first suggest that GIs fail to engage and foster the interest of local producers in 
using the origin labels, or producing the genuine product, when the GI name lacks 
distinctiveness, which undermines their communication function – and hence lessens their 
value and appeal – in the marketplace. This is the case for conical hats from Huế and Marseille 
soap. While conical hats have become an iconic product that are symbolically resonant well 
beyond a specific origin, the name of Marseille soap is used generically on a wide range of 
different goods to meet the growing consumer demand for the ‘concept’ of the soap rather than 
for the actual traditional soap itself. Subsequently, Section 6.2 will argue that the lack of 
interest of local stakeholders to use the origin label may also derive from the lack of economic 
incentives for producers to adhere to the initiative. This is illustrated by the case study of sticky 
rice from Đông Triều. Finally, Section 6.3 will highlight the significance of the marketing 
channels via the initiatives of pottery from Đông Triều, H’mong beef from Cao Bằng and star 
anise from Lạng Sơn. The nature and structure of the marketing channels of these products, 
which are predominantly exported to foreign markets, largely account for their lack of 
reputation on the end markets while decreasing the use of the origin labels.  
 
6.1 The lack of distinctiveness of the name  
 
As already mentioned, the primary function of GIs is based on the economics of product 
differentiation (see Chapter 1). By conveying information to consumers on the specific origin 
and the unique quality, characteristic or reputation of origin products, GIs aim to build niche 
markets.1 Bramley and Biénabe note that ‘the stronger the product/origin nexus, the more 
robust the competitive advantage created by the differentiation is likely to be’.2 Both case 
studies of conical hats from Huế and Marseille soap show that, conversely, when the link 
between the product and the specific origin is weakened or little known to consumers, GIs 
cannot serve their differentiation function and lose de facto their utility in producers’ and 
consumers’ eyes.  
                                                        
1 F. Addor and A. Grazioli, ‘Geographical Indications beyond Wines and Spirits: A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical 
Indications in the WTO/TRIPS Agreement’ (2002) 5 JWIP 865, 870. 
2 C. Bramley and E. Biénabe, ‘Developments and considerations around geographical indications in the developing world’ (2012) 2 (1) Queen 
Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 14, 23. 
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6.1.1 Iconic or local product? 
 
The GI label of conical hats from Huế was tested in 2014 by one trader on twenty conical hats 
only.3 In 2016, no producer was granted the right to use the GI4 and the current situation is 
unclear. This section will argue that the national symbolic status and iconic nature of conical 
hats in Vietnam tends to supersede the regional identity of hats from Huế, which diminishes 
the value of the origin label.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Vietnamese people have progressively abandoned the practice of 
wearing conical hats due to modernisation of ways of life and rapid urbanisation. However, 
conical hats are still considered as an iconic product, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary 
as ‘[…] a thing regarded as a representative symbol, especially of a culture or a movement’. 
According to the GI application, ‘the industry of making leaf conical hat is regarded as an 
emblem of the country thanks to its close connection with traditional agriculture and very early 
appearance in the history of the country’.5 Due to their iconic status, conical hats have enjoyed 
a high international visibility which is evidenced by the widespread use of images of women 
wearing conical hats on the cover of foreign travel guides. In effect, Western tourists identify 
conical hats as symbolic and representative of Vietnam, particularly its farming culture.6 To 
the older generation of Americans, conical hats are also iconic of the Vietnamese struggle for 
unification and independence.7  
 
This exposure to foreign tourists has greatly contributed to turning the hat into a souvenir 
product, keeping in mind that Huế Imperial City has been listed as a World Heritage Site since 
1993 and as such attracts hundreds of thousands of visitors every year.8 As tourists’ interest in 
cultural representations of the visited country often translates into the purchase of handicraft 
souvenirs,9 foreign tourists make up the large majority of customers especially since 
                                                        
3 Interview V-E6. 
4 Interview V-E8. 
5 Document describing the characteristics of conical hats from Huế (GI application), 10. 
6 K.Thirumaran, M.X. Dam and C.M. Thirumaran, ‘Integrating souvenirs with tourism development: Vietnam's challenges’ (2014) 11(1) 
Tourism Planning and Development 57, 59. 
7 ibid. 
8 UNESCO World Heritage List, ‘Complex of Hué Monuments’ <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/678> accessed 18/09/2017. 
9 T.T. Dung, ‘Représentation culturelle et souvenir artisanal, Expérience des touristes au centre du Viet Nam’ (Master’s thesis, Université 
du Québec à Montréal, 2016) Chapter 3.  
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sightseeing tours generally include the visit of fabrication workshops and festivals where 
tourists can buy conical hats.10 According to the NOIP, conical hats are one of the most popular 
souvenirs bought by foreign tourists.11  
 
Picture 6.1 
The use of conical hats on the cover of foreign tourist guides 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 6.2 
Festival of conical hats in Huế 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
10 Thirumaran, Dam and Thirumaran (n6). 
11 NOIP, ‘“Hué” is protected as geographical indication for coconut-leaf conical hat’ 
<http://noip.gov.vn/noip/cms_en.nsf/vwDisplayContentNews/0CCFF937254F9B80472577830012215A?OpenDocument> accessed 
9/04//2018. 
© HACHETTE LIVRE (Hachette Tourisme), 2006 
 
Permission from Rough Guides 
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Whereas conical hats from Huế are promoted by local authorities as a cultural symbol of both 
Vietnam in general and the craft villages of Huế in particular,12 tourists value conical hats as a 
national symbol of Vietnam but do not necessarily attach importance to the territorial 
connexion with Huế. As a result, the hat has a weak territorial identity which explains why it 
has proved difficult to differentiate it based on its geographical origin. By comparison, the 
name ‘Panama hat’ has been very popular in the marketplace, yet it is a misnomer for the 
‘Montecristi hat’ (first Ecuadorian GI registered in 2008).13 The misuse of the name, which 
tends to overshadow the territorial origin of the hat, dates back to the early 20th Century when 
the straw hats were transported from Montecristi (where they have been produced since the 
16th Century) to the USA and Europe via the Isthmus of Panama.14 In contrast, other local 
products have become successful national champions while retaining their specific regional 
identity, such as Champagne for France15 and Darjeeling tea for India.16  
 
On the one hand, tourism offers opportunities for local producers of conical hats from Huế to 
increase the production and sale of conical hats. On the other hand, the nature of the clientele 
has impacted negatively on the production and hence preservation of the genuine traditional 
product. As mentioned in Chapter 3, three categories of conical hats are produced in the area. 
According to the CoP, only those hats made of coconut-palm leaf with three stitches per 1cm 
knitted down from the top brim to 15th brim can be sold with the GI label,17 thereby excluding 
the other categories of hats made of a lower quality leaf and with more space between stitches. 
The production of the GI-qualified conical hat logically involves the most costly and time-
consuming process. However, foreign tourists are generally not connoisseurs and as such are 
not aware of the characteristics and methods of production of the genuine conical hat from 
Huế. This is especially true considering that, as acknowledged in the GI application document, 
conical hats from Huế are ‘almost similar’ to other conical hats produced across the country,18 
despite having its own characteristics in terms of colour, design, size, weight and durability 
which only connoisseurs are aware of.19  
                                                        
12 Thirumaran, Dam and Thirumaran (n6). 
13 A.B. Russell, ‘Using Geographical Indications to Protect Artisanal Works in Developing Countries: Lessons from a Banana Republic’s 
Misnomered Hat’ (2010) 19 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 705, 715-716.  
14 ibid 709. 
15 G. Kolleen, When champagne became French (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
16 K. Das, ‘International protection of geographical indications with special reference to Darjeeling tea’ (2006) 9(5) JWIP 459. 
17 Document describing the characteristics of conical hats from Huế (GI application), 8. 
18 ibid 10. 
19 ibid 16. 
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The image 6.3, ‘Examples of different shapes of conical hats found in Vietnam’, has been 
removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
 
As a result, producers have taken advantage of tourists’ ignorance and switched to the 
production of the cheapest categories of hats to save time and money.20 This practice spread 
quickly, especially because most producers are small households whose production is very 
little and hence who combine hat production with other jobs so as to increase their incomes.21 
Consequently, producers not only conceal information on the genuine product from customers 
but also exclude the use of the GI label which seems to be displayed only in festivals and 
exhibitions. Ultimately, should a customer want to buy the genuine product, he must request it 
explicitly.  
 
Our analysis thus points to the need to educate consumers as per the characteristics of the GI 
product and build its reputation, and that of the GI label, through investments in advertising 
and promotion. The lack of use of the GI label by producers and traders due to the lack of 
consumer demand for the GI-qualified product has been seen in other initiatives. For instance, 
Durand reports that, as of 2013, all but one of the companies who have the right to use the GI 
on the Buôn Ma Thuôt coffee, in Vietnam, do not use the label simply because their buyers do 
not ask for it.22 Yet, in relation to conical hats, consumers’ education is particularly challenging 
due to the broader – diffuse national rather than specific regional – symbolic status of the 
product. This status has resulted in a weak territorial identity, combined with the fact that the 
majority of customers are foreign tourists who buy conical hats as iconic souvenirs from 
Vietnam rather than from Huế. In this context, the concept of origin is thus closer to that of 
country of provenance, as it is the case for famous ‘country-GIs’ such as Café de Colombia 
that is ‘based on the general image of the country instead of on real links of the coffee 
production process to local specific resources’.23 Borrowing from legal terminology, 
Vietnamese conical hats, including but not limited to those from Huế, arguably lack 
geographical – or rather regional – distinctiveness at least among foreign tourists, which 
                                                        
20 Interviews V-E1, V-E3 and V-E4. 
21 ibid. 
22 C. Durand, ‘L’émergence des indications géographiques dans les processus de qualication territoriale des produits agroalimentaires - Une 
analyse comparée entre l’Indonésie et le Vietnam’ (PhD Thesis, Institut national d'études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - 
Montpellier SupAgro, 2016) 345-346. 
23 A. Marescotti and G. Belletti, ‘Differentiation strategies in coffee global value chains through. reference to territorial origin in Latin 
American countries’ (2016) 5(1) Culture & History Digital Journal 1, 8. 
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generally explains why local producers have turned away from the traditional local product 
and the origin label. If there is no consumer awareness about, and demand for, the GI-labelled 
product, producers see no reason to produce it and use the GI label especially since the 
manufacturing process of the GI-qualified product is more costly and time-consuming. The 
sustainability of the initiative is further undermined by the fact that the producers’ association 
does not have any activity, and does not contribute to the promotion of the label, due to lack of 
resources.24 Consequently, not only is there no use of the GI label, but the production of the 
genuine conical hat from Huế has been decreasing rapidly, which puts at risk the preservation 
of traditional methods of production.  
 
6.1.2 Concept or genuine product? 
 
Unlike the other products studied in this chapter, the name ‘savon de Marseille’ has had an 
established reputation and strong evocative value in the marketplace since the nineteenth 
century as a good quality toiletry product.25 The world market for soaps sold under the name 
‘savon de Marseille’, currently estimated at about €350 million,26 is growing, driven by 
consumer demand for ‘natural’ products. However, the name has been used for decades on a 
large range of soap products made outside Marseille area and/or that do not comply with the 
traditional rules of production as established by the Edict of Colbert of 1688 and Napoleon’s 
Decree of 1812 (see Chapter 4). Only a very small proportion of the soap products bearing the 
name ‘savon de Marseille’ can be considered as traditional or ‘genuine’ according to these 
texts. As this section will show, a large market exists for products named ‘savon de Marseille’, 
i.e. for the concept of the soap as a natural, traditional product, but comparatively the consumer 
demand for the genuine soap is low. As the name has been extensively used on a wide range 
of soap products, the differentiation of the genuine product in the marketplace has proved 
challenging.  
As seen in Chapter 4, the traditional Marseille soap is primarily (i.e. up to 90%) produced by 
the four members of the UPSM, who owns the figurative collective mark ‘savon de Marseille’. 
                                                        
24 Interviews V-E1, V-E3 and V-E4. 
25 P.-P. Zalio, ‘Le « savon de Marseille», Contribution à une sociologie économique des produits’ in A. Stanziani, La qualité des produits en 
France (XVIIIe-XXe siècles)’ (Belin, 2003) 93. 
26 E-mail from Mr Jaussaud, CEO of ‘La Grande Savonnerie’, to author (12/04/2018). 
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However, their annual sales, estimated at about €18 million, represent only 10% of the 20,000 
tonnes of soaps that are sold every year as ‘savon de Marseille’ in France.27 In effect, no less 
than 90% of all products stamped with the name ‘savon de Marseille’ are not produced 
following the traditional ‘Marseille method’ (see Chapter 4). Rather, most of these soaps, 
produced by outsiders in China, Thailand, Turkey and other countries, are made from animal 
fat, dye and fragrance and using a cheaper manufacturing process.28 Further, an increasing 
number of French soapmakers also produce and market coloured and perfumed soaps under 
the name ‘savon de Marseille’.  
 
Picture 6.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
27 Interviews F-A5 and F-A6. 
28 ibid. 
The traditional Marseille soap 
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Picture 6.5 
The coloured and perfumed soaps sold as ‘savon de Marseille’ 
 
 
 
The production and marketing of these products under the name ‘savon de Marseille’ reflects 
the strong demand of today’s consumers for both (i) coloured and perfumed soaps, because 
consumers’ taste has evolved toward this type of product and (ii) the ‘concept’ of Marseille 
soap, because consumers associate the name with the image of a good quality and natural 
product. However, most consumers are not aware of the characteristics of the traditional soap. 
Besides, the traditional Marseille soap is about 30-40% more expensive than the standard soap 
due to the use of more labour-intensive and extensive production methods, yet many consumers 
are not ready to pay this premium, especially as they prefer coloured and perfumed soaps.29 
According to the UPSM, new market demands coupled with consumers’ lack of awareness of 
the characteristics of the traditional product have put at risk the preservation of traditional 
methods of production.30  
 
In contrast to the limited consumer awareness about, and demand for, the genuine product in 
France, consumer demand for the traditional Marseille soap is growing fast on foreign markets. 
Between 30% and 50% of the production of traditional soaps by members of the UPSM are 
exported to foreign countries, especially Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan but also to 
other European countries, the USA and Russia.31 The same export strategy has been adopted 
by other companies.32 According to the UPSM, the attributes of the traditional product as a 
natural, mild and biodegradable soap are known and sought after by consumers on foreign 
                                                        
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
31 Interviews F-A1 and F-A2. 
32 Interviews F-A8 and F-A11. 
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markets who also value the cultural heritage dimension embodied in the product.33 There, as is 
the case for bouchot mussels from Mont-Saint-Michel Bay (see Chapter 5), Marseille soap is 
promoted as a high-end craft product with a strong ‘Made in France’ emphasis in line with the 
demand of foreign consumers for French ‘refined’ or ‘sophisticated’ products. This market 
positioning has translated into higher selling prices that foreign customers are ready to pay for 
– about €15 for a three-hundred gramme soap in Asia as compared with €3 in France.34 As 
explained by a producer, ‘[w]hile the domestic market is flooded with coloured, scented, cheap 
and low-quality products that are wrongly marketed as ‘savon de Marseille’, the traditional 
soap has gained an excellent reputation as a high-end product among a large fraction of the 
Chinese and Japanese population who have increased their purchasing power. Exporting 
Marseille soaps abroad allows us to be what we want to be outside France, that is the custodians 
of the genuine product; not what people want us to be in France where consumers don’t know 
what it truly is’.35  
 
The denomination ‘savon de Marseille’ thus appears to face a paradox. On the one hand, its 
concept is a huge commercial success but the name is used generically in France, including in 
its region of origin where consumers are not familiar with the characteristics of the genuine 
product. On the other hand, it emerges as a geographically defined name for a traditional 
product whose specific characteristics are known and sought after by consumers outside the 
country.  
 
Finally, it should be stressed that, in determining whether the denomination ‘savon de 
Marseille’ is generic and, if not, for which type of product the IGPIA should be granted, the 
outcome of the legal dispute between the UPSM, the AFSM and the ASDMF (see Chapters 2 
and 4), is likely to impact on the market for at least two reasons. First, if granted, the registration 
of a IGPIA for the name ‘savon de Marseille’ might call for intervention of the state on the 
market to fight against the use of the name on soap products that do not correspond to the CoP. 
Second, the UPSM represents four producers only, while the ASDMF gathers 95% of French 
soap producers outside Marseille area and the economic weight of the AFSM, who consists of 
twelve producers including the global group L’Occitane, is significant. The decision as to 
which producers’ association would have the right to use the GI might impact not only on their 
                                                        
33 Interview F-A10. 
34 Interviews F-A10 and F-A11. 
35 Interview F-A7. 
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marketing strategy, including their pricing policy, but also on their ability to secure and 
enhance employment opportunities.  
6.2 The lack of economic incentives 
 
The analysis of the case study of sticky rice from Đông Triều suggests that the arrangements 
made at the initiative level for the marketing of the labelled rice, which were decided by local 
authorities following Vietnam’s top-down management approach to trade marks (see Chapter 
3), greatly contribute to the limited use of the origin label in the marketplace. These 
arrangements did not consider the interests of established producers and do not provide them 
with economic incentives to adhere to the initiative.  
 
While Vietnamese consumer demand for rice is considerable across the country (see Chapter 
4), the differentiation of one specific rice is difficult. This is especially true when the rice does 
not have a specific quality or characteristics such as sticky rice from Đông Triều.36 If there is 
a strong consumer demand at the local level, it does not derive from the consumers’ preference 
for this specific rice but rather from its local availability. In this context, the main objectives 
assigned to the collective trade mark were to increase the production area and the productivity 
of sticky rice (see Chapter 4) while building its reputation through the use of promotional 
brochures and panels and the organisation of exhibitions and TV and radio promotional 
programmes that took place in 2012-2013. As a result, the production area of sticky rice from 
Đông Triều increased from 50 hectares when the project started in 2012 to about 230 hectares 
in 2017.37  
  
                                                        
36 Interview V-A1. 
37 Interview V-A11. 
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Picture 6.6 
Example of promotional panel for sticky rice from Đông Triều 
 
 
Source: CASRAD 
 
However, the use of the collective mark has proved particularly challenging for reasons linked 
to the organisation of the initiative and producers’ lack of involvement. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the structures of the initiatives for sticky rice from Đông Triều and green lentils 
from Berry are very similar. In both initiatives, farmers sell their production to the producers’ 
association (for sticky rice from Đông Triều) or the commercial entity Cibèle (for green lentils 
from Berry) who subsequently proceed with the labelling, packaging and sale of the products 
on the market. Unlike for green lentils from Berry, rice farmers do not enter into an annual 
production and purchase agreement with the association. Consequently, while only the 
association, and no individual farmer, can sell the labelled rice, rice farmers can choose to sell 
their unlabelled production either to the association or to end consumers, or can even keep their 
production for themselves. As a matter of fact, in 2016, the association bought, labelled and 
subsequently sold only 10% of the total production of sticky rice by members of the association 
(about 630 tonnes/year).38  
 
The low use of the trade mark label is due to a variety of reasons, including the lack of 
appropriate funding and equipment that hinders the label printing and packaging processes 
from a practical point of view as well as farmers’ low awareness about the trade mark and their 
                                                        
38 Interview V-A10. 
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own membership to the association (see Chapter 4).39 This section will more particularly focus 
on the lack of economic incentives for farmers to market their production through the 
association.  
 
According to farmers, the price paid to them is the same whether they sell their rice to the 
association or to final consumers40 although, according to the President of the producers’ 
association, the price paid by the association is higher but the difference is nonetheless 
negligible (about 3%).41 In these conditions, a farmer observed that ‘the process of packaging 
and labelling the rice is not serious. We haven’t got any good reason to sell our rice to the 
association so we don’t see the benefits of the trade mark. The fact is that we end up selling 
our rice on the markets without the label’.42 By comparison, Durand reports that, in the GI 
initiative built around the litchi Thieu from Thanh Hà (Haï Duong province, North-Vietnam), 
the producers’ association buys fresh fruits from its members at a price that is about 30% higher 
than the market price (VND9,000/kg equivalent to €0.4/kg as compared with VND7,000/kg 
equivalent to €0.3/kg on the marketplace in 2007).43 With no incentive to sell their rice to the 
association, farmers prefer to sell their production on farm and in bulk to collectors and 
wholesalers, which is both fast and convenient, whereas the association aims to sell the labelled 
rice at exhibitions as well as to rice companies and shops at both the local and regional levels.  
 
In 2011, before the trade mark was granted, the price of the rice was about $US0.9/kg. Since 
then, both the prices of the non-labelled and the labelled sticky rice have increased only 
marginally. The price of the non-labelled rice paid to farmers by both wholesalers and the 
association varied from $US1-1.2/kg between 2012 and 2016.44 At the same time, the price of 
the labelled rice charged by the association was $US1.4/kg in 2016 up from $US1.3/kg in 2012, 
taking into account that the price of the rice is higher just before or after the Vietnamese New 
Year holiday (Tết) than following the harvest.45 Yet the increase in the prices of sticky rice is 
generally not attributed to the trade mark, especially considering its limited usage. According 
to farmers, the price difference between the labelled and non-labelled rice is due to the different 
                                                        
39 Interview V-A7, V-A9 and V-A10. 
40 ibid. 
41 Interview V-A11. 
42 Interview V-A12. 
43 Durand (n22) 350. 
44 Interview V-A12. 
45 ibid. 
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points of sale and marketing channels used whereas the increase in the prices of both the 
labelled and non-labelled rice is linked to the expansion of the production of sticky rice on 
agricultural lands where normal rice was previously produced.46 This has contributed to 
increasing its consumption locally. At the same time, the production costs are said to have 
increased dramatically.47 This has allegedly led some farmers to mix sticky rice with normal 
rice, which costs half as much as sticky rice to produce, and sell it at the price of pure sticky 
rice in order to get higher margins. This illustrates the absence of efficient quality controls (see 
Chapter 3).  
 
Two main observations can be derived from this case study. First, the law has an important 
role in shaping origin-labelling initiatives which, in turn, impacts on producers’ adherence to 
or lack of involvement in the initiatives. Unlike in bottom-up and participatory approaches 
where producers decide upon the rules of the initiative, Vietnam’s top-down approach to trade 
marks, as established by the law, does not provide much space to producers (see Chapter 3). 
This model has not only resulted in low awareness among farmers about the trade mark. It has 
also resulted in arrangements made by external actors that did not consider the producers’ 
interests and were imposed upon them without their volitional commitment to the certification 
process. It is because of the lack of economic incentives provided to them that farmers are 
reluctant to participate in the initiative. This stresses the importance to consider producers’ 
motivations and interests when establishing a GI initiative.48 The sustainability of the origin-
labelling initiatives ultimately depends upon producers’ willingness to use the origin label and 
the balance of advantages and disadvantages associated with it.49  
 
Second, this case study finds that there is no real economic benefit derived from the trade mark. 
This may be due, at least in part, to the commodity nature of the product. From that perspective, 
the importance of rice as a staple food in Vietnam makes it particularly challenging to 
differentiate the product, build its reputation in the marketplace and increase its price, 
especially considering the lack of reputation (at least initially) and that of distinctive quality 
and characteristics of sticky rice from Đông Triều. 
                                                        
46 Interviews V-A5, V-A7 and V-A8. 
47 ibid. 
48 E. Vandecandelaere and others, ‘Linking People, Places and Products: A Guide for Promoting Quality Linked to Geographical Origin and 
Sustainable Geographical Indications’ (FAO and SINER-GI, 2009) 40. 
49 ibid 101. 
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6.3 The impact of marketing channels  
 
In the initiatives of the pottery from Đông Triều, H’mong beef and star anise from Lạng Sơn, 
most of the production is exported to foreign countries without the origin labels. On the one 
hand, export markets provide local producers with the opportunity to increase production and 
participate in the global market. On the other hand, the marketing channels of these three 
products, which are characterised by a large number of middlemen and long chains of 
intermediaries at the regional and international levels, have contributed to the lack of reputation 
of the products on the end markets while decreasing the use of the origin labels significantly. 
They have also led to the emergence of new production models that put at risk the preservation 
of traditional methods of production for the pottery from Đông Triều and threatened the 
preservation of the H’mong beef indigenous breed. From this perspective, the analysis of these 
case studies will illustrate the primacy of individual economic and market considerations over 
collective, cultural and environmental concerns. Further, long marketing channels have 
revealed and reinforced inequalities of bargaining power to the detriment of Vietnamese 
producers, especially the poorest ones.  
 
This section will first investigate the case study of pottery from Đông Triều where sub-
contracting practices at the global level have eliminated de facto the use of the origin label on 
the export products while leading to the declining production of the genuine product. It will 
subsequently turn to the case studies of H’mong beef and star anise from Lạng Sơn. As will be 
discussed, the regional context of both initiatives largely explain the lack of use of the origin 
labels.  
 
6.3.1 Sub-contracting  
 
Although virtually all the members of the producers’ association have the right to use the trade 
mark,50 no use of the label has been made on the pottery from Đông Triều since at least 2013.51 
Reasons for this range from the lack of involvement of local authorities to promote the label, 
                                                        
50 Interview V-B1. 
51 Interview V-B8. 
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to the reluctance of some producers to be associated through the common label with others 
whose products are of lesser quality, to the lack of activity of the producers’ association due to 
the lack of funding.52 Yet the main reason for the non-use of the label is to be found in the 
development of new production models centred around the design and fabrication of modern 
and diversified products for the largest part of the production. The shift in production is itself 
closely linked to the value chain that heavily relies on sub-contracting by foreign companies, 
taking into account that 80% of production is exported to foreign markets. In fact, this initiative 
is characterised by a strong dichotomy between the export and the domestic markets. On the 
one hand, companies and wealthy households with the largest production, technical and 
financial capacities are more interested in export markets where modern products have replaced 
the traditional product that has been produced in Đông Triều craft village since the sixteenth 
Century and for which the trade mark is registered. Consequently, the origin label is 
inapplicable for the largest part of the production. On the other hand, most households with 
lower capacities still produce the traditional pottery product for the domestic market. However, 
it is usually sold without the origin label due to the organisation of the value chain.  
 
Starting with the export market, most companies that are members of the association are sub-
contracted either directly or indirectly by foreign companies based in Australia, Russia, Europe 
and the USA to manufacture hand-made, modern pottery products for home accessories that 
meet the tastes of foreign consumers. From a broader perspective, Vietnam has emerged on the 
international scene as an alternative to China as a leading producer-exporter of handicrafts, 
especially as ‘pricing is comparable, labor is skilled and hardworking, quality and delivery are 
good, and producers have low minimum order requirements’.53 Sub-contracting has in fact 
reflected the transition from small-scale, traditional production of large and heavy ceramic jars 
that correspond with the traditional pottery from Đông Triều, to the large-scale, modern 
manufacturing of smaller, lighter and thinner ceramic products shipped all over the world. 
These new products are produced to order with no specific reference to their place of origin 
and are alien to notions of tradition and authenticity. This is because foreign companies value 
the labour and skilled craftsmanship of local potters but have no interest in the traditional 
pottery from Đông Triều as an object of cultural heritage. While, according to Gough and Rigg, 
                                                        
52 Interviews V-B3, V-B5 and V-B7. 
53 T. Barber and M. Krivoshlykova, ‘Global market assessments for handicrafts’ (USAID, July 2006) 19 
<https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADN210.pdf> accessed 02/09/2018. 
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‘the cultural authenticity and value of handicrafts rests upon their very placeness’,54 this case 
study exemplifies how such territorial connexion has gradually vanished. 
 
This change in objects has involved new production processes. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
traditional pottery from Đông Triều requires the use of traditional kilns and a high-temperature 
fire of 1,280-1,300°C to ensure their very high quality.55 Yet these methods of production have 
not proved to be cost-effective, safe and competitive enough for the manufacturing of the new, 
lighter products for the export market. Hence, whereas traditional kilns are still used to produce 
the traditional pottery for the domestic market, they have been increasingly replaced by gas 
and electric furnaces to increase productivity.56 As explained by a producer, ‘[i]n order to win 
customers, the most important thing for potters is to make new products that suit customers’ 
tastes. We need to innovate and apply new technology to our production process if we want to 
save our village’.57 Other craft villages in Asia have experienced changes in marketing and/or 
shifted away from traditional production processes under the forces of globalisation and rural 
industrialisation. For instance, Gough and Rigg show how, in Thailand, the mulberry or saa 
paper that had been produced in Ban Pasakluang village for centuries to make candles, lanterns 
and umbrellas, has diversified to new (and more elaborate) products to meet the increased 
demand of new markets.58 This change in the production processes saw the use of chemical 
dyes to standardise the products, sodium hydroxide to accelerate the production process, and 
churning machines to produce a finer end product.59  
 
  
                                                        
54 K.V. Gough and J. Rigg, ‘Reterritorialising rural handicrafts in Thailand and Vietnam: a view from the margins of the miracle’ (2012) 44 
Environment and Planning A 169, 176. 
55 Regulations on the management and use of the collective mark ‘pottery from Đông Triều’ 3. 
56 Interview V-B1. 
57 Interview V-B4. 
58 Gough and Rigg (n54) 174. 
59 ibid 175. 
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Picture 6.7 
The traditional pottery from Đông Triều 
 
 
 
 
Picture 6.8 
Modern products made in Đông Triều 
 
 
 
The development of new production models associated with the demand of the export market 
is the main factor explaining the lack of use of the origin label. Indeed, the label can be used 
only on products that comply with the rules of production laid down in the CoP.60 The 
manufacturing of new types of products has thus led to the inapplicability of the label for the 
great majority of products that are made in Đông Triều. The use of the label is even more 
limited considering that, as revealed during the interviews, foreign companies instruct 
Vietnamese producers to use their own labels on the products to the exclusion of any other 
                                                        
60 Document describing the technical production process of pottery from Đông Triều, Article 6. 
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label.61 Besides, there is generally no mention on the packaging or the products themselves of 
the region or even the country where they come from.  
 
At the time of the visit to the Quang Vinh company, one of the largest member of the 
association with about 300 employees, the labels of eighteen foreign companies could be 
identified on handmade products.62 On the pictures below, a Vietnamese worker is presenting 
the shipping carton for handmade pottery products to be sent to the American company Be 
Home, and another worker is affixing the label ‘Be Home’ on the bottom of the products.  
 
Ironically, whereas the rationale of the collective mark was to protect a traditional product, 
sub-contracting practices have led to the ‘quasi-industrial’ production of high volumes of the 
same items for different companies, as shown below.  
 
Picture 6.9 
The label ‘Be Home’ 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
61 Interviews V-B2, V-B5 and V-B8. 
62 Among them, seven are from Australia (Albi, Amalfi, Collect Home, Tara Dennis, Emporium, Ikou, Marmoset Found); two from the USA 
(Be Home, HomArt); eight from Europe, including Denmark (Bloomingville, Mojoo, Just by Rikki Tikky, Pure Culture), France (Habitat, 
Casino), Germany (Asa Selection, Liv Interior) and Spain (Zara Home). 
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Pictures 6.10 
The production of the same item for different companies 
 
 
 
Screenshot of Rikki Tikki website63   Screenshot of Marmoset Found website64 
 
  
 
 
 
Interestingly, the interviews showed that producers place more importance on their own 
individual reputation among foreign companies than on the reputation of the collective mark 
associated with the traditional pottery from Đông Triều. This shift in focus from collective to 
individual reputation has important consequences as it favours mass manufacturing of 
                                                        
63 Historic screenshot (July 2014), on file with author.  
64 Historic screenshot (July 2014), on file with author. 
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commodity products at the expense of the preservation of a traditional product. It also signals 
the failure of the initiative to sustain and promote the collective reputation. 
 
Not surprisingly, the primacy of the producers’ individual interests over collective and cultural 
concerns are based on economic and market considerations. While, on the one hand, 
multinational companies rely on sub-contracting to reduce their production costs, these 
practices also support the local supply industry by allowing small enterprises to increase 
production and participate in the global market. As explained by the leader of a pottery 
household, ‘if profits are higher and quantities are bigger, it is better to have contracts with 
foreign companies and use their labels rather than to use our collective mark’.65 Today, the 
production of pottery products in Đông Triều contributes greatly to the regional economy and 
provides jobs for nearly 2,000 workers, 90% of which are women.66 
 
This case study illustrates how market forces and economic considerations can lead to the 
restructuration of production practices to the detriment of traditional methods of production, 
thus undermining the reputation of the genuine product and rendering the origin label 
inapplicable for the largest part of the production. These findings relate to some extent to what 
Esperanza found in relation to the handicraft village of Tegallalang in Bali, Indonesia, which 
has increasingly specialised in the mass-production of non-Balinese ‘ethnic’ art for export, for 
instance Moroccan furniture and African masks. As Esperanza argues, ‘middlemen not only 
control the flow of these commodities, but also control their cultural values and meanings’.67 
End consumers ignore the origin of the products and the very existence of the traditional 
product and that of the collective mark, and have no idea of who the producers are. Producers 
are also generally unaware of how and where their products are marketed. In this regard, the 
director of one of the largest companies explained that, although desirable, building the 
reputation of the local trade mark on export markets would require considerable investment 
that companies and households do not have the financial capacity to make.68 He further 
suggested that state authorities should provide funding to support the participation of producers 
in international fairs and exhibitions as a way to build the image of the pottery from Đông Triều 
                                                        
65 Interview V-B4. 
66 Interviews V-B1 and V-B8. 
67 J.S. Esperanza, ‘Outsourcing otherness: crafting and marketing culture in the global handicrafts market’ (2008) 28 Research in Economic 
Anthropology 71, 73. 
68 Interview V-B5. 
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in foreign countries,69 as it has been done elsewhere. For instance, in line with its promotion 
policy ‘Enjoy, it's from Europe!’ adopted in October 2015, the European Commission supports 
information provision and promotion measures aimed ‘to increase consumers’ awareness of 
the merits of the Union’s agricultural products and production methods and to increase the 
awareness and recognition of Union quality schemes’,70 including participation in international 
exhibitions and fairs. Similarly, the Tea Board of India, a statutory body under the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry, supports the exposure of the Darjeeling tea in international trade fairs 
and exhibitions.71  
 
Long marketing channels also raise the issue of the distribution of benefits across the supply 
chain. Indeed, in complex supply chains, traders with bargaining power usually earn a higher 
profit than individual producers.72 As shown in Picture 6.11, the difference between the prices 
of the same item when it is sold in Vietnam and in Europe, is significant.  
 
Picture 6.11 
Price in Euro and Vietnamese Dong of the same item 
 
  
 
The bowl in the pictures above, which was found with two price tags in the shop of Quang 
Vinh company, is sold by Zara Home for €5.99 in Europe and 10,000 Vietnamese Dong in 
                                                        
69 ibid.  
70 Regulation EU 1144/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on information provision and promotion 
measures concerning agricultural products implemented in the internal market and in third countries, Recital 3.  
71 A. Lecoent, E. Vandecandelaere and J.J. Cadilhon (eds.), ‘Quality linked to geographical origin and geographical indications: lessons 
learned from six case studies in Asia’ (FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, RAP Publications, 2010) 140. 
72 G. Belletti and A. Marescotti, ‘Origin products, geographical indications and rural development’ in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), 
Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (Wallingford: CAB International, 2011) 75, 83. 
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Vietnam, which is the equivalent of €0.3 in 2014, i.e. about twenty times less than its price in 
euros. Although it is difficult to estimate the margins of Zara Home without knowing the 
labour, transportation, logistics, tax and marketing costs involved, it seems nonetheless 
reasonable to assume that its profit is higher than that of the Quang Vinh company – let alone 
the revenues of local producers. This is especially true when considering that some pottery 
products made in Đông Triều were found to be sold in an upscale department store in Paris. 
 
Picture 6.12 
The same item found in a factory of Đông Triều and in Galeries Lafayette, Paris  
 
 
 
Going further, the director of Quang Vinh company gave assurances that it was not involved 
in Fair Trade.73 This tends to be confirmed by the fact that the producers’ incomes were 
reported to be less than $US4/day74 and that their working conditions are poor, which 
highlights the risk of exploitative labour relations in long supply chains. Recalling that Fair 
Trade is ‘about better prices, decent working conditions and fair terms of trade for farmers and 
workers’,75 these findings directly challenge Be Home’s claim to be a ‘socially responsible 
company, dedicated to the principles of fair trade and equal opportunity’.76  
 
 
  
                                                        
73 Interview V-B2. 
74 Interview V-B3. 
75 Fair Trade Foundation, ‘What Fair Trade does?’ <http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/en/what-is-fairtrade/what-fairtrade-does> accessed 
02/09/2018. 
76 Be Home, ‘About Us’ <https://be-home.com/about/> accessed 25/08/2018. 
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Pictures 6.13 
The working conditions in the factory of the Quang Vinh company 
 
 
 
This leads us to question the extent to which the Fair Trade certification could contribute to a 
fairer distribution of the benefits along the supply chain and the better recognition of the 
Vietnamese craftsmen’ hidden hands by foreign customers. In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that Fair Trade certification has been increasingly used in combination with GI protection 
for some categories of origin products. For instance, this has been the case for some single-
origin coffees with a view to de-commodify the coffee market and achieve fairer distribution 
of the value added in the global value chain.77 However, the impact of this certification on the 
de-commodification of the coffee market is uncertain, considering that the norms of the 
certification were designed by actors in the downstream part of the value chain and that they 
have almost the same content across the world regardless of the specificities of the local 
contexts.78 When studying the impact of the Fair Trade certification on producers of the GI 
Darjeeling tea, all being Nepali-speaking women, Coombe and Malik find that women do not 
receive any part of the fair trade premium. Instead, all benefits and profits are captured by the 
local men who manage the cooperatives and act as middlemen with the international agencies, 
taking into account that the certification was implemented in a top-down fashion.79 These 
                                                        
77 L.T. Raynolds, ‘Re-embedding global agriculture: The international oganic and fair trade movements’ (2000) 17(3) Agriculture and Human 
Values 297; L.T. Raynolds, ‘Mainstreaming Fair Trade Coffee: From Partnership to Traceability’ (2009) 37(6) World Development 1083. 
78 F. Galtier, G. Belletti and A. Marescotti, ‘Factors Constraining Building Effective and Fair Geographical Indications for Coffee: Insights 
from a Dominican case study’ (2013) 31(5) Development Policy Review 597, 598. 
79 R.J. Coombe and S. Malik, ‘Rethinking the Work of Geographical Indications in Asia: Addressing Hidden Geographies of Gendered 
Labor’ in I. Calboli and W. Ng-Loy (eds.), Geographical Indications at the Crossroads of Trade, Development, and Culture: Focus on Asia-
Pacific (CUP, 2017) 87, 94-95. 
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findings show that the Fair Trade certification does not in itself resolve issues of socio-
economic exclusion and political marginalisation that derive from local dynamics. As Coombe 
and Malik argue, ‘[f]air trade certification has a long way to go in making all stages in value 
chain transparent; labor relations are notoriously difficult to discern and improve’.80 
Interestingly, they suggest that to achieve greater social justice, GIs must find ways to address 
exclusion and political marginalisation based on cultural, linguistic, ethnic and gender issues 
by providing producers with a space where their claims and voices are heard.81  
 
In Vietnam, the market for the pottery from Đông Triều, where the genuine traditional product 
is sold mostly to tourists,82 accounts for about 20% of the total production of Đông Triều 
village. While interviewees indicated that the trade mark label had been used in the first year 
following its registration – reportedly with no impact on selling prices83 – the use of the label 
has since then been very limited or non-existent due to the long value chain and the high 
number of middlemen involved. Indeed, the pottery produced in Đông Triều is usually sold to 
traders and middlemen who subsequently re-sell it either in the Bat Trang pottery village, 
which is a seven-century old traditional craft village near Hanoi and a very popular tourist 
attraction, or to wholesalers and middlemen in other provinces of Vietnam. However, traders, 
wholesalers and other middlemen involved in the value chain reject the use of the origin label 
because they want end consumers to believe that the products were made near the points of 
sale. As summarised by a producer, ‘final customers do not know that the products are made 
here because there is no label on the products. A tourist who buys one of our products in Bat 
Trang pottery village thinks that it comes from there, which is not true. Our reputation suffers 
because of the marketing distribution system’.84 This was later confirmed by a seller in Bat 
Trang pottery village who admitted that ‘consumers do not ask where the products come from 
so [he] do[es]n’t tell them’.85 Considering that Ba Trang village has built its reputation on the 
traditional pottery making skills of its craftsmen, one can reasonably assume that tourists may 
be misled by the point of sale location and believe that unbranded products sold in the village 
were made there. Once again, this highlights the strong inequalities of bargaining power 
                                                        
80 ibid 95. 
81 ibid 96. 
82 Interviews V-B4, V-B6 and V-B7. 
83 ibid. 
84 Interview V-B4. 
85 Interview V-B7. 
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between, on the one hand, local producers and, on the other hand, traders, wholesalers and 
other middlemen involved in the supply chain. 
 
6.3.2 Cross-border traffic  
 
In the initiative of H’mong beef from Cao Bằng, two reasons contribute to explain the lack of 
use of the origin label. These are, with regard to the foreign market, the nature of the cross-
border trade with China and, on the domestic market, the cost of the packaging. 
 
Cao Bằng is one of the poorest provinces, located along the border with China. It covers 
mountainous and remote areas (see Chapter 4). This situation has greatly impacted on the way 
in which the trade of H’mong beef has developed and the collective mark been used. In 2017, 
about 95% of cattle raised by the H’mong people in Cao Bằng were sold to Chinese traders, up 
from 80% in 2014.86 The importance of China as an export market has largely contributed to 
decreasing the value of the collective mark by limiting its use to the domestic market only. 
This is because Chinese traders only buy live animals that are subsequently slaughtered in 
China.87 This practice has de facto prevented the use of the trade mark for this market that 
represents an estimated 400-600 calves or cows per week.88 Indeed, it is on the packaging of 
the final product only, i.e. after the slaughtering and the meat processing stages, that the label 
of the collective mark can be used by all compliant members of the association.89 The 
importance of the cross-border trade with China leads us to question why Chinese traders buy 
animals from Vietnam; and why Vietnamese farmers sell to Chinese traders. 
 
From the Chinese traders’ perspective, their interest in H’mong beef should be appreciated in 
light of the fact that China’s consumption of beef has grown six-fold since 1990.90 In effect, 
China consumes more than a quarter of the world supply of meat91 while only about 11% of 
                                                        
86 Email from Mr Xuan, Project leader, CASRAD, to author (11/03/2017). 
87 Interviews V-F2, V-F4 and V-F5. 
88 Email from Mr Xuan, Project leader, CASRAD, to author (11/03/2017). 
89 Regulations on the management and use of the collective trade mark ‘H’mong beef from Cao Bằng’, Article 9.2.  
90 OECD, ‘Data, Meat consumption’ <https://data.oecd.org/agroutput/meat-consumption.htm> accessed 25/07/2018. 
91 OECD-FAO, ‘Agricultural Outlook 2015-2024’  
<https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?QueryId=66510&vh=0000&vf=0&l&il=&lang=en> accessed 15/08/2018. 
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Chinese land is arable.92 Consequently, China relies extensively on imports of meat, especially 
from neighbouring countries like Vietnam, which explains its aggressive commercial practices. 
As reported by interviewees, Chinese traders seek to manipulate the market by offering a price 
estimated to be 30% above the real value of H’mong beef (as compared to its price on the 
domestic market) and by influencing the exchange rate on the black market at the border.93 As 
such, 1 Chinese Yuan was equivalent to 3,380 Vietnamese Dongs in 2014 up from 2,100 in 
2007 and 2,500 in 2011 without illustrating the evolution of the official exchange rate.94  
 
Pictures 6.14 
Currency exchange on the black market at the border 
 
 
 
From the Vietnamese farmers’ point of view, both economic and practical reasons explain why 
they sell their cattle (usually calves) to Chinese traders. While the Chinese aggressive 
commercial practices make it difficult for Vietnamese traders to compete, they also result in 
resource-poor farmers preferring to sell to Chinese traders to get higher profits. This is 
especially true considering that Cao Bằng is a very mountainous area with a poor road 
infrastructure, which makes it more convenient for isolated farmers to sell their cattle on Tra 
Linh market, located six kilometres away from the border, thus avoiding paying high 
transportation costs. Moreover, according to the interviewees, Chinese traders do not require 
certificates of origin and food safety (and even less so formal sales or supplies contracts) that 
                                                        
92 The World Bank, ‘Data, Arable land’ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.ZS?locations=CN> accessed 15/08/2018. 
93 Interviews V-F2, V-F3 and V-F5. 
94 Interview V-F1. 
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farmers should normally pay for at the local People’s Committee.95 Even though, by law, these 
certificates should be provided to customs authorities when crossing the border, most cross-
border transfers are done through unofficial ways in the mountains, thus avoiding official 
border posts and checks.96 Doing business with Chinese traders therefore allows Vietnamese 
farmers to reduce their overall costs.97 Besides, there is generally a very low awareness among 
farmers about the origin label and many do not even know that they are members of the 
producers’ association, which further undermines the value of the trade mark.  
 
Pictures 6.15 
The sale of live cattle on Tra Linh market 
 
 
 
Interestingly, the owner of a slaughterhouse in Cao Bằng warned about the dangers of an over-
dependence of Vietnamese farmers on Chinese traders considering that the lack of supply 
contracts would not protect farmers against a fall in selling prices in case traders stop buying 
cows in large quantities.98 He further suggested that the state should provide farmers with a 
technical and financial support to help them negotiate the market price and the supply 
conditions as well as to diversify and open new market opportunities.99  
 
From an environmental point of view, the high demand from Chinese traders coupled with 
poverty of local farmers has also had serious consequences on the reproduction of the animals. 
                                                        
95 Interviews V-F3, V-F4 and V-F6. 
96 ibid. 
97 ibid. 
98 Interview V-F4. 
99 ibid. 
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While on average each household has a herd of three cows,100 resource-poor farmers in need 
of cash often sell calves at an early stage in the breeding process when the animals are about 
one year old only, without ensuring their reproduction adequately. Reproduction happens only 
when the animals are at least three years old. According to producers, these practices have led 
to a decrease in the number of cows and buffaloes in the area.101 In turn, the diminution of the 
number of animals puts at risk the preservation of this indigenous breed while contributing to 
higher prices. Similarly, greater demand for the GI-protected Mexican Mezcal beverage led to 
over-harvesting of the cultivated or wild plants before the sexual reproduction stage, which has 
contributed to reducing genetic diversity.102 This confirms that, as noted by Lybbert,103 and as 
will be seen in Chapter 7 in relation to fried calamari from Hạ Long, market pressure and 
increased demand for agro-food products can lead to excessive pressure on the biological 
resources needed for their production, thereby resulting in their over-exploitation and 
depletion.  
 
In the domestic market, sales are estimated at 25-30 cows a week i.e. about 5% of the total 
production.104 Unlike the export market, cows and buffaloes are not sold live but in cuts, taking 
into account that there is only one slaughterhouse operating within the association as of March 
2017.105 However, in Cao Bằng, beef cuts are sold ‘in bulk’ and unpackaged – i.e. without the 
label – on farm or on the local market. When asked about the trade mark, traders were not 
interested in using it, first because they are not accustomed to the packaging process, and 
second because the costs of printing the label, that traders consider too high, are borne by the 
users.106  
  
                                                        
100 Email from Mr Xuan, Project leader, CASRAD, to author (01/07/2017). 
101 Interviews V-F2, C-F3 and V-F6. 
102 J. Larson, ‘Relevance of geographical indications and designations of origin for the sustainable use of genetic resources’ (Study prepared 
for the Global Facilitation Unit for Underutilized Species, FAO, 2007) 43. 
103 T. Lybbert, ‘Commercialising Argan Oil in Southwestern Morocco: Pitfalls on the Pathway to Sustainable Development’, in S. Pagiola, 
J. Bishop and S. Wunder (eds), Buying Biodiversity: Financing Conservation for Sustainable Development (World Bank, 2002). 
104 Interviews V-F1, V-F2 and V-F8. 
105 Email from Mr Xuan, Project leader, CASRAD, to author (11/03/2017). 
106 Regulations on the management and use of the collective trade mark ‘H’mong beef from Cao Bằng’, Article 6.8. 
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Picture 6.16 
The sale of beef cuts on the local market 
 
 
 
Outside Cao Bằng, only one company based in Hanoi, RuralFood Co., sells H’mong beef. In 
2012, the company used the origin label on the packaging of beef products that were sold in 
‘Big C’ supermarkets in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (which require products to be packaged) 
as part of an exclusive sales arrangement that was developed under the ‘SuperChain’ project. 
This project, which was funded by IFAD and implemented in Vietnam in 2007-2009 for three 
products including H’mong beef from Cao Bằng,107 aimed at strengthening supply chains by 
linking small-scale farmers to supermarkets and other quality chains.108 
  
                                                        
107 The two other products that were the focus pf the SuperChain project were the ‘safe’ vegetables in Hanoi Province and the Hoa Vang 
sticky rice from Hai Duong Province. 
108 P. Moustier, D. The Anh and S. Sacklokham, ‘Linking small-scale farmers to supermarkets and other quality chains’ (Final Superchain 
report) <https://agritrop.cirad.fr/553967/1/document_553967.pdf> accessed 25/08/2018. 
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Picture 6.17 
The sale of the labelled H’mong beef in Big C supermarkets 
 
 
 
However, RuralFood Co. stopped supplying supermarkets in 2014 because of the prohibitive 
costs of the packaging and use of the label added to selling prices that were already very high 
and uncompetitive, resulting in a margin of only 3-4%.109 Three main reasons explain the high 
price of H’mong beef on the domestic market. The first reason lies in the small-scale herding 
per household, which is also linked to poverty. The second reason is the high number of 
middlemen in the value chain, including the small and large collectors, slaughterhouses and 
distributors, which is partly due to the remoteness and difficult accessibility of the area. The 
last reason is to be found in the fierce competition from mass imports of live cattle from 
Australia that are sold to slaughterhouses in Vietnam and which results in slightly lower retail 
prices of the beef from Australia (US$13-14/kg) as compared with the beef from Vietnam 
(US$14-15/kg in Hanoi).110 As a result, the Director of RuralFood Co. explained that ‘[u]sing 
the trade mark was too expensive. I had to pay the trade mark fees in addition to the costs 
related to the certificates of origin and food safety, the transportation and the packaging. All 
these costs led to increasing the selling price for me to get a profit, but the price of H’mong 
beef is already too high. My profit was too low. It is easier for me to sell without packaging.’111 
As of May 2018, because of the prohibitive costs linked to the use of the trade mark and the 
packaging, it is only to restaurants in Hanoi that RuralFood Co. sold H’mong beef.112 
                                                        
109 Interview V-F11. 
110 Email from Mr Xuan, Project leader, CASRAD, to author (11/03/2017). 
111 Interview V-F11. 
112 Email from Mr Xuan, Project leader, CASRAD, to author (11/03/2017). 
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Considering that restaurants buy unpackaged beef cuts, the use of the trade mark label on the 
domestic market is consequently inexistent just as with the export market. 
 
6.3.3 Pressure from importers  
 
Similar to H’mong beef from Cao Bằng, the use and value of the origin label of the Lạng Sơn 
star anise is practically non-existent due to a variety of reasons, including the low awareness 
and lack of interest of local stakeholders in the GI, the lack of activity of the producers’ 
association, and the lack of local authorities’ involvement in the promotion of the GI.113 Yet 
the most important reason relates to the heavily export-oriented marketing channels, which are 
partly determined by the location of the Province, and the inequality of bargaining power along 
the supply chain.  
 
Lạng Sơn is one of the poorest and most remote provinces in Vietnam located along the border 
with China with a poor transportation infrastructure. As with H’mong beef from Cao Bằng, 
about 95% of the production is exported in 2017 up from 80% in 2014.114 Export markets 
include China up to 40% (as star anise oil), India up to 30% (as dry star anise), and other Asian 
countries as well as Europe, Russia and the USA, where the spice is used to improve the ﬂavour 
of wine and other beverage products.115 China and India therefore play significant roles in the 
trade of the Lạng Sơn star anise, which is explained by a number of reasons.  
 
It should be noted that China and Vietnam are the two largest producers of star anise in the 
world. China is also the world’s largest consumer of star anise unlike Vietnam where the 
domestic demand is very low.116 Yet China’s domestic production does not meet its domestic 
demand. This explains why China relies extensively on imports of star anise from Vietnam, 
which are estimated to be thousands of tons per year.117 The trade of star anise from Vietnam 
to China is so important that the border post in Lạng Sơn is even decorated with star anise 
                                                        
113 Interviews V-G4, V-G6 and V-G7. 
114 Email from Mr Xuan, Project leader, CASRAD, to author (11/03/2017). 
115 ibid. 
116 E.A. Weiss, Spice Crops (CABI Publishing, 2002). 
117 The Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid (CORDAID) & the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), 
‘Leveraging the Spice Sector for Poverty Reduction in Northern Vietnam (Star Anise Market Research and Value Chain Analysis, Project 
Report, February 2013) 27. 
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figures. However, the interviews indicated that a large part of this trade takes place, not at the 
official border posts, but through unofficial exchanges in the mountains, where the transaction 
is completed without written contracts or certificates of quality,118 as with H’mong beef from 
Cao Bằng. Both case studies can be compared with what Phuong Le found in relation to the 
woodcarving production in Kim Thieu, Vietnam. Almost 80% of the annual total production 
is exported to China through unofficial channels by merchants who ‘import unfinished 
products, then reprocess, particularly dry and polish by machines, before selling to the domestic 
end-users or exporting to other countries’.119 
 
Picture 6.18 
The border post in Lạng Sơn 
 
 
 
As regards India, it is the world’s largest importer of star anise accounting for about 50% of 
global imports from production countries.120 This is because, while star anise is widely used in 
Ayurvedic medicine and the Indian cuisine, it is only produced to a small extent in part of the 
Arunachal Pradesh State in the north-east part of the country.121 Besides, since the entry into 
force of an FTA between India and Vietnam on 1 January 2014 which removed all import-
export taxes – following the signature of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods in 2009 – 122 Indian 
                                                        
118 Interviews V-G1, V-G4 and V-G5. 
119 N. Phuong Le, ‘Commodity Chain of Woodcarvings: Global Impacts and Local Responses: A Case Study in Traditional Craft Village, 
Red River Delta, Vietnam’ (2008) 2(2) Chiang Mai University Journal of Soc. Sci. and Human. 5, 10. 
120 CORDAID & SNV (n117) 20. 
121 Spices Board of India <http://www.indianspices.com/spice-catalog/star-anise> accessed 20 May 2018. 
122 A. Varma, ‘ASEAN-India free trade agreement: an assessment of merchandise exports and imports’ (2015) MPRA Paper 75035 
<https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75035/> accessed 25/04/2018. 
Star anise figures 
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importers have become more interested in importing star anise from Vietnam rather than China 
which still imposes a 30% export-tax duty.   
 
It is in this context that only two companies have been granted the right to use the GI, Aforex 
Co. and Vinasamex Co.,123 which both export almost all their production. However, neither of 
these companies have used the GI label on the products for export. Rather, they buy star anise 
in bulk from collectors and producers before using bulk boxes and bags to export it. The 
interviews revealed that the non-use of the GI label is linked to pressure from Chinese and 
Indian importers who seem to deliberately opt out of using the label. Whereas Chinese traders 
seek to mislead their customers as to the origin of star anise from Lạng Sơn by re-packaging it 
with a Chinese logo, the objective of the Indian traders is to hide the origin of star anise from 
their own competitors to keep their supply sources a secret.124 When trying to negotiate the use 
of the GI label, the export companies with the right to use the GI label were reportedly 
threatened by their customers to be replaced by other suppliers.125  
 
This not only illustrates the lack of negotiation skills of Vietnamese traders and asymmetric 
power distribution in the value chain. This further shows that, even though the right to use the 
GI was granted by state authorities, it is in practice denied by foreign importers at the 
transaction level. In other words, importers expropriate the legal right from Vietnamese 
producers and traders to use the GI.126 The one-sidedness of the negotiations is also evidenced 
by the fact that Chinese and Indian buyers impose the use of sulphur to improve the colour of 
star anise to meet the taste of their consumers, whereas such use is excluded by the GI 
regulations – and is also prohibited in European countries for health reasons.127  
 
 
  
                                                        
123 Interview V-G2. 
124 Interviews V-G4, V-G5 and V-G6. 
125 ibid. 
126 B. Pick, D. Marie-Vivien and D. Bui Kim, ‘The Use of Geographical Indications in Vietnam: A Tool For Socio-Economic Development?’ 
in I. Calboli and W. Ng-Loy (eds.), Geographical Indications at the Crossroads of Trade, Development, and Culture: Focus on Asia-Pacific 
(CUP, 2017) 305, 331. 
127 Interviews V-G1, V-G4 and V-G5. 
245 
 
Picture 6.19 
The bulk packaging of star anise in Chinese bags on Aforex’s premises 
 
 
 
 
 
It can thus be said that the market of star anise involes a buyer-driven commodity supply chain 
rather than a producer-driven market. As a result, final consumers do not know where the 
product comes from and are even less aware of the GI label. In fact, it seems that consumers 
on foreign markets buy star anise regardless of its origin.128 In the UK, while the mention of 
Vietnam as the country of origin can be found in very few high-end grocery stores such as 
Whole Foods Market which specialises in organic food products, the packaging of star anise 
sold in ‘regular’ supermarkets either does not give any information on the origin of the spice, 
as is the case for Sainsbury’s129 and Marks and Spencer,130 or indicates that it is ‘a produce of 
more than one country’, like in Waitrose131 and Tesco.132  
  
                                                        
128 CORDAID & SNV (n117). 
129 Sainsbury website <https://www.sainsburys.co.uk/shop/gb/groceries/sainsburys-star-anise-15g-7776690-p-44> accessed 09/05/2018. 
130 Marks and Spencer website <https://www.m-s.gr/product/star-anise-12-gr/> accessed 09/05/2018. 
131 Waitrose website <https://www.waitrose.com/ecom/products/bart-star-anise/007364-3455-3456> accessed 09/05/2018. 
132 Tesco website <https://www.tesco.com/groceries/en-GB/products/268531364> accessed 09/05/2018. 
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Picture 6.20 
Steenberg’s packaging of star anise sold in Whole Foods Market 
 
 
 
 
The screenshots 6.21 and 6.22, ‘Bart’s packaging of star anise sold in Waitrose’ and 
‘Sainsbury’s packaging of star anise’, have been removed as the copyright is owned by another 
organisation. 
 
 
These characteristics are common to many other raw materials that are seen as commodities, 
for instance coffee, cocoa, rice, pepper, salt or tea, although ‘de-commodification’ strategies 
have been increasingly implemented for these categories of products.133 A de-commodification 
process would contribute to better value the origin of star anise on the global market and lead 
to higher earnings due to the non-applicability of tariffs for commodity products.134 However, 
as mentioned in Chapter 4, the specificity of the quality and characteristics of star anise from 
Lạng Sơn is questionable, which may make it difficult to differentiate the product on the 
market. 
 
As a consequence of the above, and as explained by the director of Vinasamex Co., ‘the GI is 
not useful for the export market. Foreigners would not understand this logo. Today it can only 
be used on the domestic market to guarantee the quality of star anise’.135 However, between 
                                                        
133 J. Hughes, ‘Coffee and Chocolate: Can We Help Developing Country Farmers through Geographical Indications?’ 32–36 (Report 
prepared for the IIPI, 2009) 152. 
134 R. M. Williams, ‘Do Geographical Indications Promote Sustainable Rural Development? Two UK Case Studies and Implications for New 
Zealand Rural Development Policy’ (Master thesis, Lincoln University, 2007) 42 
<https://researcharchive.lincoln.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10182/585/williams_mnrmee.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 10/08/2018. 
135 Interview V-G7. 
‘Star anise from Vietnam’ 
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the two companies that have the right to use the GI, one exports its entire production to foreign 
markets and thus does not make any use of the GI, and the other one exports about 90% of its 
production and sells the rest in its local shop. It follows from this that the use of the GI label is 
very limited in practice, let alone the fact that, as seen in Chapter 3, the GI logo was seen to be 
affixed to not only the star anise’s packaging, but also to the cinnamon’s packaging. This shows 
both a lack of efficient controls and the producer’s low understanding of the meaning and 
objective of the GI. Despite its low usage on the regular market, it is interesting to note that the 
origin label of star anise from Lạng Sơn is usually made visible in national festivals and 
exhibitions.  
 
Picture 6.23 
Exhibition stand of star anise from Lạng Sơn 
 
 
 
Logically, because the origin label is not used, it does not impact on the selling prices. In fact, 
there has been no observable difference in the producers’ selling prices of star anise grown in 
GI-protected areas and non-protected areas. However, it has been reported that, outside the 
remit of the GI initiative, farmers have gained a stronger negotiation power for setting prices 
following the project ‘Leveraging the Spice Sector for Poverty Reduction amongst Ethnic 
Minority Communities in Vietnam’ that was funded by the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC) and the NGO Cordaid, and implemented in 2013-2016 by the NGO 
SNV Netherlands Development Organisation. This project aimed, among others, at developing 
new markets and strengthening cooperation among farmers, processors and traders through the 
establishment of farmers’ groups and the provision of accurate information on quality standards 
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and market prices.136 While, in 2014, prices were reportedly set by the buyers, including the 
two companies that have the right to use the GI, they are now negotiated between buyers and 
farmers’ groups who appear to be stronger, better able to make informed decisions on prices, 
and better connected to traders and export companies.137 This explains the increase in the 
producers’ selling prices from $US1.3-2.7/kg in May 2014 up to $US2-2.5/kg in May 2017 
and to $US3.5-3.7/kg in May 2018 for the dried star anise, which has resulted in higher incomes 
for producers.138  
 
Prices depend on the quality of star anise being requested by the importing countries who have 
been informally classified as ‘high-end markets’, ‘middle-class markets’ and ‘low-class 
markets’. High-end markets, for which the quality of star anise required is the highest, include 
European countries, Russia, Japan and the USA; middle-class countries are Singapore, Taiwan 
and Korea; and low-class markets include China, Bangladesh and India.139 Considering that 
only star anise exported to high-end markets corresponds to the GI quality standards, a very 
small amount of the total production of star anise can technically and legally qualify for the GI 
label. At the same time, the largest part of the production is sold to countries who have the 
poorest quality requirements hence with the lowest selling prices. The future registration of the 
GI in the EU following the EU-Vietnam FTA of December 2015140 may lead to a change in 
the marketing strategy of the companies entitled to use the GI. Indeed, they may wish to 
decrease their focus on the Chinese and Indian markets and increase their exports to European 
countries and hence their use of the GI label with a view to get more benefits derived from 
higher selling prices.  
 
Finally, as has already been observed for other export products, the price of star anise is much 
higher on the foreign markets. A look at the websites of the supermarkets mentioned above 
indicates that the price of star anise sold in the UK supermarkets ranges from about 
                                                        
136 Information on the project can be found here: <http://www.snv.org/project/spice-life-leveraging-spice-sector-poverty-reduction-northern-
vietnam#key-facts> accessed 02/09/2018. 
137 SNV Sustainable Market Team, ‘Leveraging the Spice Sector for Poverty Reduction amongst Ethnic Minority Communities in Vietnam’ 
(Final Project Report, SNV, 2016). 
138 Emails from Mr Le Anh, project leader, SNV, to author (28/03/2017 and 09/05/2018). 
139 ibid. 
140 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437> 
accessed 20/08/2018. Chapter 12 ‘Intellectual Property’ of the FTA is available here:  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154223.%20institutional%20-%20GIs%206.5a3%206.11wg%20rev2%20-
%20for%20publication.pdf> accessed 20/08/2018>. The list of the 39 protected GIs from Vietnam in Annex GI-I Part B of the FTA. 
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$US90/kg141 to $US256/kg,142 i.e. about 25 to 70 times higher than the price paid to Vietnamese 
farmers. As with the pottery from Đông Triều, it is difficult to estimate the margins of the 
import companies, commercial entities and retailers without knowing all the costs involved. 
However, one can reasonably assume that they achieve significant profits, especially 
considering that the prices paid to the Vietnamese export companies range from $US4.5/kg to 
6.5/kg depending on the quality,143 i.e. 28% to 75% higher than the prices paid to farmers, but 
20 to 40 times lower than the retail prices in the UK. Figure 6.1 provides an estimate of the 
price breakdown of another spice, cinnamon, which is mainly produced in Indonesia, Vietnam, 
China, Madagascar, Sri Lanka and India. 
 
Figure 6.1 
Estimated price breakdown of cinnamon, sold in supermarkets in Europe 
 
 
Source: Centre for the Promotion of Imports from developing countries (CBI), Product factsheet: cinnamon in 
Europe (2015) 
 
These findings raise again the question of whether the Fair Trade certification could contribute 
to a fairer distribution of the benefits along the supply chain. Bearing in mind the limitations 
and pitfalls of using the Fair Trade certification, as mentioned when analysing the case study 
of the pottery from Đông Triều, it is argued that further research is needed on the opportunity 
of combining origin labelling and other certifications.  
 
 
                                                        
141 Sainsbury website (n129). 
142 Marks and Spencer website (n130). 
143 Email from Mr Le Anh, project leader, SNV, to author (09/05/2018). 
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Conclusion 
 
Among our case studies, six initiatives show little, adverse or no use of the origin labels or 
names on the market. The purpose of this chapter was to provide an analysis of the factors 
involved in ‘GI failures’ – where GI labels or products remain relatively invisible on the 
market. A common thread to these initiatives is their inability to communicate the products’ 
origin to consumers and to sustain the producers’ reputation which, as already mentioned, are 
the primary functions of GIs.144 This is reflected in the lack of reputation of the origin label or 
the name associated with the traditional product, and/or consumers’ low awareness of the 
quality and characteristics of the traditional product. As a result, there is a lack of demand for 
the origin label and/or the traditional product, which both derives from, and contributes to, 
producers’ lack of engagement with the GI initiatives. In exploring the reasons for the 
producers’ avoidance or ignorance of the origin labels, this chapter has tried to reconstruct the 
specific socio-economic contexts of each product and their effects on the use of the origin 
labels or the promotion of the traditional product. In doing so, this chapter sheds new light on 
why local producers individually and/or collectively do not engage with the GI initiatives. This 
analysis is particularly useful to understand better the inhibiting factors for successful GI 
mobilisations because, as argued by Belletti and Marescotti, ‘the triggering factors are always 
the local actors and policies that support their empowerment and coordination’.145 Depending 
on each context, the case studies show that, producers do not want, do not need, or are not able, 
to use the label or promote the traditional product. In effect, constraints and inhibiting practices 
that negatively affect the producers’ willingness or capacity to use the origin labels and/or 
promote the traditional product have been observed in all six initiatives. While some of our 
findings are very context-specific, others bring out characteristics that are common to all or 
most of the initiatives.  
 
A constraint common to the five Vietnamese initiatives is the very low awareness and 
understanding among producers about the origin labels and, worse still, of their own 
association to the initiative, as addressed in Chapter 4. Similarly, in Indonesia, Durand and 
Fournier found that producers of Muntok white pepper, for which a GI was registered in 2009 
                                                        
144 C. Bramley and J.F. Kirsten, ‘Exploring the Economic Rationale for Protecting Geographical Indicators in Agriculture’ (2007) 46 Agrekon 
69. 
145 Belletti and Marescotti (n72) 75, 87. 
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at the initiative of a public agency, know very little about the GI.146 The fact that GI projects 
are driven by outside actors following Vietnam’s top-down approach makes it particularly 
difficult for local producers to understand the GI concept, take ownership and participate 
willingly in the initiatives. This is especially true when the arrangements made by external 
actors did not consider the interests of producers, as with sticky rice from Đông Triều. Yet the 
motivation and commitment of local actors, as well as their coordination and cooperation, have 
been identified in the GI literature as a main factor of successful GI mobilisations.147 Top-down 
approaches, which are still common in many emerging and developing countries,148 carry the 
risk that initiatives remain ‘purely administrative, without the genuine involvement of 
producers and with a very low level of use’.149 Lack of awareness and participation of 
Vietnamese producers is further exacerbated by the lack of involvement of local authorities, 
the lack of activity of the producers’ associations and, for some products, by the low number 
of actors who have the right to use the origin label. Many other origin-labelling initiatives in 
Vietnam share these characteristics.150  
 
The lack of reputation of some products has also emerged as a factor undermining not only the 
ability of GIs to act as an origin-based differentiation tool,151 as it has also been the case for 
instance for many origin coffees,152 but also the producers’ interest in using the origin labels. 
Generally speaking, the development of the product’s image and reputation requires substantial 
investments that many producers and producers’ associations, especially in developing 
countries, simply cannot afford. This raises the question as to who should support these costs. 
In some regions and countries, the state provides funding for promotion and marketing 
                                                        
146 C. Durand and S. Fournier, ‘Can Geographical Indications Modernize Indonesian and Vietnamese Agriculture? Analyzing the Role of 
National and Local Governments and Producers’ Strategies’ (2017) 98(C) World Development 93, 97-98. 
147 D. Barjolle and B. Sylvander, ‘Some factors of success for ‘origin labelled products’ in agri-food supply chains in Europe: market, internal 
resources and institutions’ (2002) 36 (9-10) Economies et sociétés 1441, 1450.  
148 G. Sautier, E. Biénabe and C. Cerdan, ‘Geographical Indications in Developing Countries’, in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), Labels 
of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (Wallingford: CAB International, 2011) 138, 142. 
149 G. Belletti, A. Marescotti and J-M Touzard, ‘Geographical Indications, Public Goods, and Sustainable Development: The Roles of 
Actors' Strategies and Public Policies’ (2017) 98(C) World Development 45, 53. 
150 Đ. Đức Huấn and others, ‘Rapport - Etude des modèles de gestion des indications géographiques du Vietnam’ (NOIP/AFD, 2017). 
151 D. Zografos, ‘Geographical Indications and Socio-economic Development’ (2008) IQSensato Working Paper n°3 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628534> accessed 15/08/2018. 
152 Galtier, Belletti and Marescotti (n78). 
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activities, such as in Europe,153 India,154 or Brazil.155 In Vietnam, local state authorities are 
generally responsible for financing and implementing advertising and promotion activities. 
However, this does not always happen in practice, as described by interviewees in virtually all 
the initiatives analysed in this chapter. This issue is further exacerbated in low-income, aid-
dependent countries.156 
 
Building and maintaining a product’s reputation is also particularly difficult when the market 
for it is simply too small, if not non-existent, due to modernisation of ways of life, changes in 
consumer tastes, new customer requests, and prohibitive selling prices, among others. This is 
illustrated, in different ways, and considering the different markets involved for each product, 
by all the initiatives except sticky rice from Đông Triều. The lack of reputation can also result 
from the product’s lack of distinctive character, as with sticky rice from Đông Triều and star 
anise from Lạng Sơn which, as raw and unprocessed products, are also seen as commodities. 
This confirms that, as argued by Barjolle and Sylvander, GIs should be based on the product 
specificity rather than on generic quality attributes.157 The process to make the product clearly 
distinguishable from others may require the mobilisation of specific local social, cultural or 
environmental resources.158 Finally, the lack of reputation can also derive from the lack of 
distinctiveness of the designation itself. This may occur when the product designated by the 
origin label is considered as a national symbol that overshadows the specific territorial origin, 
as with conical hats from Huế, or when the origin name is widely used on goods that do not 
correspond to the traditional product, as with Marseille soaps. In both cases, the territorial 
identity is too weak for GIs to be meaningful, thus turning them into hollow labels that have 
lost their very purpose.  
 
The analysis of the case studies also shows the impact of marketing practices on the use and 
value of the origin labels. As illustrated by the case studies of sticky rice from Đông Triều, 
H’mong beef from Cao Bằng and star anise from Lạng Sơn, most Vietnamese producers still 
                                                        
153 D. Barjolle, B. Sylvander and E. Thévenod-Mottet, ‘Public Policies and Geographical Indications’ in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), 
Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (Wallingford: CAB International, 2011) 92. 
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use traditional production and marketing methods (sale of the product through collectors) and 
are not accustomed with the packaging and labelling processes. This can be extended to other 
GI initiatives in Vietnam. For instance, producers of Luc Ngạn lychee (GI in 2008), Bẩy Núi 
fragrant rice (GI in 2011), Ninh Thuận grape (GI in 2012) and Tân Triều grapefruit (GI in 
2012) are all small-scale farmers who sell their production in bulk to the association (for the 
rice) or to collectors (for the other products).159 Reasons for this are not only cultural but also 
economic. Indeed, the investment costs that packaging represents for farmers that lack financial 
capacities has emerged as a factor explaining why many products are sold in bulk not only in 
Vietnam but also in other emerging and developing countries, for instance in Africa.160 From 
a commercial perspective, the lack of direct linkages between local producers and traders, 
which  derives from the low financial and organisational capacities of producers to develop 
their own distribution channel, also contributes to explain the maintenance of traditional 
marketing practices and the lack of use of the labels.161  
 
Producers’ inability to connect to intermediate and final markets was found to affect the use of 
the origin labels more particularly in the three initiatives that are heavily export-oriented. These 
initiatives are characterised by the reliance of local communities on the demand of foreign 
markets; the lack of recognition of the product origin by end consumers; the lack of negotiation 
skills of Vietnamese farmers and traders; and the unbalanced distribution of benefits along the 
value chain to the detriment of Vietnamese producers. Other export products from emerging 
and developing countries share the same characteristics. For instance, cocoa and coffee can 
generate very high price premiums at the consumer level in foreign markets, but farmers 
usually do not receive any benefit and consumers have no idea who the producers are.162 
However, it is not suggested that these findings extend to all other export GI products from 
emerging countries. For example, Argan oil,163 Darjeeling tea164  and Café de Colombia165 are 
                                                        
159 Đức Huấn and others (n150) 47. 
160 African Union, ‘A continental strategy for geographical indications in Africa – Summary’ (AU, 2017) 4 
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successful GI products with a strong export focus, although the equitable distribution of 
benefits along the supply chain is not guaranteed, as was noted for the Darjeeling tea.166 This 
has led us to consider the opportunity of combining the origin labelling with other certifications 
that focus on social issues, on which further research should be done.  
 
In light of the above, a range of reasons explain why producers avoid or ignore the origin-label 
initiatives, which see the emergence of dichotomies between tradition and modernity, local and 
global, artisanal and industrial, and economic interests and state intervention, among others. In 
all these initiatives, except for Marseille soap, individual and community economic needs take 
precedence over the GI protection and the value of conveying the product origin to consumers, 
regardless of the type of legal protection, sometimes with negative effects on biodiversity and 
cultural heritage. In such instances, the economic and commercial value of GIs has vanished. 
Further, GIs are devoid of political substance, failing to ‘localize cultural and economic 
control’167 and hence ‘restor[e] elements of distributive and social justice, promot[e] priciples 
of identity and sovereignty, among others’.168  
 
It is clear that GIs in themselves cannot resolve issues of social relations of power, forms of 
exploitative labour, lack of transparency, opportunistic behaviours and poverty, among others, 
and that the intervention of outside actors is necessary. Our findings draw attention to the role 
of the state, including through the law and market intervention, in adopting adequate policies 
to support GI initiatives and empowering local producers. They also highlight the need to 
consider producers’ motivations and interests in light of each specific institutional and socio-
economic context, in which GI protection may have (too) little resonance. Ultimately, they 
question the place of GIs in law, and in society, in specific environments. 
                                                        
166 Coombe and Malik (n79). 
167 D. Rangnekar, ‘The Challenge of Intellectual Property Rights and Social Justice’ (2011) 54(2) Development 212, 213. 
168 ibid.  
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7 
 
Mapping the effects of GIs outside the market 
 
 
 
This chapter explores the non-economic effects of GIs outside the market. It will consider only 
the six products, including two in Vietnam and four in France, whose GI labels are used in the 
marketplace. As seen in Chapter 5, these are the fried calamari from Hạ Long, vermicelli from 
Bình Liêu, bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay, Pélardon cheese, green lentils from 
Berry, and wood from the Alps. The six products studied in Chapter 7 are excluded from the 
scope of the present chapter as it is impossible to link any effect to GIs when the use of the 
origin labels is very low, negligible or non-existent, as is the case for these initiatives. 
 
The analysis of the effects of GIs outside the market has received increased attention among 
GI scholars. It is argued that the private benefits derived from the successful marketing of GIs 
may have multi-dimensional effects and generate territorial dynamics, including job creation, 
preservation of culture or heritage, and biodiversity protection.1 In that regard, it has been 
contended that the function of GIs has evolved over time to embrace: (1) the protection of the 
consumers and producers’ interests against fraud and unfair competition practices; (2) the 
control of supply and demand on the agro-food markets; (3) local rural development; and (4) 
preservation of cultural heritage, traditional methods of production and natural resources.2 
Whereas the first two functions are concerned with the role of GIs in the marketplace and were 
addressed in the previous chapters, the last two roles assigned to GIs emphasise their ‘non-
market’ values, which will be the focus of this chapter.  
 
At the policy level, the potential of GIs to generate positive outcomes outside the market has 
become an important political issue with legal implications. As explained in Chapter 1, the EU 
                                                        
1 D. Barjolle, ‘Geographical Indications and Protected Designations of Origin: Intellectual Property Tools for Rural Development Objectives’ 
in D.Gangjee (ed.) Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Geographical Indications (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 440, 447. 
2 B. Sylvander, G. Allaire and E. Thévenod-Mottet, ‘Qualité, origine et globalisation: Justifications générales et contextes nationaux, le cas 
des Indications Géographiques’ (2006) XXIX:1 Revue canadienne des sciences régionales 43, 44. 
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and its partners justify the strengthening of legal protection of GIs within the ambit of the WTO 
on the basis that, while primarily established for economic and commercial purposes, GIs can 
also deliver on a range of development and public policy outcomes owing to their unique 
characteristics derived from their link to origin as translated through the use of local resources 
– both natural/physical and cultural/human – in the production process.3  
 
In that respect, Chapter 2 has shown how the concept of terroir underpins the French sui 
generis system for the protection of GIs. From an anthropological perspective, Barham argues 
that food and culture, history, heritage, traditions, savoir-faire, ‘patrimoine’,4 and local forces 
and processes are closely interwoven and contribute to shaping the French national identity at 
all levels of society.5 As Bérard suggests, ‘the concept of terroir is woven into the political and 
cultural history of France’.6 In Vietnam, marketing and product development concerns prevail. 
In this country, rural industrialisation and agricultural modernisation are national priorities to 
support rural and agricultural development.7 Understanding the priorities and sensitivities of 
both countries is important when exploring the effects of GIs outside the market.  
   
Recalling that the six initiatives under consideration involve both sui generis and trade marks 
approaches, this chapter will aim to identify the effects of GIs outside the market and unpack 
the contributory factors involved. Section 7.1 will first explore the dynamics of territorial 
development that have derived from the GI initiatives. Subsequently, Sections 7.2 and 7.3 will 
examine the extent to which GIs have contributed to the preservation of cultural heritage and 
the protection of biodiversity respectively.  
 
                                                        
3 G. Belletti, A. Marescotti and J.-M. Touzard, ‘Geographical Indications, Public Goods, and Sustainable Development: The Roles of Actors’ 
Strategies and Public Policies’ (2017) 98 World Development 45. 
4 M. Rautenberg and others, Campagnes de Tous Nos Désirs: Patrimoines et Nouveaux Usages Sociaux (Maison des Sciences de l’Homme 
2000). 
5 E. Barham, '’Translating Terroir” Revisited: The Global Challenge of French AOC Labelling'’ in D. Gangjee (ed), Research Handbook on 
Intellectual Property and Geographical Indications (Edward Elgar, 2016) 46, 58-60. 
6 L. Bérard, ‘Terroir and the Sense of Place’ in D. Gangjee (ed), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Geographical 
Indications (Edward Elgar, 2016) 72, 72. 
7 C. Durand and S. Fournier, ‘Can Geographical Indications Modernize Indonesian and Vietnamese Agriculture? Analyzing the Role of 
National and Local Governments and Producers’ Strategies’ (2017) 98(C) World Development 91. 
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7.1 Dynamics of territorial development  
 
The proposal that, when successful on the market, GIs can bring economic value to the 
territories by generating jobs and economic growth, preventing rural exodus or promoting the 
development of new economic activities centered around the promotion of the GI products, has 
received much attention recently. As stated by Schejtman and Berdegué, territory is defined 
not only as an ‘“objectively existing” physical space, but [also] as a set of social relations that 
both generate and express an identity and a sense of purpose that is shared by both public and 
private agents’.8 With this definition in mind, this section will first focus on the extent to which 
the six GI products have contributed to maintaining and increasing the workforce on the 
territory before exploring the type of new economic activities that have derived from the 
successful marketing of the GI products. Subsequently, it will shed light on two less well-
known effects of GIs. These are the ability of GIs to foster vocational training, innovation and 
exchange of good practices; and their potential to increase the legitimacy, representative 
capacity and influence of the collectives built around the GI products.   
 
7.1.1 Maintaining and increasing the workforce  
 
As explained by Downes and Laird, the commercial success of GI products can preserve 
existing economic activities on the territory by securing and enhancing job opportunities in the 
different stages of the production processes.9 Both the strength of the link to origin and the 
characteristics of GI products, which often involve labour-intensive, small-scale artisanal 
production techniques, are seen ‘as a means of localising production within the framework of 
globalisation’.10 In that respect, a number of European PDO cheeses have generated a positive 
impact on employment in the area of origin. For example, Comté cheese engenders five times 
more jobs than Emmental at all stages of production due to the use of extensive, traditional 
                                                        
8 A. Schejtman and J.A. Berdegué, ‘Rural Territorial Development’ (2004) Documento de Trabajo N° 4, Programa Dinámicas Territoriales 
Rurales, RIMISP <http://www.rimisp.org/wp-content/files_mf/13663830272004_schejtman_berdegue_rural_territorial_development.pdf> 
accessed 02/09/2018. 
9 D. Downes and S. Laird, ‘Community Registries of Biodiversity-Related Knowledge: The Role of Intellectual Property in Managing Access 
and Benefit’ (1999) Paper prepared for UNCTAD Biotrade Initiative <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/CommunityRegistries.pdf> accessed 
03/09/2018. 
10 S. Bowen, ‘The importance of place, re-terittorialising embeddedness’ (2011) 51(4) Sociologia Ruralis 325, 328. 
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methods of cattle breeding and cheese making and aging.11 This comparison is particularly 
useful considering that both cheeses share the same geographical and historical origins but 
have followed different marketing pathways. Comté being France’s first origin-labelled cheese 
in 1952 has preserved traditional production and processing practices, while the production of 
Emmental has become industrial. In the United Kingdom, Larson notes that the industry of 
Scotch Whisky has generated 11,000 jobs in fragile urban and rural areas while supporting 
more than 40,000 indirect jobs.12  
 
Among the six case studies, the origin labels have, according to producers, strongly contributed 
to maintain the production workforce on the territory. This is particularly true for the four 
French products that are produced in areas that were characterised by marginalisation, 
depopulation and loss of production before the GI protection (see Chapter 4). However, the 
creation of new employment opportunities derived from the use of the origin labels varies 
greatly across the products.  
 
The section below will first analyse the GI initiatives that have been found to generate 
employment opportunities before exploring the factors hindering job creation in the other 
initiatives. It should be noted that, in Vietnam, the initiatives are generally too recent to allow 
for an evaluation of their impacts on local employment. It is, however, possible to make some 
general comments on how likely the initiative created around fried calamari from Hạ Long may 
foster job creation. With regard to vermicelli from Bình Liêu, although it is difficult to evaluate 
their potential to generate new employment opportunities, it is noteworthy that, according to 
the President of the producers’ association, over 2,000 households are involved in the planting 
of arrowroot, the raw material, and depend on the commercial success of the certified 
vermicelli.13 
 
  
                                                        
11 A. Gerz and F. Dupont, ‘Comté Cheese in France: Impact of a Geographical Indication on Rural Development’ in P. van de Kop, D. Sautier 
and A. Gerz (eds.), Origin-Based Products-Lessons for pro-poor market development (Royal Tropical Institute and CIRAD, 2004) 75, 82-84. 
12 J. Larson, ‘Relevance of geographical indications and designations of origin for the sustainable use of genetic resources’ (Study prepared 
for the Global Facilitation Unit for Underutilized Species, FAO, 2007) 28. 
13 Interview V-D8. 
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7.1.1.1 Market success and social awareness as keys to job creation 
 
Both the wood from the Alps and green lentils from Berry initiatives positively impact job 
creation in the area of origin. This section will argue that different reasons account for the 
ability of the two initiatives to create employment opportunities. On the one hand, the 
commercial success of green lentils from Berry largely drives job creation. On the other hand, 
the development of employment in the context of wood from the Alps flows from a clearly-
defined social and employment strategy adopted by the association. From that perspective, it 
is closely linked to the association’s internal strategy and voluntary approach as opposed to 
external factors such as market success.  
 
Starting with green lentils from Berry, Chapter 5 explained that the association actively seeks 
to attract new members with a view to increase the production and meet the growing consumer 
demand.14 The commercial success of the lentils thus appears as the main driver for the growth 
of the initiative. In that respect, the association has increased by 80% to 50 producers in 2018 
up from 28 producers in 2014.15 Interestingly, new members are usually pre-selected and 
approached by the President of the producers’ association among acquaintances, thereby 
reflecting the strong club culture of the initiative. In his own words, ‘[o]ur association is like a 
club. We always choose members among our acquaintances. When I hear that someone works 
well, I will go to invite him to join the association’.16 Beyond market and production 
considerations, the initiative shows a strong social awareness and commitment. This is 
reflected in the fact that the association has entrusted a vocational rehabilitation centre for 
disabled workers with the responsibility of proceeding with the packaging of the lentils. This 
arrangement, which can be construed as a voluntary social development objective, highlights 
the socio-economic role played by the GI initiative at the territory level.  
 
Turning to the wood from the Alps, the number of certified companies has increased from 10 
in 2013 to 61 as of July 2018, representing a turnover of over 350 million euros up from 186 
million euros in 2016 and 55 million euros in 2013.17 In this respect, one of the expected 
impacts of the 2014-2020 ERDF interregional programme ‘Massif des Alpes’, which aims to 
                                                        
14 ANILS and ODG ‘Green lentils from Berry’, ‘Le Marché de la Lentille, Le Fonctionnement de l’ANIL, Ses activités techniques’ 
(PowerPoint presentation, February 2017). 
15 E-mail from Ms Taillandier, Commercial Director of Cibèle, to author (12/07/2018). 
16 Interview F-D2. 
17 Interview F-E9. 
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improve the attractiveness of the Alps and ensure sustainable growth, is to increase the number 
of enterprises certified ‘Bois des Alpes’ up to 85 by 2020.18 As mentioned earlier, this initiative 
has the strongest focus on territorial development. In fact, the association has adopted a pro-
active voluntary approach that aims to create jobs in the territory. This approach is first 
enshrined in the statutes of the producers’ association which make an explicit reference to the 
preservation of local jobs. One stated objective is to maintain 3,700 local jobs in the area.19 To 
go further, the creation of local jobs has become a condition for the certification of applicant 
companies, taking into account that the right to use the certification mark is automatically 
granted to all certified companies.20 Indeed, the evaluation of the applicants by the certification 
body is based on a number of criteria, called ‘issues of sustainable development’, which include 
the commitment to foster job creation,21 thereby reflecting the socio-economic objectives of 
the producers’ association.  
 
In this initiative, the maintenance and creation of jobs in the territory, as well as the structuring 
of the whole value chain from sawyers to carpenters and architects, are particularly important 
as they are used as an argument to offset the potential extra-cost of the certified wood. In 
contrast to green lentils from Berry, job creation in the context of wood from the Alps does not 
derive from commercial success, at least to begin with. Rather, the initial demonstration that 
the use of the certified wood fosters job creation is aimed to promote its wider use and hence 
to foster its market success, which in turn should contribute to job creation. In this regard, a 
study conducted by the Rhônes-Alpes Forest Wood Federation has evaluated the economic 
impacts of the use of local wood, including but not limited to wood from the Alps.22 Keeping 
in mind that about 7,500-8,000 m3 of wood from the Alps have been used as of March 2018 
since the start of the certification process,23 this study shows that the use and local processing 
of 1,000 m3 of local wood – for example to build a high-school for 600 pupils – contributes to 
create 21 direct, local jobs that cannot be outsourced during a year. These new jobs further 
generate over €400,000 in taxes derived from employers' and employees' contributions, which 
                                                        
18 European Commission, ‘Interregional Programme Alps 2014-2020’ <http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-
2020/2014-2020/2014fr16rfop001> accessed 13/07/2018. 
19 Association ‘Bois des Alpes’, ‘Comment valoriser les bois de la région Rhône-Alpes ?’ (Powerpoint présentation, 04/05/2010). 
20 Interview F-E9. However, the automatic granting of the right to use the certification mark to all certified companies is currently being 
discussed and might be amended in the future.  
21 Regulation of the certification mark ‘Bois des Alpes’, 5-6. 
22 Fédération Forêt-Bois Rhône-Alpes, ‘Construire en bois local’ (December 2016, on file with author). 
23 Email from Mr Portier, coordinator of the producers’ association, to the author (21/02/2018). 
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can be reallocated by the state for the development of the territory.24 Put differently, it is 
estimated that for each euro spent on the local wood, 60 cents go back to the territory as 
compared with 20 cents for imported wood, i.e. three times more direct economic benefit in 
the territory.25  
 
7.1.1.2 Challenges in creating employment opportunities  
 
This sub-section will turn to the GI initiatives where job creation has been either difficult, made 
intentionally complicated or even impossible. These are the Pélardon cheese, fried calamari 
from Hạ Long and bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay. As will be argued, the factors 
negatively affecting job creation are found at different levels and range from the difficult access 
to land to market issues, to rules governing the membership and right to use the GI, to the state 
regulation of production activities.  
 
In the Pélardon cheese initiative, Chapter 4 explained that the need to attract new breeders to 
develop a remote territory was clearly articulated by the producers involved in the construction 
phase of the GI initiative. As discussed in Chapter 5, the initiative has been seeking to recruit 
new members to increase the production to meet consumer demand. However, the growth of 
the producers’ association has proved difficult for two main reasons. The first reason is linked 
to the challenging access to, and very high cost of, land. This is particularly true for ‘outsiders’ 
with no family connection within the initiative. In that respect, the coordinator of the producers’ 
association explained that ‘[i]t is very difficult for a farmer to settle in this territory if he doesn’t 
have the opportunity to take over an existing agricultural holding. It is not a simple matter 
because agricultural holdings are very expensive and because we are quite a few farmers to 
have our agricultural holding and housing embedded together. This means that if we want to 
transfer our farm, we must decide as to whether we want to leave everything behind. People 
find it difficult because they have inherited a family patrimony’.26  
 
In addition to the difficult access to land, the prevalence of highly local marketing channels 
inside the area of origin has negatively impacted on farmers’ interest in the origin label and 
hence in their willingness to join the initiative. Indeed, as argued in Chapter 5, the origin label 
                                                        
24 Fédération Forêt-Bois Rhône-Alpes (n22) 6. 
25 Interview F-E9. 
26 Interview F-B2. 
262 
 
has little value inside the area of production because the local clientele has a personal 
knowledge and experience of both the product and its producers and thus does not rely on 
labels. Besides, inside the area of origin, all ‘Pélardon type’ goat cheese producers benefit from 
the reputation of, and collective communication associated with, Pélardon cheese, and hence 
claim the same origin and similar values of authenticity and tradition when selling their cheese 
without having to support the costs related to the GI initiative.27 This type of behaviour further 
diminishes the value of the origin label. As most of the production of goat cheeses from 
Cévennes is still sold inside the area of origin, it is particularly challenging for the GI initiative 
to generate interest in the origin label among local producers, as well as to keep and attract new 
members in the association who accounts for about one-third of all ‘Pélardon type’ cheese 
producers in the area.28 As a result, the number of members has decreased by more than 35% 
from 120 members in 2001 to 100 in 2010 to 77 members in 2018.29    
 
 
Source: Coordinator of the ODG 
 
Despite the difficulty in keeping and attracting members, this initiative nevertheless shows a 
strong potential to contribute to the socio-economic development of the territory in the future 
                                                        
27 Interview F-B6. 
28 Interview F-B8. However, this figure masks substantial differences among departments located inside the PDO area. In the Lozère 
department, 70-80% of all goat cheese producers are members of the ODG.   
29 Email from Ms Podeur, coordinator of the ODG, to author (12/03/2018). 
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through at least two ways. First, as explained in Chapter 5, an increasing number of cheese 
producers are involved in marketing channels outside the area of the origin and sell a growing 
share of their production on the regional and national market where the origin labels are highly 
valued. One consequence of the diversification of marketing channels outside the production 
area is the growing interest of local producers in the use of the origin label, which is likely to 
contribute to the growth of the producers’ association in the future.30  Second, this initiative 
plays a significant socio-economic role in the territory. Its main actor, the Cooperative 
Fromagerie des Cévennes, which represents about a third of the total production of Pélardon 
cheese – 75 tonnes out of a total production of 228 tonnes in 2016 – deliberately seeks to recruit 
young non-professionals from the area with a view to provide training and motivate young 
people to stay in the region.31 By doing so, this cooperative has become central to the region’s 
agriculture and employment. This highlights the importance of the social awareness and pro-
active voluntary approach of members of the GI initiative at the individual level.  
 
In the case of fried calamari from Hạ Long, the main challenge to job creation lies in the rules 
governing the membership of the producers’ association and the right to use the GI. In this 
initiative, maintaining the existing workforce is generally an objective agreed upon by the 
twenty-four members of the association. However, the growth of the initiative was made 
intentionally complicated. As mentioned in Chapter 3, unlike other GI initiatives, membership 
of the association is a condition for having the right to use the GI,32 taking into account that 
members must also have at least three years professional experience in the production and sale 
of fried calamari.33 According to the project leader, these rules were designed by local 
authorities with a view to control and restrict the use of the origin label.34 In effect, the number 
of members, including twenty-one individual members and three companies, has not changed 
since the GI was obtained in December 2013,35 although the number of employees within the 
companies that are members of the producers’ association has reportedly increased.36 The 
growth of the initiative is further compounded by the exclusion from the right to use the GI of 
                                                        
30 J.P. Boutonnet and others, ‘AOC Pélardon, filière en émergence. Enseignements et questions vives’ (Communication présentée au 
Symposium International Territoires et enjeux du développement régional, Résultats de recherches en partenariat avec cinq régions, Lyon, 
France, 9-11 mars 2005). 
31 Interview F-B3. 
32 Regulations on the management and use of the GI for fried calamari from Hạ Long, Article 9.7. 
33 ibid Article 4.5. 
34 Interview V-C1. 
35 Interview V-C13. 
36 ibid. 
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the fishermen who provide the calamari. The exclusion of a phase of the product cycle from 
the GI initiative has been seen elsewhere in Vietnam, for example in the case of the fish sauce 
from Phú Quốc which also excludes fishermen.37 These examples illustrate the exclusionary 
effects that can derive from the establishment of a GI initiative, and which Belletti and 
Marescotti have noted in the European context.38 As they explain, ‘the choice of which phases 
of the production process to link to the original territory (for example meat processing but not 
animal breeding), which entails a choice between a PDO and a PGI, can exclude entire 
components of the territorial system of production from the benefits of the name protection’.39 
 
Finally, with regard to bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay, job creation is hindered by 
the strict regulation of the mussel aquaculture industry in the area due to the nature of the Mont-
St-Michel Bay as a PMD. As discussed in Chapter 5, the number and distribution of mussel 
leases, as well as the number of, and distance between, piles of the vertical stakes, have been 
established by Decree.40 By contrast to the other initiatives studied in this chapter, the 
productive capacity of the producers’ association is thus restricted despite the growing 
consumer demand. This has important social consequences considering that, since the 
productive capacity is fixed, the initiative cannot grow, and the creation of new jobs is thus 
very limited. The only way for new producers to join the producers’ association is to buy 
existing leases. However, these are expensive41 and not often available for selling as these are 
usually transmitted within the same family,42 as is the case in the Pélardon initiative. When a 
producer without children retires, his lease is usually not acquired by a new (external) producer, 
but by an existing (internal) large producer.43 This further reduces the openness of the initiative 
and the ability of outsiders to join it. The number of producer members has even decreased 
from 50 in 2014 to 43 in 2018.44 
                                                        
37 D.H. Dao, ‘Institutions de gestion de la qualité: action collective et apprentissage organisationnel. Le case de l’indication geographique 
‘Nuoc mam de Phu Quoc’ (Master’s thesis, ESSOR, Ecole Nationale Supérieure Agronomique de Toulouse, 2011) 19. 
38 G. Belletti and A. Marescotti, ‘Origin products, geographical indications and rural development’ in E. Barham and B. Sylvander (eds.), 
Labels of Origin for Food: Local Development, Global Recognition (CAB International, 2011) 75, 83-86. 
39 ibid 85. 
40 Arrêté du 21 mai 1985 portant réglementation des installations de bouchots à moules en baie du Mont-Saint-Michel (Order of 12 May 
1985 regulating installations of bouchot mussels in the Mont-St-Michel bay), JO 08-06-1985 
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?cidTexte=JPDF0806198500006346&categorieLien=id> accessed 18/07/2018. 
41 The cost is about €50,000 for a hundred meters of vertical stakes in 2016. Interview F-C3. 
42 Interviews F-C3, F-C7 and F-C11.  
43 Interview F-C13. 
44 Interview F-C12. 
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7.1.2 Development of new economic activities 
 
It has been argued that the successful establishment of GI initiatives can facilitate the 
development of new economic activities that also contribute to territorial development by 
securing or creating local jobs and promoting the image of the territory.45 These activities, for 
example in the gastronomy and cultural sectors, keep alive local traditions around the GI 
product while promoting the product itself through the strengthening of the brand and regional 
images46 which, as noted by Giovannucci and others, may also benefit other products in the 
area through a ‘complementary effect’.47 In turn, the promotion of the GI product may attract 
more tourists in the area, thereby highlighting the ‘symbiotic interactions that may arise from 
the GI process’.48 For example, in France, Gerz and Dupont note that Comté cheese has led to 
the development of tourism and economic activities in the Franche-Comté region with cheese 
factory tours, which resulted in increased sales volumes of the cheese.49 In Vietnam, agro-
tourism initiatives have been launched around the GI-labelled mint honey of Mèo Vạc and 
Buôn Ma Thuôt coffee in the touristic Dak Lak region where a coffee museum has been 
established.50  
 
All the initiatives under study except the wood from the Alps and vermicelli from Bình Liêu 
have led to the development of economic activities centered around the promotion of the GI 
products – sometimes together with other local products. These activities may include the 
creation of museums or other cultural institutions. This is the case for bouchot mussels from 
Mont-St-Michel Bay and green lentils from Berry. Every year about 30,000 tourists visit the 
Bay Centre that educates visitors about the history and production of the PDO mussels,  among 
other products of the area, and in 2017 there were about 6,500 visits of the Bay production 
                                                        
45 E. Vandecandelaere and others, ‘Linking people, places and products: A guide for promoting quality linked to geographical origin and 
sustainable Geographical Indications’ (FAO and SINER-GI, 2009) 22. 
46 K. Das, ‘Socio-economic implications of protecting geographical indications in India’ (2009) Centre for WTO Studies.  
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1587352> accessed 03/09/2018. 
47 D. Giovannucci and others, Guide to Geographical Indications: Linking Products and Their Origins (International Trade Centre, 2009) 
21. 
48 C. Bramley and E. Biénabe, ‘Developments and considerations around geographical indications in the developing world’ (2012) 2(1) 
Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 14, 24. 
49 Gerz and Dupont (n11). 
50 C. Durand, ‘L’émergence des indications géographiques dans les processus de qualification territoriale des produits agroalimentaires - Une 
analyse comparée entre l’Indonésie et le Vietnam’ (PhD Thesis, Institut national d'études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - SupAgro 
Montpellier, 2016) 346 and 353. 
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area.51 Besides, some initiatives have established a tourist trail specifically dedicated to the 
visit of the production area (bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay together with other 
products of the area) or including the tasting of the local product (Pélardon cheese, bouchot 
mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay and fried calamari from Hạ Long). Free visits of public 
buildings constructed with the certified wood from the Alps are also regularly organised for 
promotional purposes by the association for construction industry professionals. Although 
these activities do not generate direct and immediate economic benefit, they nonetheless 
contribute to promote the product which may lead to future benefits. Finally, collaboration with 
Michelin-starred chefs and restaurateurs have led to the compilation of cookbooks for sale 
(bouchot mussels from the St Michel Mont Bay52 and Pélardon cheese53) or for promotion in 
tasting events and restaurants (green lentils from Berry).  
 
Picture 7.1 
Chefs promoting green lentils from Berry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
51 Interview F-C14. 
52 C. Wasser, Goûter les moules (Ouest France, 2010). 
53 Syndicat des Producteurs de Pélardon, Le Pélardon revu et inspiré (publisher unknown, 2011). 
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7.1.3 Training, innovation and exchange of good practices  
 
If the development within GI initiatives of activities related to vocational training, innovation 
and exchange of good practices has been mentioned in the GI literature,54 only a few authors 
have undertaken a thorough analysis of these practices.55 They found that innovation diffusion 
processes are one of the most important functions of GI collectives,56 which highlights the need 
for more systematic research in this area. These activities have been developed within all six 
initiatives in a variety of forms and by different actors. Our findings thus confirm that GI 
initiatives can provide a platform for exchange of knowledge and sharing of practices, thereby 
contributing to local actors’ empowerment through the development of their technical skills 
and know-how.  
 
First, it has generally been recognised that all six GI associations foster exchange of 
information and good practices among producers on an informal basis. This is even more true 
in the smallest initiatives characterised by the geographical proximity among producers, as it 
is the case for fried calamari from Hạ Long and mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay. In the last 
initiative which covers seven communes only, the physical proximity of producers, whose 
buildings are grouped in the same area, was said to greatly facilitate dialogue and exchange of 
good practices. As one producer put it, ‘the proximity of all producers allows us to exchange 
information and to discuss our views and experiences with one another despite our points of 
contention. We learn tremendously from each other. We see each other every day which is a 
great advantage for the transmission of techniques. This has allowed us to become a very 
innovative cluster as compared with other initiatives in Normandy’.57 The ability of GI 
initiatives to act as an informal platform for producers and other stakeholders to exchange 
information and share good practices has been observed in other GI initiatives. For example, it 
                                                        
54 M. Ollagnon and J.-M. Touzard, ‘Indications géographiques et développement durable: Enquête nationale sur les actions des organisations 
de gestion locale des IG’ (Rapport de recherche, ANR/PRODDIG, 2007) 44 
<https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jean_Marc_Touzard/publication/272444703_Indications_geographiques_et_developpement_durable/
links/54e469280cf2b2314f60d0c7/Indications-geographiques-et-developpement-durable.pdf> accessed 02/08/2018. 
55 See for example J. S. Cañada and A.M. Vazquez, ‘Quality certification, institutions and innovation in local agro-food systems: Protected 
designations of origin of olive oil in Spain’ (2005) 21 Journal of Rural Studies 475. 
56 ibid 476. 
57 Interview F-C3. 
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has been reported that small producers of Penja pepper in Cameroon have greatly benefited 
from the exchange of good practices within the GI collective.58  
 
Second, training, innovation and exchange of good practices may be formulated as formal 
objectives or requirements of the producers’ associations. This is the case for all origin-
labelling initiatives in Vietnam.59 With a strong interventionism of the Vietnamese state in 
agricultural matters, training of farmers has been institutionalised since the adoption in 2008 
of Resolution 26/NQ-TW in support for agricultural development with a growth target of 3.5-
4% per year by 2020.60 Known as the Tam Nong policy,61 this resolution emphasises the need 
to provide training to farmers and increase their scientific and technical knowledge.62 In this 
context, the guides published by the NOIP for initiation and management of the GI and trade 
mark projects mention training of producers as one of the main tasks of the producers’ 
associations.63  
 
Among the French initiatives, the objectives of the associations of producers of green lentils 
from Berry and ‘Bois des Alpes’ include sharing of technical knowledge and technical 
assistance64 as well as, for the former, research and improvement of cultivation techniques; 
development of new by-products derived from the lentils; and varietal research.65 In the case 
of wood from the Alps, training and skills development are not only an objective of the 
producers’ association but have further become a criterion for the evaluation of the applicants 
for certification.66 According to the coordinator of the producers’ association, this model has 
enabled to spread good practices. For example, a number of applicant companies started 
                                                        
58 D. Chabrol, M. Mariani and D. Sautier, ‘Establishing Geographical Indications without State Involvement? Learning from Case Studies in 
Central and West Africa’ (2017) 98(C) World Development 68, 72. 
59 See, for instance, the Charter of the association ‘Production and commercialisation of fried calamari from Hạ Long’, Article 6.4;  Charter 
of the association ‘Production and commercialisation of vermicelli from Bình Liêu’, Article 21. 
60 Resolution 26-NQ/TW of 05 August 2008. 
61 This policy aims at agricultural development along three different axes: agriculture, farmers and rural areas. 
62 Resolution 26/NQ-TW, parts II.5 and II.8. 
63 NOIP, ‘Guide à la construction du projet “Gestion et Developpement des IGs”’, 16 and 25; ‘Guide à la construction du projet 
“Etablissement, Gestion et Développement des marques collectives utilisées pour les spécialités locales”’, 5 and 9; ‘Guide à la construction 
du projet “Etablissement, Gestion et Développement des marques de certification utilisées pour les spécialités locales”’ 5 (NOIP, 2009). 
64 Charter of the association ‘Bois des Alpes’, Article 2. 
65 Charter of the ODG ‘Lentilles vertes du Berry’, Article 2.2. 
66 Rules governing the certification mark ‘Bois des Alpes’, 5-6. 
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publishing safety guides. This has ultimately led all members to install fire extinguishers, 
which none had before the certification mark.67  
 
Besides formal objectives or requirements, training courses or seminars on technical aspects of 
the production have been organised in all the initiatives with varying degrees of efficiency 
except for bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay. The lack of training course in the latter 
initiative can be explained by the pre-requirement for all producers to have a technical 
qualification in order to have the right to operate a mussel lease.  
 
Both green lentils from Berry and Pélardon initiatives have recruited an external technician in 
charge of enhancing their members’ technical knowledge. Lentils farmers meet in group two 
to three times a year with the technician to discuss technical matters. Producers can also call 
the external technician for any issue they face at any time.68 Pélardon producers can be 
provided individual technical support upon request to address issues identified during the 
control procedures.69 Besides, the ODG has been instrumental in spreading quality manuals 
and a code of good practices within the area.70 Interestingly, in the case of wood from the Alps, 
the association has sought to educate a wider public outside the association on the technical 
aspects and the socio-economic and environmental benefits brought about by the certified 
wood with a view to promote its use. It has done so by entering into agreements with vocational 
high schools to support the use of the certified wood in courses and group works, and to train 
teachers on the technical and legal aspects of the certification as well as on its economic, 
environmental and societal benefits.71 As mentioned in Chapter 6, the association is also 
actively involved in the organisation of training and awareness raising activities with 
contractors, wood specifiers or buyers.  
 
By contrast to the regular technical training of producers in most French initiatives, training in 
Vietnam is primarily provided by the technical expert in charge of leading the origin-labelling 
project under the supervision of local authorities. In the largest initiatives, training sessions 
involve primarily farmers’ representatives who are expected to train, in turn, other farmers. In 
                                                        
67 Interview F-E9. 
68 Interview F-D2. 
69 Interview F-B8. 
70 ibid. 
71 Interview F-E9. See for example the agreement between the association and the lycée professionnel Alpes et Durance for 2015-2010 (on 
file with author). 
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many cases, training is provided during the project implementation only, especially as there is 
no mechanism to ensure the ongoing training of producers, which is further compounded by 
the lack of resources and equipment.72  
 
Finally, in addition to training courses, research and development activities have been 
conducted on vermicelli from Bình Liêu73 and green lentils from Berry74 with a view to create 
high-yielding and more resistant varieties. On the one hand, research activities on vermicelli 
from Bình Liêu were decided by local authorities, in a context where agricultural modernisation 
is a national priority.75 This would tend to support Durand and Fournier’s claim that origin 
labels are used in Vietnam as a way to promote the use of modern techniques and improved 
varieties.76 On the other hand, plant breeding activities on the ANICIA variety – used for green 
lentils – were initiated by producers themselves after successfully enhancing their 
representative capacity and credibility with authorities.  
 
7.1.4 Representative capacity and influence 
 
Although the GI literature has generally overlooked this aspect, this section will show that, in 
at least two French initiatives, GI protection has contributed to enhance the representative 
capacity and influence of producers’ organisations. Keeping in mind the state oversight of 
associations and in general their limited freedom of action and influence in Vietnam, it is 
important to contextualise these findings. This is especially the case considering the specific 
way in which France celebrates a holistic vision of terroir and supports local processes that 
underpin traditions, heritage and savoir-faire. As will be shown, this approach can facilitate 
the satisfaction of specific needs and demands that go well beyond the sole interests of the 
stakeholders involved in the initiatives. 
 
                                                        
72 Interviews V-C13 and V-D8.  
73 Interview V-D8. 
74 Interview F-D6. 
75 R. De Koninck, ‘Les agricultures du Sud-Est asiatique: interrogations sur l’avenir d’un nouveau modèle de développement’ (2004) 4 
L’Espace géographique 301. 
76 Durand and Fournier (n7). 
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First, the influence of Pélardon cheese as a GI-labelled product has played a pivotal role in the 
maintenance and survival of small sheep and goat producers in the area, both members and 
non-members of the initiative. Indeed, in the context of the preparation of the EU's Common 
Agricultural Policy reform in 2015, the French government had planned to remove non-
productive areas covered with oak and chestnut trees from the eligible categories of state aid. 
This project reform would have not only negatively affected those Pélardon producers whose 
goats feed on oaks and chestnut trees, but more generally put at risk the livelihoods of small 
ruminant producers in the area including those outside the GI initiative. This risk prompted 
Pélardon producers to launch a large media campaign and meet with public authorities to 
explain that, although these areas are not productive in the traditional agricultural sense, they 
sustain the feeding of the goats and hence the production of Pélardon cheese following the 
traditional pastoral and grazing practices in the area. This approach has been successful and, in 
the new system of aid adopted in 2015, those areas covered with oak and chestnut trees for the 
Pélardon area of production only, remain eligible for state support as an exception to the 
general ineligibility rule.77 This exception was subsequently expanded to encompass the 
broader UNESCO World Heritage site of the Mediterranean Agro-pastoral Cultural Landscape. 
This outcome, which is a major success not only for Pélardon producers but generally for all 
small ruminant producers including those outside the GI association, has been closely linked 
to the visibility, credibility and influence of the PDO protection. From that perspective, the 
PDO protection has proved to have a political weight which has empowered Pélardon 
producers while preserving the development of the territory and contributing to social cohesion 
and pride within the territory.78 The PDO initiative has thus emerged as the driving force of the 
whole small ruminant industry in the area.  
 
Turning to green lentils from Berry, it has already mentioned that, to tackle the high wastage 
rate, there is a need to develop lines with higher and more reliable yields. However, because 
the total production area for lentils in France is less than 20,000 hectares and the national 
                                                        
77 Arrêté du 9 octobre 2015 relatif aux modalités d'application concernant le système intégré de gestion et de contrôle, l'admissibilité des 
surfaces au régime de paiement de base et l'agriculteur actif dans le cadre de la politique agricole commune à compter de la campagne 2015 
(Decree of 9 October 2015 on the implementing provisions for the integrated administration and control system, the eligibility of areas 
under the basic payment scheme and the active farmer in the context of the CAP as from 2015) Article 13. Available at 
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/arrete/2015/10/9/AGRT1515973A/jo> accessed 02/08/2018. 
78 Interview F-B8. 
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production is less than 400,000 tonnes per year, lentils are considered as a minor crop.79 One 
consequence is that they have traditionally not attracted much interest from research and 
development institutes. This is shown in the lack of plant improvement research on the 
ANICIA variety since 1966 – which, as the only variety available for green lentils, is used for 
both green lentils from Berry (PGI) and Le Puy (PDO).80 This issue has been compounded by 
the fact that lentil farmers had traditionally no representation before the authorities hence a 
lack of dialogue with the Ministry of Agriculture as regards its product homologation policy. 
Yet, the influence of both green lentils from Berry and from Le Puy have been instrumental in 
enhancing the visibility and credibility of the sector with the creation in 2016 of the ‘National 
Interprofessional Dried Vegetables Association’ (‘Association nationale interprofessionnelle 
des légumes secs’ – ANILS) that brings together the producers, collectors and packers of 
lentils, chickpeas and dry beans with the aim to defend their interests at the local and national 
level. According to the coordinator of the association of producers of green lentils from Berry, 
the PDO and PGI protection has been the primary impetus for enhancing the organisational 
capacity of producers of dried vegetables at the national level and creating a space for their 
visibility and representation.81 Importantly, because the lentil sector is already well-organised 
and origin-labelled, it is for this sector that the first agreement within ANILS has been made 
to develop plant breeding programmes with funding from producers’ contributions. In this 
initiative, the political leverage deriving from the GI protection not only contributes to the 
preservation of a culture but further facilitates its improvement and enhancement.   
 
7.2 Preservation of cultural heritage  
 
The proposal that GIs may contribute to the safeguarding of cultural heritage82 through the 
preservation of the traditional methods of production and cultural practices needed for the 
                                                        
79 For further information on the criteria used for classifying a crop or a product as 'major' in the European Union, see European Commission, 
‘Guidance Document, Guidelines on comparability, extrapolation, group tolerances and data requirements for setting MRLs’ (7525/VI/95 
Rev. 10.3, 13/06/2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/pesticides_mrl_guidelines_app-d.pdf> accessed 03/07/2018. 
80 S.L. Anvar, ‘Semences et Droit: L'emprise d'un modèle économique dominant sur une réglementation sectorielle’ (Thèse pour le Doctorat 
en Droit, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, 2008) 67. 
81 Interview F-D6. 
82 For general background on the concept of cultural heritage in international law, see F. Macmillan, ‘The Protection of Cultural Heritage: 
Common Heritage of Humankind, National Cultural ‘Patrimony’ or Private Property?’ (2013) 64(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quaterly 351, 
357-361. 
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elaboration of local products has been subject to much debate recently.83 As recalled by 
MacMillan,84 it is only recently that UNESCO has recognised the importance of intangible 
cultural heritage, and not only that of tangible cultural heritage, with the adoption of the 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2003. According to this 
Convention, intangible cultural heritage includes ‘the practices, representations, expressions, 
knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated 
therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their 
cultural heritage’.85 The Convention goes on by specifying that intangible cultural heritage is 
‘transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups 
in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides 
them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and 
human creativity’.86 Manifestations of intangible cultural heritage include the knowledge and 
practices concerning nature and the universe as well as traditional craftsmanship.87  
 
As argued by Gangjee, a number of features of GI products meet this definition.88 Specifically, 
this proposal concerns those products ‘at the intersection of culture and geography’89 that rely, 
at least partly, on the knowledge, skills, how-how, practices and traditions that have been 
developed collectively by local producers over time and transmitted across generations.90 
Referred to as human factors, these include breeding and cultivation practices or weaving and 
sewing techniques. If handicrafts are typically heavily based on human factors, a large number 
of food and agricultural products, that are usually believed to derive mainly or entirely from 
natural factors, also require specific know-how, especially when they are processed.91 
Examples of agro-food products that are based on both natural and human factors include 
                                                        
83 D. Gangjee, 'Geographical Indications and Cultural Rights: The Intangible Cultural Heritage Connection?' in Christophe Geiger 
(ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2015) 544; A. Kamperman Sanders, ‘Incentives for 
Protection of Cultural Expression: Art, Trade and Geographical Indications’ (2010) 13 JWIP 81. 
84 F. Macmillan (n82) 12. 
85  Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, Article 2. 
86 ibid. 
87 ibid. 
88 Gangjee 'Geographical Indications and Cultural Rights’ (n83) 556. 
89 D. Rangnekar, ‘The Socio-Economics of Geographical Indications: A Review of the Empirical Evidence from Europe’ (UNCTAD/ICTSD 
Issue Paper No. 4, 2004) 16. 
90 N.S. Gopalakrishnan, P.S. Nair and A.K. Babu, ‘Exploring the relationship between geographical indications and traditional knowledge: 
an analysis of the legal  tools  for  the protection of geographical  indications  in Asia’ (2007) ICTSD Working Paper 
<http://www.measwatch.org/sites/default/files/bookfile/MonMarch2009-14-28-16-GIandTKGopalakrishnan.pdf> accessed 03/09/2018. 
91 D. Marie-Vivien, ‘A comparative analysis of GIs for handicrafts: the link to origin in culture as well as nature?’ in D. Gangjee (ed.) 
Research handbook on intellectual property and geographical indication (Edward Elgar, 2016) 292.  
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Darjeeling tea, Basmati rice or Melton Mowbray pork pies. The elaboration of Feni, which was 
the first Indian GI for an alcohol, heavily relies on specific rules for the harvesting and crushing 
of apples and the distilling process, i.e. human factors.92  
 
In the debate over GIs and cultural heritage, it has been suggested that the CoPs can be a 
powerful tool to help preserve traditional and cultural practices93 and thus provide an option 
for the implementation of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage.94 This is because, through the identification and codification of traditional production 
technics, the CoPs ensure that these continue to be followed and hence sustained.95 This is 
particularly true when the market success of GI products depends on the use of local traditional 
methods of production, and hence when consumers value and reward the traditional and 
cultural practices embedded in the GI product. In that case, producers are provided with an 
incentive for preserving them so as to continue to benefit economically from their use,96 as 
long as the traditional and cultural practices ‘prove necessary to justify the specificity linked 
to a particular place.’97 In other words, producers are incentivised to ‘translate their 
longstanding, collective and patrimonial knowledge into livelihood and income’,98 whenever 
their knowledge is needed to make the product. For example, Bienabé and Marie-Vivien have 
shown how the reputation of the Basmati rice has been built upon traditional savoir-faire 
passed through generations of producers, and translated in the CoP, which they refer to as 
‘heritage-based reputation’.99  
 
With these considerations in mind, this section will argue that both the rules adopted by 
producers at the local level and the broader state policies and laws have a strong impact on the 
maintenance or abandonment of traditional and cultural practices.  
 
                                                        
92 D. Rangnekar, ‘Geographical Indications and Localisation: A Case Study of Feni’ (ESRC Report, 2009) 30-32. 
93 Gangjee, 'Geographical Indications and Cultural Rights’ (n83) 549. 
94 ibid 556-558. 
95 S. May and others (eds.), Taste – Power – Tradition. Geographical Indications as Cultural Property (Göttingen Studies in Cultural 
Property, Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2017) 6. 
96 Bramley and Biénabe (n48). 
97 C. de Sainte Marie and L. Bérard, ‘Taking Local Knowledge into Account in the AOC System’ in L. Bérard and others (eds.) Biodiversity 
and Local Ecological Knowledge in France (INRA/CIRAD, 2005) 181. 
98 L. Bérard and P. Marchenay, ‘Tradition, regulation and intellectual property: local agricultural products and foodstuffs in France’, in S.B. 
Brush and D. Stabinsky (eds.) Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property Rights (Island Press, 1996) 230, 240. 
99 E. Biénabe and D. Marie-Vivien, ‘Institutionalizing Geographical Indications in Southern Countries: Lessons Learned from Basmati and 
Rooibos’ (2017) 98(C) World Development 58, 61.  
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In France, as seen in Chapter 5, when the product is protected by a PDO or PGI, the missions 
of the producers’ associations are laid down by the law and should mirror the terms used in 
Article L.642-22 of the Rural Code. These include, among others, the ‘mission of general 
interest of preservation and promotion of terroirs, local traditions and know-how as well as of 
products derived thereof’.100 Here, law is used as a means to effectively promote the 
preservation of the cultural element embedded in the origin products protected through a sui 
generis system. In practice, according to the interviews, the definitions of the products, 
including their production process, as collectively adopted in the respective CoPs, reflect the 
traditional practices that pre-existed the establishment of the initiatives. The preservation of 
traditional methods of production was particularly highlighted by the producers of bouchot 
mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay and of Pélardon cheese.  
 
Starting with bouchot mussels, these are bred on wooden stakes (the ‘bouchots’) arranged 
vertically in lines101 following the use of a traditional aquaculture technique that goes back to 
1235, which has been transcribed in the CoP.102 To reflect the traditional character of this 
aquaculture technique, bouchot mussels have been protected with the European traditional 
speciality guaranteed (TSG) label since 2013. As explained in Chapter 5, this label aims to 
‘safeguard traditional methods of production and recipes by helping producers of traditional 
product in marketing and communicating the value-adding attributes of their traditional recipes 
and products to consumers’.103 It has enjoyed a great success amongst consumers,104 which is 
likely to contribute further to the preservation of the traditional aquaculture technique.  
 
In the Pélardon initiative, the practice of taking goats out on the territory for a minimum number 
of days, in consistency with traditional pastoral and grazing practices in the area, was made a 
                                                        
100 Charters of the ODGs ‘Lentilles vertes du Berry’ and ‘Pélardon’, Articles 2.   
101 CoP ‘Bouchot mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay’, Article 3.6.3 
<http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominationId=10203> accessed 10/06/2018. 
102 ibid Article 3.8.1. 
103 Council Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuff, Article 17. As of August 2018, a total of 58 products were protected as a TSG. See results of the DOOR 
database:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html?&recordStart=0&filter.dossierNumber=&filter.comboName=&filterMin.milestone__
mask=&filterMin.milestone=&filterMax.milestone__mask=&filterMax.milestone=&filter.country=&filter.category=&filter.type=TSG&filt
er.status=REGISTERED> accessed 21/08/2018. 
104 FranceAgriMer, ‘L’image de la moule en France auprès des consommateurs de moules et des professionnels de la filière’ (Les Etudes de 
FranceAgriMer, 2014). 
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mandatory requirement in the CoP.105 The importance of ancestral agro-pastoral practices has 
been recognized by UNESCO with the inclusion in 2011 of the National Park of Cévennes on 
the list of the World Heritage Sites as a ‘Mediterranean Agro-pastoral Cultural Landscape’.106 
Interestingly, this initiative also provides an example of how the inclusion in the CoP of strict 
criteria aimed at ensuring compliance with traditional methods of production may run counter 
the producers’ interests. Indeed, with a view to ensure that producers observe agro-pastoral 
practices, the quantity of feed concentrate to be distributed to goats is limited to 400 grams per 
day per litre of goat’s milk produced.107 However, it was found that those farmers who take 
goats out the most on the territory and hence who provide them with very little forage, were 
compelled to exceed this limit so as to support lactation. As a result, in the words of the 
coordinator of the producers’ association, ‘[w]e end up penalising those breeders who are the 
most authentic, who respect the traditional pastoral and grazing practices the most’.108 Whereas 
it is the intention of the producers’ association to request a modification of this rule in the 
future, the complex and time-consuming process to modify the CoP at the EU level109 has 
discouraged producers from initiating it so far.110 
 
Turning to the Vietnamese products, the producers of fried calamari from Hạ Long generally 
agree that the CoP reflects the traditional methods of production back to 1946, in particular the 
use of a mortar to grind the calamari and their shaping by hand.111 However, in the case of 
vermicelli from Bình Liêu, which have been produced in the area by generations of farmers, 
their production practices have recently evolved with the introduction of improved varieties 
and modern equipment, including milling, grinding, washing and drying machines, that have 
replaced the traditional manual process.112 The mechanisation of production methods which, 
as explained in Chapter 5, responds to the need to increase the production, fits into the broader 
policy of agricultural modernisation that Vietnam has adopted as a national priority since the 
                                                        
105 At least 210 days per year for the goat farms located at less than 800 meters of altitude and 180 days for those located at a higher altitude. 
CoP ‘Pélardon’, Article 3 <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominationId=529> accessed 26/06/2018 
106 UNESCO World Heritage List, ‘The Causses and the Cévennes, Mediterranean agro-pastoral Cultural Landscape’ 
<http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1153> accessed 18 September 2017. 
107 Technical rules for the implementation the CoP ‘Pélardon', Article 1 (on file with author). 
108 Interview F-B6. 
109 Council Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuff, Article 53. 
110 Interview F-B8. 
111 Document providing technical instructions for the processing of fried calamari from Hạ Long, Article 2(c). 
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1960s to address the need to feed the growing Vietnamese population.113 In this regard, it has 
been mentioned that, according to Durand and Fournier, GIs are used in Vietnam as a way to 
promote agricultural modernisation, including through the substitution of traditional local 
techniques with modern ones and/or the use of improved varieties. These authors show how 
the production of Mèo Vac mint honey, traditionally extracted directly from natural tree trunks 
following a traditional technique aimed to capture wild beehive colonies, has evolved since 
2003 under the impetus of local authorities with the introduction of standard wooden hives and 
centrifugal extractors with a view to increase production.114 When the GI was registered in 
2013, it is the model of production based on the use of wooden hives that was introduced in 
the CoP.  
 
There are a number of examples of origin products in other countries for which local traditional 
practices have been modified or abandoned usually to meet new social conditions or market 
demands. For example, while the production of Porto wine traditionally depended on grapes 
trodden by human feet, most producers are now using computer-operated systems.115 Similarly, 
Bowen reports that Tequila farmers have increasingly replaced traditional, labour-intensive 
practices with chemical-intensive and labour-efficient practices.116 While it remains difficult 
in the case of vermicelli from Bình Liêu (and maybe in other cases too) to determine precisely 
the extent to which the traditional manual process had been essential to the distinctive character 
of the product, these findings nonetheless highlight the need to consider GI initiatives not in 
isolation but in their broader political context and taking into account the market demands. 
 
7.3 Biodiversity conversation 
 
Although biodiversity conservation is usually not an explicit objective of GI protection,117 it 
has been argued that, because GIs draw on local features of the natural environment, their 
protection may contribute to the conservation of local natural resources. The interaction 
between the natural and human factors required for the elaboration of origin products is 
                                                        
113 N.H Bui and T.N. Duc, ‘Le développement de l’agriculture vietnamienne au cours des 15 dernières années’ (2002) 3(2) VertigO 
<https://journals.openedition.org/vertigo/3738> accessed 20/08/2018. 
114 Durand and Fournier (n7) 98-99. 
115 J. Robinson, ‘The port trade’s calling card’ Financial Times (London, 30/05/2009) Life & Arts 4. 
116 S. Bowen and A. Zapata, ‘Geographical indications, terroir, and socioeconomic and ecological sustainability: The case of tequila’ (2009) 
(25)1 Journal of Rural Studies 108, 115. 
117 J. Larson, ‘Geographical indications, in situ conservation and traditional knowledge’ (ICTSD Policy Brief, October 2010) 9. 
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strongly reflected in the concept of terroir which, as seen in Chapter 2, is at the very heart of 
the French AOC system.118 Barham goes as far as saying that ‘natural factors are the most 
important determinants of how well a product represents its terroir’.119 
 
Here again, scholars generally agree on the important role of the rules included in the CoP in 
directing the effects of GIs on biodiversity. This is because CoPs may specify the use of specific 
biological and genetic resources that are essential to the distinctive character of the GI 
product,120 including soil, climate, species or native plant varieties and breeds, or they may 
prescribe production practices that have a positive impact on biodiversity at the landscape and 
ecosystem levels.121 As such, the set standards may impose production limits or incorporate 
good agricultural practices.122 A notable example of a GI product with a positive environmental 
impact is the Rooibos herbal tea from South Africa. When building the GI, producers 
collectively agreed on standards aimed at preserving biodiversity and ensuring environmental 
sustainability to take into account the importance of environmental factors to the product’s 
distinctive character.123 In Morocco, the plantation of new Argan trees, which helps combat 
desertification, is a requirement of the CoP of the Argan oil.124 
 
Within our case studies, the initiatives built around Pélardon cheese, bouchot mussels from 
Mont-St-Michel Bay, wood from the Alps, green lentils from Berry and fried calamari from 
Hạ Long, have provided evidence of environmental impacts through at least four different 
ways. Drawing upon these case studies, this section will argue that, in addition to the formal 
rules decided at the local level and included in the CoP or trade marks regulations, attention 
should also be paid to the environmental awareness and commitment of producers at the 
individual level; the production activities or the profile of the products in themselves; and 
market demands. Finally, this section will highlight the need to consider broader national and 
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local policies and approaches as these may also impact on the environmental performance of 
GIs.  
 
First, the importance of formal rules adopted at the local level is particularly evident in the 
wood from the Alps, Pélardon cheese and green lentils from Berry initiatives. In the first 
initiative, the regulations of the certification mark include environmental criteria that applicants 
must satisfy in order to be granted the right to use it. By assessing the applicants’ activities as 
regards the preservation of water and soils; the reduction of nuisances and pollutions; the waste 
management; the use of energy; and the cleanliness and the state of maintenance,125 these 
criteria aim at improving their environmental awareness and responsibility.  
 
In the Pélardon initiative, the CoP sets out the obligation to take goats out on the territory for 
a minimum number of days in consistency with traditional pastoral and grazing practices.126 
By ensuring that goats feed on local plants and herbs, this requirement is at the heart of the 
terroir connection of the cheese. Importantly, it has had a positive environmental impact 
considering that pastoral and grazing practices have contributed to the conservation of 
landscape and ecosystems while reducing the risk of fire. In the case of green lentils from 
Berry, the CoP forbids the use of sludge from treatment plants and inputs such as fertilisers, 
which highly reduces environmental impact.127 
 
In the same way as for Rooibos herbal tea and Argan oil, these examples show the importance 
of the rules adopted at the local level and included in the CoPs or the regulations of the 
certification mark. However, despite these examples of positive environmental impact, Larson 
warns that the CoP can also have negative environmental effects, for example through the 
promotion of one particular landrace or breed that may lead to a loss of genetic diversity.128 
This has been the case for the CoP of Tequila which, by prescribing the use of the blue variety 
of agave plant only to the exclusion of all others, has led to the loss or marginalization of half 
a dozen other varieties, providing Tequila with a narrow genetic base.129 Similarly, in the case 
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of chestnut from Ardèche, the CoP retained only 19 of the 66 varieties developed by 
generations of peasant farmers,130 thereby reducing the genetic diversity of the chestnut within 
the GI.  
 
Second, our findings suggest that the ability of GIs to contribute to biodiversity conservation 
can derive from the environmental awareness and commitment of producers at the individual 
level. This factor, which is a less well-studied aspect of GIs, is exemplified by the commitment 
of some Pélardon producers to preserve endangered goat breeds, including the Massif Central, 
Provençale and Pyrénéenne breeds. Unlike the obligation to take goats out on the territory, 
these breeds are not listed in the CoP according to which ‘[t]he milk must be from herds made 
up of goats of the Alpine, Saanen, or Rove breeds and their crossbreeds’.131 However, in 
practice, many farmers who are members of environmental associations use the endangered 
breeds listed above to ensure their preservation and because these goats are invariably well-
suited to grazing practices. Up to now, these practices have been discussed during the general 
assemblies of the producers’ association and been tacitly accepted by the inspectors in charge 
of the external controls. This is because the mention of ‘crossbreeds’ in the CoP allows for 
some confusion as to the type of breeds, but also because such practices generally conform to 
the overall environmentally-friendly approach of the initiative. This example of environmental 
impact derived from the environmental awareness and commitment of producers at the 
individual level also illustrates the importance of informal ethical or moral rules within a 
collective group.  
 
Third, as suggested by Belletti and Marescotti, the mere continuation of production activities 
may bring about environmental benefits,132 as it is the case for bouchot mussels from Mont-St-
Michel Bay and wood from the Alps. Indeed, the method of production of bouchot mussels is 
environmentally-friendly in itself because the wooden poles where mussels grow, function as 
nurseries that preserve the local species that gravitate around them. According to a producer, 
there would be ten times less biodiversity in the area without these artificial reefs.133 Turning 
to wood from the Alps, its mere use in construction brings about benefits to the ecosystem 
given that one cubic meter of wood is equivalent to one tonne of Co2 stored. The wider use of 
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the certified wood in construction projects is even promoted in the Strategic Plan for Forestry 
in the Alps adopted in 2006 by local authorities as a way to reach its objective to improve the 
carbon footprint through Co2 capture.134 Besides, the very way in which the initiative is 
designed to ensure that the processing and construction stages take place locally through short 
circuits translates into reduced transportation thereby contributing to fighting the greenhouse 
effect. From a health perspective, the use of wood in buildings has also been linked to quality 
of life, health and well-being benefits, including stress reduction, humidity control, enhanced 
indoor air quality, and reduction in noise levels.135  
 
Fourth, as noted by Lybbert and others, the market can have an important role in directing the 
effects of GIs on biodiversity conservation.136 In the initiative of fried calamari from Hạ Long, 
increased consumer demand has led to over-exploitation of calamari in the Gulf of Tonkin, 
where, according to the CoP, at least 70% of calamari should be fished.137 According to 
producers, this has resulted in a significant reduction in the number of calamari in the area. 
Because their supply is quickly decreasing, producers have increasingly sourced calamari from 
Central Vietnam, China, Indonesia, and Malaysia.138 These practices may affect the quality of 
fried calamari. Other examples provide evidence that increased consumer demand for GI 
products can lead to excessive pressure on the biological resources needed for their production, 
which may ultimately result in their over-exploitation and erosion. For example, in Vietnam, 
the success of Cao Phong orange (GI granted in November 2014) has led to the rapid increase 
in cultivated areas with orange trees, with 16% of areas covered with orange trees being outside 
the GI area. This situation has caused environmental damages including deforestation, erosion 
and water shortage.139  
 
Finally, state authorities in both France and Vietnam have adopted policies or practices that 
may influence the effects of GIs on biodiversity. In France, Barham reports that, according to 
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Bérard and Marchenay, AOC areas are subject to higher environmental restrictions and to the 
state’s higher level of scrutiny in terms of compliance with environmental regulation.140 In 
Vietnam, the state’s agricultural modernisation and intensification policy may affect 
production practices as well as the delimitation of production areas. In the case of vermicelli 
from Bình Liêu, the interviews revealed that, in order to increase production, the cultivation 
area has extended by 30% in a few years to include forest areas, originally excluded from the 
GI production area for environmental protection purposes.141 The extension of the cultivation 
area is supported by local DARD authorities who have provided local farmers with additional 
arrowroot seeds.142 Although it is difficult to know if these practices derive from Vietnam’s 
national policy for agricultural intensification, the fact remains that they are encouraged by 
public authorities, thereby suggesting that the effects of GI initiatives on biodiversity can also 
be mediated by public policies and practices. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Drawing upon six case studies in France and Vietnam, this chapter has aimed to identify the 
effects of GIs outside the market and disentangle the factors involved therein. Our findings 
confirm that GI initiatives can foster job creation and the development of new economic 
activities in the territory, as well as impact on the preservation of cultural practices and 
biodiversity, as already observed in the GI literature. In addition to the well-studied effects of 
GIs in scholarship, our data also suggest that GI initiatives can act as a platform for exchange 
of knowledge, sharing of practices and diffusion of innovations, thereby contributing to local 
actors’ empowerment through the development of their technical skills and know-how. 
Besides, this chapter has shown that GI protection enjoys high credibility in France, which can 
lead to greater representative capacity and influence of GI collectives with state and other 
authorities. This may further enable the satisfaction of certain needs and demands.   
 
However, the impacts vary greatly across the initiatives. For example, the initiatives of green 
lentils from Berry and wood from the Alps generate positive impacts on job creation that were 
largely driven by market success and social awareness of the producers’ association, 
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respectively. In contrast, the creation of new job opportunities within the GI initiatives has 
either been impossible due to institutional constraints for bouchot mussels from Mont-St-
Michel Bay; made intentionally complex in the regulations of fried calamari from Hạ Long; or 
been hindered by the difficult access to land and the prevalence of short marketing circuits in 
the Pélardon initiative. Similarly, some initiatives have generated positive impacts on the 
preservation of cultural practices and biodiversity conservation but not others, due to a range 
of reasons specific to each initiative. At a more general level, the empirical research that has 
been carried out so far in the GI literature has also led to inconclusive results of the non-market 
effects of GIs, even in Europe where impacts vary on a case-by-case basis.143  
 
What has nonetheless emerged as a consensus among researchers is that GI legal protection 
alone is a necessary but insufficient condition to bring the desired effects.144 Our findings 
clearly confirm that, as argued by Barjolle and Sylvander, a combination of enabling factors is 
required.145 This chapter has shown that factors conducive or detrimental to the positive 
externalities of GIs vary depending on the context of each product and stand on different levels: 
(i) at the producer/initiative level, the formal rules negotiated and included in the CoP/users’ 
regulations as well as the informal self-imposed codes of conduct as derived from the social, 
cultural or environmental awareness of individual producers and/or GI collectives, can provide 
powerful levers for directing the effects of GIs outside the market;  
(ii) at the market level, market success can increase the attractiveness of the GI initiative among 
local producers and drive job creation within the initiative (and conversely). At the same time, 
the type of marketing channels prevailing for a GI product may undermine producers’ interest 
in joining the GI initiative and hence limit the creation of new employment opportunities 
therein. Market success can also affect, both in a positive and negative way, the preservation 
of traditional methods of production and the protection of biodiversity; and 
(iii) at the state level, the formal approach to GIs, and regulation of production activities in 
specific sectors, as well as laws, public policies, strategies and informal practices of state 
authorities, have also been identified as factors enabling or constraining the creation of public 
benefits derived from the operation of the GI initiatives.  
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These findings suggest the need to develop a dynamic understanding of GIs and consider both 
the functioning of the initiatives at the local level, including formal rules and informal 
constraints, and the broader commercial, societal and institutional context in which the GI 
initiatives are operating when exploring their effects outside the market. Further, contrary to 
the EU’s claim that sui generis systems of protection of GIs contribute to development 
dynamics, our findings indicate that GI legal protection alone is not enough, and that the type 
of legal protection is not necessarily a relevant factor influencing the ability of GI initiatives to 
create such effects. It is true that, at least in France, the sui generis systems of protection enjoy 
a special status that can result in positive externalities. This is shown in the missions of general 
interest assigned by the law to producers’ associations, particularly as regards the cultural 
heritage dimension; the special environmental protection of production areas; as well as, in the 
case of Pélardon cheese and green lentils from Berry, the enhanced legitimacy, representative 
capacity and influence of GI collectives. However, the wood from the Alps initiative, protected 
through a certification mark, has emerged as the initiative that has the greatest impact on 
sustainable development of the territory, especially in relation to job creation, local actors’ 
empowerment via the development of their technical skills and know-how, and environmental 
sustainability.  
 
Rather than the certification mark itself, it is the producers’ association’s pro-active voluntary 
approach and commitment to contribute to local sustainable development, as reflected in the 
regulations of the certification mark and the criteria for certification, that are driving the 
territorial impacts of this initiative. In effect, the initiatives that consciously focus on 
sustainable development and engage in behaviours that are sensitive to social justice, cultural 
heritage and environmental protection, either at the collective or individual level, are the most 
likely to bring about public benefits, regardless of the type of legal protection. 
 
These results not only challenge the EU’s assumption of the positive externalities of sui generis 
systems of protection of GIs by calling for particular attention on the role of institutions and 
individual and collective behaviours. They also confirm that, at a more general level, a bundle 
of socio-economic, cultural, institutional and organisational factors engage with the law and 
influence the way in which it contributes to achieve public benefits and territorial dynamics.  
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General conclusion 
 
 
 
This thesis has sought to understand the effects of the terroir and the trade mark approaches 
on the creation process, the operation and the economic and non-economic benefits of GI 
initiatives in two contrasting countries, France and Vietnam. My main argument is that the 
significance of the distinction between the two types of protection varies greatly depending on 
the institutional context in which the GI initiatives are embedded, and that the differences 
between both approaches can be greatly reduced in practice. I further argue that the type of 
legal protection is often not enough to drive the value and benefits of GIs, except in countries 
where the sui generis system enjoys a special status, and that legal protection per se is irrelevant 
in specific contexts.  
 
To test this argument, the thesis was organised into six chapters. The first two chapters provided 
an overview of the sui generis and trade mark systems of protection for GIs that apply in France 
and Vietnam. The objective was to set up the relevant legal frameworks for identification of 
the differences between the two systems in both countries and discussion of the effects of the 
law in practice. I then turned to the analysis of my empirical findings. I first explored the actors’ 
objectives and collective dynamics involved in the establishment and management of the GI 
initiatives. Moving from the internal life to the outward face of the initiatives, I then considered 
GIs from a market perspective. Among my case studies, two groups of initiatives could be 
readily distinguished: those in which the GI label is used on the market, and those in which it 
is not. For the first group, I endeavoured to understand the factors impacting the commercial 
value of GIs and economic benefits of GIs. For the second group, I tried to identify the reasons 
for the limited, adverse or non-use of the origin labels. Finally, I looked beyond the market and 
investigated the dynamics of territorial development resulting from the use of GIs and the 
extent to which GIs contribute to the preservation of cultural heritage and the protection of 
biodiversity.  
 
Over the course of this research project it became clear that GIs stand at the crossroads of 
multiple interests and expectations raised at various levels and by different types of actors, 
revealing a host of thorny issues that require closer scrutiny. As the international dispute over 
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the benefits of GIs remains unresolved, I do not want to simply map out the scale of the 
problem. I wish to suggest improvements to a system which does have the potential for 
territorial development. The conclusion of this project summarises the issues at stake and 
proposes what might be done better in the future. To do so, this chapter revisits the hypotheses 
that were formulated in Chapter 1 before making final comments.  
 
(i) The integration of GI schemes with other regulatory interventions and requirements  
 
According to my first hypothesis, GI schemes are affected by, and integrated with, other 
regulatory interventions and requirements. One main consequence is that, contrary to a 
conventional rules-based approach to regulation, the design, operation and effects of GI 
initiatives result not only from formal GI law, but from a wider set of regulations and forms of 
norm-making located at different levels and defending various interests.  
 
Throughout my thesis, I have shown how GIs engage and are closely intertwined with both 
formal and informal rules located at various levels. 
 
At the state level, formal laws and policies adopted in other areas were found to impact on the 
creation and effects of GI initiatives. For example, I have shown how in Vietnam, where there 
is a strong state intervention in agricultural matters, GI protection is closely intertwined with 
the state’s objectives and strategies that encompass poverty alleviation, rural industrialisation, 
agricultural modernisation and export-oriented agricultural policy. Such ‘meta-policies’ may 
contribute to explain the choice of products for protection, influence the content of the rules 
governing the products, or justify the objectives of the producers’ associations. For instance, 
the protection of the pottery from Đông Triều falls within the ambit of Vietnam’s rural 
industrialisation policy. Similarly, national objectives of agricultural modernisation have 
contributed to justify the introduction of improved varieties and the use of modern equipment 
to increase the productivity of vermicelli from Bình Liêu and sticky rice from Đông Triều. 
Alongside general policies, sector-specific regulations may directly affect the registration of 
GIs, as was the case with the trade mark ‘Bois des Alpes’ that arose from the Interregional 
Convention for the Alps for 2015-2020. They may also influence the effects of GIs – for 
example, the strict regulation of the mussel aquaculture industry in the Mont-St-Michel Bay as 
a public maritime domain limits production capacity and hinders job creation.  
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At the collective level, the most significant illustration of regulatory intervention affecting GIs 
lies in the product specification that contains the rules governing the product. As seen in the 
first chapters, both sui generis and trade mark systems allow for some flexibility in the content 
of the CoPs and users’ regulations which thus vary greatly in terms of details and standards 
depending on the stakeholders’ strategies and priorities. Although the trade mark system 
provides for less stringent legal requirements than the sui generis system, local stakeholders 
may decide to provide a high degree of technical detail and complexity in the users’ regulations. 
Conversely, in the sui generis system, local stakeholders may adopt higher or looser standards. 
For instance, the standards adopted for green lentils from Berry and bouchot mussels from 
Mont-St-Michel Bay are low and flexible while those of Pélardon cheese, Marseille soap and 
wood from the Alps include time-consuming artisanal and eco-friendly practices. Rules 
adopted at the local level therefore play a pivotal role in the design of the GI initiatives and 
may even contribute to the convergence of the two systems of protection.  
 
The charters of the producers’ associations were also found to influence the operation and 
effects of GI initiatives. They may ensure stakeholders’ control and participation in decision-
making processes in the French initiatives or, conversely, secure state control of the initiatives 
in Vietnam. The objectives laid down in the charters of the producers’ associations may include 
training, innovation and exchange of good practices. This is the case for green lentils from 
Berry, wood from the Alps and all the origin-labelling initiatives in Vietnam. They may also 
limit membership and hinder job creation, such as with fried calamari from Hạ Long.  
 
Alongside formal rules and policies, I have provided numerous examples of informal norms 
and behaviours that engage with GIs and affect the creation and effects of the initiatives. 
Informal interventions are first found at the state level. For instance, the French influence has 
led to a rigid interpretation of the Vietnamese law in practice, and non-transparent practices of 
state authorities undermine the smooth functioning of GI initiatives. At the individual and 
collective level, informal interventions include self-imposed codes of conduct that derive from 
cultural, social and environmental awareness. For example, the association ‘Bois des Alpes’ 
has adopted a pro-active voluntary approach that aims to create jobs in the territory and some 
Pélardon producers use endangered goat breeds that are not listed in the CoP to ensure their 
conservation. Finally, informal mechanisms can be seen at the market level. Increasing control 
by mass retailers of prices and distribution channels of green lentils from Berry and bouchot 
mussels from Mont-St-Michel Bay, and pressure from importers to not use the GI label in the 
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case of Lạng Sơn star anise, are striking illustrations of this. These various informal 
interventions provide powerful levers for shaping GIs and directing their effects regardless of 
the type of legal protection, often to a greater extent than formal regulation.  
 
The regulation of GIs thus has multiple levels and sources, which suggests that formal GI law 
– often the subject of analysis in the IP scholarship field – cannot be studied and does not work 
in isolation. A number of actors other than the state participate in the regulation of GIs and 
influence their effects. This plurality of regulatory forms reflects the importance of considering 
the empirical dimension of the regulatory activity on GIs and stresses the need to understand 
how legal processes really work outside the statutes and the text books. It further contributes 
to a wide definition of regulation that includes not only the state but also new forms of formal 
and informal norm-making. 
 
(ii) The significance of the distinction between the terroir and the trade mark approaches  
 
My second hypothesis considers that the significance of the distinction between the two types 
of legal protection varies greatly depending on the institutional context in which the GI 
initiatives are embedded. It further suggests that the sui generis system can lead to higher 
economic benefits than the trade mark system, however the type of legal protection fails to 
fully explain the non-economic effects of GIs outside the market.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 have put in evidence considerable differences between the French and 
Vietnamese terroir and trade mark regimes, which shows the importance of considering the 
institutional context in which GI initiatives are established. In French and European law, the 
two legal approaches are totally independent from one another and significantly different from 
each other. The French sui generis system of protection not only provides for more stringent 
registration requirements than the trade mark system. It has also been designed specifically to 
certify the origin of the products, unlike the trade mark system that may be used for that purpose 
under certain conditions, and it is considered as a higher-quality certification that is sought 
after.  
 
By contrast, in Vietnam, the distinction between the two legal approaches is not so clear-cut. 
In that country, the sui generis and trade mark systems can equally protect the geographical 
names of local products and the establishment and implementation processes of both regimes 
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show strong similarities. These include the rigid interpretation of the law, the policy 
intervention for the identification of GIs, the state’s control over the initiatives, the arbitrariness 
in the choice of the means of protection, and the lack of efficient quality controls. Besides, the 
lack of one official state logo for all sui generis GIs, unlike in France, makes it more difficult 
for consumers to distinguish a sui generis GI logo from a trade mark logo. The prevalence of 
bureaucratic and non-transparent practices further exposes the subordinate role of legal 
structures in Vietnam, which also contributes to make the distinction between the sui generis 
and trade mark systems insignificant. 
 
Looking beyond the law, I examined whether the objectives attached to GIs differ depending 
on the type of legal protection. In theory, the sui generis system is more closely associated with 
cultural, social and environmental values unlike the trade mark system that traditionally aims 
to protect private economic interests. This is particulary true in France where the PDO/PGI 
system enjoys a special status based on a holistic vision of terroir. Unlike Vietnamese law, 
French law imposes higher environmental restrictions to PDO/PGI production areas and 
provides that producers’ associations established under the sui generis system should preserve 
local traditions and know-how. In practice, the analysis of the case studies in Chapter 4 shows 
that the motivation for the registration of GIs varies greatly and that both economic and non-
economic objectives are associated with GIs by those seeking protection, regardless of the type 
of legal protection. These range from the fight against unfair competition practices to the 
defence of traditional production activities, market development, territorial development, 
biodiversity conservation, industrialisation and modernisation of agriculture, among others.  
 
To what extent do the two types of protection lead to different effects on the market? Here I 
argue that, unlike in Vietnam where the confusion between the two systems of protection does 
not allow for a meaningful differentiation of their effects on the market, in France the sui 
generis scheme may generate more economic benefits than the trade mark system. As seen in 
Chapter 5, this is because there is great commercial interest in PDO/PGI labels among mass 
retailers, wholesalers and distributors to meet the demand of consumers for PDO/PGI products. 
From that perspective, sui generis protection matters to producers as it allows them to access 
the regional and national market, sell off substantial volumes of their production, and be 
guaranteed payments within a short period of time. At the institutional level, the European 
Commission and regional authorities provide financial support to implement communication 
activities for the promotion of PDO/PGI products on the market. These various benefits could 
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be observed across all the PDO/PGI cases studies. At the same time, my findings also show 
that most of the price premiums are captured by commercial entities and retailers, which 
reduces the potential profits of producers.  
 
I further contend that both sui generis and trade mark systems can lead to non-economic effects 
outside the market in either country. Chapter 7 has observed positive and negative impacts on 
job creation, preservation of cultural practices and biodiversity conservation across GI 
initiatives established under both schemes in France and Vietnam. Hence, outside the market, 
sui generis systems do not seem to do better than trade marks, at least as far as certification 
marks are concerned. As seen in Chapter 7, the effects of GIs outside the market are largely 
mediated by the rules governing the product. As one scholar put it, ‘GI products remain in a 
perpetual flux between a number of different values and interests’,1 thus raising the question 
as to which values are given prominence when elaborating the rules governing the product. In 
requiring to take goats out on the territory for a minimum number of days, the CoP of Pélardon 
cheese reflects strong environmental and cultural values, which has contributed to the 
conservation of landscape and ecosystems while reducing the risk of fire. Yet, as I have argued 
earlier, the flexibility of the trade mark system allows for social, cultural and environmental 
interests to be reflected in the users’ regulations as well as in the CoPs under the sui generis 
system, depending on the stakeholders’ priorities and strategy. For instance, the certification 
mark ‘Bois des Alpes’ was found to have a great impact on territorial development resulting 
from strict social and environmental criteria included in its regulations.  
 
Other non-legal factors contribute to explain the non-economic effects of GIs. The 
stakeholders’ social, cultural and environmental awareness may lead to the voluntary adoption 
of informal rules and codes of conduct, which provide powerful levers for directing the effects 
of GIs, regardless of the type of legal protection. The commitment of Pélardon producers to 
preserve endangered goat breeds not listed in the CoP, which was already discussed, provides 
a good example. Besides, market success has emerged as a particularly important issue 
affecting producers’ interest in participating in GI initiatives and driving or hindering job 
creation, as with green lentils from Berry and Pélardon cheese. Market success can also impact 
on the preservation of traditional methods of production and the protection of biodiversity. For 
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instance, increased consumer demand for fried calamari from Hạ Long has led to over-
exploitation of calamari in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
 
(iii) Collective action and collaboration among local stakeholders  
 
Building on collective action theory, my third hypothesis suggests that the establishment and 
use of GIs on the market encourages collaboration among producers and other local 
stakeholders, which further contributes to generate spillover effects outside the market.  
 
The issue of producers’ collaboration is addressed in various ways throughout my thesis. It is 
first discussed when analysing the legal frameworks for the protection of GIs in Chapters 2 and 
3. The French law for sui generis protection of GIs provides a key role to local stakeholders, 
as a collective, in the registration of the GI and the establishment and management of the 
initiatives. The collective action of local stakeholders is particularly blatant in the elaboration 
of the local rules governing the GI product. This process provides local actors with a space to 
discuss their own vision of the product and agree collectively upon common standards. In 
involving interaction and decision-making processes, the French law for sui generis protection 
of GIs strongly encourages, and is fundamentally based on, collaboration among local 
stakeholders, which has significant consequences for the participation and empowerment of 
local actors. By contrast, neither the French trade mark system nor Vietnamese law for sui 
generis and trade mark protection of GIs contain specific requirements aimed at promoting 
producers’ collaboration.  
 
Despite the differences among the various legal systems, Chapter 4 has shown how, in practice, 
a producers’ association has been established in all twelve GI initiatives not only to defend, 
manage and promote the GI product on the market, but also to act as collaboration platforms 
to facilitate the exchange of information, technical knowledge and good practices among local 
stakeholders. Unlike in France where collective action dynamics often preceded the creation 
of producers’ associations, and where the elaboration of the rules governing the products 
involved collaboration among local stakeholders in both systems of protection, in Vietnam 
external experts have emerged as key players in such processes. 
 
Looking at the use of GIs on the market, Chapter 5 confirms that GI initiatives encourage 
collaboration among local stakeholders to sustain the collective reputation attached to the 
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product and increase its market value. The analysis of my case studies has particularly 
emphasised the need for collaboration within GI collectives to implement costly collective 
communication and promotion activities, and increase material, human and organisational 
capacities to pursue new business opportunities such as with bouchot mussels from Mont-St-
Michel Bay and Pélardon cheese. This is particularly advantageous to small producers. From 
that perspective, collaboration allows local actors to pool resources towards common goals that 
they would not be able to meet individually.  
 
Finally, the assumption that collaboration among local stakeholders within GI collectives 
contributes to generate spillover effects outside the market could be verified in Chapter 7 for 
all six initiatives for which the GI label is used in the marketplace. Some important spillover 
effects found in all six GI initiatives are the structuring of the value chain and the development 
of the technical skills and know-how of local stakeholders through the exchange of good 
practices. Knowledge-sharing and innovation diffusion processes, which have been recognised 
as one of the most important functions of GI collectives, further contribute to the empowerment 
of local actors. Equally important, the collective implementation and observance of the formal 
rules governing the GI product was clearly identified as a powerful tool to drive the effects of 
the initiatives. Examples were given of how compliance with such rules may impact on job 
creation, preservation of traditional practices and biodiversity conservation.  
 
(iv) The relevance of legal protection  
 
My last hypothesis challenges the very usefulness of legal protection. It posits that legal 
protection of GIs is irrelevant in some circumstances, typically when local producers have no 
space to participate meaningfully in the initiatives or find no reason to use the GIs. 
 
Chapter 6 has documented and discussed compelling stories that show little, adverse or non-
use of GI labels across both sui generis and trade mark initiatives in each country. I argue that 
reasons for ‘GI failures’ are to be found in the limited space provided to local stakeholders and 
in the specific environment of each initiative.  
 
The study of the French and Vietnamese legal frameworks for the protection of GIs in Chapters 
2 and 3 is useful to understand the respective roles of the state and local stakeholders in the 
registration process, the management of the initiatives, and the use of GIs in each country. How 
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does GI law affect the actions of local actors and shape the processes for their involvement in 
the GI initiatives? In short: immensely. As I have argued, in France, local actors strategically 
initiate the protection process, actively negotiate the rules governing the product and manage 
the initiatives in a participatory manner which contributes to their empowerment. In Vietnam, 
where there is strong state intervention in agricultural matters, local actors are usually 
integrated passively within initiatives designed by external consultants and managed by state 
authorities. As I have shown, the contrasting roles of local actors in each context are the 
consequence of the law and translate a bottom-up or top-down approach to GIs.  
 
These approaches provide different advantages and disadvantages in each specific context, 
which I discussed earlier. The French system can lead to long and complex negotiations that 
may result in the adoption of low quality standards, while the Vietnamese top-down approach 
can be useful to accelerate the registration process in a country where there is little awareness 
about the GI concept and where local stakeholders lack organisational capacities.  
 
However, one common pitfall of top-down processes is the little space, if at all, left to local 
stakeholders to contribute to the decision-making processes in a meaningful way and take 
ownership of the GI collectives. In Vietnam, with some exceptions, the top-down approach to 
GIs has generally translated in very little understanding, adhesion and commitment of local 
actors. Some producers of star anise from Lạng Sơn reported not knowing the CoP or the GI 
logo itself. In the initiatives of sticky rice from Đông Triều and vermicelli from Bình Liêu, 
some farmers are not aware of the existence of the association or of their own membership. As 
a result, there is very low use of the GI labels, if at all, in most Vietnamese GI initiatives 
established under both protection systems.  
 
If the way in which law shapes the role of local actors is a significant factor accounting for the 
failure of the initiatives to promote the use of the origin labels, it is not the only factor involved. 
As the analysis of the case studies in Chapter 6 demonstrates, we need to consider how the 
specific institutional and socio-economic contexts in which the initiatives are established, 
affect the producers’ ability and interest in using the origin labels. Modernisation of ways of 
life, changes in consumer tastes, prohibitive selling prices, lack of economic incentives and 
long marketing channels have all emerged as factors impacting negatively on the use and value 
of origin labels. Conical hats from Huế are no longer worn by Vietnamese people and tourists 
do not know and do not ask for the genuine product. French consumers use coloured and 
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perfumed soaps rather than the traditional and more expensive cube of green Marseille soap. 
In Đông Triều, potters are sub-contracted by multinational companies to produce modern 
products at the expense of the traditional heavy pottery. In the same district, rice farmers sell 
their production in bulk to wholesalers because they gain no economic advantage in selling it 
to the trade mark association. Poor farmers in Cao Bằng get higher profits from selling live 
calves to Chinese traders while Chinese and Indian importers exert pressure on Vietnamese 
traders to not use the GI label on star anise from Lạng Sơn.  
 
These stories demonstrate the need to look closely at the interests and priorities of local 
producers. In seeking to understand why producers do not engage with GI initiatives, this study 
establishes that the economic and non-economic values of GIs are contingent on time, place, 
personal and community needs and priorities. In doing so, it engages with socio-legal and 
anthropological perspectives on IP and questions the place and mere relevance of GI protection 
in specific environments.	 
 
Final comments  
 
I want to finish this thesis by identifying avenues for reflection on how we can do better. I do 
not believe there is one single perfect formula or one ideal approach to GIs, yet there are surely 
matters we should be aware of. I want to briefly highlight five issues which I believe are worth 
considering.  
 
First, I argue that attention should be paid to the supply chain coordination and management 
and to the participation of all relevant stakeholders in decision-making processes within the GI 
collectives. In this regard, the structure of collective organisations with strong institutional 
mechanisms and governance systems is key. If top-down approaches are useful to drive the 
registration process and support the establishment of initiatives in countries where the concept 
of GI is still very new, they should seek to involve stakeholders as early as possible – and well 
before the post-registration phase. This is essential to ensure their full adhesion to the 
initiatives, promote their cooperation, and develop a sense of fairness and belonging. 
 
This observation leads me to consider the role of the state and non-state actors in fostering the 
interest, awareness and empowerment of local stakeholders, including by increasing common 
understanding of the concept of GIs, providing training on leadership and negotiation skills, 
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designing representative, independent and efficient organisations, and building trust in the 
institutions. Here, I want to stress the importance of informal practices and soft law, including 
guidelines, manuals, handbooks of good practices, that can be informed by empirical work and 
which can usefully complement formal law to create an enabling institutional environment.  
 
This leads to my third comment on the multiple dimensions of GIs. We need to develop a 
critical awareness of the complex interactions between GIs and economic, social, political, 
cultural and environmental issues while considering the characteristics of each specific context. 
Considering these interactions and the possible synergies between GIs and other sectors, I 
argue that, rather than being seen in isolation, GIs should be part of a comprehensive, holistic 
and coherent context-specific territorial development strategy that would foster mutually-
reinforcing territorial effects and be customised to the peculiar needs, challenges and priorities 
of the communities concerned. 
 
Following from the above consideration and as I have argued in different parts of my thesis, 
the range of potential impacts of GIs, both economic and non-economic, makes it particularly 
relevant to consider adopting a complementary approach to, and seek convergence among, 
different certifications. I argue that further research is needed on the use of various certification 
schemes addressing provenance, quality, tradition, fair trade, and organic farming to determine 
the costs incurred and the possible mutually-reinforcing processes derived from their use in the 
marketplace.    
 
Finally, although there is increasing knowledge on the effects of origin labelling, I argue that 
we are still at the beginning of the process of understanding GIs and that we need to do more 
fieldwork to develop empirically-grounded theory and sustainable practices. Much of the 
current research, including my own project, is limited in the absence of more and better data. 
We need to come to grips with the empirical richness of GIs by examining how the initiatives 
are built, how they operate and what effects they contribute to deliver.   
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ANNEX 1 
List and codification of interviews conducted in Vietnam 
 
 
All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. I removed all potential information that may help 
identify those interviewees who requested it.  
 
 
§ Group A: Sticky rice from Đông Triều  
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
V-A1 
 
Mr Xhan, 
Project leader, CASRAD  
 
05/03/2014 Hanoi Face-to-face, Individual 
V-A2 
 
Mr Thang, 
President of the Association 
 
15/03/2014 Đông Triều, Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-A3 
 
Mr Diem,  
Chairman, Agricultural 
Division, DARD 
 
15/03/2014 Đông Triều, Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-A4 Mrs Thoa, Farmer 15/03/2014 
 
Yen Duc Village, 
Đông Triều District 
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-A5 
 
Mrs Huyen, 
Farmer, Head of Hoang Que 
village 
 
Mr Hop, 
Farmer 
 
Mr Hau, 
Farmer 
 
16/03/2014 Hoang Que Village,  Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
V-A6 
 
 
Mr Ngoc Tien, 
DG of Plant Seed Joint Stock 
Company 
 
17/03/2014 Mao Khe Town, Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
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Code Name and function 
 
Date of interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
V-A7 
Mr Nghi, 
Farmers’ representative for 
Hong Phong village 
 
Ms Thi Hang, 
Farmer 
 
Ms Thi Thuy, 
Farmer 
 
Ms Dhi Dunh, 
Farmer (non-member) 
 
18/03/2014 
Hong Phong Village, 
Đông Triều District 
 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
 
V-A8 
 
Ms Thi Manh, 
Farmer, Head of Yen Khanh 
ward 
 
19/03/2014 Yen Duc Village, Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-A9 
 
Ms Thoa, 
Farmer 
 
04/04/2014 Distant By phone 
V-A10 
 
Ms Huyen, 
Farmer, Head of Hoang Que 
village  
 
04/04/2014 Distant By phone 
V-A11 
 
Mr Thang, 
President of the Association 
 
05/07/2017 Distant By phone 
V-A12 
 
Ms Huyen, 
Farmer, Head of Hoang Que 
village  
 
06/07/2017 Distant By phone 
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§ Group B: Pottery from Đông Triều  
 
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
V-B1 
 
Mr Lenh,  
President of the Association  
 
15/03/2014 
Kim Sen Industrial 
Park, 
Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-B2 Mrs Thi Vinh,  CEO of Quang Vinh Company 17/03/2014 
 
Ving Hong Village, 
Đông Triều District  
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-B3 
 
Group of four potters-producers 
(anonymous) 
Quang Vinh Company 
 
17/03/2014 
 
Ving Hong Village, 
Đông Triều District  
 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
V-B4 
 
Mr Sy Nha,  
Head of Ving Hong village 
 
17/03/2014 Ving Hong Village, Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-B5 
 
Mr Tuyet,  
CEO of Thanh Dong Company 
 
18/03/2014 Binh Duong Village, Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-B6 
 
Mrs Thi Vinh,  
CEO of Quang Vinh Company  
 
19/03/2014 
 
Ving Hong Village, 
Đông Triều District  
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-B7 
 
Trader (anonymous) 
 
19/03/2014 Bat Trang Pottery Village 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-B8 
 
Mrs Thi Vinh,  
CEO of Quang Vinh Company  
 
15/09/2017 Distant By phone 
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§ Group C: Fried calamari from Hạ Long  
 
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
 
V-C1 
 
 
Mr Bui Kim, 
Project leader, CASRAD  
 
06/03/2014 Hanoi Face-to-face, Individual 
V-C2 
 
Mr Tuan, 
Deputy Head, 
Culture and Tourism Department 
 
Mr Thang, 
Deputy Head, 
Economic Department 
 
Ms Thu, 
Officer, 
Economic Department 
 
24/03/2014 
 
Hạ Long City 
 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
 
V-C3 
 
Mr Hai, 
then President of the Association  
 
25/03/2014 Hạ Long City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-C4 
 
Mrs Thoan, 
Producer-trader, 
Vice-President of the Association 
 
25/03/2014 
 
Hạ Long City 
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-C5 
 
Group of two producer-traders 
(anonymous) 
 
25/03/2014 
 
Hạ Long City 
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-C6 
 
Mrs Thi Thoa, 
Producer-trader (non-member) 
 
25/03/2014 Hạ Long City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-C7 
 
Ms. Thi Hoang,  
Producer-trader (non-member) 
 
26/03/2014 Hạ Long City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-C8 
 
Ms. Thi Loi  
Wholesaler-supplier of fresh 
calamari 
 
26/03/2014 Hạ Long City Face-to-face, Individual 
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Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
V-C9 
Ms. Thi Huyen 
Producer-trader (non-member) 
 
26/03/2014 Hạ Long City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-C10 
 
Mrs Kieu, 
Producer-trader 
 
26/03/2014 Hạ Long City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-C11 
 
Producer-trader  
(anonymous) 
 
26/03/2014 Hạ Long City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-C12 
 
Mr Sy Nguyen 
Head of IP Division, MOST 
 
Mr Duong, 
Deputy Head of IP Division, 
MOST 
 
27/03/2014 Hạ Long City 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
V-C13 
Ms Thu,  
Officer, 
Economic Department 
 
27/03/2014 Hạ Long City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-C14 Mr Ngi Hiêp, President of the association 22/07/2017 Distant By phone 
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§ Group D: Vermicelli from Bình Liêu  
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
V-D1 
 
Ms Quyntho, 
Project leader, CASRAD 
 
30/03/14 Bình Liêu Face-to-face, Individual 
V-D2 
 
Mr Van Mùu, 
Officer, Bureau of Agriculture  
 
31/03/14 Bình Liêu Face-to-face, Individual 
V-D3 
 
Mr Xuân Bàch, 
President of the Association  
 
31/03/14 Bình Liêu Face-to-face, Individual 
V-D4 
 
Mrs Thanh Hé, 
Officer, Economic and 
Infrastructure Department 
 
01/04/2014 Bình Liêu Face-to-face, Individual 
V-D5 
 
Mr Thù, 
Farmer, Head of Hùc Dong village  
 
01/04/2014 
 
Hùc Dong village, 
Bình Liêu District 
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-D6 
 
Mr Thaù, 
Farmer (non-member)  
 
01/04/2014 Bình Liêu Face-to-face, Individual 
V-D7 
 
Group of three farmers 
(anonymous) 
 
02/04/2014 Bình Liêu 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
V-D8 
 
Mr Xuân Bàch, 
President of the Association  
 
07/05/2017 Distant By phone 
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§ Group E: Conical hat from Huế́  
 
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
V-E1 
 
 
Mrs. Thuy Hoa, 
Former President of the 
Association 
 
Mrs. Ha, 
Current President of the 
Association, President of the 
Provincial Women’s Union 
 
Mrs. Yen, 
Officer at the Provincial 
Women's Union 
 
15/04/2014 
 
Huế́ City 
 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
 
V-E2 
 
Group of 3 brim producers 
(anonymous) 
 
16/04/2014  Huế́ City  
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
V-E3 
 
Producer (anonymous) 
 
16/04/2014 Huế́ City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-E4 
 
Ms. Thuy, 
Producer-trader  
 
16/04/2014 Huế́ City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-E5 
 
Group of three leaf 
collectors/processors 
  
17/04/2014 Huế́ City 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
V-E6 
 
Mr. Hung, 
Head of IP Division, DOST 
 
17/04/2014 Huế́ City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-E7 
 
Ms. Nhon, 
Wholesaler  
 
26/03/2014 Huế́ City Face-to-face, Individual 
V-E8 
 
Mr. Hung, 
Head of IP Division, DOST 
 
22/05/2016 Distant By phone 
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§ Group F: H’mong beef from Cao Bằng  
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
V-F1 
 
Mr Xuan Hoang, 
Project leader, CASRAD 
 
05/03/2014 Hanoi Face-to-face, Individual 
V-F2 
 
Ms Le Thanh, 
President of the Association 
 
06/05/2014 Cao Bằng Face-to-face, Individual 
V-F3 
 
Trader (anonymous) 
 
06/05/2014 Cao Bằng Face-to-face, Individual 
V-F4 
 
Mr Van Ngan,  
Owner of the slaughterhouse 
 
06/05/2014 Cao Bằng Face-to-face, Individual 
V-F5 
 
Group of Chinese traders 
(anonymous) 
 
07/05/2014 Tra Linh market 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
V-F6 
 
Mr Ly Van Sau, 
breeder and head of a farmers’ 
group 
 
07/05/2014 Ha Thon Village Face-to-face, Individual 
V-F7 
 
Mr Tan,  
Director, Department of Planning 
and Investment 
 
08/05/2014 Cao Bằng Face-to-face, Individual 
V-F8 
 
Mr Khan,  
Deputy Director, DARD  
 
08/05/2014 Cao Bằng Face-to-face, Individual 
V-F9 
 
Mr Tru,  
Head of Animal Raising 
Department, DARD 
 
08/05/2014 Cao Bằng Face-to-face, Individual 
V-F10 
 
Mr Nang Cong,  
CEO of Ha Anh Company 
(trader) 
 
17/05/2014 Hanoi Face-to-face, Individual 
V-F11 
 
Mr Viet,  
CEO of Rural Food Company 
(trader) 
 
17/05/2014 Hanoi Face-to-face, Individual 
325 
 
§ Group G: Star anise from Lạng Sơn  
 
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
V-G1 
 
Mr Le Anh, 
Project leader, 
Netherlands Development 
Organisation, SNV 
 
21/03/2014 Hanoi Face-to-face, Individual 
V-G2 
 
Mr Dang Ninh  
Director, DOST 
 
12/05/2014 Lạng Sơn Face-to-face, Individual 
V-G3 
 
Mr Dac, 
Director of STAMEC 
 
Mrs Tran Thanh Phuang, 
Deputy Head of STAMEC 
 
13/05/2014 Lạng Sơn 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
 
V-G4 
 
Ms Thi Huyen, 
Sale Manager, Vietnam Star 
Anise Processing and 
Exporting Company Limited 
(AFOREX) 
 
 
Mr Motiani, 
Indian buyer/importer 
 
14/05/2014 Lạng Sơn 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
 
V-G5 
 
Mr Kien,  
Farmer, President of the 
Association  
 
15/05/2014 Lạng Sơn Face-to-face, Individual 
V-G6 Group of four producers (anonymous) 15/05/2014 Lạng Sơn 
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
 
V-G7 
 
Mr Que Anh,  
Director of Vinasamex Company 
 
08/05/2014 Co Bi Village,  Gia Lam District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-G8 
 
Mr Le Anh, 
Project leader, 
Netherlands Development 
Organisation, SNV 
 
21/03/2017 Distant By phone 
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§ Group H: Non-product specific  
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
V-H1 
 
Mr Dinh Sy Nguyen 
Head of IP Division, MOST, 
Quang Ninh Province 
 
Mr Duong, 
Deputy Head of IP Division, 
MOST, Quang Ninh Province 
 
Mr Duc, 
Director, DARD 
 
Mr Thang, 
Vice-Head of Science Division, 
DARD 
 
 
Mr Dung, 
Vice-Head, Plantation 
Department, DARD 
13/03/2014 
 
Hạ Long City 
 
Face-to-face, 
Group 
interview 
 
V-H2 
 
Ngô Tiến Thiệu,  
Vice Chairman, 
People’s Committee, 
Đông Triều District  
 
14/03/2014 Đông Triều, Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-H3 
 
Mr Tuat,  
Vice-Chairman, 
Economics and Infrastructure 
Department, 
Đông Triều District  
 
14/03/2014 Đông Triều, Đông Triều District 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
V-H4 
 
Mr Duc Thanh, 
Deputy Director,  
Head of GIs Division 
NOIP 
 
21/05/2014 Hanoi Face-to-face, Individual 
V-H5 
 
Mr Hoi 
Director, Law firm CONCETTI 
 
26/05/2014 Hanoi Face-to-face, Individual 
 
 
327 
 
ANNEX 2 
List and codification of interviews conducted in France 
 
 
All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. I removed all potential information that may help 
identify those interviewees who requested it.  
 
 
§ Group A: Marseille soap 
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of 
interview Method 
F-A1 
 
Ms Bousquet-Fabre, 
Director, Marius Fabre soap factory 
 
05/02/2014 Salon-de-Provence 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
F-A2 
 
Mr Demeure, 
Former Director, Fer à Cheval soap 
factory 
 
06/02/2014 Marseille Face-to-face, Individual 
F-A3 
 
Mr Boulanger,  
Historian, Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Marseille Provence 
 
06/02/2014 Marseille Face-to-face, Individual 
F-A4 
 
Mr Jaussaud,  
Director, Grande Savonnerie soap factory 
 
07/02/2014 
 
Marseille 
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
F-A5 
 
Daniel Boetto,  
Director, Sérail soap factory 
 
23/06/2014 Marseille Face-to-face, Individual 
F-A6 
 
Mr Demeure, 
Former Director, Fer à Cheval soap 
factory 
 
24/06/2014 Marseille Face-to-face, Individual 
F-A7 
 
Mr Seghin, 
Director, Fer à Cheval soap factory 
 
25/09/2014 Marseille 
 
Face-to-face,  
Group interview 
(InterGI) 
 
F-A8 
 
Mr Bruna, 
Director, Licorne soap factory  
 
25/09/2014 Marseille 
 
Face-to-face,  
Group interview 
(InterGI) 
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Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
F-A9 
 
Sylvain Dijon,  
Soap-maker, Grande Savonnerie soap 
factory 
 
25/09/2014 Marseille 
 
Face-to-face,  
Group interview 
(InterGI) 
 
F-A10 
 
Mr Demeure, 
Former Director, Fer à Cheval soap 
factory 
 
12/11/2015 Distant By phone, Individual 
F-A11 
 
Mr Jaussaud,  
Director, Grande Savonnerie soap factory 
 
15/02/2016 Distant By phone, Individual 
 
 
 
§ Group B: Pélardon cheese  
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
F-B1 
 
Mr Mazenq,  
Farmer 
 
24/06/2014 Cévennes 
Face-to-face, 
Group interview 
(InterGI) 
F-B2 Ms Calvet,  Farmer, President of ODG 24/06/2014 
 
Cévennes  
 
 
Face-to-face, 
Group interview 
(InterGI) 
 
F-B3 
 
Ms Davoult, 
Director,  
Coopérative la Fromagerie des 
Cévennes 
 
25/06/2014 Cévennes 
Face-to-face, 
Group interview 
(InterGI) 
F-B4 
 
Mr Rio, 
Farmer 
 
25/06/2014 Cévennes 
Face-to-face, 
Group interview 
(InterGI) 
F-B5 
 
Mr Rigotard, 
Refiner  
 
25/06/2014 Cévennes 
Face-to-face, 
Group interview 
(InterGI) 
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Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of 
interview Method 
F-B6 
 
Ms Podeur, 
Coordinator of ODG 
 
04/07/2014 
 
Distant 
 
By phone, 
Individual 
F-B7 
 
Ms Richer, 
Territorial delegate, INAO 
 
15/12/2014 
 
Distant 
 
Phone interview, 
Individual 
F-B8 
 
Ms Podeur, 
Coordinator of ODG 
 
21/06/2017 Distant By phone, Individual 
F-B9 
 
Mr Vincent, 
Farmer  
 
29/11/2017 Distant By phone, Individual 
 
 
§ Group C: Mussels from Mt-St-Michel Bay  
 
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of 
interview Method 
 
F-C1 
 
 
Ms Salardaine, 
Coordinator of ODG  
 
07/08/2014 Vivier-sur-Mer Face-to-face, Individual 
F-C2 
 
Mr Lebeau, 
Producer 
 
07/08/2014 Vivier-sur-Mer Face-to-face, Individual 
F-C3 
 
Mr Jagou, Producer 
 
Mr Hodbert, Producer and President of 
ODG 
 
07/08/2014  Vivier-sur-Mer  
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
F-C4 
 
Mr Desormeaux, 
Commercial Director, Mytilimer 
(packager – commercial enterprise) 
 
08/08/2014 Vivier-sur-Mer Face-to-face, Individual 
F-C5 
 
Mr Cornée, 
Producer 
 
08/08/2014 Vivier-sur-Mer Face-to-face, Individual 
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Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of 
interview Method 
F-C6 
 
Mr Quéma, 
President, Cultimer  
(packager – commercial enterprise) 
 
08/08/2014 Vivier-sur-Mer Face-to-face, Individual 
F-C7 
 
Mr Morel, 
Producer 
 
09/08/2014 Vivier-sur-Mer Face-to-face, Individual 
F-C8 
 
Mr Salardaine, 
Producer 
 
Mr Hurtaud, 
Producer 
 
09/08/2014 Vivier-sur-Mer Face-to-face, Group interview 
F-C9 
 
Mr Hodbert,  
Producer and President of ODG 
 
09/08/2014 Vivier-sur-Mer Face-to-face, Individual 
F-C10 Mr Boyaval, Territorial delegate, INAO 06/11/2014 Distant 
By phone, 
Individual 
F-C11 Mr Hodbert,  Producer and President of ODG 14/06/2017 Distant 
By phone, 
Individual 
F-C12 Ms Salardaine, Coordinator of ODG  15/06/2018 Distant 
By phone, 
Individual 
F-C13 (anonymous) 16/07/2018 Distant By phone, Individual 
F-C14 
 
Officer of the Mt-St-Michel Bay Centre 
(anonymous) 
16/07/2018 Distant By phone, Individual 
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§ Group D: Green lentils from Berry  
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of interview Method 
F-D1 
 
Mr Cardaillat, 
Farmer 
 
11/08/2014 Issoudun Face-to-face, Individual 
F-D2 
 
Mr Perrot, 
Farmer and President of ODG 
 
11/08/2014 Issoudun Face-to-face, Individual 
F-D3 
 
Ms Taillandier, 
Commercial Director, Cibèle 
 
12/08/2014 Issoudun Face-to-face, Individual 
F-D4 
 
Farmer (anonymous) 
 
12/08/2014 
 
Issoudun  
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
F-D5 
 
Packer (anonymous) 
 
12/08/2014 
 
Issoudun  
 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
F-D6 
 
Ms Taillandier, 
Commercial Director, Cibèle 
 
11/04/2017 Issoudun Face-to-face, Individual 
 
 
§ Group E: Wood from the Alps  
 
 
Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of 
interview Method 
F-E1 
 
Mr Portier, 
Coordinator of the Association 
 
15/10/2014 Villars-de-Lans (Alps) 
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
F-E2 
 
Mr Buisson, 
President, Community of communes of 
Massif of Vercors 
 
15/10/2014 Villars-de-Lans (Alps) 
 
Conference  
&  
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
 
F-E3 
 
Daniel Bignon, 
President of the Association  
 
15/10/2014 Villars-de-Lans (Alps) 
 
Conference  
&  
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
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Code Name and function 
 
Date of 
interview 
 
Place of 
interview Method 
F-E4 
 
Ms Pertourie,  
Coordinator of the network of pilot 
projects ‘Bois des Alpes’ 
 
15/10/2014 Villars-de-Lans (Alps) 
 
Conference  
&  
Face-to-face, 
Individual 
 
F-E5 
 
Mr Blanc, 
Director, Sawmill Blanc 
 
15/10/2014 Marche (Alps) Face-to-face, Individual 
F-E6 Carpenter (anonymous) 25/06/2017 Distance 
 
Phone, 
Individual 
 
F-E7 Carpenter (anonymous) 25/06/2017 Distance 
 
Phone, 
Individual 
 
F-E8 
 
Mr Mermet, 
Specifier, Inter-professional Federation 
Bois de Rhônes-Alpes 
 
27/06/2017 Distance Phone, Individual 
F-E9 
 
Mr Portier, 
Coordinator of the Association 
 
13/07/2018 Distance Phone, Individual 
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ANNEX 3 
Interview guides 
 
 
1. Producers 
 
 
Theme 1 – History and typicity of the product 
 
1. Since when has the product been produced in the area? 
 
2. Do you consider the product as a traditional and typical product from the area?  
 
3. Can you describe the specific qualities and characteristics of the product?  
 
4. What are the most important factors for the elaboration of the product?  
 
5. To what extent are they attributable to the place, including the soil, the climate, local 
practices etc.? 
 
6. Do you think that consumers appreciate the product as a typical product from the area?  
 
 
Theme 2 – Production of the product 
 
7. Since when have you been producing the product?  
 
8. How big is your production? 
 
9. Has it increased in the past two years?  
 
10. If yes, how did it increase?  
 
11. Do you think it will increase in the future? Why?  
 
12. Have the production techniques you employ changed since the registration of the GI? 
If so, how? 
 
13. What are the production costs?  
 
14. Has it increased in the past two years?  
 
15. How much quantity do you produce per year?  
 
16. How much quantity do you sell per year?  
 
17. Has it increased in the past two years? How?  
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Theme 3 – The association  
 
18. Were you involved in the process of establishing the association?  
 
19. Why did you decide to join the association?  
 
20. What are the main objectives of the association? 
 
21. What are the main activities of the association? 
 
22. What do you think of the association?  
 
23. Is there a cohesion among members of the association/users of the GI? 
 
 
Theme 4 – Adoption of the GI 
 
 
24. What do you think of the adoption of the GI?  
 
25. What are the main objectives of the GI? 
 
26. Were you involved in the process of drafting the technical regulations and choosing the 
logo (for Vietnam)?  
 
27. Was there any issue of disagreement among individuals involved in the elaboration of 
the technical rules? Which ones?  
 
28. How were these issues resolved?  
 
29. What do you think of the product regulations? 
 
30. According to you, do the production standards comply with the traditional and cultural 
practices associated with the product?  
 
31. Do the production standards leave room for application of new production techniques? 
 
32. Are production techniques evolving fast?  
 
 
Theme 5 – Quality control 
 
33. Do you think that the product quality is the same for all producers? Why? 
 
34. Can you tell me how the quality controls are organised and where they take place?  
 
35. Do you think the quality controls are efficient? Why?  
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Theme 6 – Marketing aspects 
 
36. Is all your production sold with the GI label and packaging?  
 
37. If not, what is the proportion of your production sold with the GI label and packaging?  
 
38. What are the reasons for not selling with the label? 
 
39. Who is responsible for the packaging and labelling of the product?  
 
40. How much does the packaging and labelling cost?  
 
41. What is the selling price?  
 
42. Has it increased since the GI registration?  
 
43. Is the price different from that for equivalent non-GI products? 
 
44. Where do you sell the product?  
 
45. What marketing channels are used to sell this product to final consumers?  
 
46. Is the labelled product sold on different markets than the non-labelled product?  
 
47. Has your income increased?  
 
48. Do you think the GI will help you promote the product and sell more?  
 
 
Theme 7 – Non-market aspects 
 
49. Have you been involved in any training? Which one?  
 
50. Is there any exchange of good practices among producers? Which ones? 
 
51. Do the production rules adopted in the technical regulations have environmental and 
cultural impacts? Which ones?  
 
52. Are there any practices adopted informally by producers that impact on the environment 
or the preservation of traditional cultural practices? 
 
 
Theme 8 – Conclusion 
 
53. In your opinion, what should change and how could you do better? 
 
54. What are your priorities and challenges for the coming two years? 
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55. Is there anything that I haven’t mentioned which you think would be interesting to 
discuss? 
 
 
2. President of the association 
 
 
Theme 1 – Creation of the association  
 
1. How did the idea of creating the association start? What motivated its creation?  
 
2. Can you describe the different steps taken for the establishment of the association?  
 
3. What are the main objectives of the association?  
 
4. How were you elected or appointed? 
 
5. How many members did the association have when it was created? 
 
 
Theme 2 – Registration of the GI  
 
6. Can you describe the different steps that were taken for the registration of the GI?  
 
7. For what reasons was it decided to register a collective mark and not a certification 
mark or a sui generis geographical indication (for example)? 
 
8. Was this choice discussed? Among which individuals/organizations?  
 
9. What are the main objectives you aim to achieve through the GI?  
 
10. Can you tell me more about the process of drafting the technical rules of the product 
and for governing the use of the GI?  
 
11. What experts, individuals and organisations were consulted in this process and how?  
 
12. Was there any issue of disagreement among individuals involved in the elaboration of 
the technical rules? Which ones?  
 
13. How were these issues resolved?  
 
14. How long did the registration process take?  
  
 
Theme 3 – Present operation of the association  
 
15. Today, how many members does the association have? 
 
16. Among them, how many are producers and traders?  
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17. Has membership increased since the creation of the association?    
 
18. Does the association provide its members with raw material (seeds etc.)?  
19. Do you aim to increase the association’s membership?  
 
20. How would you describe the functioning of the association? 
 
21. Are members of the association actively involved in its management/activities? 
 
22. What are the main activities of the association? 
 
23. Have you received any funding or support such as provision of materials or agricultural 
inputs? If so, from which institution? 
 
24. How do you evaluate the success of the initiative so far?  
 
25. According to you, are stakeholders satisfied with the association?  
 
26. Is there a cohesion among members of the association?  
 
27. What are the biggest challenges for the well-functioning of the association? 
 
 
Theme 4 – Labelling and market issues 
 
 
28. How much quantity of the GI product is produced and sold every year by members of 
the association?  
 
29. Has it increased in the past two years? Why? 
 
30. Is all the production sold with the GI label?  
 
31. If not, what is the proportion of the production sold with the label?  
 
32. What are the reasons for not selling with the label? 
 
 
Theme 5 – Quality control 
 
 
33. Do you think that the quality is the same for all producers? Why?  
 
34. Can you tell me how the quality control is organised and who is in charge?  
 
35. Where does the quality control operate? 
 
36. Is the quality control internal/external?  
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Theme 6 – Promotional activities 
 
 
37. What activities/programmes have you conducted or are you planning to conduct in 
order to promote the product and the GI?  
 
38. How do you create value out of the use of the mark?   
 
39. Have you developed any promotional materials?  
 
40. Do you participate in exhibitions, trade fairs etc.? Has there been any use of mass 
media?  
 
41. Do you think that the local community is better aware today of the specific qualities 
and production techniques of the rice thanks to the collective mark?  
 
 
Theme 7 – Non-market aspects 
 
1. Has the association organised any training? Which one?  
 
2. Does the association facilitate the exchange of good practices among producers? How? 
 
3. Do the production rules adopted in the technical regulations have environmental and 
cultural impacts? Which ones?  
 
4. Are there any practices adopted informally that impact on the environment or the 
preservation of traditional cultural practices? 
 
 
Theme 8 – Conclusion 
 
42. What are your top priorities and challenges for the two coming years? 
 
43. Is there anything that I haven’t mentioned which you think would be interesting to 
discuss? 
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3. Traders  
 
 
Theme 1 – Creation and operation of the association 
 
1. Were you involved in the process of establishing the association?  
 
2. Why did you decide to join the association?  
 
3. What are the main objectives of the association? 
 
4. What are the main activities of the association? 
 
5. What do you think of the association?  
 
 
Theme 2 – Use of the GI  
 
 
6. What do you think of the GI?  
 
7. What are the main objectives of the GI? 
 
8. Were you involved in the process of drafting the technical regulations and choosing the 
logo (for Vietnam)?  
 
9. What do you think of the GI logo? 
 
10. What are your expectations? 
 
11. Is there a cohesion among members of the association/users of the GI? 
 
 
Theme 3 – Labelling and marketing aspects 
 
 
12. Who is responsible for the packaging and labelling of the product?  
 
13. Where does the packaging and labelling take place?  
 
14. How much do the packaging and labelling cost?  
 
15. What is the selling price of one kilo (for example)?  
 
16. Has it increased? Why?  
 
17. Is the price different for the GI-labelled product and the equivalent non-labelled 
product?  
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18. Is the production sold locally? In other provinces? On the international market?  
 
19. What marketing channels are used to trade this product?  
 
20. Are they many distributors/traders (intermediary/final)? 
 
21. Is the labelled product sold on different markets than the non-labelled rice?  
 
22. Has consumers’ demand increased?  
 
23. Has consumers’ demand changed? How? 
 
 
Theme 4 – Quality controls  
 
24. Do you think that the product quality is the same for all labelled products? Why? 
 
25. Can you tell me how the quality controls are organised and where they take place?  
 
26. Do you think the quality controls are efficient? Why?  
 
27. When was the last time you were inspected? 
 
 
Theme 5 – Promotional activities 
 
 
28. What activities/programmes have you conducted or are you planning to conduct in 
order to promote the product and the GI?  
 
29. How do you create value out of the use of the mark?   
 
30. Have you developed any promotional materials?  
 
31. Do you participate in exhibitions, trade fairs etc.? Has there been any use of mass 
media?  
 
32. Do you think that the local community is better aware today of the specific qualities 
and production techniques of the rice thanks to the collective mark?  
 
 
Theme 6 – Non-market aspects 
 
33. Does the marketing of the GI product have environmental and cultural impacts? Which 
ones?  
 
34. Are there any practices adopted informally that impact on the environment or the 
preservation of traditional cultural practices? 
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Theme 7 – Conclusion   
 
 
35. What are your top priorities and challenges for the two coming years? 
 
36. Is there anything that I haven’t mentioned which you think would be interesting to 
discuss? 
 
 
4. Public authorities  
(interview guide used with the authorities of the People’s Committee of Quang Ninh Province 
taken as an example) 
 	
Theme 1 – Quang Ninh investment in science and technology 	
1. Quang Ninh Province has started to invest strongly in science and technology, 
including on branding local products, in 2012. Can you explain why it was decided to 
invest in science and technology? 
  
2. On 13 February 2012 Quang Ninh Province has adopted the Decision PPC 273/QD-
UBND about "Building program and brand development for agricultural products from 
Quang Ninh by 2015". Can you tell me more about this programme?  
 
3. Why has the branding of local products become a priority for Quang Ninh Province 
since 2012?  
 
 
Theme 2 – The selection of the products and the means of protection 
 
 
4. Can you explain how and on which criteria was the selection of the products made? 
 
5. Are all these products traditional local products that enjoy a specific reputation? 
 
6. Which institutions were involved in the choice of the products? 
 
7. Did the selection of the products involve assistance from technical experts?  
 
8. Can you explain how the choice of a particular means of protection (collective mark, 
certification mark or sui generis GI) was made?   
 
9. Do these three means of protection have different objectives?  
 
10. Which institutions were involved in the choice of the means of protection? 
 
11. Did the selection of the means of protection involve assistance from technical experts?  
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Theme 3: Implementation of the GI projects  
 
12. How many projects have been implemented so far?  
 
13. Which institutions have been involved in the implementation of these projects? 
 
14. How were the description of the product characteristics and quality drafted? 
 
15. How were the technical production requirements for each product drafted?  
 
16. Did you collect opinions from industry, farmers etc. to draft the technical requirements 
and the description of the product characteristics and qualities? 
 
17. What was the role of the DARD in this process? 
 
18. Is it possible to know which consultancy firm worked for which product? 
 
19. How do you select the technical consultancy firm? What is their role?  
 
20. Were the districts and communes associated to the implementation of the projects? 
How?  
 
21. One of the planned activities in the Decision PPC 273/QD-UBND is to develop quality 
standards for the products bearing GIs. Can you tell me more about how these standards 
have been developed?  
 
22. Which institutions have been involved in the development of quality standards? 
 
23. Can you tell me how the process aimed to set up a system for managing the GI was 
conducted?  
 
24. Can you tell me how the process of setting up associations was conducted?  
 
25. Once the brand is registered, how do you follow up with the post-registration phase, 
i.e. respect of production or quality standards etc.?  
 
26. Who is responsible for the quality control procedure? How is the quality process 
organised? 
 
 
Theme 4: Budget 
 
27. What has been your total budget for all GI projects? 
 
28. Where does the funding come from?  
 
29. For the two projects funded by the state, can you explain why these two products were 
funded by the Programme 68?  
 
30. Inversely, why did the Programme 68 not fund more products?  
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31. Do you anticipate an increase in the number of branding projects (hence in the budget)? 
 
32. Do the districts, communes or other institutions/organisations contribute to the funding 
of these projects? 
 
 
Theme 5 – Production and marketing activities 
 
33. In addition to supporting products branding, are you also involved in production 
activities? 
 
34. Do you provide support for developing the production and the marketing of the GI 
products?  
 
35. Have you organised training seminars or training materials on GIs?  
 
36. Do you also support projects of technical equipment and materials?  
 
37. Do you aim at developing the internal and/or international market for these products?  
 
38. What is the role of the Department of Industry and Commerce in this regard? 
 
39. Do you believe that the GI labels will help promote the products and strengthen their 
reputation? 
 
40. According to you, is the price of the GI-labelled products higher than the price of other 
non-branded products? 
 
 
Theme 6 – General issues and conclusion  
 
 
41. How do you evaluate the success of the branding programme so far?  
 
42. Are there some projects less successful than others? How do you explain it?  
 
43. How do you think that the programme will evolve in the future? 
 
44. What are your main challenges today for the success for the branding programme?  
 
45. Is there anything that I haven’t mentioned which you think would be interesting to 
discuss? 
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ANNEX 4 
List of protected sui generis GIs in Vietnam as of 21 August 2018 
(including six foreign GIs) 
 
Registration 
certificate No GI Product 
Date of 
issuance 
00001 Phú Quốc Fish sauce 01.06.2001 
00002 Mộc Châu Tea shan tuyet 06.06.2001 
00003 
(France) Cognac Spirit  
00004 Buôn Ma Thuột Coffee 14.10.2005 
00005 Đoan Hùng Grapefruit 08.02.2006 
00006 Bình Thuận Dragon fruit 15.11.2006 
00007 Lạng Sơn Anise 15.02.2007 
00008 
(Peru) Pisco Spirit  
00009 Thanh Hà Litchi 25.05.2007 
00010 Phan Thiết Fish sauce 30.05.2007 
00011 Hải Hậu Oval rice 31.05.2007 
00012 Vinh Oranges 31.05.2007 
00013 Tân Cương Tea 20.09.2007 
00014 Hồng Dân Rice 26.06.2008 
00015 Lục Ngạn Litchi 26.06.2008 
00016 Hòa Lộc Mango 30.09.2009 
00017 Đại Hoàng Banana 30.09.2009 
00018 Văn Yên Cinnamon 07.01.2010 
00019 Hậu Lộc Shrimp paste 25.06.2010 
00020 Huế Conical hat 19.07.2010 
00021 Bắc Kan Kaki Seedless 08.09.2010 
00022 Phúc Trạch Grapefruit 09.11.2010 
00023 
(Scotland) Scotch Whisky Spirit  
00024 Tiên Lãng Pipe tobacco 19.11.2010 
00025 Bảy Núi Eight oval rice 10.10.2011 
00026 Trùng Khánh Chestnut 21.03.2011 
00027 Bà Đen Mat 10.08.2011 
00028 Nga Sơn Sedge 13.10.2011 
00029 Trà My Cinnamon 13.10.2011 
00030 Ninh Thuận Grapes 07.02.2012 
00031 Tân Triều Grapefruit 14.11.2012 
00032 Bảo Lâm Red Seedless 14.11.2012 
00033 Bắc Kan Tangerines 14.11.2012 
00034 Yên Châu Mango round 30.11.2012 
00035 Mèo Vạc Honey 01.03.2013 
00036 Bình Minh Pomelos 29.08.2013 
00037 Hạ Long Fried squid 12.12.2013 
00038 Bạc Liêu Salt 12.12.2013 
00039 Luận Văn Grapefruit 18.12.2013 
00040 Yên Tử Yellow apricot flowers 18.12.2013 
00041 Quảng Ninh Ngan (shellfish) 19.03.2014 
00042 Điện Biên Rice 25.09.2014 
00043 Vĩnh Kim Fruit milk 28.10.2014 
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00044 Quảng Trị Pepper 28.10.2014 
00045 Cao Phong Oranges 05.11.2014 
00046 
(Thailand) Isan indigeneous silk Silk  
00047 Van Don Peanut worm 12.11.2015 
00048 Long Khánh Rambutan 08.06.2016 
00049 Ngọc Linh Ginseng  
00050 Vĩnh Bảo Tobacco 19.08.2016 
00051 Thường Xuân Cinnamon 10.10.2016 
00052 Hà Giang Orange 10.10.2016 
00053 
(Cambodia) Kampong Speu Sugar Palm 28.12.2016 
00054 
(Cambodia) Kampot Pepper 28.12.2016 
00055 Hưng Yên Longan 23.01.2017 
00056 Quang Ba Kaki (fruit) 05.07.2017 
00057 Xin Man Rice 28.09.2017 
00058 Son La Coffee 28.08.2017 
00059 Ninh Thuan Sheep meat 24.10.2017 
00060 Thẩm Dương Rice 08.12.2017 
00061 Muong Lo Rice 22.01.2018 
00062 Ben Tre Green pomelo 26.01.2018 
00063 Ben Tre Coconut and products 26.01.2018 
00064 Ba Ria - Vung Tau Black pepper 12.02.2018 
00065 Ô Loan Seashell 12.02.2018 
00066 Binh Phuoc Cashew nut  
00067 Ninh Binh Meat mountains goat 04.07.2018 
00068 Cao Bằng Bambou 23.07.2018 
 
 
 
 
 
